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ABSTRACT
INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE ROBUSTNESS OF SUSTAINABLE REAL
ESTATE PREMIUMS AND COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE ECONOMETRICS
SPENSER J. ROBINSON
This dissertation consists of three papers, all using CoStar Group, Inc. Commercial
Real Estate (CRE) data. The first two papers explore Sustainable Real Estate (En-
ergy STAR and LEED building) rental premiums. The third paper develops and tests
a new method for the empirical testing of CRE. Paper number one, Managing Well
by Managing Good, is the first paper to argue against the existence of sustainable
real estate premiums. It demonstrates that some of the Sustainable Real Estate rent
premiums previously shown in the literature are neither theoretically nor empirically
supported. In addition to presenting theoretical arguments against the premiums, the
dissertation shows that, when properly controlling for geography through fixed effects
and accounting for potentially missing variables, Energy Star buildings and Dual En-
ergy Star/LEED buildings show no empirical support for market rental premiums. It
provides evidence that Energy Star certification may be a signal of superior manage-
ment, rather than an independent premium. Through market by market analysis of
green building effects, it shows that possible market premiums are highly localized,
and not national phenomena. The second paper, Size Does Matter, is amongst the
only papers to argue for value weighting real estate portfolio in regressions. It also
demonstrates clear differences in the potential sustainability premiums across differ-
ent size categories of buildings. It provides evidence that the premiums in the extant
literature may have been driven by the smaller subset of buildings, and that larger
buildings demonstrated neither rent nor sales premiums. This paper also proposes
that value weighting real estate portfolio estimations provides important information
as to the economic impact of CRE building attributes in the hedonic regressions.
The third paper, A New Paradigm, defines a new econometric method for assessing
vi
normal and abnormal returns for CRE. The matching method uses appraisal based
grid comparisons coupled with hedonic coefficient adjustments. This method was
systematized and automated using the CoStar database. The matching method per-
mits local comparisons of real estate assets rather than imposing national supply and
demand parameters through hedonic regression. The theoretical development and
empirical testing of these methods represents a new contribution in the commercial
real estate literature.
vii
Table of Contents
Contents
Introduction 1
Essay 1: Managing Well by Managing Good 4
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Sustainable Real Estate Literature Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Theoretical Arguments Regarding Sustainability Premiums . . . . . . . . 11
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Model Description and Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
OLSDV Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Fixed Effect Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Logistic Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
By Market Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Essay 2: Size Does Matter 78
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Research Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Energy Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
LEED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Dual Buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Professional Ownership Related Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
viii
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Essay 3: A New Paradigm: CoStar and the Matching Method 141
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Model and Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Basic Matching Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Matching Model with Hedonic Coefficient Adjustment . . . . . . . . 156
Testing the Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
Conclusion 212
ix
Introduction
This dissertation is comprised of three essays. Each essay uses CoStar data.
The genesis of the idea was an investigation into the existence of Sustainable Real
Estate premiums. The prior literature’s’ findings lacked theoretical foundations when
compared with the author’s personal experience in the commercial real estate (CRE)
industry. This dissertation strives to accomplish three major goals, split into three
distinct papers.
The first paper, Managing Well by Managing Good, outlines the theoretical argu-
ments against sustainability premiums in CRE. The second paper, Size Does Matter,
explores the effect of building size on sustainable real estate premiums in CRE. The
third paper, A New Paradigm, presents a new theoretical model for examining CRE,
and identifying expected returns.
Managing Well by Managing Good first outlines the burgeoning field of sustain-
able real estate in both academia and industry. Sustainable Real Estate typically de-
scribes buildings with an Energy Star (ESTAR), LEED, or both designations (Dual).
The paper provides detailed explanations of these terms.
Several articles provided empirical support for sustainable building sales, leasing
and cap rate premium. Perhaps the most cited is ”Doing Well by Doing Good”
by Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley (2010). Other notable examples include Fuerst and
McAllister (2011); Pivo and Fisher (2010); Wiley, Benefield, and Johnson (2010) all
of whom found support for market premiums.
However, I question both the theoretical basis for Energy Star premiums, and the
method used in the extant literature. Theoretically, Energy Star buildings offer little
basis for rental premiums. Due to prevalent lease structure, potential costs savings
do not get passed to tenant, thus, Energy Star buildings should rent at market levels.
The uniform use of Ordinary Least Squares hedonic regression in the extant liter-
ature presents an econometric concern. Market controls consisted primarily of linear
adjustments in the form of dummy variables, and none tested for, or implemented
controls for potential endogeneity.
This paper demonstrated that using clustered fixed effects to control for geogra-
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phy, rather than Ordinary Least Squares Dummy Variables (OLSDV) provided more
consistent estimators of sustainable real estate effects. In addition it offered theo-
retical arguments that Energy Star certification may indicate management, rather
than market premiums. Consequently, the models used in the extant literature likely
suffered from a missing variable issue. This paper explored the idea that a real estate
portfolio should be examined from both an equal weight and a value weight perspec-
tive, offering evidence that value weighting changes results in real estate portfolio
valuation.
Size Does Matter explores the effect of building size and sale price on sustainable
real estate premiums. Most of the prior literature examined sustainable real estate as
a uniform body; this research showed that premiums, or the lack thereof, vary with
different size categories of buildings. This paper also complements the first in provid-
ing additional evidence of a heterogenous relationship between size and sales/rent.
Both econometric and economic issues exist when evaluating a diverse set of build-
ings. From an econometric perspective, sales per square foot (PSF) varies with size.
In general, larger buildings tend to sell at larger nominal prices, but lower PSF prices
than smaller buildings. The assumption of independence for the independent variables
used in most sales regressions, PSF or sale price, may be erroneous.
Economically, the issue of equal weight versus value weight in a real estate port-
folio has received little academic attention. Although the bulk of the extant finance
literature in stocks, bonds, etc., addresses both equal and value weights. The issues
remains unexplored, at least in sustainable real estate. Value weighting matters at
its most basic level because an investor can not easily purchase one floor of a twenty
story buildings as an equal investment to a smaller building.
The findings set a precedent that future research should consider equal weight and
value weight analyses.
A New Paradigm introduced, developed and tested a new econometric method for
assessing Commercial Real Estate (CRE) normal and abnormal returns. It provides
an objective, repeatable methodology suitable for academic use. After outlining the
theoretical model, results from nearly 20 Million iterations of empirical tests of the
2
model are presented.
The model is based primarily on the grid method used in traditional appraisals,
but also incorporates the best elements of hedonic regression.
The empirical testing of the theoretical model show that the model works remark-
able well in practice. It could potentially provide a new empirical method for testing
commercial real estate.
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ESSAY 1
Managing Well by Managing Good
The true story of sustainable real estate market premiums
Abstract This paper was the first to demonstrate that some of the Sustainable Real
Estate rent premiums previously shown in the literature were neither theoretically or
empirically supported. The first theoretical arguments against Energy Star building
premiums were outlined and presented. When properly controlling for geography
through fixed effects and accounting for potentially missing variables, Energy Star
buildings and Dual Energy Star/LEED buildings showed no empirical support for
market rental premiums; although, some support was found for LEED building rental
premiums. It provided evidence that Energy Star certification may be a signal of
superior management, rather than an independent premium. In addition, this paper
was the first to present a market by market analysis of green building effects, and
showed that possible market premiums were highly localized, and not a national
phenomena.
4
1. Introduction
Academia has recently focused significant attention on the burgeoning field of
Sustainable Real Estate. In addition to several articles in prominent journals, new
journals such as the Journal of Sustainable Real Estate are now wholly dedicated to
the topic. Sustainable Real Estate typically describes buildings with an Energy Star
(ESTAR), LEED, or both designations (Dual).1. Trends in commercial real estate
have driven increased attention of academic researchers; LEED-certified buildings
now account for nearly one-third of new construction in the U.S. (Kok, McGraw, and
Quigley, 2011)
Several articles provided empirical support for sustainable building sales, leasing
and cap rate premium. Perhaps the most cited is ”Doing Well by Doing Good” by
Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley (2010)2. Other notable examples include Fuerst and
McAllister (2011); Pivo and Fisher (2010); Wiley, Benefield, and Johnson (2010) all
of whom found support for market premiums.
However, I question both the theoretical basis for Energy Star premiums, and
the method used in the extant literature. Theoretically, Energy Star buildings offer
little basis for rental premiums. As discussed in more detail later in the paper, no
meaningful supply constraints exist, potential costs savings do not get passed to
tenants, and no demand enhancements appear in the market. Theoretically, Energy
Star buildings should rent at market levels.
Empirically, all of the aforementioned articles used some form of Ordinary Least
Squares hedonic regression. Market controls consisted primarily of linear adjustments
in the form of dummy variables, and none tested for, or implemented controls for
potential endogeneity.
This article demonstrated that using clustered fixed effects to control for geog-
raphy, rather than Ordinary Least Squares Dummy Variables (OLSDV) provided
more consistent estimators of sustainable real estate effects. I also offered theoretical
1See section 5 for detailed descriptions of Energy Star and LEED
2And the paper who’s title I have respectfully adapted to this one.
5
arguments that Energy Star certification may be a signal of effective management,
and provided evidence that the market premium achieved by Energy Star buildings
may be more aptly attributed to the effective management of the property than the
green designation. Consequently, the models used in the extant literature likely suf-
fered from a missing variable issue. This paper explored the idea that a real estate
portfolio should be examined from both an equal weight and a value weight perspec-
tive, offering evidence that value weighting changes results in real estate portfolio
valuation.
Although the evidence presented in this paper suggested that green building mar-
ket premiums may not exist, the author supports the many non-financial benefits of
green buildings. In fact, when considering the many potential benefits associated with
reduced pollution, increased productivity or Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
policy compliance tenants may well prefer green buildings. All else equal–including
rent–tenants may choose green buildings over traditional ones.
This article does argue any premiums should be driven by basic supply and de-
mand metrics. At this point, the data suggests that tenants are not willing to overpay
for green buildings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature.
Section 3 outlines potential gaps in the existing literature. Section 4 details theoretical
arguments regarding sustainable real estate premiums. Section 5 describes the data.
Section 6 details the models and the empirical findings for the rent and sales data.
Section 7 presents results for robustness tests. Section 8 concludes.
2. Literature Review
A significant body of work has been published on modeling rental and leasing
premiums using the CoStar database and also using the NCREIF index.
Eichholtz et al. (2010) used hedonic regression modeling with a standard vector of
controls. They found ESTAR rental premiums of 3.5% to 9%, and sales premiums of
26% on ESTAR; surprisingly, they found no LEED premiums. They used a sample of
199 sales from 2004 to 2007 as identified in the CoStar database for transactions. It
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appeared that they used 2006 rental data, but it is unclear. In addition to a standard
vector of controls, they controlled for local demand with a NNN lease dummy and
employment growth factors. To capture regionality, they included 694 “clusters” of
control buildings in a 0.2 mile radius.
Some concerns with their paper are, as pointed out by Fuerst and McAllister
(2011), the use a 0.2 mile cluster method and 694 dummies may have created improper
pairings, and biased the results. For example, in Cleveland, 0.2 miles might reasonably
select comparable buildings. However, in San Francisco 0.2 miles could transition from
the aﬄuent financial district to distinctly less desirable districts. Thus, the clustering
by distance may not have created effective controls.
Their results included two curious findings. First their results showed that Energy
Star, an easier designation to achieve, held a greater premium than LEED. This
suggested that the many hurdles, consultants, and design requirements of LEED did
not provide economic benefit, which was contrary to the prevailing sentiment in the
real estate community and to the other empirical findings. Second they found that
larger buildings, i.e. more stories, commanded lower rent, which is contrary to prior
literature, e.g. (Shilton and Zaccaria, 1994)
Fuerst and McAllister (2011) used a hedonic regression based on CoStar data with
transaction prices from 1999 to 2009, and rental rates as of Q4 2008. They found
ESTAR and LEED rental premiums of 4% and 5% respectively and sales premiums of
25% and 26% respectively. In addition to the standard vector of controls, they include
submarket, latitude and longitude dummies. They also include dummy variables for
net lease and full service lease. Furthermore, they control for market conditions in
their sales model by using the quarterly return for an MSA from the NAREIT index.
In their rent model they used 853 submarkets as controls. While this should
further refine the hedonic model, it could open their regressions up to the inciden-
tal parameter problem(Baltagi and Kao, 2001), which suggests that a large number
dummy variables could lead to inconsistent estimators.
Wiley et al. (2010) estimated a two-stage hedonic regression, with market dummies
as their instrumental variables, simultaneously estimating rental rates and occupancy
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rates. They found ESTAR and LEED rental premiums of 8% and 17% respectively
and sales premiums of $30 Per Square Foot (PSF) and $129 PSF respectively. The
outer ranges of their findings seemed to indicate strong arbitrage opportunities; basic
financial arbitrage theory would suggest that those premiums would be short-lived
at best. In addition, their sales regression used nominal sales price as the dependent
variable. This introduced heteroscedasticity due to the wide range of prices. Also,
their premium findings were based on the interaction terms of Energy Star*Building
square feet and LEED * Building square feet, but they ignored negative $7.5MM
and $10.5MM coefficients on the stand alone LEED and Energy Star variables, which
could have significantly offset their conclusions of a premium.
Pivo and Fisher (2010) examined what they defined as Responsible Property In-
vesting (RPI) properties. The authors included in their definition of RPI properties
that included Energy Star (not LEED), those close to transit stations, and those in ur-
ban revitalization areas. They used the National Council of Real Estate Investment
Fiduciaries (NCREIF) database from 1999-2008, for a sample of 1,199 properties.
They identified Energy Star with US EPA Energy Star labeling.
They estimated a hedonic regression for their data analysis. Since NCREIF uses
appraised values, which are usually updated annually, the authors accounted for po-
tential lag in appraised value by using a four quarter moving average of returns as
the dependent variable. They found Energy Star properties’ Net Operation Income
(NOI) was 2.7% higher and that Energy Star buildings have 8.5% higher market val-
ues per square foot. Furthermore, they were able to identify a cap rate premium for
Energy Star labeled properties of 0.5%.
Miller, Spivey, and Florance (2008) estimated the effect of sustainability on sales
prices. They found sales premiums of 11% and 6% for ESTAR and LEED respectively.
However, they use a limited data set, confining their study to Class A, five story
or greater, 200,000 square foot plus, multi-tenant office properties built after 1970.
They tested 643 sustainable buildings utilizing a hedonic regression model and found
a 9.94% price premium for LEED buildings and a 5.76% price premium for Energy
Star buildings.
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The findings of specific sales and rental premiums were summarized in Table
1. In summary the literature has consistently found evidence of a rental and sales
premium for LEED and Energy Star buildings. However, the data sets have been
confined to a limited time period, which coincided with significant real estate growth.
Some potential concerns, are the exclusive use of Ordinary Least Squares Dummy
Variable (OLSDV) regression, that the results vary, some of the results were contrary
to previous literature, and some did not seem economically realistic
Table 1: Summary of Existing Property Level Findings
Rental Premium Sales Premium
Author Database Method LEED Energy Star LEED Energy Star
(Fuerst and McAllister, 2011) CoStar Hed. Reg. 5% 4% 25% 26%
(Eichholtz et al., 2010) CoStar Hed. Reg. Not Sig 3.5%/9% Not Sig 19%
(Wiley et al., 2010) CoStar Hed. Reg. 15%-17% 7%-8% $129 PSF $30 PSF
(Pivo and Fisher, 2010) NCREIF Hed. Reg. 2.7% (NOI) 8.5%
(Miller et al., 2008) CoStar Hed. Reg. 6% 11%
3. Sustainable Real Estate Literature Contributions
Several holes existed in the current literature on green real estate. From a research
methods perspective, there are several unique aspects this paper investigated:
1. Examination of, and control for issues of endogeneity,
2. Investigation of fixed effect vs OLS Dummy Variable regressions
3. Investigation of equal weighting vs value weighting,
Issues of Endogeneity
Amongst the significant contributions to the literature this paper makes is the
introduction of Professional Ownership related variables to help control for endo-
geneity. While the existing models attempted to control for the age of buildings, size
and other physical characteristics, they may have failed to fully capture the issue of
why certain buildings command rent premiums.
Specifically in green real estate, does eco-labeling itself create a premium, or do
developers/managers of newer, well located buildings, that would tend to capture
ceterus paribus rent premiums, enhance their offerings with LEED or Energy Star
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certifications? Previous research assumed the independence of the “green dummy”
terms in the regressions. However, the models could suffer from either a missing
variable or endogeneity problem
Prior literature has demonstrated that Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT)
owned properties generate higher effective rents than non-REIT owned properties
(Hardin III, Hill, and Hopper, 2009). The assertion that private professional man-
agers might also outperform non-professional owners reasonably follows from those
findings, although no study that I am aware of prior to this one documents that
phenomenon. The first link to sales or rent and Energy Star could be the manager’s
negotiating ability and/or ability to maintain the property in a more attractive way
than competitors.
In addition, sellers with stronger negotiating power tend to command higher sales
prices (Fisher, Gatzlaff, Geltner, and Haurin, 2003). Managers demonstrating skill in
maintaining energy costs in the upper quartile could represent a group of managers
better and more skilled property management overall. The well documented effect
of “Curb Appeal,” or the appearance of a property’s ability to affect price (Seiler,
Lane, Seiler, and Harrison, 2010), could represent another correlation between price
and effective management.
Energy consumption represents 30 percent of a typical commercial office buildings
operating costs (EPA, 2006); effective management of this expense through attention
to detail and utilization of technology could significantly reduce overall expenses.
Thus, another possible link to sales price could be through increased NOI via lower
costs, which would yield a higher sales price in traditional cap rate based sales.
Also, as discussed in more detail later, a current mismatch of financial motivation
exists in lease structure. If tenants pay higher rent, one would expect they would
benefit in the form of reduced operating expenses. However, 61% of the ESTAR
buildings have Full Service Gross leases, where the tenant pays no operating expenses.
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4. Theoretical Arguments Regarding Sustainability Premiums
The extant literature proposed several theoretical reasons for green building premi-
ums. Arguments such as as improved productivity (Miller, Pogue, Gough, and Davis,
2009), using potentially positive externalities of green buildings to offset industry or
firm negative externalities (Kok et al., 2011), or compliance with CSR policies all
potentially could shift demand upwards. (Simons, Choi, and Simons, 2009) discussed
the effect of legislative initiatives on increasing demand. The majority of their argu-
ments, at their core, argued in some fashion simply that demand for green buildings
exceeded supply. However, upon close examination of all the facts, the logic behind
demand exceeding supply for all green buildings breaks down. In fact, simple demand
and supply theory suggests that Energy Star buildings should not yield a market
premium and that LEED/Dual buildings should.
As an editorial note, this author believes in the indisputable benefits of green
buildings. As one of the worlds’ largest energy consumers, 30% by some estimates,
more ecological construction and management of buildings clearly provides global
benefits. However, the focus of this paper was not whether green buildings provide
any benefits, but rather whether consumers were willing to pay premiums for those
benefits. Consumer preferences, and the conditional valuation of those preference
may not always be in perfect alignment.
Energy Star–and the Energy Star Premium Puzzle
Energy Star (ESTAR) operates as a quartile ranking. Buildings ranking in the
top quartile of energy usage compared to their peers, after controlling for age, size,
climate, etc., earn Energy Star rankings. Several cities, such as New York City have
recently passed legislation requiring Energy Star participation. Local Law 86 requires
all buildings greater than 10,000 SF to participate in the system.3 Any building
owner may participate in the Energy Star program. As a peer evaluation program,
the evaluation metrics are relative to other buildings rather than pre-defined. Almost
by definition, there are few supply constraints.
3http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/ll84of2009 benchmarking.pdf
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Without a strong likelihood of supply curve shifts, let us examine potential de-
mand shifts. Assuming that ESTAR buildings provide decreased operations costs,4
who would benefit from those savings–the owner or the tenant?
Commercial lease types range from Full Service Gross (FSG) to Triple Net (NNN),
with a spectrum of leases between the two extremes. In an FSG lease, the tenant
pays a fixed rent and the building owner incurs all operating costs. In a NNN lease
the tenant pays both a fixed rent, and the tenant incurs all operating costs of the
building. Leases not categorized as specifically FSG or NNN were categorized as
Other; they may include a wide spectrum of lease types that distribute the risks and
costs of buildings expenses between the owner and the tenant. The majority of office
buildings, as shown in Table 2, tend to be FSG; the subject sample has about 41%
pure FSG and 20% pure NNN for Non-Eco buildings. However, the Eco-Building
sample demonstrated a heavy skew of 57% FSG lease types compared to only 17%
NNN lease types. The remaining buildings were lease types somewhere in the middle
of the two extremes.
Table 2: Rental Data by Lease Type
FSG NNN Other
Non-Eco Buildings 41% 20% 39%
Eco-Buildings 57% 17% 36%
ESTAR Certified 61% 14% 25%
LEED Certified 42% 29% 29%
Dual Certified 50% 26% 24%
With a FSG lease, what motivation does a tenant have to pay additional rent
for an Energy Star building? Additional energy savings benefit the building owner,
not the tenant. In competitive equilibrium, I might expect ESTAR buildings to
demonstrate slightly lower rent and capture a higher market share.
I find it hard to envision a commercial broker urging their client to choose an
4The literature on whether cost savings are in fact generated by green buildings is mixed. See
(Ciochetti and McGowan, 2010; Galuppo and Tu, 2010; Miller, Pogue, Saville, and Tu, 2010; New-
sham, Mancini, and Birt, 2009; Scofield, 2009)
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Energy Star building, all else equal, because, “Even though it costs your company
more rent, you’ll be saving the building owner energy costs!”
With no evident supply constraints and no excess demand drivers, no monetary
theoretical basis for ESTAR premiums exists. Yet, the extant literature has demon-
strated ESTAR premiums. I call this the Energy Star premium puzzle.
LEED and Dual
LEED certification has existed for just over a decade, and buildings must pass
rigorous testing and undergo expensive assessments to achieve LEED certification.
Clear supply constraints exist as the market provides a limited and finite supply of
LEED buildings
At the same time, numerous federal and state regulations have required govern-
ment tenants to occupy LEED certified buildings–see Table B in the Appendix for
a partial list. In addition to government enhanced demand, informal conversations
with high level market practitioners indicate that LEED buildings wield a certain
cache to owners and tenants.
Limited supply and enhanced demand should create a market premium. Theoret-
ically, LEED and Dual LEED/Energy Star certified building premiums are justified.
Fixed Effect vs OLS Dummy Variable
All the published articles used some sort of ordinary least squares Dummy Variable
control as their method to control for geography. However, LEED buildings are
neither randomly nor uniformly distributed. Certain states, like California, Texas,
Minnesota, and Washington have significantly higher percentages of their total base
as energy efficient. The use of dummy variables adjusts the intercept of rent or sales
in a linear fashion. Unfortunately, the use so many dummy variable in a regression
may create the ”incidental parameter problem,” causing the coefficients to become
inefficient and unreliable (Baltagi and Kao, 2001). Fixed effect clustering controls for
the many markets or submarkets without the use of market based dummy variables.
Each of the variables are reduced by the mean of their submarket, and weighted within
their cluster. This reduces heterogeneity, effectively controls for submarkets, and
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eliminates the incidental parameter problem. The fixed effect method is commonly
used in the finance literature.
Equal Weight vs Value Weight
All of the current published research on sustainability premiums treats the port-
folio of green real estate effectively as an equal weight portfolio. In other words,
each observation represents an equal weight in the regressions. Both economic and
econometric issues arise from the exclusive use of equal weighting.
In an economic sense, real estate assets are investment assets like any other fi-
nancial investment. An investor attempts to generate returns whether they purchase
stocks, bonds, or real estate assets. The predominant research method in the extant
investment literature for stock and bond portfolios involves examining both an equal
weight and a value weighted portfolio. That equal-weight returns produce different
results than value-weight returns has been well documented in the financial invest-
ment literature (Brown and Warner, 1980; Fama, 1998; Fama and French, 1988). Real
estate assets should be treated no differently.
In real estate, the practice of giving every observation equal weight suggests that
an investor would generate the same effective return by purchasing five $200,000 real
estate assets as they would by purchasing one $1,000,000 real estate asset. This
may or may not be the case. Furthermore, an investor with only $200,000 can not
effectively purchase a portion of the $1,000,000 asset.5
For the sales data, I used the natural log of sales as the weight. Since the rental
data set did not include price, I selected size as the weighting variable for rent.
Although not a perfect proxy for price due to the non-linear relationship between
size and price, it acted as a reasonable proxy for value weighting the portfolio. This
5The author recognizes that the existence of Tenant-in-Common (TIC), and Real Estate Invest-
ment Trusts (REIT) do permit some buyers to purchase limited shares of real estate assets. However,
REITs provide indirect ownership of real estate through equity holdings, while the direct investment
in real estate assets is managed through fiduciary responsibility obligations as individual investments
in the portfolio. Tenant-In-Common Association (TICA) recently changed their name to Real Es-
tate Investment Securities Association (REISA), and there currently exists debate whether TICs are
direct or indirect real estate investment. Furthermore, TIC investments represent a comparatively
small portion of the market.
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more heavily weights the larger, and more costly assets in the regression, in a similar
manner to how they would be weighted in an economic investment portfolio.
Also, from an econometric perspective, the existing literature appeared to overlook
the size of buildings as an issue other than as a control variable. Sustainable buildings
tend to be larger than average size buildings. The subject rent sample contains
all buildings in a market greater than 10,000 Square Feet (SF). The Eco building
population had a mean size of 264,398 SF and standard deviation of 276,175 SF,
compared to a mean of 56,239 SF and standard deviation of 88,819 SF for the non-
green sample. The sales sample showed a similar discrepancy with means of 55,071 SF
and 320,323 SF for the general population and Eco buildings, and standard deviations
of 107,156 SF and 314,712 SF respectively.
Expected Signs
I expected the bulk of the standard control variables’ sign and significance to
align with those of previous authors, and little discussion was required. However,
two distinguishing feature of this research were my expected signs for Energy Star,
and the inclusion of Professional Management Variables. For a detailed explanation
of the professional management variable, please see Section 5. As such, I confined
the discussion to the sustainable real estate and professional management related
variables.
Expected signs are listed in Table 3.
ESTAR: Although prior authors found the ESTAR variable statistically signifi-
cant, I found no economic basis for this conclusion. Energy Star is a quartile ranking,
and almost by definition has no supply side constraint.
As shown in Table 2, 61% of ESTAR office leases were Full Service Gross lease,
where the tenant pays a flat rent and the owner pays the expenses. In this form of
lease, the tenant receives no direct fiscal benefit for any energy savings. Since the
tenant receives no fiscal benefit for the energy savings, what motivation do they have
to pay more?
The only plausible explanation is the Energy Star buildings possess some sort of
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Table 3: Expected Signs of Variables
Rent Sales
Variable Expected Sign Previous Green Expected Sign Previous Green
Research Sign Research Sign
ESTAR Neutral + Neutral +
LEED + + + +
Dual + + + +
Prof Owner + n/a n/a n/a
Prof Seller n/a n/a + n/a
Prof Buyer n/a n/a - n/a
Lnsize - - - -
Age100 - - - -
Age75 - - - -
Age50 - - - -
Age40 - - - -
Age30 - - - -
Age20 - - - -
Age15 - - - -
Age10 - - - -
Age5 - - - -
Renovated + + + +
Percent Leased + + + +
Stories + +/- + +/-
A Class + + + +
B Class + + + +
NNN - - - -
FSG + + + +
Amenity + + + +
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cache in the industry for which tenants are willing to pay.
As a former practitioner, it was not one of the author’s personal experience that
tenants would be willing to pay more for an equivalent space solely for the privilege
of residing in an Energy Star building. As discussed earlier, I find it hard to envision
a commercial broker urging their client to choose an Energy Star building, all else
equal, because, “Even though it costs your company more rent, you’ll be saving the
building owner energy costs!”
My prediction for the sign of Energy Star for rent was neutral.
For sales, a positive premium would be justified. Assuming equal rent, building
owners should earn additional income via documented energy savings. An equal
capitalization rate on slightly higher net operating income would generate higher
sales price.
LEED: LEED designations have only existed since roughly the year 2000. The
bulk of the government ordinances requiring green leases have focused on LEED
buildings.
The combined facts of a smaller inventory from a shorter building cycle, coupled
with government driven demand enhancement should create a premium. Less supply,
more demand.
I predicted a positive sign for LEED for rent and sales.
DUAL: Similarly, DUAL designations contain the LEED designations.
As with LEED, I predicted a positive sign for rent and sales.
PROF Owner: Professional Owners should operate and lease their properties
better than ordinary operators. For a complete discussion and definition of the vari-
able, see the Professional Ownership Variables heading in Section 5.
I predicted a positive sign for professionally owned buildings.
Prof Seller: A Professional Seller should be able to market their property better
than an ordinary seller. In addition, assuming they have captured higher rent, their
capitalized value will be higher.
I predicted a higher sales value, or a positive sign.
Prof Buyer: Theoretically, a Professional Buyer should be a more capable ne-
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gotiator than an ordinary seller. They should be able to purchase at a better than
market rate.
I predicted a lower sales value, or a negative sign.
5. Data
The primary data sources for my analysis came from CoStar.6 CoStar contains
over 2.8 Million US Commercial properties, including sales and leasing information.
Data includes, but is not limited to location, physical buildings characteristics, ten-
ants, and lease details. My rent sample contained data from Q4 2011, and the sales
data covered 2001 to 2011. A detailed list of variables used in this research can be
found in the Appendix, Table Appendix A.
Energy Star for Buildings
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy
jointly manage the Energy Star program. Energy Star is available for 13 types of
commercial buildings, including retail stores, hotels, schools, supermarkets and more.
Nearly 9,000 buildings across the nation have earned the Energy Star for superior en-
ergy efficiency over the past decade and the numbers continue to climb daily. Energy
Star buildings typically use 35 percent less energy and emit 35 percent less carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere than average buildings (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 2009).
Under the program, the energy performance of a building is scored on a 1-100
scale; buildings scored 75 or above are recognized as Energy Star Certified Buildings.
The numbers directly relate to percentage ratings. For example, a building that has
a score of 80 means the building is in the top 20% of facilities in the country for
energy performance. The score is calculated by estimating how much energy the
building would use if it were the best- or worst-performing building of its type (along
with levels in between) in terms of its size, location, and number of occupants. The
6Source: CoStar Group, Inc.
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rating system then compares the actual energy data input to the internal database
to determine where the building ranks relative to other similar buildings (Ciochetti
and McGowan, 2010).
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED)
The U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) operates the Leadership in Energy
and Environmental Design (LEED) Green Building Rating System as an independent
third party. They are a non-profit organization with a stated mission, “To transform
the way buildings and communities are designed, built and operated, enabling an
environmentally and socially responsible, healthy, and prosperous environment that
improves the quality of life.”
LEED promotes a whole-building approach to sustainability by examining five
categories of building performance:
1. sustainable site development,
2. water efficiency,
3. energy efficiency,
4. materials selection,
5. and indoor environmental quality (U.S. Green Building Council, 2009).
Building owners earn points in each of the five categories, with allocation of points
between credits based on the potential environmental impacts and human benefits of
each credit with respect to a set of impact categories. In addition, properties can earn
credit for regionally specific innovations that may relate to climate, transportation,
or other related issues. Depending on the number of total points earned, buildings
can achieve LEED levels of certified, silver, gold or platinum.
The certified level indicates conformance with minimum requirements for LEED
certification, and the platinum certification level indicates outstanding levels in vir-
tually all categories.
Descriptive Statistics
The rent data was cleaned to include only data with a size and rent fields existing,
and the sales data cleaned to only include data with sale price and size fields in place.
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The data consists of 48,733 rent observations across the top 50 Metropolitan Statisti-
cal Areas (MSA) (56 defined markets) in the United States; all rent observations are
from Q4 2011. The sales data covers from 2001 to 2011, also in the top 50 MSA’s (56
defined markets) in the United States. The sales data has 26,261 observations.
Table 4 summarizes size and rent statistics for the rental data by eco-building
type. Clear differences in the mean size and mean rent were observed between non-
Eco and Eco-labeled buildings. Table 5 summarizes the sales data by green building
type. As with rent, clear differences appeared in both Per Square Foot (PSF) sales
price and size between non-Eco and Eco buildings.
Table 6 shows a detailed market by market breakdown by size and by rent for
green building type. Again, clear differences were observed not only between green
and non-green buildings, but also between markets. For example the mean rent in
New York City was $50.63 for non-green buildings compared to median rent of $16.47.
Table 7 shows market by market size and sales PSF for green building type. Again,
clear differences across market and building type were evidenced. New York City’s
mean PSF sales was $419 versus a median of $70.
Additionally, concentrations of green buildings were observed in western urban
cities, and in Washington DC specifically.
Several extremely small minimum PSF prices observed in the data were verified
as reasonable. There are approximately 20 sales under $1.00 PSF. All but one occur
during the financial crisis period, and several are noted as auction or distress sales,
which is controlled for in several of the regression specifications. In addition, the use
of winsorized data, where the top and bottom percentiles are replaced by the 99th
and 1st, did not significantly alter the findings herein.
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Table 4: The following table provides descriptive statistics for the rental data set.
The rental data set was from Q4 2011, and including the all office buildings over
10,000 SF from the top 50 MSA by population. Source for this, and all rental tables:
CoStar Group, Inc.
Size Rent
n mean std max min mean std max min
No Eco-Label 45,354 56,239 88,819 3,781,045 10,000 18.62 10.23 600 0.95
All Eco 3,379 264,398 276,175 4,000,000 10,000 25.48 12.73 253.55 5.46
ESTAR Certified 2,473 228,464 233,246 2,650,000 10,000 24.561 11.0093 250 5.46
LEED Certified 278 223,761 331,746 4,000,000 10,524 28.545 16.7803 253.55 6.48
Dual Certified 628 423,892 341,333 1,721,242 33,851 27.719 16.0813 250 8.5
Table 5: The following table provides descriptive statistics for the sales data set. The
sales data set was from 2001 through 2011, and included all office buildings sales over
10,000 SF from the top 50 MSA by population. Source for this, and all sales tables:
CoStar Group, Inc
The small minimum PSF prices were verified. There are approximately 20 sales under $1.00 PSF.
All but one occur during the financial crisis period, and several are noted as auction or distress sales.
PSF Size
eco n mean std max min mean std max min
No Eco-Label 45,354 56,239 88,819 3,781,045 10,000 18.62 10.23 600 0.95
All Eco 3,379 264,398 276,175 4,000,000 10,000 25.48 12.73 253.55 5.46
ESTAR Certified 2,473 228,464 233,246 2,650,000 10,000 24.56 11.0093 250 5.46
LEED Certified 278 223,761 331,746 4,000,000 10,524 28.55 16.7803 253.55 6.48
Dual Certified 628 423,892 341,333 1,721,242 33,851 27.72 16.0813 250 8.50
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Table 6: The following table provides descriptive statistics for the rental data set, segmented by market. The rental data set
was from Q4 2011, and including the all office buildings over 10,000 SF from the top 50 MSA by population (56 markets).
No Eco Certification ESTAR labeled only LEED certified Only Dual Certified
Market Name n Mean Size Mean Rent n Mean Size Mean Rent n Mean Size Mean Rent n Mean Size Mean Rent
Atlanta 1,581 56,211 15.40 112 249,478 20.76 7 463,860 25.12 42 405,839 21.66
Austin 511 51,587 17.31 31 144,174 18.56 6 102,072 16.33 12 255,291 22.44
Baltimore 770 49,515 18.50 3 319,000 22.55 10 117,145 25.58 2 87,816 21.75
Birmingham 300 51,733 15.66 4 184,953 21.86
Boston 1,343 48,994 18.00 29 207,404 23.93 6 427,420 43.58 8 423,486 37.70
Buffalo/Niagara Falls 184 49,206 14.40 3 442,670 22.33 1 34,113 8.63
Charlotte 587 52,513 16.89 48 196,904 21.11 9 423,438 26.42 7 446,904 26.90
Chicago 2,392 64,344 16.77 145 351,964 18.92 6 968,801 25.72 63 703,520 21.95
Cincinnati/Dayton 619 51,668 12.53 15 297,185 13.68 6 178,578 18.39 2 395,608 13.29
Cleveland 634 57,304 14.25 12 412,804 18.97 4 407,114 17.09 2 914,787 21.75
Columbus 679 46,375 12.62 8 364,677 18.13 2 243,256 14.00
Dallas/Ft Worth 1,676 76,008 15.97 126 281,295 19.56 13 313,526 24.81 31 412,575 25.09
Denver 1,002 49,630 15.90 105 168,614 19.84 13 169,646 21.78 57 329,782 21.47
Detroit 1,267 55,908 15.12 32 284,722 19.85 1 170,363 20.40
East Bay/Oakland 609 42,208 20.63 47 195,597 26.55 5 133,195 27.37 15 254,381 26.19
Hampton Roads 413 40,887 16.04 14 138,841 19.95 2 186,616 24.25 1 75,000 17.70
Hartford 372 58,023 16.45 11 283,433 22.86 1 33,700 18.95
Houston 1,148 72,954 16.99 122 280,988 19.68 8 280,822 21.88 45 661,655 22.12
Indianapolis 599 50,578 15.35 18 265,489 17.74 1 26,892 20.00 2 105,854 22.50
Inland Empire (California) 773 29,619 16.47 25 78,067 20.20 3 126,295 23.80
Jacksonville (Florida) 387 47,814 15.47 8 280,154 19.03 2 384,173 18.39
Kansas City 784 55,551 16.19 14 229,601 18.73 3 65,470 23.33 3 158,601 20.67
Las Vegas 679 37,435 16.85 5 111,642 28.15 5 104,158 26.56
Long Island (New York) 859 64,223 24.57 7 478,241 30.35 1 113,284 21.00
Los Angeles 2,144 56,665 25.00 238 207,236 29.26 11 178,672 35.54 54 468,174 32.88
Louisville 318 52,823 13.40 12 179,936 17.66 1 19,500 17.00
Marin/Sonoma 121 40,736 26.28 7 83,317 36.66
Memphis 273 59,093 14.89 3 102,388 20.24 1 147,982 27.50
Milwaukee/Madison 539 49,892 14.05 23 161,309 15.56 3 97,525 15.63 4 80,384 15.00
Minneapolis/St Paul 910 57,416 13.33 73 278,904 13.88 3 128,305 16.67 23 519,180 15.10
Nashville 419 54,187 16.65 19 210,894 21.30 5 247,321 26.05 5 139,339 22.81
New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner 233 66,821 15.59 9 629,176 18.32
New York City 718 181,808 50.63 46 624,767 55.31 3 1,027,991 120.68 10 764,424 103.22
Northern New Jersey 1,690 52,884 19.53 30 216,758 25.10 2 111,064 22.79 1 421,317 30.00
Oklahoma City 268 62,886 14.08 1 195,702 14.00
Orange (California) 1,247 38,095 20.24 143 147,127 24.14 5 34,542 24.36 20 211,061 23.08
Orlando 573 42,344 16.03 21 180,843 20.96 3 136,066 20.72 1 640,741 20.00
Philadelphia 1,595 63,191 18.15 54 289,533 22.85 6 131,395 27.49 6 697,347 27.31
Phoenix 1,375 47,226 17.30 74 143,613 21.71 8 163,398 22.54 14 316,046 24.90
Pittsburgh 557 72,024 15.79 8 92,981 21.33 2 128,000 19.75
Portland 643 45,853 17.92 49 163,062 22.53 16 137,335 23.47 6 383,766 22.83
Providence 255 45,996 16.33 1 150,000 22.39 1 330,449 23.00
Raleigh/Durham 496 39,750 16.97 21 157,571 20.52 2 207,454 27.77
Richmond VA 339 55,804 15.74 16 141,177 18.64
Sacramento 788 39,020 18.29 67 96,486 23.32 4 42,883 29.48 17 212,447 25.37
Salt Lake City 411 51,854 15.61 10 150,086 21.56 1 426,657 31.00 1 255,255 26.14
San Antonio 413 50,698 16.67 28 178,431 22.33 1 200,000 20.24 2 296,138 23.75
San Diego 903 40,182 21.34 65 161,267 27.14 4 63,833 30.52 11 309,886 30.82
San Francisco 435 59,523 30.20 60 272,331 34.68 3 90,778 35.80 40 425,738 38.87
Seattle/Puget Sound 1,088 45,912 18.88 47 214,859 22.59 19 189,807 26.80 33 437,174 24.79
South Bay/San Jose 568 44,883 23.73 34 127,347 29.93 6 261,557 33.30 9 130,541 30.65
South Florida 1,815 50,340 19.12 99 156,992 20.47 10 227,138 27.54 21 297,250 28.87
St. Louis 865 53,983 16.22 11 461,004 22.01 4 124,750 22.00 1 123,055 24.00
Tampa/St Petersburg 730 42,252 15.45 32 236,518 23.58 2 223,500 27.00 5 408,778 25.69
Washington DC 2,149 74,422 25.46 219 236,453 38.87 43 198,709 38.22 44 303,627 41.67
Westchester/So Connecticut 308 65,730 23.99 9 284,644 29.82 1 288,322 35.00 1 384,000 36.66
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Table 7: The following table provides descriptive statistics for the sales data set, segmented by market. The sales data set was
from 2001 through 2011, and included all office buildings sales over 10,000 SF from the top 50 MSA by population (56 markets).
Non-Eco Buildings Energy Star Certified LEED Certified Dual Certified
Market n Mean Size Mean Sales PSF n Mean Size Mean Sales PSF n Mean Size Mean Sales PSF n Mean Size Mean Sales PSF
Atlanta 910 56,547 113.34 33 313,007 183.33 1 30,000 55.42 18 549,021 196.98
Austin 208 43,849 88.64 8 188,971 247.35 2 155,929 301.03 3 404,208 271.00
Baltimore 436 46,341 99.43 5 342,470 204.42 3 104,531 179.59 1 81,728 1.85
Birmingham 73 53,602 89.93 1 205,000 18.29 1 587,528 289.35 - - .
Boston 973 60,235 138.55 30 237,297 233.50 13 330,586 266.80 5 797,065 373.27
Buffalo/Niagara Falls 59 61,496 39.25 1 1,200,000 70.85 1 430,458 196.30 - - .
Charlotte 180 56,925 115.11 9 281,556 186.34 2 189,340 162.93 1 866,810 177.55
Chicago 1,600 66,465 104.50 64 449,848 167.90 4 200,730 210.14 37 736,531 211.22
Cincinnati/Dayton 321 42,088 73.50 6 369,118 104.89 7 42,314 77.30 1 26,400 64.39
Cleveland 323 57,803 64.69 4 921,550 89.16 3 201,475 42.38 1 506,656 19.24
Columbus 411 47,348 80.31 2 461,829 89.11 - - . 1 161,598 114.79
Dallas/Ft Worth 661 84,318 94.19 42 255,006 122.82 6 214,862 132.39 8 441,496 147.39
Denver 715 46,098 106.02 52 215,001 163.95 8 94,552 181.47 26 326,226 199.92
Detroit 580 56,730 87.36 3 198,400 144.76 1 215,000 193.62 2 113,165 226.39
East Bay/Oakland 411 30,848 166.50 12 218,850 181.15 3 109,863 265.41 5 196,755 212.56
Hampton Roads 89 43,388 106.12 4 237,137 158.16 - - . - - .
Hartford 94 63,928 78.17 2 545,617 71.35 - - . - - .
Houston 509 76,885 90.42 43 334,001 124.45 - - . 21 557,453 192.29
Indianapolis 104 49,378 88.01 5 276,241 126.47 - - . - - .
Inland Empire (California) 459 25,730 132.72 1 427,883 152.38 - - . - - .
Jacksonville (Florida) 207 43,064 88.65 5 382,109 104.00 1 150,000 86.32 - - .
Kansas City 267 51,645 81.07 5 229,253 151.07 - - . 1 187,000 208.56
Las Vegas 402 30,423 192.22 - - . - - . 1 11,785 70.00
Long Island (New York) 429 49,107 177.08 4 761,922 261.72 - - . - - .
Los Angeles 1,602 44,316 167.93 79 276,955 239.99 9 177,984 291.68 19 499,333 260.14
Louisville 87 58,870 64.99 1 686,292 187.24 - - . - - .
Marin/Sonoma 60 28,383 227.75 1 39,627 441.62 - - . - - .
Memphis 75 48,388 79.58 - - . - - . - - .
Milwaukee/Madison 204 45,330 96.32 9 180,233 127.86 1 29,297 231.25 - - .
Minneapolis/St Paul 367 54,144 93.76 22 375,150 138.93 5 96,978 186.03 7 681,543 147.49
Nashville 127 53,280 98.19 1 538,788 129.92 2 124,869 121.07 1 498,961 139.79
New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner 51 87,488 64.63 2 1,016,606 85.76 - - . - - .
New York City 790 193,153 435.19 43 743,214 407.88 6 1,066,066 459.62 12 1,109,145 439.46
Northern New Jersey 1,200 55,946 117.47 31 227,958 177.39 3 295,709 209.79 7 633,694 201.47
Oklahoma City 116 61,305 76.33 - - . 1 147,350 199.19 - - .
Orange (California) 658 36,074 168.84 27 174,869 262.15 1 40,058 195.03 9 241,637 270.31
Orlando 341 42,968 133.90 15 180,749 144.74 3 115,781 157.79 3 152,361 194.96
Philadelphia 1,037 58,883 102.27 22 418,042 151.45 3 526,961 226.73 4 600,254 113.97
Phoenix 983 41,295 145.59 34 200,471 206.45 2 80,505 173.76 7 359,301 329.37
Pittsburgh 215 58,564 64.69 2 868,913 136.90 1 30,000 83.33 - - .
Portland 382 36,479 128.23 12 248,275 204.74 9 83,530 140.94 3 418,955 163.42
Providence 75 55,588 84.60 - - . 1 29,256 136.38 - - .
Raleigh/Durham 136 34,521 109.75 3 369,352 197.48 1 31,725 56.74 - - .
Richmond VA 97 59,970 104.15 2 100,660 97.55 - - . - - .
Sacramento 478 33,198 151.01 24 114,641 190.58 2 112,429 112.14 6 253,023 227.64
Salt Lake City 66 33,667 115.67 2 253,648 134.83 - - . - - .
San Antonio 65 38,493 118.34 6 249,579 112.15 1 145,025 226.51 - - .
San Diego 552 36,809 188.44 30 180,247 279.52 5 88,030 256.14 6 348,941 317.27
San Francisco 339 52,957 243.25 40 240,178 314.19 4 107,644 258.73 17 402,280 406.86
Seattle/Puget Sound 699 38,253 170.70 14 233,306 295.35 11 238,723 296.33 8 299,600 307.89
South Bay/San Jose 280 33,824 248.15 7 168,995 351.75 4 47,999 593.82 1 142,651 219.42
South Florida 1,386 44,261 135.05 37 185,598 179.89 6 78,725 177.60 14 443,754 221.31
St. Louis 236 70,111 89.88 7 324,905 126.54 2 117,450 193.00 - - .
Tampa/St Petersburg 547 41,647 108.99 9 297,695 149.56 1 247,000 101.22 2 644,008 197.02
Washington DC 1,087 74,578 204.73 108 235,135 370.47 17 215,571 457.33 37 298,476 371.37
Westchester/So Connecticut 116 64,190 133.34 2 327,264 185.80 1 288,322 104.05 - - .
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Professional Ownership Variables
To address potential issues of a missing variable problem, I created professional
ownership dummy variable. This helped assess whether the developers and managers
who own and operate these buildings exhibited superior site selection, construction or
management, or if the presence of green certification in and of itself created a market
premium.
Prof Owner: The Prof Owner, professional ownership variable, used in the rent
regressions was a binary dummy variable equal to 1 when an ownership group, as listed
by their address in CoStar,7 owned 6 or more physical properties totaling greater than
500,000 SF. Thus a group that owned 10 small buildings would not qualify via the
SF hurdle. Furthermore, a group that owned one or two large buildings would not
qualify via the number of properties hurdle.
These measures were intended to capture ownership groups whose total holdings
qualify them as professional owners. The number and scale of commercial property
holdings would require, at a minimum, several full time staff members to effectively
operate and manage. The dummy variable was set to zero otherwise. While some
of the non-Prof Owners may in fact be better owner operators than some of the
Prof Owners, the dummy variable’s purpose was test for statistical significance of
professional ownership at a macro level.
8,327 observations, owned by a total of 435 ownership groups qualified as pro-
fessionally owned. Professionally owned buildings represented 17% of the building
population.
However, professional owned buildings represented a considerably larger portion
of green buildings. As shown in Table 8, 69% of Energy Star population, 36% of
the LEED population, and 74% of the Dual population were professionally owned.
Roughly 2/3 of the green population was professional owned, while only 13% of the
non-eco population was.
Prof Seller: A Professional Seller variable was set to one when the seller of a
75,884 observations had no address field, and were set to zero
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Table 8: This table shows nominal and percentage breakdowns by green building type
for professionally and non-professionally owned buildings from the rental data set.
Percentages indicate the percent of building type in terms of professional ownership,
i.e Prof Owned ESTAR buildings/ Total ESTAR buildings.
No Prof %No Prof Prof Owner % Prof Owner Total % Total
ESTAR 758 30.7% 1,715 69.3% 2,473 5.1%
LEED 179 64.4% 99 35.6% 278 0.6%
Dual 163 26.0% 465 74.0% 628 1.3%
Green 1,100 32.6% 2,279 67.4% 3,379 6.9%
Non-Eco 39,309 86.7% 6,045 13.3% 45,354 93.1%
Population 40,409 82.9% 8,324 17.1% 48,733 100.0%
property correlated to the rent database as a Professional Owner. It was set to zero
otherwise. One potential hazard with this method is that ownership groups who
qualified as professional owners in Q4 2011, may or may not have qualified at the
time of sale. The rent database covers only Q4 2011, while the sales data covers ten
years. Additionally, some building owners who may have qualified as professional at
the time of sale, might no longer be so in Q4 2011. However, I believe the noise
around the estimate should be minimal.
Prof Buyer: A Professional Buyer variable was set to one when the seller of a
property correlated to the rent database as a Professional Owner. It was set to zero
otherwise. As with Professional Sellers, there may be some omitted or erroneously
added observations due to time lag.
Prof Buyer: A Professional Buyer variable was set to one when both the buyer
and seller were categorized as professional
As shown in Table 9, 97% of the traditional, or non-sustainable building sales did
not involved a professional buyer or seller. However, 29% of the total green building
sales did involve a professional buyer or seller.
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Table 9: This table shows nominal and percentage breakdowns by green building
type for professionally and non-professionally bought/sold buildings from the sales
data set. Percentages indicate the percent of building type in terms of professional
ownership, i.e Prof Sold ESTAR buildings/ Total ESTAR buildings
No %No Prof %Prof Prof %Prof Prof %Prof
Prof Prof Seller Seller Buyer Buyer Both Both Totals %Total
ESTAR 663 71.1% 32 3.4% 212 22.7% 26 2.8% 933 3.6%
LEED 123 77.8% 13 8.2% 17 10.8% 5 3.2% 158 0.6%
Dual 203 68.8% 13 4.4% 75 25.4% 4 1.4% 295 1.1%
Green 989 71.4% 58 4.2% 304 21.9% 35 2.5% 1,386 5.3%
Non-Eco 24,070 96.8% 228 0.9% 545 2.2% 32 0.1% 24,875 94.7%
Population 25,059 95.4% 286 1.1% 849 3.2% 67 0.3% 26,261 100.0%
6. Model Description and Empirical Results
The OLSDV rent and sales models were of a standard one stage semi-log hedonic
regression form (Rosen, 1974):
ln(Rjt) = αj + βjXi + φjZi + εj (1)
PSFjt = αj + βjXi + φjZi + εj (2)
where:
ln (Rjt) = natural log of average rent per square foot in a given building j
(PSFjt) = sales price per square foot in a given building j
Xi = a vector of the property specific explanatory variables
βi = the regression-derived coefficient for property characteristic i
Zi =a vector of time and non-property variables
φi = the regression-derived coefficient for time and non-property vari-
able i
εj = random error term
j, t = property and time variables respectively
A detailed list of the variables used, along with their corresponding fields in the
CoStar database can be found in the Appendix, Table A.
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6.1. OLSDV Regression
Rent
Table 10 shows the rent results, from standard OLSDV regressions. Eight different
regression configurations are shown. Models 1-4 include 1,284 submarket dummies;
Models 2 and 4 add the professional ownership controls, and Models 3 and 4 are
weighted by size. Models 5-6 include 55 market dummies, while Models 7-8 have no
market controls; each set is shown without and with professional ownership controls
respectively.
The findings from the OLSDV regressions without management controls were rea-
sonably similar to the extant literature Eichholtz et al. (2010); Fuerst and McAllister
(2011). The unweighted regressions in Models 1 and 5 found 1.7% and 2.8% market
premiums for Energy Star at a 1% significance level. LEED buildings commanded
9.9% to 14.3% premiums, and Dual buildings generated 3.5% to 6.4% rent premiums,
all at 1% significance.
However, the addition of the Prof Owner variable changed the scale of the ESTAR
variables. Prof Mgmt was highly significant in all specifications. This indicated a clear
connection between professional ownership and rent. The data suggested that ceterus
paribus, a professional owner extracted from a 1.3% to a 2.1% market rent premium
from their tenants.
Furthermore, the coefficients on Energy Star dropped approximately 20%, from
0.028 to 0.021, indicating a clear relationship between management and ESTAR.
Interestingly, LEED and Dual building coefficients were largely unchanged. However,
in the OLSDV regressions, even with the Prof Owner variable, all green building rent
premiums continued to be significant at the 1% level.
The model appeared to be generally well behaved in that all control coefficients
were of the proper sign and reasonable scale. Weighting the regressions, using size
in the rent data, shown in Models 3 and 4, had very little effect in the OLSDV
regressions.
Finally, I noted that the R-squared for Model 8, with the Prof Owner variable but
no market controls was 0.2359. Thus, the higher R-squared in the other models could
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be largely attributed to the submarket or market dummies. I specifically mention
this as the careful reader will observe that the R-squared of my fixed effects models
in the next section were identical to the no market dummies model. This supported
the argument that the fixed effect models have equivalent explanatory power to the
OLSDV regressions, sans the submarket dummies.
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Table 10: This table presented a series of regressions on lnrent. Models 1 and 2
included 1,284 submarket dummy variables. Models 3 and 4 also had 1,284 submarket
dummy variables, and were both weighted by lnsize. Models 5 and 6 included 55
market dummies. Models 7 and 8 included no market or submarket controls. Models
2, 4, 6, and 8 all included the Prof Owner variable. Results were the regression
coefficient(T-Value). ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8
ESTAR 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(2.945) (2.124) (3.074) (2.227) (4.320) (3.133) (4.783) (2.466)
LEED 0.099∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(6.262) (6.222) (6.478) (6.432) (8.098) (8.029) (7.914) (7.735)
Dual 0.035∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.013
(3.081) (2.649) (3.665) (3.200) (5.146) (4.510) (2.072) (0.842)
Prof Owner 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(3.727) (3.831) (5.367) (10.768)
Intercept 2.781∗∗∗ 2.852∗∗∗ 2.784∗∗∗ 2.855∗∗∗ 2.704∗∗∗ 2.734∗∗∗ 2.336∗∗∗ 2.388∗∗∗
(65.746) (65.425) (67.719) (67.409) (102.729) (102.332) (94.401) (94.794)
lnsize 0.030∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(15.085) (14.278) (15.604) (14.784) (11.589) (10.414) (10.112) (7.933)
age100 −0.166∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.015 −0.016
(−20.228) (−20.284) (−20.821) (−20.880) (−11.272) (−11.287) (−1.582) (−1.612)
age75 −0.176∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(−23.648) (−23.720) (−24.319) (−24.394) (−16.863) (−16.890) (3.767) (3.721)
age50 −0.194∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗
(−26.866) (−26.958) (−27.039) (−27.132) (−16.832) (−16.905) (−4.343) (−4.464)
age40 −0.177∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗
(−28.355) (−28.465) (−28.935) (−29.053) (−19.338) (−19.483) (−7.186) (−7.482)
age30 −0.174∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗
(−34.016) (−34.138) (−34.474) (−34.604) (−29.034) (−29.266) (−18.244) (−18.754)
age20 −0.153∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
(−33.379) (−33.550) (−33.841) (−34.019) (−30.877) (−31.210) (−18.482) (−19.318)
age15 −0.087∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗
(−11.220) (−11.354) (−11.624) (−11.761) (−10.162) (−10.374) (−8.250) (−8.694)
age10 −0.084∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗
(−14.763) (−14.910) (−15.291) (−15.445) (−13.446) (−13.743) (−14.467) (−15.127)
age5 −0.027∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(−5.075) (−5.041) (−5.583) (−5.549) (−4.587) (−4.642) (−4.788) (−5.055)
Renovated 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(8.185) (8.212) (8.057) (8.083) (8.361) (8.434) (3.155) (3.340)
Percent Leased 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(20.283) (20.342) (20.191) (20.254) (26.142) (26.234) (31.770) (31.993)
stories 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(5.168) (5.231) (5.223) (5.288) (12.992) (13.303) (21.981) (22.611)
A Class 0.233∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(43.289) (42.894) (44.363) (43.965) (47.372) (46.718) (45.055) (43.888)
B Class 0.113∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(35.404) (35.358) (35.335) (35.291) (38.289) (38.139) (35.710) (35.367)
NNN −0.102∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗
(−28.945) (−28.935) (−29.698) (−29.688) (−30.210) (−30.231) (−33.250) (−33.363)
FSG 0.105∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(35.067) (35.139) (35.366) (35.445) (31.101) (31.116) (16.877) (16.682)
Amenity 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.006∗
(2.045) (1.950) (2.111) (2.013) (4.712) (4.576) (1.876) (1.675)
R-Square 0.6089 0.6093 0.6202 0.6206 0.4795 0.4800 0.2341 0.2359
Model N 48, 630 48, 630 48, 630 48, 630 48, 630 48, 630
Submarket Dummies x x x x
Weighted x x
Market Dummies x x
No Market Controls x x
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Sales
Sales results are shown in Table 11. Eight Models are shown. Model 1 begins with
basic market dummies, Model 2 adds professional ownership controls, and Model 3
adds sale condition controls. Models 4-6 repeat the cycle, but weighted by Sale Price.
Models 7 and 8 are shown for reference with submarket dummies and with no market
controls.
For the sales models without ownership controls, the findings again mirrored the
extant work with reasonable similarity Eichholtz et al. (2010); Fuerst and McAllister
(2011). The unweighted regressions in Models 1 and 5 found $40 and $33 PSF market
premiums for Energy Star at a 1% significance level. LEED buildings commanded
$80 and $75 PSF premiums, and Dual buildings generated $71 and $65 PSF rent
premiums, all at 1% significance. Using the mean PSF prices for ESTAR, LEED,
and Dual of $257 PSF, $247 PSF and $223, the premiums were 12%, 30% and 29%
respectively.
The Prof Buyer/Seller/Both variables were all highly significant in every specifi-
cations. This indicated a clear connection between professional ownership and sales.
The Prof Seller variable aligned with my expectations with a $52 to $55 PSF premium
range in the regressions. Surprisingly, the Prof Buyer variable indicates that Profes-
sional Buyers purchased their buildings at over market prices, and when both sides
of the transaction included real estate professionals, the market premium jumped up
even higher.8 One would think the gains through professional purchases and seller
should offset, but that is not the case.
The most plausible explanation for this finding is that professional owners tended
to purchase premium or trophy buildings. The logistic regressions, discussed in section
6.3 support this theory in that Professionals are much more likely to purchase larger,
A-Class buildings with amenities.
Comparing Model 1 with 4, and Model 2 with 5, the unweighted and weighted re-
8Similar findings in a related by paper on green building sales have been found by
Fuerst, Gabrielli, and McCallister. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2114528 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2114528
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gressions respectively, showed minimal effect. However, when I included a full suite of
sale condition controls, weighting did effect the size of the green coefficients, although
not their significance levels. I saw ESTAR and Dual premiums in particular drop by
more than half. Thus with a full suite of condition controls, value weighting appears
to impact at the least the scale of the market premiums, if not their significance.
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Table 11: This table presented a series of OLSDV regressions on sales PSF. Models 1 through 6 included 55 market dummies.
Models 4-6 were weighted by lnsales. Models 7 included submarket dummies and Model 8 included no market or submarket
controls for reference. Models 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8 all included the Professional buyer and seller related variables. Models 3 and
6 included a full suite of sale condition controls as well. Results were the regression coefficient(T-Value).***,**,* represent statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8
ESTAR 39.926∗∗∗ 33.964∗∗∗ 34.924∗∗∗ 39.010∗∗∗ 33.440∗∗∗ 19.369∗∗∗ 28.665∗∗∗ 24.297∗∗∗
(9.946) (8.412) (8.690) (10.379) (8.848) (7.683) (7.713) (5.215)
LEED 80.075∗∗∗ 74.354∗∗∗ 75.268∗∗∗ 81.113∗∗∗ 75.089∗∗∗ 63.134∗∗∗ 56.018∗∗∗ 80.338∗∗∗
(9.059) (8.427) (8.577) (9.571) (8.877) (10.102) (6.926) (7.870)
Dual 70.561∗∗∗ 66.009∗∗∗ 65.637∗∗∗ 69.089∗∗∗ 64.773∗∗∗ 33.595∗∗∗ 55.850∗∗∗ 34.812∗∗∗
(10.306) (9.649) (9.641) (11.008) (10.329) (9.879) (8.875) (4.420)
Prof Buyer 37.976∗∗∗ 38.725∗∗∗ 35.246∗∗∗ 20.849∗∗∗ 25.730∗∗∗ 43.612∗∗∗
(9.423) (9.653) (9.240) (7.770) (6.941) (9.372)
Prof Seller 52.143∗∗∗ 50.590∗∗∗ 53.369∗∗∗ 55.467∗∗∗ 37.456∗∗∗ 66.419∗∗∗
(7.973) (7.776) (8.526) (11.709) (6.225) (8.790)
Prof Both 86.307∗∗∗ 89.081∗∗∗ 87.586∗∗∗ 126.110∗∗∗ 47.835∗∗∗ 85.224∗∗∗
(6.475) (6.722) (7.056) (16.585) (3.931) (5.530)
Intercept 262.294∗∗∗ 278.184∗∗∗ 276.888∗∗∗ 259.017∗∗∗ 274.724∗∗∗ 180.621∗∗∗ 204.440∗∗∗ 325.852∗∗∗
(17.804) (18.874) (18.806) (17.636) (18.703) (10.620) (11.048) (26.751)
lnsize −18.410∗∗∗ −19.770∗∗∗ −19.539∗∗∗ −17.204∗∗∗ −18.534∗∗∗ −0.604 −28.860∗∗∗ −5.775∗∗∗
(−14.803) (−15.887) (−15.679) (−14.073) (−15.155) (−0.495) (−23.198) (−4.085)
age100 5.238 5.576 4.689 3.056 3.460 −48.307∗∗∗ −9.445∗∗ 31.361∗∗∗
(1.181) (1.261) (1.060) (0.680) (0.772) (−8.280) (−2.219) (6.310)
age75 −15.130∗∗∗ −14.648∗∗∗ −15.282∗∗∗ −17.708∗∗∗ −17.179∗∗∗ −77.179∗∗∗ −20.620∗∗∗ 20.542∗∗∗
(−3.782) (−3.674) (−3.832) (−4.381) (−4.265) (−15.539) (−5.407) (4.564)
age50 −8.641∗∗ −8.855∗∗ −8.963∗∗ −11.101∗∗∗ −11.304∗∗∗ −63.142∗∗∗ −22.442∗∗∗ 1.481
(−2.246) (−2.309) (−2.339) (−2.834) (−2.896) (−12.158) (−6.147) (0.338)
age40 −10.575∗∗∗ −10.909∗∗∗ −10.495∗∗∗ −11.845∗∗∗ −12.187∗∗∗ −37.294∗∗∗ −20.118∗∗∗ −0.121
(−2.897) (−2.998) (−2.883) (−3.194) (−3.298) (−7.759) (−5.809) (−0.029)
age30 −8.221∗∗ −8.447∗∗ −7.718∗∗ −9.654∗∗∗ −9.875∗∗∗ −48.497∗∗∗ −14.778∗∗∗ 0.660
(−2.480) (−2.557) (−2.330) (−2.867) (−2.943) (−10.928) (−4.688) (0.175)
age20 −3.232 −3.995 −3.804 −4.854 −5.642∗ −43.576∗∗∗ −6.692∗∗ 7.276∗∗
(−1.030) (−1.277) (−1.211) (−1.525) (−1.778) (−10.385) (−2.247) (2.036)
age15 21.022∗∗∗ 20.623∗∗∗ 18.865∗∗∗ 19.994∗∗∗ 19.570∗∗∗ −21.951∗∗∗ 17.583∗∗∗ 28.564∗∗∗
(4.480) (4.410) (4.038) (4.220) (4.145) (−3.901) (4.035) (5.295)
age10 33.931∗∗∗ 33.689∗∗∗ 31.889∗∗∗ 32.990∗∗∗ 32.735∗∗∗ 2.249 30.963∗∗∗ 41.929∗∗∗
(8.691) (8.657) (8.196) (8.367) (8.331) (0.443) (8.434) (9.438)
age5 36.551∗∗∗ 36.604∗∗∗ 35.024∗∗∗ 36.775∗∗∗ 36.871∗∗∗ 30.213∗∗∗ 35.830∗∗∗ 45.841∗∗∗
(9.665) (9.711) (9.306) (9.612) (9.671) (6.198) (10.088) (10.629)
stories 1.202∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗ 1.260∗∗∗ 1.166∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 2.357∗∗∗
(6.297) (5.958) (6.632) (6.609) (6.263) (7.100) (3.840) (11.031)
A Class 73.141∗∗∗ 70.514∗∗∗ 70.578∗∗∗ 72.393∗∗∗ 69.907∗∗∗ 59.913∗∗∗ 52.602∗∗∗ 73.682∗∗∗
Weighted x x x
Market Dummies x x x x x x
Sale Condition Controls x x
Submarket Dummies x
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variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8
(23.054) (22.249) (22.358) (23.392) (22.620) (17.866) (17.631) (20.377)
B Class 24.139∗∗∗ 24.095∗∗∗ 24.065∗∗∗ 23.996∗∗∗ 23.952∗∗∗ 17.523∗∗∗ 14.166∗∗∗ 26.640∗∗∗
(14.638) (14.660) (14.707) (14.240) (14.264) (6.732) (9.231) (14.146)
lnland −0.869 −0.680 −1.164 −1.644∗∗ −1.439∗ −9.354∗∗∗ 14.250∗∗∗ −18.847∗∗∗
(−1.058) (−0.831) (−1.427) (−2.005) (−1.760) (−11.134) (15.914) (−20.789)
Amenity 9.222∗∗∗ 8.661∗∗∗ 9.000∗∗∗ 10.249∗∗∗ 9.644∗∗∗ 31.772∗∗∗ 6.966∗∗∗ 6.014∗∗∗
(6.137) (5.780) (6.034) (6.722) (6.344) (15.135) (4.977) (3.573)
Year 2002 1.609 1.388 0.982 1.357 1.108 −6.195 4.794 7.135∗
(0.439) (0.380) (0.270) (0.367) (0.300) (−1.334) (1.436) (1.688)
Year 2003 1.850 1.754 2.012 1.395 1.318 −7.255∗ 5.470∗ 4.313
(0.515) (0.490) (0.565) (0.385) (0.365) (−1.658) (1.673) (1.044)
Year 2004 6.623∗ 6.530∗ 7.188∗∗ 5.697∗ 5.607 −6.107 11.459∗∗∗ 10.799∗∗∗
(1.942) (1.921) (2.126) (1.657) (1.636) (−1.459) (3.685) (2.752)
Year 2005 23.481∗∗∗ 22.925∗∗∗ 23.761∗∗∗ 22.478∗∗∗ 21.875∗∗∗ 11.674∗∗∗ 27.286∗∗∗ 25.507∗∗∗
(7.201) (7.052) (7.340) (6.845) (6.684) (2.932) (9.183) (6.792)
Year 2006 45.465∗∗∗ 44.997∗∗∗ 45.878∗∗∗ 44.748∗∗∗ 44.256∗∗∗ 38.631∗∗∗ 49.516∗∗∗ 48.422∗∗∗
(13.972) (13.873) (14.187) (13.689) (13.584) (9.946) (16.667) (12.941)
Year 2007 60.388∗∗∗ 58.716∗∗∗ 60.643∗∗∗ 59.943∗∗∗ 58.157∗∗∗ 64.198∗∗∗ 62.991∗∗∗ 55.637∗∗∗
(18.806) (18.327) (18.962) (18.594) (18.081) (16.802) (21.443) (15.075)
Year 2008 72.195∗∗∗ 67.923∗∗∗ 70.839∗∗∗ 72.536∗∗∗ 67.959∗∗∗ 89.580∗∗∗ 72.373∗∗∗ 63.062∗∗∗
(22.788) (21.386) (22.333) (22.784) (21.284) (23.335) (24.804) (17.300)
Year 2009 70.870∗∗∗ 67.522∗∗∗ 70.269∗∗∗ 70.755∗∗∗ 67.132∗∗∗ 85.457∗∗∗ 73.890∗∗∗ 54.794∗∗∗
(20.569) (19.609) (20.456) (20.361) (19.329) (19.735) (23.283) (13.933)
Year 2010 31.269∗∗∗ 27.847∗∗∗ 34.600∗∗∗ 30.785∗∗∗ 27.087∗∗∗ 27.659∗∗∗ 32.177∗∗∗ 17.269∗∗∗
(9.337) (8.317) (10.239) (9.117) (8.023) (6.568) (10.442) (4.523)
Year 2011 29.047∗∗∗ 24.823∗∗∗ 33.909∗∗∗ 29.113∗∗∗ 24.488∗∗∗ 33.294∗∗∗ 30.311∗∗∗ 21.334∗∗∗
(7.502) (6.410) (8.623) (7.493) (6.301) (7.504) (8.493) (4.800)
1031 15.754∗∗∗ 13.800∗∗∗
(6.525) (4.400)
Assemblage 33.202∗∗∗ 28.679∗
(3.304) (1.926)
Build to Suit 34.558∗∗∗ −20.924
(2.953) (−1.450)
Business Value 27.306 44.442∗∗
(1.444) (1.990)
Condo Conversion 24.895∗∗ −0.619
(2.369) (−0.059)
Contamination −34.099 21.081
(−1.389) (0.714)
Deed Restriction −4.167 −13.599
(−0.146) (−0.407)
Deferred Maintenance −12.917∗∗ −2.652
(−2.570) (−0.413)
Distressed Sale −29.338∗∗∗ 26.802∗∗∗
Weighted x x x
Market Dummies x x x x x x
Sale Condition Controls x x
Submarket Dummies x
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variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8
(−4.102) (4.042)
Ground Lease 8.166 −53.093∗∗∗
(1.228) (−11.459)
High Vacancy −17.996∗∗∗ −45.991∗∗∗
(−3.671) (−10.146)
Historical 17.775 49.023∗∗∗
(1.378) (3.974)
Investor NNN 31.838∗∗∗ 23.600∗∗∗
(7.580) (5.427)
Land Contract −18.448 12.865
(−1.087) (0.355)
Option Sale 11.531 5.101
(1.360) (0.568)
Partial Interest −55.724∗∗∗ −97.510∗∗∗
(−6.552) (−20.716)
Redevelopment 20.950∗∗∗ −28.699∗∗∗
(2.642) (−3.438)
REO −42.397∗∗∗ −55.092∗∗∗
(−6.579) (−7.223)
Sale Leaseback 14.056∗∗∗ 8.140∗
(3.138) (1.931)
Shell Condition −4.274 −50.415∗∗∗
(−0.357) (−3.105)
Short Sale −30.964 15.228
(−1.578) (0.652)
Single Tenant 8.656∗∗∗ 11.049∗∗∗
(4.905) (4.507)
Tenant Purchase 11.397∗∗∗ 25.355∗∗∗
(2.607) (4.643)
Model N 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515
R Square 0.360 0.365 0.373 0.364 0.369 0.473 0.515 0.143
Weighted x x x
Market Dummies x x x x x x
Sale Condition Controls x x
Submarket Dummies x
34
6.2. Fixed Effect Regression
Rent
To this point, the introduction and significance of the Professional Ownership
related variables distinguished this research from the extant literature. However,
the use of fixed effect regressions, a method I felt much better suited to the data,
dramatically changed the results and significance levels of the sustainability variables.
The fixed effect regressions were of similar form to Equation 2, with the addition of
market or submarket fixed effects.
Table 12 shows the rent results for the Fixed Effect Regressions. Six Models
are shown. Model 1 and Model 2 include submarket fixed effects, without and with
professional ownership controls. Models 3 and 4 repeat the first two, but weighted by
size. Models 5-6 used market fixed effects without and with professional ownership
controls.
In my first rent Model, with submarket fixed effects, Energy Star showed a 3.8%
premium, significant at the 5.0% level. Although no longer a significance level of 1%,
the 3.8% premiums closely matched extant findings. LEED buildings demonstrated
a whopping 16.8% premium at 1% significance. Curiously, Dual buildings showed no
premium at all.
The most plausible explanation for the lack of a Dual building premium is that
many Dual buildings likely achieved their Dual certification near or after 2008. LEED
changed their requirements in 2009 to require all LEED buildings score a minimum
of 69 on the Energy Star ranking.9 With the hurdle rate only 75, many buildings
became Energy Star as well. As such, many Dual buildings may have been leasing up
during the financial crisis. Similarly, many LEED-only buildings may have written
their leases during the real estate boom, and could explain a portion of the large rent
premium.
The inclusion of the professional ownership variable considerably changed the
results. First, the variable itself was significant at 1% in all specifications. In the
9LEED Reference Guide for Green Building Operations and Maintenance, USGBC
35
fixed effect regressions, professional owners commanded 5% market premiums.
Importantly, the statistical significance of Energy Star variable disappeared. This
evidence strongly supports the potential link between effective management and price,
rather than ESTAR alone commanding a premium. This finding supports the theory
that market premiums more closely relate to professional ownership, and that there
was a possible missing variable issue in the extant literature. Perhaps the Energy
Star puzzle was merely missing a piece.
When I considered the heavy bias towards variable significance in the fixed effect
regressions with submarket dummies, the finding for no ESTAR premiums were even
more convincing. The fixed effect regressions reduced the N in the denominator of the
standard deviation calculations by the number of clusters. Thus, a regression with
1,428 clusters biases towards variable significance through larger standard deviations
and inflated T-Stats.
Sales
The sales data are shown in Table 13. Six Models are shown. Model 1 uses market
fixed effects, Model 2 adds professional ownership controls, and Model 3 adds sale
condition controls. Models 4-6 repeat the cycle, but weighted by Sale Price.
The sales data followed a similar, albeit not identical pattern to the OLSDV regres-
sions. The first fixed effect regression showed both ESTAR and LEED as significant
at $31 and $87 PSF respectively. Again, Dual showed no market premium. Using
the mean PSF prices for ESTAR and LEED $257 PSF and $247 the premiums were
12% and 35% respectively.
All three professional ownership variables were significant at 5% or better. Again,
the Prof Buyer variable showed a strong positive coefficient, contrary to expectations.
In Models 2 and 3, with professional ownership controls and the sale condition
controls, ESTAR dropped to significant only at the 10% level, marginally significant
by conventional standards. However, in Model 5, when I value weighted the sale
prices by lnsales, ESTAR premium significance disappeared statistically. In Model
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Table 12: This table presents a series of fixed effect regressions on lnrent. Models 1-4
used submarket fixed effects. Models 3 and 4 were both weighted by lnsize. Models
5 and 6 used market fixed effects. Models 2, 4, and 6 all include the Prof Owner
variable. Results are the regression coefficient(T-Value). ***,**,* represent statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6
ESTAR 0.038∗∗ 0.020 0.038∗∗ 0.020 0.038 0.020
(2.389) (1.280) (2.355) (1.274) (1.536) (0.851)
LEED 0.168∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(6.248) (6.150) (6.160) (6.054) (4.618) (4.655)
Dual 0.031 0.013 0.039 0.020 0.031 0.013
(1.040) (0.425) (1.286) (0.678) (0.655) (0.265)
Prof Owner 0.051∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(6.312) (6.378) (3.195)
Intercept 2.336∗∗∗ 2.388∗∗∗ 2.333∗∗∗ 2.386∗∗∗ 2.336∗∗∗ 2.388∗∗∗
(42.396) (44.578) (40.819) (43.065) (20.503) (22.841)
lnsize 0.026∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.021∗
(4.425) (3.582) (4.408) (3.591) (2.239) (1.923)
age100 −0.015 −0.016 −0.017 −0.018 −0.015 −0.016
(−0.431) (−0.440) (−0.477) (−0.484) (−0.195) (−0.198)
age75 0.034 0.033 0.036 0.036 0.034 0.033
(0.980) (0.972) (1.007) (0.999) (0.395) (0.393)
age50 −0.040 −0.041∗ −0.042 −0.043∗ −0.040 −0.041
(−1.619) (−1.662) (−1.640) (−1.682) (−0.842) (−0.869)
age40 −0.058∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.058∗ −0.060∗
(−3.405) (−3.562) (−3.420) (−3.586) (−1.834) (−1.920)
age30 −0.120∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗
(−9.945) (−10.226) (−10.200) (−10.498) (−4.759) (−4.881)
age20 −0.109∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
(−11.055) (−11.604) (−11.519) (−12.094) (−5.094) (−5.329)
age15 −0.085∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗
(−6.642) (−7.020) (−6.943) (−7.344) (−4.649) (−4.855)
age10 −0.108∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗
(−9.877) (−10.394) (−10.236) (−10.778) (−6.475) (−6.709)
age5 −0.034∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.036∗∗
(−3.753) (−3.985) (−4.083) (−4.348) (−2.397) (−2.559)
Renovated 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.020∗
(2.521) (2.685) (2.172) (2.337) (1.679) (1.808)
Percent Leased 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(17.197) (17.294) (16.850) (16.948) (8.521) (8.544)
stories 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(4.786) (4.933) (4.465) (4.617) (2.328) (2.387)
A Class 0.314∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(18.751) (18.425) (18.339) (18.018) (10.988) (10.749)
B Class 0.149∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(17.138) (17.030) (16.528) (16.424) (12.007) (11.976)
NNN −0.148∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗
(−14.401) (−14.485) (−14.205) (−14.298) (−5.882) (−5.926)
FSG 0.061∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.061∗ 0.060∗
(5.405) (5.347) (5.036) (4.975) (1.810) (1.794)
Amenity 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006
(0.971) (0.871) (0.933) (0.825) (0.426) (0.382)
R-Square 0.2341 0.2359 0.2427 0.2447 0.2341 0.2359
Model N 48, 630 48, 630 48, 630 48, 630 48, 630 48, 630
Denominator DF 1,458 1,458 1,458 1,458 55 55
Submarket Fixed Effects x x x x
Weighted x x
Market Fixed Effects x x
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6, also weighted, but including sale condition controls, ESTAR was again marginally
significant, at the 10% level.
Value weighting changed the scale of the coefficients, and in some cases their
significance. This provided support for my contention that value weighting deserves
consideration in real estate regressions.
In summary, this section provided evidence that Professional Ownership signifi-
cantly altered rent and sales prices. I provided strong evidence that contradicted prior
findings of Energy Star premiums, instead demonstrating a link between management
and Energy Star.
Table 13: This table presents a series of fixed effect regressions on sales PSF. Models 1
through 6 all used market fixed effects. Models 4-6 were weighted by lnsales. Models
2, 3, 5, and 6 all included the Professional buyer and seller related variables. Models 3
and 6 included a full suite of sale condition controls as well. Results are the regression
coefficient(T-Value).***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6
ESTAR 31.236∗∗ 24.297∗ 25.557∗ 28.661∗ 22.053 23.323∗
(2.213) (1.858) (1.991) (1.903) (1.570) (1.698)
LEED 87.271∗∗∗ 80.338∗∗∗ 79.249∗∗∗ 90.808∗∗∗ 83.493∗∗∗ 82.230∗∗∗
(4.304) (4.340) (4.176) (4.556) (4.588) (4.386)
Dual 40.663 34.812 35.328 37.312 31.616 32.265
(1.621) (1.395) (1.454) (1.417) (1.207) (1.270)
Prof Buyer 43.612∗∗∗ 44.598∗∗∗ 41.387∗∗∗ 42.448∗∗∗
(4.197) (4.462) (4.115) (4.389)
Prof Seller 66.419∗∗∗ 64.447∗∗∗ 67.956∗∗∗ 65.771∗∗∗
(3.589) (3.590) (3.655) (3.659)
Prof Both 85.224∗∗ 86.524∗∗ 85.745∗∗ 86.744∗∗
(2.041) (2.112) (2.107) (2.181)
Intercept 309.750∗∗∗ 325.852∗∗∗ 322.513∗∗∗ 319.918∗∗∗ 336.159∗∗∗ 332.764∗∗∗
(6.613) (6.912) (6.423) (6.411) (6.708) (6.243)
lnsize −4.001 −5.775 −6.016 −2.041 −3.869 −4.112
(−0.727) (−1.219) (−1.266) (−0.338) (−0.741) (−0.785)
age100 30.808 31.361 31.927 33.987 34.677 35.325
(0.793) (0.806) (0.819) (0.795) (0.810) (0.824)
age75 19.746 20.542 21.276 21.269 22.175 22.975
(0.647) (0.675) (0.703) (0.646) (0.674) (0.703)
age50 1.745 1.481 1.813 1.141 0.917 1.234
(0.129) (0.110) (0.136) (0.075) (0.061) (0.083)
age40 0.503 −0.121 0.885 −0.994 −1.619 −0.616
(0.055) (−0.014) (0.100) (−0.105) (−0.174) (−0.066)
age30 1.131 0.660 1.245 −1.547 −1.984 −1.334
(0.123) (0.072) (0.137) (−0.163) (−0.209) (−0.141)
age20 8.425 7.276 7.331 5.516 4.360 4.526
(0.961) (0.833) (0.849) (0.607) (0.479) (0.501)
age15 29.064∗∗∗ 28.564∗∗∗ 26.080∗∗∗ 27.009∗∗ 26.520∗∗ 24.052∗∗
(3.029) (2.949) (2.676) (2.625) (2.548) (2.290)
age10 42.347∗∗∗ 41.929∗∗∗ 40.099∗∗∗ 40.638∗∗∗ 40.234∗∗∗ 38.447∗∗∗
(4.201) (4.132) (3.980) (3.797) (3.725) (3.577)
age5 45.966∗∗∗ 45.841∗∗∗ 44.074∗∗∗ 45.930∗∗∗ 45.834∗∗∗ 43.988∗∗∗
(5.542) (5.562) (5.420) (5.291) (5.309) (5.157)
stories 2.402∗ 2.357∗ 2.415∗∗ 2.269∗ 2.230∗ 2.270∗
(1.982) (1.952) (2.048) (1.845) (1.827) (1.905)
A Class 77.081∗∗∗ 73.682∗∗∗ 73.633∗∗∗ 78.680∗∗∗ 75.375∗∗∗ 75.411∗∗∗
(8.661) (9.079) (8.875) (8.227) (8.544) (8.328)
B Class 26.897∗∗∗ 26.640∗∗∗ 26.213∗∗∗ 27.410∗∗∗ 27.145∗∗∗ 26.795∗∗∗
(8.203) (8.266) (8.200) (7.971) (8.038) (7.974)
lnland −19.209∗∗ −18.847∗∗ −18.993∗∗ −21.586∗∗ −21.170∗∗ −21.316∗∗
(−2.425) (−2.423) (−2.439) (−2.528) (−2.528) (−2.539)
Amenity 6.623∗∗ 6.014∗∗ 5.583∗∗ 6.089∗∗ 5.440∗ 5.118∗
Weighted x x x
Market Fixed Effects x x x x x x
Sale Condition Controls x x
continued on next page
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variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6
(2.421) (2.158) (2.114) (2.165) (1.901) (1.887)
Year 2002 7.508 7.135 6.785 8.234 7.810 7.319
(1.465) (1.414) (1.386) (1.455) (1.405) (1.357)
Year 2003 4.460 4.313 4.573 3.786 3.638 3.774
(0.986) (0.966) (1.040) (0.772) (0.753) (0.798)
Year 2004 10.950∗∗ 10.799∗∗ 11.628∗∗∗ 10.262∗∗ 10.100∗∗ 10.831∗∗
(2.507) (2.463) (2.705) (2.200) (2.166) (2.377)
Year 2005 26.197∗∗∗ 25.507∗∗∗ 26.728∗∗∗ 26.143∗∗∗ 25.381∗∗∗ 26.499∗∗∗
(3.710) (3.700) (4.075) (3.473) (3.457) (3.783)
Year 2006 49.048∗∗∗ 48.422∗∗∗ 49.163∗∗∗ 49.867∗∗∗ 49.187∗∗∗ 49.911∗∗∗
(4.550) (4.556) (4.705) (4.280) (4.282) (4.402)
Year 2007 57.530∗∗∗ 55.637∗∗∗ 57.717∗∗∗ 58.948∗∗∗ 56.910∗∗∗ 58.945∗∗∗
(4.820) (4.750) (5.111) (4.518) (4.441) (4.750)
Year 2008 67.825∗∗∗ 63.062∗∗∗ 66.190∗∗∗ 71.736∗∗∗ 66.589∗∗∗ 69.623∗∗∗
(3.627) (3.440) (3.727) (3.416) (3.228) (3.472)
Year 2009 58.410∗∗∗ 54.794∗∗∗ 57.512∗∗∗ 62.559∗∗∗ 58.615∗∗∗ 61.154∗∗∗
(3.627) (3.498) (3.798) (3.444) (3.309) (3.552)
Year 2010 21.001∗ 17.269 25.777∗∗ 24.747∗ 20.636 29.248∗∗
(1.765) (1.531) (2.395) (1.874) (1.648) (2.446)
Year 2011 26.059 21.334 32.409∗∗ 32.063∗ 26.757 37.901∗∗
(1.639) (1.403) (2.297) (1.827) (1.590) (2.444)
1031 30.850∗∗∗ 30.035∗∗∗
(6.556) (6.282)
Assemblage 29.705∗∗ 31.015∗∗
(2.321) (2.432)
Build to Suit 34.785∗∗∗ 32.860∗∗∗
(3.907) (3.580)
Business Value 33.477 36.473
(1.455) (1.396)
Condo Conversion 39.717 41.729
(1.531) (1.559)
Contamination −38.660 −42.629
(−1.647) (−1.636)
Deed Restriction −10.167 −11.219
(−1.015) (−1.081)
Deferred Maintenance −25.557∗∗∗ −26.031∗∗∗
(−4.366) (−4.506)
Distressed Sale −24.476∗∗∗ −24.133∗∗
(−3.162) (−2.655)
Ground Lease 34.359∗∗∗ 35.609∗∗
(2.684) (2.637)
High Vacancy −14.744 −16.605
(−1.299) (−1.403)
Historical −15.292 −17.234
(−0.853) (−0.916)
Investor NNN 28.855∗∗∗ 27.850∗∗∗
(5.567) (4.804)
Land Contract −63.382∗∗∗ −66.669∗∗∗
(−6.218) (−6.196)
Option Sale 17.728 15.834
(1.513) (1.227)
Partial Interest −2.553 2.746
(−0.152) (0.171)
Redevelopment 29.319 29.703
(1.415) (1.372)
REO −55.825∗∗∗ −59.784∗∗∗
(−6.762) (−6.978)
Sale Leaseback 20.730∗∗∗ 20.566∗∗∗
(4.769) (4.540)
Shell Condition 11.792 8.048
(1.036) (0.712)
Short Sale −44.145∗∗∗ −49.211∗∗∗
(−3.027) (−3.191)
Single Tenant 7.481∗∗ 7.810∗∗
(2.560) (2.424)
Tenant Purchase 11.126∗∗∗ 11.740∗∗∗
(3.194) (3.308)
R Square 0.137 0.143 0.156 0.144 0.150 0.162
Model N 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515
Weighted x x x
Market Fixed Effects x x x x x x
Sale Condition Controls x x
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The Best Models and R-Squared
This article reported a variety of methods and techniques to estimate green build-
ing premiums. The criteria used to select the best models was a combination of
statistical reliability, functional form, and R-Squared.
The R-Squared from a regression reports the percentage of the variance from the
mean explained by the regression co-efficients. In its basic form, a higher R-Squared
tends to suggest an improved model. However, when using Dummy Variables, that
basic heuristic may not hold. Almost by definition, when dummy variables are added
to a regression, the R-Squared increases. Consider if I were to add a dummy variable
for each building in the rent regressions, 48,732 dummies with one building omitted.
The R-squared would be near to 1.0, but the model would be a poor indicator of
market trends.
Similarly, when I added 1,284 submarket dummies, the R-Squared trended higher.
When I controlled with 55 market dummies, the R-Squared moved lower relative to
the submarket dummies model. As discussed earlier, modern econometrics suggests
that the overuse of dummy variables can lead to inconsistent estimators (Baltagi and
Kao, 2001). More likely, the model with 55 market dummies effectively controls, in
an OLSDV format, for market effects. Thus Model 6 in the OLSDV tables for rent,
Table 10, and Model 3 in the OLSDV sales regression, Table 11 were the best OLSDV
models. The rent model included the professional ownership controls, and the sale
model included the professional buyer/seller and sale condition controls. They each
used 55 market dummies as controls.
In a fixed effect model, the within transformation occurs prior to the regression.
The markets have then been controlled for in each variable, and not in a single
linear adjustment. But, the R-Squared for the model will not include the effect of
the dummy variables. This does not diminish the explanatory power of the model
relative to the OLSDV version. In fact, compare Models 7 and 8 in the OLSDV
regressions, Table 10, which were purposefully shown with no market controls, to
their counterparts, Models 5 and 6 in the fixed effect regressions, Table 12, and the
R-Squared are exactly the same–0.2341 and 0.2359 respectively. The same comparison
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holds for the sales tables as well. The explanatory power based exclusively on the
level of variance explained by the control variables are identical between the OLSDV
with market dummies and the fixed effect by market.
The best models, producing the most reliable and consistent estimators, whose
functional form best suits the data are the fixed effect models. The rent model with
the most explanatory power is Model 6 from Table 12 and the sales is Model 3 from
Table 13–the unweighted regressions which control for ownership and sale condition.
Additional Questions
After having established a link between ownership and price, and observing the
distinct difference between fixed effect and OLSDV regressions, two important ques-
tions arose. First, how strong was the link between Professional Ownership and green
buildings? Second, what, more specifically, in the data caused the distinct differences
between the fixed effect and OLSDV regressions? The next two sections attempt to
answer those questions.
6.3. Logistic Regression
To answer the question of how strong the relationship between professional own-
ership and green buildings is, I estimated a series of logistic regressions. In each
regression the dependent variable was set to “1”, so the interpretation of the coef-
ficients was the likelihood that characteristics contributed towards a building being
ESTAR, LEED, Dual or Professional ownership related variables. Table 14 shows the
rent results, and Tables 15 and 16 show the sales results.
The rent results included two regressions for each green variable, one without mar-
ket dummies and the second including them. The rent results showed clear causal
relationships between Prof Owner and all green buildings. Particularly strong cor-
relations appeared in the Energy Star and Dual buildings. An Energy Star or Dual
building was roughly 4.5 times more likely to be owned by a Professional Owner than
not. Similarly, Professionally Owned buildings were more than 4 times more likely to
be Energy Star or Dual certified than not.
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LEED correlations to Prof Owner were also significant at the 1% level, although of
slightly smaller scale. One explanation for the smaller scale appeared in the sales logis-
tic regressions in that LEED buildings were more likely to be single tenant buildings,
while Dual and ESTAR were less likely to be single tenant. Single tenant buildings
are often corporate headquarters and may be corporate, rather than professionally
owned. Regardless, the correlation between LEED and Prof Owner was statistically
significant.
In the sales data each variable underwent three regressions, first with no controls,
then with market dummies, and finally with the sale condition controls added.
The distinction of Prof Buyer, Prof Seller and Prof Both offered some interesting
findings. When I included sale condition controls, Energy Star buildings were more
likely to be bought by a professional buyer, but no significance appeared on the Prof
Seller. Thus, in the full model, Prof Sellers were not more likely to sell an Energy Star
building. This pointed towards an acquisition bias of green buildings by professional
owners, and provided a theoretical basis for professional buyer acquisition premiums.
For Dual buildings, again only Prof Buyer was significant, showing that profes-
sional buyers looked to acquire these types of properties, and were willing to pay a
premium for them.
LEED buildings appeared likely to be exchanged by two professional owners, but
no other ownership variable showed as statistically significant.
The propensity of green buildings to be larger appeared clear in both the rent
and sales logistic regressions. The coefficients on lnsize were both large and highly
significant in each regression. This suggested that not only were green buildings much
more likely to be larger, but that professional owners purchased larger buildings as
well. The increased likelihood of larger buildings being green lent further support to
potential size bias in unweighted regressions.
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Table 14:
This table presents results from logistic regression of the rent data with the dependent variable set to “1”. Each of
the three green real estate variables and the professional ownership (Prof Owner) variable were tested as the
dependent variable. Each dependent variables was tested with and without market dummies. Results are the
likelihood estimate (WaldChiSq). ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Dependent ESTAR ESTAR LEED LEED Dual Dual Prof Owner Prof Owner
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8
ESTAR −16.186 −15.401 −17.554 −17.988 1.416∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (758.503) (712.525)
LEED −18.200 −18.328 −17.906 −18.097 0.630∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (19.778) (11.874)
Dual −19.552 −20.059 −16.991 −16.351 1.448∗∗∗ 1.455∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (202.164) (192.899)
Prof Owner 1.486∗∗∗ 1.506∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 1.446∗∗∗ 1.493∗∗∗
(819.886) (778.619) (10.713) (6.778) (183.623) (167.587)
Intercept −34.558 −36.122 −33.539 −32.371 −52.839 −55.323 −13.103∗∗∗ −15.031∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.049) (0.021) (0.062) (0.046) (0.053) (3098.41) (1700.37)
lnsize 1.063∗∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗ 1.108∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗ 1.714∗∗∗ 1.841∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗
(559.280) (555.243) (100.543) (74.186) (303.801) (277.021) (1706.20) (1728.97)
age100 −0.030 0.204 −3.093∗∗∗ −3.296∗∗∗ −2.096∗∗∗ −1.870∗∗∗ 0.108 0.064
(0.012) (0.512) (56.419) (58.026) (10.415) (7.751) (0.845) (0.276)
age75 0.149 0.394∗ −3.811∗∗∗ −3.788∗∗∗ −1.191∗∗∗ −0.583 0.323∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗
(0.438) (2.782) (88.732) (81.996) (12.274) (2.443) (10.457) (4.023)
age50 0.229 0.357 −3.691∗∗∗ −3.656∗∗∗ −0.865∗∗ −0.520 0.217∗ 0.201∗
(0.771) (1.729) (47.575) (44.817) (4.947) (1.547) (3.587) (2.870)
age40 0.305 0.414∗ −3.805∗∗∗ −3.901∗∗∗ −1.100∗∗∗ −0.976∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗
(2.124) (3.551) (103.480) (96.247) (12.849) (8.268) (59.392) (55.708)
age30 0.623∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ −4.799∗∗∗ −5.018∗∗∗ −1.139∗∗∗ −1.267∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗
(11.120) (10.473) (143.180) (144.083) (18.051) (18.007) (145.664) (149.115)
age20 0.947∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ −4.534∗∗∗ −4.749∗∗∗ −0.634∗∗∗ −0.713∗∗∗ 1.145∗∗∗ 1.157∗∗∗
(29.152) (26.716) (309.908) (305.892) (8.051) (8.185) (295.799) (285.703)
age15 0.935∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗ −3.853∗∗∗ −4.215∗∗∗ −0.718∗∗ −0.673∗ 1.069∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗
(18.892) (20.819) (40.595) (45.042) (4.352) (3.138) (123.048) (118.971)
age10 1.107∗∗∗ 1.183∗∗∗ −3.617∗∗∗ −3.794∗∗∗ 0.053 −0.080 1.100∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗
(36.283) (38.383) (113.875) (120.196) (0.048) (0.091) (217.398) (202.540)
age5 1.065∗∗∗ 1.100∗∗∗ −3.038∗∗∗ −3.278∗∗∗ −0.022 −0.116 0.668∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗
(32.366) (32.152) (110.200) (119.645) (0.008) (0.181) (76.636) (66.367)
Renovated −0.040 0.029 1.488∗∗∗ 1.600∗∗∗ 0.005 0.222 −0.199∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.112) (43.104) (45.474) (0.001) (1.593) (15.361) (10.487)
Percent Leased 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(57.738) (60.134) (0.003) (0.018) (18.241) (17.534) (10.628) (11.106)
stories −0.003 −0.004 −0.006 0.008 0.009 0.009 −0.050∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗
(0.620) (0.590) (0.423) (0.530) (2.152) (1.508) (289.449) (333.399)
A Class 1.623∗∗∗ 1.771∗∗∗ 3.156∗∗∗ 3.077∗∗∗ 13.300 13.482 1.053∗∗∗ 0.988∗∗∗
(66.068) (75.986) (9.618) (9.004) (0.005) (0.005) (270.732) (222.149)
B Class 1.006∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗ 2.521∗∗ 2.446∗∗ 12.315 12.208 0.622∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗
(27.281) (27.555) (6.229) (5.820) (0.004) (0.004) (145.894) (123.369)
NNN 0.352∗∗∗ 0.069 0.333∗ 0.106 1.172∗∗∗ 0.330∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗
(17.393) (0.457) (3.330) (0.241) (60.537) (2.883) (9.555) (6.103)
FSG 0.513∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.149 −0.257 0.668∗∗∗ 0.090 0.182∗∗∗ 0.049
(75.126) (9.702) (0.843) (1.553) (29.899) (0.274) (32.286) (1.614)
Amenity 16.314 16.286 16.054 15.147 14.382 14.276 0.159∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (20.846) (27.247)
Model N 48, 630 48, 630 48, 630 48, 630 48, 630 48, 630 48, 630 48, 630
AIC 11, 269 10, 684 1, 893 1, 819 3, 181 2, 806 34, 101 33, 337
SIC 11, 462 11, 361 2, 086 2, 496 3, 374 3, 483 34, 295 34, 014
Market Dummies X X X X
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Table 15: This table presents results from logistic regression of the sales data with the dependent variable set to “1”. Each of the
three green real estate variables and the three professional ownership (Prof Buyer, Prof Seller and Prof Both) were tested as the
dependent variable. The Prof variables are shown in Table 16 Each dependent variable was tested first with no controls, then
with market dummies added, and then with sale condition controls added. Results are the likelihood estimate (WaldChiSq).
***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Dependent ESTAR LEED DUAL
variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9
ESTAR −15.556 −14.871 −14.870 −16.839 −14.345 −14.320
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.053) (0.057)
LEED −18.507 −17.405 −17.484 −17.553 −14.549 −14.698
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.006)
Dual −19.292 −18.826 −18.880 −16.103 −15.306 −15.244
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Prof Buyer 1.113∗∗∗ 1.045∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 0.166 0.110 0.113 0.837∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗
(94.874) (76.057) (68.115) (0.299) (0.117) (0.120) (20.350) (6.693) (4.854)
Prof Seller 0.492∗∗ 0.429∗ 0.373 0.670∗ 0.808∗∗ 0.598 0.250 −0.056 −0.040
(4.458) (3.092) (2.301) (3.328) (3.883) (1.993) (0.453) (0.019) (0.009)
Prof Both 1.636∗∗∗ 1.471∗∗∗ 1.344∗∗∗ 1.789∗∗∗ 1.792∗∗∗ 1.807∗∗∗ 0.299 −0.587 −0.625
(24.452) (17.470) (14.471) (9.255) (7.822) (7.920) (0.172) (0.472) (0.525)
Intercept −34.661 −35.905 −35.955 −27.085 −26.506 −26.490 −35.535 −47.532 −49.520
(0.022) (0.068) (0.068) (0.025) (0.071) (0.069) (0.030) (0.020) (0.030)
lnsize 1.506∗∗∗ 1.562∗∗∗ 1.574∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 1.965∗∗∗ 2.213∗∗∗ 2.291∗∗∗
(396.394) (365.324) (356.509) (38.227) (26.856) (26.278) (217.085) (205.962) (204.816)
age100 −0.717∗ −0.343 −0.432 −1.767∗∗∗ −2.073∗∗∗ −2.104∗∗∗ −4.132∗∗∗ −3.208∗∗∗ −3.411∗∗∗
(3.384) (0.704) (1.073) (17.195) (20.498) (20.097) (14.764) (8.407) (9.347)
age75 −0.481 −0.002 −0.111 −2.370∗∗∗ −2.496∗∗∗ −2.478∗∗∗ −2.531∗∗∗ −1.456∗∗∗ −1.724∗∗∗
(2.172) (0.000) (0.097) (33.059) (32.708) (31.361) (33.519) (8.577) (10.953)
age50 −0.726∗∗ −0.435 −0.490 −1.934∗∗∗ −2.043∗∗∗ −2.084∗∗∗ −2.183∗∗∗ −1.306∗∗ −1.598∗∗∗
(4.034) (1.289) (1.598) (23.371) (23.011) (22.947) (21.102) (5.892) (8.176)
age40 −0.420 −0.246 −0.370 −1.917∗∗∗ −2.076∗∗∗ −2.044∗∗∗ −2.172∗∗∗ −1.715∗∗∗ −1.878∗∗∗
(1.665) (0.517) (1.120) (29.443) (30.478) (28.842) (25.268) (12.426) (13.814)
age30 −0.123 −0.067 −0.242 −2.548∗∗∗ −2.760∗∗∗ −2.708∗∗∗ −2.276∗∗∗ −2.270∗∗∗ −2.472∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.045) (0.557) (58.185) (59.680) (55.587) (31.574) (23.275) (25.360)
age20 0.094 0.109 −0.060 −3.039∗∗∗ −3.260∗∗∗ −3.210∗∗∗ −1.603∗∗∗ −1.537∗∗∗ −1.756∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.137) (0.039) (116.257) (113.250) (105.581) (22.100) (14.747) (17.321)
age15 0.455 0.605∗ 0.537 −2.636∗∗∗ −2.837∗∗∗ −2.876∗∗∗ −1.787∗∗∗ −1.841∗∗∗ −1.947∗∗∗
(1.856) (2.944) (2.220) (18.385) (19.881) (19.734) (11.110) (8.725) (8.805)
age10 0.825∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗ −2.939∗∗∗ −3.208∗∗∗ −3.239∗∗∗ −0.313 −0.400 −0.545
(7.855) (8.010) (5.685) (36.134) (39.952) (39.745) (0.690) (0.850) (1.445)
age5 0.604∗∗ 0.650∗∗ 0.563∗ −2.246∗∗∗ −2.373∗∗∗ −2.374∗∗∗ −0.528 −0.489 −0.612
(4.174) (4.354) (3.120) (37.827) (38.319) (37.026) (2.071) (1.317) (1.914)
stories −0.035∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.020 −0.024 −0.019∗∗ −0.002 −0.004
(27.934) (7.397) (7.578) (4.686) (1.115) (1.545) (4.631) (0.030) (0.122)
A Class 2.006∗∗∗ 2.064∗∗∗ 1.991∗∗∗ 1.602∗∗∗ 1.441∗∗∗ 1.541∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗ 1.345∗∗∗ 1.234∗∗
(52.199) (53.097) (48.686) (14.384) (10.302) (11.525) (4.787) (7.635) (6.210)
B Class 1.130∗∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗ 1.093∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗ 0.995∗∗∗ 0.208 0.291 0.232
(17.838) (16.864) (15.343) (8.857) (6.342) (6.906) (0.213) (0.377) (0.229)
Market Dummies x x x x x x
Sale Condition Controls x x x
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Dependent ESTAR LEED DUAL
variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9
lnland −0.239∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗ −0.109 0.012 −0.018 −0.451∗∗∗ −0.441∗∗∗ −0.439∗∗∗
(30.946) (13.807) (8.920) (1.431) (0.014) (0.030) (40.736) (27.629) (26.158)
Amenity 16.398 15.315 15.273 14.955 13.957 14.013 15.107 11.598 11.814
(0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.020) (0.019) (0.005) (0.068) (0.077)
Year 2002 −0.351 −0.370 −0.365 0.493 0.479 0.404 −0.318 −0.176 −0.257
(2.186) (2.296) (2.206) (0.688) (0.636) (0.448) (0.561) (0.155) (0.315)
Year 2003 0.130 0.127 0.148 −0.817 −0.777 −0.856 −0.110 −0.121 −0.152
(0.368) (0.333) (0.449) (0.938) (0.836) (1.010) (0.075) (0.079) (0.121)
Year 2004 −0.212 −0.224 −0.256 −0.213 −0.212 −0.317 −0.047 0.167 0.009
(1.043) (1.091) (1.418) (0.111) (0.107) (0.238) (0.016) (0.178) (0.000)
Year 2005 −0.335∗ −0.278 −0.320 0.299 0.360 0.308 −0.110 0.120 −0.070
(2.901) (1.880) (2.456) (0.298) (0.424) (0.307) (0.100) (0.103) (0.034)
Year 2006 0.047 0.112 0.062 −0.032 −0.066 −0.109 0.018 0.094 −0.044
(0.065) (0.344) (0.103) (0.003) (0.013) (0.036) (0.003) (0.065) (0.014)
Year 2007 −0.159 −0.114 −0.148 0.071 0.094 −0.025 −0.198 0.044 −0.148
(0.756) (0.356) (0.601) (0.017) (0.029) (0.002) (0.348) (0.014) (0.163)
Year 2008 −0.431∗∗ −0.321 −0.352∗ 0.292 0.411 0.322 −0.608∗ −0.318 −0.505
(5.197) (2.681) (3.175) (0.317) (0.612) (0.368) (2.948) (0.682) (1.660)
Year 2009 −0.740∗∗∗ −0.530∗∗ −0.529∗∗ 0.649 0.679 0.654 −0.487 0.042 −0.058
(10.427) (4.934) (4.869) (1.560) (1.635) (1.476) (1.537) (0.010) (0.017)
Year 2010 −0.536∗∗ −0.394∗ −0.295 0.916∗ 0.945∗ 0.843 −0.683∗ −0.332 −0.342
(5.981) (2.967) (1.567) (3.315) (3.356) (2.607) (2.853) (0.569) (0.558)
Year 2011 −0.620∗∗∗ −0.506∗∗ −0.467∗ 0.882∗ 0.869 0.814 −0.447 −0.163 −0.263
(6.820) (4.256) (3.436) (2.872) (2.640) (2.236) (1.218) (0.142) (0.343)
1031 −0.452∗∗∗ −0.758∗ −0.712∗
(7.272) (2.745) (3.635)
Assemblage −0.209 0.677 −11.173
(0.038) (0.406) (0.001)
Build to Suit −0.706 −0.846 −0.889
(1.123) (0.529) (0.587)
Business Value −15.465 1.341 −11.809
(0.000) (0.886) (0.000)
Condo Conversion −15.546 −13.465 −11.295
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Contamination −15.588 −13.526 −11.108
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Deed Restriction −14.300 −11.328 −9.896
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Deferred Maintenance −0.152 −0.199 −12.230
(0.150) (0.069) (0.005)
Distressed Sale −0.698 −0.622 −2.628∗∗
(1.948) (0.535) (4.213)
Ground Lease −0.405∗ 0.313 −0.702
(2.751) (0.450) (2.481)
High Vacancy −0.286 0.181 −0.929∗
(1.373) (0.190) (2.960)
Historical 0.225 −13.998 0.767
(0.108) (0.000) (0.719)
Investor NNN 0.244 −0.156 0.233
Market Dummies x x x x x x
Sale Condition Controls x x x
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Dependent ESTAR LEED DUAL
variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9
(1.176) (0.083) (0.408)
Land Contract −11.698 −12.340 −7.444
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Option Sale −0.550 −0.213 −1.603
(0.680) (0.036) (1.567)
Partial Interest 0.159 0.847 0.471
(0.241) (2.297) (0.991)
Redevelopment −15.400 1.117∗ 2.517∗∗∗
(0.000) (2.782) (11.142)
REO −1.268∗ −0.519 0.209
(3.613) (0.728) (0.059)
Sale Leaseback −0.490∗ −0.990 −0.594
(3.422) (1.711) (1.518)
Shell Condition −0.684 −0.366 −11.524
(0.363) (0.179) (0.001)
Short Sale −14.168 −14.098 0.236
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Single Tenant −0.655∗∗∗ 0.393∗ −0.407
(16.752) (2.905) (1.782)
Tenant Purchase −0.081 0.559 −1.222
(0.043) (1.331) (1.910)
Model N 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515
AIC 4, 408 4, 242 4, 227 , 1342 1, 328 1, 353 1, 594 1, 472 , 1472
SIC 4, 661 , 4942 , 5114 , 1595 2, 029 2, 241 1, 846 2, 172 2, 360
Market Dummies x x x x x x
Sale Condition Controls x x x
46
Table 16: This table presents results from logistic regression of the sales data with the dependent variable set to “1”. Each of the
three green real estate variables and the three professional ownership (Prof Buyer, Prof Seller and Prof Both) were tested as the
dependent variable. The green variables are shown in Table 15 Each dependent variables was tested first with no controls, then
with market dummies added, and then with sale condition controls added. Results are the likelihood estimate (WaldChiSq).
***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Prof Buyer Prof Seller Prof Both
variable Model10 Model11 Model12 Model13 Model14 Model15 Model16 Model17 Model18
ESTAR 0.982∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 0.841∗∗∗ 0.305 0.167 0.112 1.516∗∗∗ 1.252∗∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗
(77.005) (53.622) (50.782) (1.853) (0.514) (0.225) (21.773) (11.950) (9.419)
LEED 0.150 0.082 −0.032 0.983∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗ 0.897∗∗ 1.603∗∗∗ 1.671∗∗∗ 1.621∗∗
(0.251) (0.074) (0.011) (7.970) (5.984) (5.929) (6.993) (6.659) (5.512)
Dual 0.822∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.266 0.016 −0.060 0.490 −0.532 −0.625
(22.296) (10.766) (8.997) (0.634) (0.002) (0.028) (0.674) (0.647) (0.823)
Prof Buyer −16.094 −16.176 −15.169 −14.325 −12.581 −12.654
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.033) (0.036)
Prof Seller −15.233 −15.441 −15.368 −14.269 −13.028 −13.058
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.012) (0.013)
Prof Both −15.518 −15.790 −15.781 −16.249 −16.522 −15.477
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Intercept −16.643∗∗∗ −31.500 −31.651 −16.562∗∗∗ −18.091∗∗∗ −18.538∗∗∗ −28.929 −39.663 −40.012
(504.289) (0.006) (0.006) (205.341) (127.329) (130.711) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017)
lnsize 1.103∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗ 1.088∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 1.316∗∗∗ 1.274∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗
(264.968) (225.482) (222.489) (50.942) (38.050) (42.220) (31.873) (23.295) (22.832)
age100 −0.430 −0.104 −0.059 −0.127 0.074 0.110 −1.111 0.257 0.482
(2.406) (0.125) (0.040) (0.072) (0.023) (0.049) (0.876) (0.041) (0.142)
age75 −0.724∗∗∗ −0.362 −0.317 0.117 0.287 0.261 −0.788 0.525 0.518
(8.569) (1.879) (1.388) (0.102) (0.545) (0.431) (0.824) (0.310) (0.278)
age50 −0.309 −0.107 −0.088 0.270 0.323 0.316 −0.085 0.758 0.658
(1.414) (0.157) (0.101) (0.474) (0.624) (0.577) (0.008) (0.554) (0.375)
age40 0.194 0.170 0.124 0.201 0.123 0.077 0.503 0.731 0.486
(0.787) (0.547) (0.279) (0.308) (0.108) (0.041) (0.436) (0.762) (0.309)
age30 −0.067 −0.022 −0.049 0.334 0.360 0.309 0.443 0.676 0.448
(0.111) (0.010) (0.052) (1.199) (1.325) (0.937) (0.386) (0.733) (0.300)
age20 0.225 0.222 0.170 0.822∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.942 1.405∗∗ 1.158
(1.620) (1.440) (0.800) (9.820) (10.219) (9.115) (2.363) (4.284) (2.668)
age15 −0.102 −0.077 −0.095 −0.123 −0.057 −0.134 1.274∗ 1.605∗ 1.757∗∗
(0.144) (0.077) (0.115) (0.065) (0.014) (0.074) (2.836) (3.625) (4.052)
age10 0.133 0.089 0.088 0.366 0.326 0.296 1.410∗∗ 1.822∗∗ 1.629∗∗
(0.399) (0.166) (0.155) (1.170) (0.887) (0.712) (4.182) (5.575) (4.143)
age5 −0.022 −0.017 −0.049 0.327 0.338 0.291 0.627 1.044 0.991
(0.011) (0.006) (0.050) (1.035) (1.060) (0.762) (0.765) (1.763) (1.439)
stories −0.044∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.008 0.003 0.005 −0.056∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.006
(41.732) (16.622) (16.831) (0.579) (0.085) (0.251) (7.053) (0.056) (0.063)
A Class 1.478∗∗∗ 1.320∗∗∗ 1.261∗∗∗ 1.538∗∗∗ 1.389∗∗∗ 1.415∗∗∗ 1.551∗ 1.005 0.865
(53.331) (40.470) (36.164) (21.015) (16.403) (16.770) (3.443) (1.323) (0.959)
B Class 0.935∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 1.330∗∗∗ 1.230∗∗∗ 1.248∗∗∗ 0.764 0.348 0.312
(27.708) (20.745) (20.344) (21.170) (17.807) (18.283) (0.984) (0.195) (0.153)
Market Dummies x x x x x x
Sale Condition Controls x x x
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Prof Buyer Prof Seller Prof Both
variable Model10 Model11 Model12 Model13 Model14 Model15 Model16 Model17 Model18
lnland −0.234∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗ 0.004 0.137∗ 0.126∗ −0.568∗∗∗ −0.348∗∗ −0.297∗
(31.707) (7.322) (5.735) (0.003) (3.760) (3.104) (20.440) (5.335) (3.697)
Amenity 0.575∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.890∗ 0.719 0.598
(25.335) (21.319) (18.156) (8.479) (9.586) (10.118) (3.158) (1.924) (1.301)
Year 2002 0.024 0.029 0.050 1.435∗ 1.388∗ 1.350∗ 10.775 8.584 8.632
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (3.180) (2.955) (2.790) (0.003) (0.017) (0.017)
Year 2003 0.174 0.167 0.165 0.877 0.820 0.815 −0.222 −0.457 −0.424
(0.101) (0.092) (0.089) (1.087) (0.942) (0.930) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year 2004 0.876∗ 0.903∗ 0.889∗ 0.421 0.379 0.389 −0.210 −0.218 −0.237
(3.418) (3.588) (3.447) (0.235) (0.189) (0.199) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year 2005 1.814∗∗∗ 1.878∗∗∗ 1.833∗∗∗ −0.067 −0.066 −0.078 11.149 9.124 9.111
(17.266) (18.305) (17.318) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.019) (0.019)
Year 2006 1.882∗∗∗ 1.934∗∗∗ 1.918∗∗∗ 0.875 0.857 0.877 9.960 7.758 7.772
(19.003) (19.845) (19.369) (1.245) (1.188) (1.242) (0.002) (0.013) (0.014)
Year 2007 2.564∗∗∗ 2.653∗∗∗ 2.627∗∗∗ 1.716∗∗ 1.729∗∗ 1.735∗∗ 11.923 9.855 9.890
(36.617) (38.762) (37.701) (5.337) (5.387) (5.413) (0.004) (0.022) (0.022)
Year 2008 3.462∗∗∗ 3.604∗∗∗ 3.600∗∗∗ 3.102∗∗∗ 3.186∗∗∗ 3.210∗∗∗ 13.297 11.619 11.748
(67.980) (72.651) (71.871) (18.579) (19.468) (19.696) (0.004) (0.030) (0.032)
Year 2009 2.935∗∗∗ 3.087∗∗∗ 3.118∗∗∗ 3.215∗∗∗ 3.299∗∗∗ 3.343∗∗∗ 13.610 11.974 11.987
(46.519) (50.716) (51.279) (19.598) (20.475) (20.967) (0.005) (0.032) (0.033)
Year 2010 2.870∗∗∗ 3.081∗∗∗ 3.125∗∗∗ 3.377∗∗∗ 3.500∗∗∗ 3.624∗∗∗ 13.127 11.476 11.550
(44.819) (50.847) (51.458) (21.904) (23.345) (24.889) (0.004) (0.030) (0.030)
Year 2011 2.928∗∗∗ 3.057∗∗∗ 3.070∗∗∗ 3.527∗∗∗ 3.561∗∗∗ 3.716∗∗∗ 13.662 11.936 11.842
(45.296) (48.630) (48.304) (23.583) (23.860) (25.783) (0.005) (0.032) (0.032)
1031 −0.576∗∗∗ −0.078 −1.688
(9.019) (0.084) (2.472)
Assemblage 0.791 0.529 −9.935
(1.389) (0.205) (0.001)
Build to Suit 0.054 0.136 −8.521
(0.005) (0.017) (0.001)
Business Value −0.080 −14.187 −9.741
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Condo Conversion −1.297 −13.935 −10.077
(1.603) (0.000) (0.001)
Contamination 2.132∗ −12.017 −7.588
(3.783) (0.000) (0.000)
Deed Restriction −13.209 −12.892 −6.545
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Deferred Maintenance −0.389 0.250 −10.590
(1.066) (0.316) (0.008)
Distressed Sale −1.134∗∗ −14.144 0.447
(4.283) (0.001) (0.199)
Ground Lease 0.211 −0.636 −0.265
(0.806) (1.883) (0.117)
High Vacancy 0.391∗∗ −0.450 0.292
(4.459) (1.552) (0.213)
Historical −2.012∗ −14.025 −11.642
(3.385) (0.000) (0.001)
Investor NNN 0.462∗ 0.179 0.018
Market Dummies x x x x x x
Sale Condition Controls x x x
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Prof Buyer Prof Seller Prof Both
variable Model10 Model11 Model12 Model13 Model14 Model15 Model16 Model17 Model18
(3.613) (0.185) (0.000)
Land Contract −11.587 −11.501 −6.140
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Option Sale −13.919 0.271 −10.036
(0.001) (0.278) (0.003)
Partial Interest −0.632∗ −0.412 −0.024
(3.336) (0.884) (0.001)
Redevelopment −0.987 −0.151 −9.762
(2.399) (0.040) (0.002)
REO −0.365 −1.518∗∗ −10.988
(1.048) (4.288) (0.005)
Sale Leaseback −0.099 −2.514∗∗ −0.669
(0.187) (6.097) (0.370)
Shell Condition −0.392 −0.458 −9.693
(0.347) (0.194) (0.001)
Short Sale 0.520 −13.329 −8.302
(0.359) (0.000) (0.000)
Single Tenant −0.411∗∗∗ 0.214 −1.968∗
(8.685) (1.515) (3.625)
Tenant Purchase −13.539 0.230 −8.921
(0.004) (0.433) (0.006)
Model N 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515 25, 515
AIC 5, 146 5, 053 5, 008 2, 451 2, 379 2, 380 642 646 669
SIC 5, 398 5, 754 5, 896 2, 703 3, 080 3, 268 895 1, 346 1, 557
Market Dummies x x x x x x
Sale Condition Controls x x x
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6.4. By Market Regression
The clear differences between the OLSDV regressions and the fixed effect regres-
sions merited further investigation beyond the econometric distinctions. What, more
specifically, in the data caused the distinct differences between the fixed effect and
OLSDV regressions?
Since clustering by market generated such different results than linear dummy
variable adjustments, exploring each individual market in detail represented the first
path of investigation. To avoid the issue of different market demand/supply fac-
tors influencing other markets, I individually regressed each market. Results for the
variables of interest are shown for rent in Table 17 and for sales in Tables 18 and 19.
Interestingly, in Model 1 and 2, which are most similar to the extant literature
without the Prof Owner variable, only seven of the markets showed Energy Star as
significant at the 5% level, but South Florida (99N) and Oklahoma City (1N) were
negative signficant!
LEED buildings appeared at 5% or better significance in only three markets, and
at 10% in as little as four markets, depending on the model.
Dual buildings appeared in only four markets, with the professional ownership
control, at 5% or better significance, and at 10% in only seven markets–including
Buffalo (1N) as negative significant.
If only 10% of the markets demonstrated positive ESTAR premiums, what drove
the premiums in the macro regression? The same question held with LEED and Dual
buildings; only a small sample of markets individually demonstrated significant green
premiums.
A few careful observation from the market by market regressions, along with
a close look at the descriptive statistics offered some clues. Looking through the
market by market regressions, several variables appeared to economically unrealistic.
For example, in New York City Dual building market premiums of roughly 50% most
likely derived from characteristics other than simply the Dual label. In San Jose, it
was unlikely that Energy Star buildings command a 20% + market premiums purely
based on the ESTAR label.
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I particularly point out New York City and San Jose (as part of the San Francisco
MSA) because, as shown in Table 4, New York City’s average non-green-building
rent of $50.63 PSF was more than 2/3 higher than the next closest, San Francisco at
$30.20 PSF, and roughly twice as high the third ranked market, Washington DC at
$25.46.10
Buildings in the most expensive and second most expensive MSA’s demonstrated
market premiums unlikely to be wholly accounted for by green labeling. What econo-
metric effect would this have on the green dummies in an OLSDV regression? Even
though these buildings may not appear like total outliers relative to their market
peers, it would be reasonable to assume their impact could be disproportionate on
the green subset.
10Although San Jose is often considered a distinct MSA from San Francisco, I considered Marin
County and San Jose as part of the San Francisco MSA for discussion purposes. The two markets
are less than an hour apart, and leasing decisions may be made between the two markets, and East
Bay/Oakland, by numerous firms.
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Table 17: Each market was individually regressed on lnrent. Results are shown for the sustainable real estate variables of interest,
ESTAR, LEED, and Dual. Results are also shown for the Prof Owner variable. Models 1 and 2 do not include the Prof Owner
variable, Models 3 and 4 do include it. Models 1 and 3 include submarket dummies. Full regression results are presented in the
appendix. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
ESTAR LEED Dual Prof Owner
Market Name N Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 N Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 N Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model3 Model4
Atlanta 112 0.001 0.036 −0.000 0.035 7 0.022 0.102 0.022 0.102 42 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.003
Austin 31 0.000 0.004 0.014 0.017 6 −0.024 −0.131 −0.024 −0.129 12 0.042 0.046 0.058 0.062 −0.032 −0.031
Baltimore 3 0.070 −0.019 0.069 −0.015 10 0.106 0.059 0.106 0.058 2 −0.087 −0.097 −0.086 −0.100 0.002 −0.007
Birmingham 4 −0.036 −0.058 −0.030 −0.047 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.026 −0.039
Boston 29 −0.027 −0.061 −0.050 −0.086 6 0.365∗∗∗ 0.294∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.282∗ 8 0.134 0.010 0.115 −0.014 0.059∗∗ 0.064∗
Buffalo/Niagara Falls 3 0.209 0.207 0.215 0.208 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 −0.439∗ −0.448∗ −0.427∗ −0.445∗ 0.257 0.055
Charlotte 48 0.038 0.015 0.040 0.016 9 −0.038 0.024 −0.036 0.025 7 0.016 0.109 0.020 0.111 −0.005 −0.003
Chicago 145 −0.012 −0.022 −0.004 −0.015 6 0.153 0.169 0.161 0.176 63 0.002 0.034 0.009 0.040 −0.022 −0.018
Cincinnati/Dayton 15 −0.045 −0.069 −0.034 −0.059 6 0.147 0.125 0.149 0.126 2 −0.099 −0.104 −0.092 −0.096 −0.042 −0.041
Cleveland 12 0.040 0.048 0.041 0.046 4 0.177 0.186 0.179 0.181 2 0.081 0.067 0.082 0.067 −0.012 0.046
Columbus 8 0.174∗ 0.162∗ 0.171∗ 0.159 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2 −0.017 −0.021 −0.021 −0.026 0.022 0.024
Dallas/Ft Worth 126 0.045∗∗ 0.023 0.032 0.010 13 0.029 0.077 0.027 0.076 31 0.129∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.031∗
Denver 105 0.071∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.024 0.015 13 −0.023 −0.033 −0.016 −0.031 57 0.065∗ 0.075∗ 0.003 0.016 0.121∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
Detroit 32 0.062 0.053 0.061 0.053 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 0.011 −0.016 0.017 −0.014 0.009 0.003
East Bay/Oakland 47 0.088∗∗ 0.099∗ 0.086∗ 0.092∗ 5 0.127 0.204 0.127 0.204 15 0.042 0.020 0.039 0.009 0.005 0.014
Hampton Roads 14 0.049 0.032 0.063 0.057 2 −0.012 −0.003 −0.005 0.012 1 −0.204 −0.174 −0.185 −0.138 −0.030 −0.046
Hartford 11 0.016 0.033 0.019 0.036 1 0.105 0.124 0.106 0.125 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.051
Houston 122 0.051∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 8 0.056 0.059 0.054 0.055 45 0.112∗∗∗ 0.068 0.118∗∗∗ 0.076∗ −0.029∗ −0.034∗
Indianapolis 18 −0.076 −0.084 −0.090 −0.096 1 0.315 0.339 0.292 0.329 2 0.170 0.154 0.142 0.128 0.080∗ 0.048
Inland Empire (California 25 0.040 0.025 −0.012 −0.034 3 −0.074 −0.104 −0.056 −0.082 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.077∗
Jacksonville (Florida) 8 −0.012 −0.054 −0.020 −0.059 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2 0.026 −0.011 0.029 −0.010 0.022 0.012
Kansas City 14 −0.035 −0.025 −0.035 −0.035 3 0.259∗ 0.255∗ 0.259∗ 0.265∗ 3 0.008 −0.012 0.008 −0.035 0.001 0.040
Las Vegas 5 0.244∗ 0.175 0.220 0.146 5 0.133 0.167 0.133 0.168 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.048
Long Island (New York) 7 0.063 −0.159 0.056 −0.166 1 −0.252 −0.280 −0.241 −0.270 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.035
Los Angeles 238 0.037∗ 0.033 0.030 0.038 11 0.074 0.115 0.072 0.117 54 0.073∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.068 0.139∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.011
Louisville 12 0.002 −0.020 0.008 −0.007 1 0.211 0.241 0.211 0.241 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.011 −0.024
Marin/Sonoma 7 0.149 0.247∗ 0.174 0.281∗∗ 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.114 0.148∗
Memphis 3 0.019 0.060 −0.018 −0.003 1 0.096 0.154 0.065 0.098 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.089 0.135∗∗
Milwaukee/Madison 23 0.030 0.014 0.060 0.057 3 0.091 0.149 0.118 0.189 4 −0.046 −0.011 −0.014 0.033 −0.056 −0.077∗∗
Minneapolis/St Paul 73 −0.031 −0.004 −0.030 −0.004 3 0.001 0.036 −0.002 0.035 23 −0.012 0.012 −0.010 0.013 −0.009 −0.004
Nashville 19 0.039 0.016 0.042 0.020 5 0.101 0.150 0.099 0.145 5 0.060 0.055 0.062 0.057 −0.006 −0.010
New Orleans/ Metairie/ Ke 9 −0.016 0.004 −0.023 −0.005 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.073
New York City 46 0.064 0.050 0.062 0.038 3 0.180 0.350 0.178 0.336 10 0.464∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.011 0.054
Northern New Jersey 30 0.053 0.083 0.046 0.070 2 −0.162 −0.090 −0.164 −0.102 1 0.036 0.042 0.016 0.008 0.030 0.049∗∗
Oklahoma City 1 −0.739∗∗∗ −0.588∗∗ −0.753∗∗∗ −0.615∗∗ 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.033
Orange (CA) 143 0.032 0.040 0.033 0.040 5 0.122 0.223∗ 0.122 0.223∗ 20 −0.036 −0.058 −0.035 −0.058 −0.003 −0.001
Orlando 21 −0.047 −0.072 −0.056 −0.078 3 0.002 0.001 −0.014 −0.015 1 −0.208 −0.404 −0.231 −0.427 0.052∗ 0.037
Philadelphia 54 0.016 0.023 0.007 0.012 6 0.253∗∗ 0.269∗∗ 0.242∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 6 0.036 0.046 0.030 0.038 0.037∗∗ 0.039∗∗
Phoenix 74 0.028 0.056∗ 0.013 0.044 8 −0.064 −0.081 −0.065 −0.081 14 0.039 0.075 0.023 0.063 0.039∗∗ 0.030∗
Pittsburgh 8 0.052 0.060 0.031 0.053 2 0.019 −0.082 0.026 −0.080 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.011
Portland 49 −0.013 0.057 −0.008 0.064 16 0.002 0.016 0.003 0.015 6 −0.021 −0.048 −0.014 −0.041 −0.046∗ −0.060∗∗
Providence 1 0.082 0.076 0.087 0.080 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 −0.296 −0.402 −0.290 −0.399 0.041 0.022
Raleigh/Durham 21 −0.012 −0.010 −0.028 −0.031 2 0.201 0.159 0.192 0.148 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.045
Richmond VA 16 0.024 0.002 0.025 0.003 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.002 −0.009
Sacramento 67 0.096∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗ 4 0.171 0.220∗ 0.171 0.221∗ 17 0.047 0.045 0.058 0.047 −0.025 −0.006
Salt Lake City 10 0.010 0.016 0.036 0.046 1 −0.023 −0.036 0.004 −0.003 1 0.176 0.168 0.200 0.198 −0.035 −0.043
San Antonio 28 0.036 0.046 0.033 0.043 1 0.253 0.252 0.254 0.255 2 0.054 0.080 0.050 0.076 0.020 0.020
San Diego 65 0.060 0.014 0.075∗∗ 0.021 4 0.310∗∗∗ 0.201 0.315∗∗∗ 0.202 11 0.070 0.044 0.084 0.052 −0.039 −0.016
San Francisco 60 −0.013 0.054 −0.013 0.049 3 0.100 0.122 0.100 0.114 40 0.020 0.123 0.020 0.117 0.002 0.030
Seattle/Puget Sound 47 0.008 −0.000 −0.006 −0.019 19 0.086 0.124∗∗ 0.080 0.115∗ 33 −0.012 0.016 −0.027 −0.005 0.031 0.045∗∗
South Bay/San Jose 34 0.114∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.106∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 6 0.038 0.300∗ 0.043 0.311∗ 9 0.350∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗ 0.031 0.040
South Florida 99 −0.042 −0.078∗∗ −0.047∗ −0.085∗∗∗ 10 0.056 0.023 0.056 0.023 21 0.006 0.029 0.000 0.021 0.011 0.015
St. Louis 11 −0.044 −0.021 −0.043 −0.032 4 0.120 0.054 0.119 0.064 1 0.049 −0.097 0.053 −0.119 −0.005 0.032
Tampa/St Petersburg 32 0.014 0.047 0.005 0.021 2 0.017 0.064 0.015 0.059 5 −0.007 0.041 −0.022 −0.001 0.025 0.063∗∗
Washington DC 219 0.011 0.067∗∗∗ 0.008 0.064∗∗∗ 43 0.006 0.097∗∗ 0.003 0.094∗∗ 44 0.019 0.112∗∗∗ 0.015 0.108∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗
Westchester/So Connecticut 9 0.041 0.028 0.035 0.025 1 0.044 0.180 0.044 0.180 1 0.182 0.244 0.159 0.233 0.024 0.012
Submarket Dummies X X X X X X X
Prof Owner Included X X
X X X X X X
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Table 18: Each market was individually regressed on sales PSF. Results are shown for the sustainable real estate variables of interest,
ESTAR, LEED, and Dual. Results are also shown for the Professional ownership variables in Table 19. Model 1 does not include any
market, ownership or sale condition controls. Model 2 adds the Professional Ownership controls. Model 3 adds sale condition controls.
Model 4 adds submarket dummy controls. Full regression results are presented in the appendix.***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels respectively.
ESTAR LEED Dual
Market Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 N Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 N Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 N
Atlanta 28.819∗∗ 28.686∗∗ 24.845∗∗ 9.405 33 −32.254 −32.401 −30.220 −6.911 1 18.760 18.226 17.570 16.529 18
Austin 54.077∗ 59.862∗ 74.861∗∗ 79.877∗∗ 8 213.017∗∗∗ 212.314∗∗∗ 114.608 62.703 2 14.199 18.267 19.740 2.545 3
Baltimore 58.617∗∗ 63.147∗∗ 53.389∗∗ 65.669∗∗ 5 62.820∗∗ 72.545∗∗ 79.569∗∗ 64.648∗ 3 −153.16∗∗∗ −154.72∗∗∗ −147.69∗∗∗ −148.18∗∗∗ 1
Birmingham −129.77∗∗ −129.77∗∗ −122.08∗ −149.98∗ 1 275.026∗∗∗ 275.026∗∗∗ 263.397∗∗∗ 270.119∗∗∗ 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Boston 11.293 3.811 −4.141 −7.331 30 26.521 18.879 4.304 31.113 13 −109.76∗ −124.57∗∗ −148.06∗∗ −83.972∗ 5
Buffalo/Niagara Falls −115.31 −115.31 −116.87 −81.028 1 207.235∗∗∗ 207.235∗∗∗ 171.745∗∗∗ 160.572∗∗∗ 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Charlotte 56.243∗ 54.494 41.212 68.778∗∗ 9 49.659 50.856 52.994 36.236 2 −47.837 −36.257 −48.647 14.935 1
Chicago 17.592 14.373 12.589 20.085∗ 64 116.249∗∗∗ 118.692∗∗∗ 117.008∗∗∗ 114.787∗∗∗ 4 27.443∗ 26.811∗ 25.529∗ 37.933∗∗∗ 37
Cincinnati/Dayton 14.134 16.327 6.932 7.662 6 −6.091 −5.311 13.396 4.007 7 −18.285 −16.395 −9.973 −9.898 1
Cleveland −11.284 −11.284 9.611 22.258 4 −8.049 −10.195 −13.177 −3.047 3 −10.630 −8.954 −0.843 −2.200 1
Columbus 29.489 35.622 35.922 34.551 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.788 5.312 15.840 21.629 1
Dallas/Ft Worth 4.976 4.677 3.356 4.441 42 −11.854 −17.914 −21.622 −24.040 6 27.073 27.725 22.674 17.613 8
Denver 24.869∗∗ 14.468 15.168 11.649 52 39.619∗ 35.473 31.979 45.398∗∗ 8 57.305∗∗∗ 50.660∗∗∗ 53.336∗∗∗ 32.036∗∗ 26
Detroit 55.438∗ 56.077∗ 54.374∗ 62.634∗∗ 3 51.523 53.743 63.180 65.887 1 140.659∗∗∗ 149.317∗∗∗ 149.082∗∗∗ 156.684∗∗∗ 2
East Bay/Oakland −33.946 −32.985 −28.967 −26.749 12 73.980 81.430∗ 62.903 59.900 3 17.535 −32.500 −84.939∗ −60.848 5
Hampton Roads 47.527 77.296∗∗ 86.044∗∗ 26.150 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hartford 55.017 50.608 47.689 85.472 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Houston 10.221 11.305 12.851 7.205 43 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 35.317∗∗∗ 35.211∗∗∗ 36.366∗∗∗ 36.134∗∗∗ 21
Indianapolis −65.601 −27.843 −75.918 −66.542 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Inland Empire (California 47.874 46.236 60.919 34.994 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Jacksonville (Florida) 15.937 11.977 5.505 8.543 5 −46.786 −46.347 −41.857 −57.101 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kansas City 30.676 34.823 49.656∗∗ 51.902∗∗ 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 56.957 59.810 52.187 58.177 1
Las Vegas 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −108.30 −108.00 −111.14 −113.26 1
Long Island (New York) 64.959 61.775 109.580 143.500∗ 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Los Angeles 45.529∗∗∗ 45.182∗∗∗ 47.300∗∗∗ 29.018∗∗∗ 79 98.937∗∗∗ 100.145∗∗∗ 95.705∗∗∗ 72.174∗∗∗ 9 68.641∗∗∗ 66.482∗∗∗ 70.527∗∗∗ 52.243∗∗∗ 19
Louisville 157.655∗ 159.875∗ 170.318∗∗ 195.480∗∗ 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Marin/Sonoma 68.055 68.055 66.730 79.524 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Memphis 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Milwaukee/Madison −34.120 −62.138∗ −48.605 −46.865 9 67.487 56.913 47.453 67.118 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Minneapolis/St Paul 17.539 18.391 16.525 17.192 22 42.601∗ 43.882∗ 35.381 43.097∗ 5 −15.342 −24.396 −35.568 −28.029 7
Nashville −60.967 −93.470 −93.299 −61.209 1 94.402 97.598 64.739 55.927 2 22.445 24.755 11.177 −19.268 1
New Orleans/Metairie/Ke 40.096 52.372 68.390 68.386 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
New York City 11.455 −9.525 −1.209 22.084 43 57.026 50.795 27.535 28.883 6 26.682 31.410 29.831 18.687 12
Northern New Jersey 34.744∗∗∗ 32.909∗∗∗ 32.561∗∗∗ 32.545∗∗∗ 31 81.698∗∗ 75.567∗∗ 75.885∗∗ 85.373∗∗ 3 30.364 32.576 29.821 24.211 7
Oklahoma City 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 150.815∗∗ 150.381∗ 149.612∗∗ 148.039∗∗ 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Orange (California) 71.335∗∗∗ 68.900∗∗∗ 62.524∗∗∗ 46.262∗∗∗ 27 −34.424 −32.879 −35.626 −33.699 1 80.576∗∗∗ 83.952∗∗∗ 76.111∗∗ 63.412∗∗ 9
Orlando −7.489 −13.761 −11.717 −12.398 15.000 49.771 47.808 63.454 33.037 3 33.280 37.574 48.224 46.405 3
Philadelphia −0.395 −2.410 −3.594 1.139 22 38.798 51.003 62.569 93.878∗∗ 3 −34.483 −40.055 −40.830 −44.867 4
Phoenix 39.030∗∗∗ 40.188∗∗∗ 36.560∗∗∗ 23.583∗∗ 34 21.518 19.060 −46.969 −82.599 2 134.989∗∗∗ 136.831∗∗∗ 129.408∗∗∗ 103.499∗∗∗ 7
Pittsburgh 15.537 17.619 34.170 51.315 2 46.830 49.189 46.378 35.844 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Portland 30.328 28.330 29.146 14.955 12 5.032 3.101 3.693 1.441 9 −49.128 −52.345 −32.578 −28.012 3
Providence 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.869 11.869 −1.062 −8.818 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Raleigh/Durham 50.891 6.817 43.682 45.719 3 −65.279 −59.346 −78.343 −83.250 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Richmond VA −10.524 −11.572 −23.850 −52.083 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sacramento 25.024 30.856∗ 20.164 27.849∗ 24 11.394 10.053 11.944 6.122 2 3.726 6.073 16.471 20.973 6
Salt Lake City 4.645 4.645 −124.12 568.584 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
San Antonio −5.295 −3.297 −11.239 30.907 6 22.280 27.403 −2.462 1.643 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
San Diego −7.852 −16.012 −14.884 −6.224 30 16.260 15.694 19.135 13.701 5 10.996 6.368 11.595 −4.711 6
San Francisco 56.148∗∗ 58.557∗∗ 66.803∗∗∗ 48.057∗∗ 40 66.969 66.887 106.580∗ 77.706 4 123.433∗∗∗ 128.159∗∗∗ 132.070∗∗∗ 104.090∗∗∗ 17
Seattle/Puget Sound 43.978∗ 39.122 37.561 26.479 14 60.244∗∗ 69.354∗∗ 84.783∗∗∗ 81.985∗∗∗ 11 37.632 24.844 21.631 2.696 8
South Bay/San Jose 55.351 34.577 −9.205 27.534 7 516.919∗∗∗ 540.860∗∗∗ 512.544∗∗∗ 213.937∗∗ 4 35.594 10.360 49.294 −86.603 1
South Florida 15.635 13.375 14.937 25.658 37 −3.907 −1.779 −16.894 −10.099 6 65.672∗∗ 62.943∗∗ 59.473∗∗ 68.033∗∗∗ 14
St. Louis 9.862 2.994 3.680 7.814 7 102.796∗ 98.959∗ 84.814∗ 109.600∗∗ 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tampa/St Petersburg 35.261 29.600 27.434 29.058 9 12.116 −37.008 −14.768 −28.759 1 33.606 −20.605 −36.936 −29.048 2
Washington DC 59.606∗∗∗ 54.273∗∗∗ 58.549∗∗∗ 47.698∗∗∗ 108 130.363∗∗∗ 116.534∗∗∗ 123.219∗∗∗ 84.493∗∗∗ 17 65.978∗∗∗ 69.910∗∗∗ 72.860∗∗∗ 59.215∗∗∗ 37
Westchester/So Connecticu −1.128 −1.610 0.443 −3.412 2 −78.172 −78.579 −77.396 −59.131 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prof Owner Controls x x x x x x x x x
Sale Condition Controls x x x x x x
Submarket Dummy Controls x x x
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Table 19: Extension of Table 18, showing Professional ownership variables. Model 1 omitted. Model 2 includes the Professional
Ownership controls, but no sale condition or submarket controls. Model 3 adds sale condition controls. Model 4 adds submarket
dummy controls. Results are the regression coefficient(T-Value).***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Prof Buyer Prof Seller Prof Both
Market Model2 Model3 Model4 N Model2 Model3 Model4 N Model2 Model3 Model4 N
Atlanta 2.197 5.543 7.010 46 20.162 22.365 28.787∗ 12 61.191 56.020 30.692 1
Austin −90.093 −86.515 −127.59∗ 1 76.014 68.065 51.931 1 0.000 0.000 0.000
Baltimore −17.186 −20.020 −19.961 12 −19.192 −19.610 −11.006 6 0.000 0.000 0.000
Birmingham 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Boston 54.979∗∗∗ 57.890∗∗∗ 20.775 34 78.861∗ 70.123 39.379 5 0.000 0.000 0.000
Buffalo/Niagara Falls 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Charlotte 1.795 21.173 6.103 10 46.739 110.114 94.473 1 53.690 53.614 39.389 1
Chicago 16.212 17.234 12.427 36 21.415 21.563 9.299 22 36.763 35.779 38.943 8
Cincinnati/Dayton 12.113 1.053 14.113 4 36.928 40.181 43.844 4 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cleveland 7.788 26.585 25.499 5 2.503 18.201 22.323 2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Columbus −14.070 −10.631 −8.096 5 −48.637 −48.860 −47.172 1 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dallas/Ft Worth 8.483 6.772 8.593 28 −17.697 −9.784 −8.645 3 40.811 28.047 39.835 2
Denver 34.232∗∗∗ 32.697∗∗∗ 29.005∗∗∗ 50 31.608∗ 30.740∗ 21.009 12 2.089 3.123 12.993 6
Detroit 76.644∗∗ 82.676∗∗∗ 75.225∗∗∗ 3 28.103 41.721 31.528 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
East Bay/Oakland 96.159∗∗∗ 118.739∗∗∗ 108.703∗∗∗ 7 107.370∗ 80.762 115.413∗∗ 2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hampton Roads 14.415 11.023 23.929 9 −12.984 −14.839 −19.069 2 −106.50∗ −96.483∗ −43.137 1
Hartford −9.978 −27.572 14.985 1 −31.258 −30.780 −29.512 1 0.000 0.000 0.000
Houston 3.606 5.659 3.225 33 25.205∗∗ 24.211∗∗ 20.967∗ 15 −45.253 −32.017 −19.824 2
Indianapolis −135.93 21.049 7.737 4 14.641 −7.183 −14.922 5 0.000 0.000 0.000
Inland Empire (California −22.825 −19.969 −17.589 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Jacksonville (Florida) 3.556 7.449 7.544 4 14.832 19.027 15.954 2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kansas City −10.238 −25.461 −21.767 6 4.983 −0.841 −8.868 7 0.000 0.000 0.000
Las Vegas 46.886 27.455 17.616 4 −69.987 −68.587 −71.842 1 0.000 0.000 0.000
Long Island (New York) 4.683 −15.360 5.004 9 84.090 89.886 55.258 3 70.423 83.991 103.053 1
Los Angeles 11.886 10.095 −2.886 52 62.892∗∗ 56.366∗ 54.096∗∗ 10 −66.279 −46.188 −4.653 3
Louisville 38.900 51.352 63.865 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Marin/Sonoma 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Memphis 4.726 35.223 66.137 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Milwaukee/Madison 57.754 55.363 62.603 5 10.090 17.333 2.832 4 0.000 0.000 0.000
Minneapolis/St Paul 16.093 18.308 16.695 16 30.079 17.440 25.193 1 45.867 45.892 47.890 2
Nashville 39.656 26.002 62.360 2 24.027 0.684 3.510 2 0.000 0.000 0.000
New Orleans/Metairie/Ke −15.533 −22.054 −6.536 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
New York City 202.147∗∗∗ 200.942∗∗∗ 114.378∗∗ 45 93.117 96.095 91.194 22 810.693∗∗ 811.403∗∗ 523.263 1
Northern New Jersey 24.309∗ 19.286 9.024 23 58.133∗ 46.411 40.666 4 24.365 22.865 31.370 1
Oklahoma City −10.458 −56.957 −89.533 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Orange (California) −4.712 −9.701 13.356 11 31.310 18.944 −2.172 4 119.836 114.430 90.497 1
Orlando 34.591 35.103 21.739 9 12.424 −14.070 −16.692 2 15.492 −42.079 −6.013 1
Philadelphia 37.209∗∗∗ 36.082∗∗∗ 21.052∗ 26 −2.252 −0.519 −3.141 22 −23.823 −24.243 −48.469 2
Phoenix −8.880 −4.249 −3.648 36 −11.605 −19.915 −10.131 9 −93.259 −93.274 −142.51∗∗ 1
Pittsburgh 8.551 34.799 44.471 3 46.136 42.777 39.738 1 0.000 0.000 0.000
Portland 22.841 18.551 8.858 13 13.520 −13.789 −19.591 2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Providence 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Raleigh/Durham 71.984∗∗∗ 73.181∗∗∗ 79.892∗∗∗ 10 65.997∗∗ 65.322∗∗ 47.667 5 30.876 30.543 −0.546 1
Richmond VA −30.241 −36.156 −43.271 3 11.336 18.990 23.453 1 −67.042 −78.637 −34.799 1
Sacramento −38.593∗ −27.577 −31.861 10 −24.908 −29.688 −38.705 3 0.000 0.000 0.000
Salt Lake City 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
San Antonio 8.472 11.462 15.336 8 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
San Diego 51.552∗∗∗ 54.836∗∗∗ 57.004∗∗∗ 24 −13.682 −1.002 −0.771 7 9.831 12.156 −4.304 1
San Francisco −17.482 −16.535 −8.805 23 11.009 −12.574 −24.481 5 13.189 6.238 17.893 1
Seattle/Puget Sound 34.738∗ 35.334∗ 22.463 26 48.528∗ 53.538∗∗ 21.036 11 126.987∗∗∗ 136.987∗∗∗ 100.766∗∗ 4
South Bay/San Jose 176.139∗∗∗ 189.848∗∗∗ 161.594∗∗∗ 6 502.423∗∗∗ 488.397∗∗∗ 291.867∗∗∗ 2 0.000 0.000 0.000
South Florida 22.044 22.306 31.116∗ 29 320.822∗∗∗ 325.140∗∗∗ 348.640∗∗∗ 1 0.000 0.000 0.000
St. Louis 49.156∗∗ 50.659∗∗ 23.218 10 21.056 25.994 −0.360 8 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tampa/St Petersburg 50.911∗∗ 55.896∗∗ 53.889∗∗ 9 −3.942 −4.925 −11.999 2 71.458 75.546 75.225 1
Washington DC 43.649∗∗∗ 43.424∗∗∗ 32.590∗∗∗ 129 71.299∗∗∗ 75.577∗∗∗ 65.746∗∗∗ 48 86.790∗∗∗ 95.447∗∗∗ 61.394∗∗∗ 24
Westchester/So Connecticu 0.000 0.000 0.000 −10.031 −16.268 −15.098 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sale Condition Controls x x x x x x
Submarket Dummy Controls x x x
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Using just OLSDV regressions, as per the extant literature, I examined the impact of removing certain
markets from the whole country regression in Table 20. New York City was removed first, and then San
Jose. Several other markets like Washington DC, San Diego, or Boston may also strongly impact results in an
OLSDV regression, but only the effect of these two were reported to conserve space.
Models 1 and 2 repeat the earlier regression including submarket controls with and without Prof Owner
for ease of comparison in the table. Model 3 and 4 omitted all New York City buildings, with and without the
Prof Owner variable. Model 5 and 6 omitted all San Francisco buildings, with and without the Prof Owner
variable. Models 7 and 8 omitted both the New York City and San Jose buildings, with and without the Prof
Owner variable.
Removing either market with the Prof Owner dropped the significance of ESTAR to 10%. More importantly,
removing just the two highest nominal markets removed the significance of ESTAR altogether, when the Prof
Owner variable was included, and to just 10% significance without the Prof Owner variable. Even replicating
prior work, in the form of OLSDV, yielded significantly different results via the omission of just two markets.
Importantly those markets did not disproportionately adjust the N of ESTAR or LEED buildings.
This brief examination of the impact of one or two market provided further support for the argument that
linear adjustments to rent in the form of dummy variables may bias the results. Fixed effects models more
accurately control for market level effects in large national databases, like CoStar.
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Table 20: Models 1 and 2 repeat the earlier regression with submarket controls with and without prof owner
for display purposes. Model 3 and 4 omits all New York City buildings, with and without the Prof Owner
variable. Model 5 and 6 omits all San Jose buildings, with and without the Prof Owner variable. Models 7
and 8 omit both the New York City and San Jose buildings, with and without the Prof Owner variable. ***,**,*
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8
ESTAR 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.010
(2.934) (2.124) (2.665) (1.823) (2.718) (1.945) (2.444) (1.638)
LEED 0.099∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(6.270) (6.222) (6.122) (6.073) (6.071) (6.024) (5.919) (5.872)
Dual 0.035∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.015
(3.080) (2.649) (2.119) (1.671) (2.725) (2.316) (1.750) (1.324)
Prof Owner 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(3.727) (3.889) (3.565) (3.725)
Intercept 2.838∗∗∗ 2.852∗∗∗ 2.826∗∗∗ 2.841∗∗∗ 2.837∗∗∗ 2.850∗∗∗ 2.825∗∗∗ 2.839∗∗∗
(65.340) (65.425) (65.933) (66.030) (65.296) (65.366) (65.898) (65.980)
lnsize 0.030∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(15.131) (14.278) (15.642) (14.762) (15.108) (14.286) (15.628) (14.780)
age100 −0.166∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗
(−20.256) (−20.284) (−20.140) (−20.173) (−20.232) (−20.257) (−20.123) (−20.154)
age75 −0.176∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗
(−23.694) (−23.720) (−22.699) (−22.719) (−23.585) (−23.609) (−22.587) (−22.605)
age50 −0.194∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗
(−26.921) (−26.958) (−27.025) (−27.066) (−26.739) (−26.774) (−26.846) (−26.885)
age40 −0.177∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗
(−28.403) (−28.465) (−28.682) (−28.745) (−28.205) (−28.266) (−28.485) (−28.548)
age30 −0.174∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗
(−34.045) (−34.138) (−34.566) (−34.665) (−33.856) (−33.945) (−34.384) (−34.479)
age20 −0.153∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗
(−33.391) (−33.550) (−33.854) (−34.023) (−33.329) (−33.479) (−33.800) (−33.961)
age15 −0.087∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗
(−11.226) (−11.354) (−11.408) (−11.544) (−11.181) (−11.304) (−11.366) (−11.495)
age10 −0.084∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗
(−14.755) (−14.910) (−14.879) (−15.043) (−14.577) (−14.726) (−14.700) (−14.859)
age5 −0.027∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(−4.976) (−5.041) (−4.965) (−5.034) (−4.847) (−4.907) (−4.833) (−4.898)
Renovated 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(8.165) (8.212) (7.642) (7.688) (8.238) (8.282) (7.715) (7.757)
Percent Leased 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(20.282) (20.342) (20.457) (20.520) (20.205) (20.262) (20.381) (20.441)
stories 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(5.125) (5.231) (6.282) (6.393) (5.102) (5.205) (6.263) (6.370)
A Class 0.233∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(43.265) (42.894) (42.861) (42.471) (43.071) (42.713) (42.673) (42.296)
B Class 0.113∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(35.431) (35.358) (35.543) (35.464) (35.403) (35.332) (35.522) (35.445)
NNN −0.102∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗
(−28.890) (−28.935) (−29.253) (−29.302) (−28.928) (−28.970) (−29.298) (−29.344)
FSG 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(35.145) (35.139) (35.639) (35.630) (35.245) (35.237) (35.750) (35.739)
Amenity 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(2.023) (1.950) (2.130) (2.054) (2.049) (1.977) (2.157) (2.083)
R Square 0.609 0.609 0.580 0.580 0.608 0.608 0.577 0.578
ESTAR N 2473 2473 2427 2427 2413 2413 2367 2367
LEED N 278 275 272 272 272 272 269 269
Dual N 628 618 608 608 578 578 568 568
Markets Removed N/A N/A No NYC No NYC No SJ No SJ No NYC No NYC
or SJ or SJ
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Notes on Sale Condition Controls
Although not primary to the research topics of this paper, the evidence presented in the sale price and
logistic regressions on the sale condition controls provided rich avenues for discussion and future research.
Several results were intuitive, such as the sale price reduction for Distressed Sale, REO, or Short Sale,
but some findings open up areas for future research. 1031 exchanges tended to increase price, but professional
buyers were less likely to be involved in one. Professional buyers tended to avoid single tenant buildings, despite
their ease of operation. What were the driver for the investor NNN premium, and to what does it correlate?
The initial findings here with respect to sale condition factors offer a starting point for further research.
7. Robustness Checks
7.1. Non Parametric Test
The subject research questioned whether green buildings labels, in and of themselves, caused rental and
sales premiums. Professional management was shown to impact rent and sales prices. Another potential
explanation for green premiums is that green buildings contain similar characteristics to non-green buildings
that generate premium rent for other reasons. In other words, if the green label were ignored, would eco-
buildings be otherwise statistically similar to premium buildings in the market? Comparing non-green high
rent buildings to green buildings tests whether the eco label itself drives the premium. The results provide
limited support for this theory.
I tested this hypothesis through a series of non-parametric tests. Results are shown in Tables 21 and 22.
Green buildings, ESTAR, LEED, and Dual were examined independently in three different ways. First all
green buildings were separated into a subset, and all non-green buildings into a subset.
I regressed the non-green subset in two sets of rent estimations and two sets of sale estimations. The
purpose was to subset as described below, using the different methods outlined in the body of the paper.
Model 1 was an OLSDV regression with basic controls, market dummies, and no green variable dummies or
ownership/buyer/seller control variables. Model 2 mirrored Model, except using fixed effects instead of market
dummies. Models 3 and 4 add the professional ownership/buyer/seller controls for OLSDV and fixed effects
respectively.
The two-fold purpose of this process was to first create a high-rent/sales subset by using the residuals from
these regressions. Those buildings whose observed rent exceeded their expected rent by certain criteria were
considered market premium buildings. Second, using the regression coefficients from the non-green regression,
I estimated expected rent and sales from the green dataset.
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With this, I was able to generate market premium subsets to compare building attributes, and also residuals
from the market premium to compare with the green set.
I ran three sets of comparisons, all shown in Tables 21 and 22. Results are the Kruskal-Wallis test for
differences between the two samples for the subject variable (ESTAR, LEED, Dual, Green). First, as a baseline,
I compared the green characteristics to the entire non-green data set. As expected, building characteristics
from the general population were statistically different than green buildings across the board.
The next two comparisons were designed to specifically test whether premium rent or sales building were
similar to green buildings. In the second comparison, I compared the green set to the building with the highest
20%, or the top quintile of residuals from the non-green regression, or the market premium buildings.
Tests of specific building characteristics such as size and age all appeared as unique. As a whole, the
premium 20% buildings did not share the same characteristics as the green buildings.
Finally, I created a data set that, rather than top percentage of residuals, included all residuals whose actual
rent exceeded expected by 8% or more and sales by 16% or more. Although admittedly somewhat arbitrary,
I chose 8% and 16% as the upper bounds of the reasonable findings in the extant literature. Here again, the
green and non-green premium sets appear to be statistically different.
Although one model indicated potential similarity, the findings did not indicate that green buildings as
a group shared common characteristics with buildings that, for other reasons, generated premium rent in a
market.
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Table 21: This table presents results from nonparametric tests comparing the attributes of green buildings to
three sets of non-green buildings. The first set compared green buildings to all buildings. The second and
third sets estimated premiums using different regression models. Model 1 was an OLSDV regression with basic
controls, market dummies, and no green variable dummies or ownership/buyer/seller control variables. Model
2 mirrored Model, except using fixed effects instead of market dummies. Models 3 and 4 add the professional
ownership/buyer/seller controls for OLSDV and fixed effects respectively. The second set compared green to
the non-green buildings whose residuals of expected rent less observed rent were the top 20% of the sample.
The third set compared green to the non-green buildings whose residuals of expected rent less observed rent
exceeded 8% for rent or 16% for sales. Results are the Kruskal-Wallis test for differences between the two
samples for the subject variable. The null is no difference. This table is continued in Table 22. ***,**,* represent
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Class ESTAR Class LEED
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Green to whole non-green data Set
Lnrent 1336.40∗∗∗ 1336.40∗∗∗ 303.261∗∗∗ 303.261∗∗∗
PSF 534.201∗∗∗ 534.201∗∗∗ 56.048∗∗∗ 56.048∗∗∗
Y Residuals 3.895∗∗ 4.175∗∗ 287.544∗∗∗ 70.298∗∗∗ 80.499∗∗∗ 59.739∗∗∗ 40.649∗∗∗ 44.721∗∗∗
LnSize 4034.25∗∗∗ 4034.25∗∗∗ 1863.64∗∗∗ 1863.64∗∗∗ 336.399∗∗∗ 336.399∗∗∗ 133.034∗∗∗ 133.034∗∗∗
LnAge 104.960∗∗∗ 104.960∗∗∗ 139.116∗∗∗ 139.116∗∗∗ 480.810∗∗∗ 480.810∗∗∗ 42.924∗∗∗ 42.924∗∗∗
Stories 2915.69∗∗∗ 2915.69∗∗∗ 1402.37∗∗∗ 1402.37∗∗∗ 242.813∗∗∗ 242.813∗∗∗ 69.638∗∗∗ 69.638∗∗∗
Green to top 20% of residuals from non-green
Lnrent 86.161∗∗∗ 590.958∗∗∗ 23.679∗∗∗ 0.388
PSF 120.353∗∗∗ 285.634∗∗∗ 10.543∗∗∗ 24.157∗∗∗
Y Residuals 3449.03∗∗∗ 2994.40∗∗∗ 588.719∗∗∗ 760.973∗∗∗ 127.911∗∗∗ 120.310∗∗∗ 21.401∗∗∗ 25.723∗∗∗
LnSize 2936.33∗∗∗ 2769.09∗∗∗ 1230.06∗∗∗ 1289.57∗∗∗ 196.963∗∗∗ 181.582∗∗∗ 51.624∗∗∗ 56.565∗∗∗
LnAge 21.349∗∗∗ 73.882∗∗∗ 59.357∗∗∗ 59.686∗∗∗ 432.720∗∗∗ 449.018∗∗∗ 32.073∗∗∗ 32.536∗∗∗
Stories 1858.60∗∗∗ 1542.33∗∗∗ 876.492∗∗∗ 914.928∗∗∗ 115.881∗∗∗ 90.606∗∗∗ 18.337∗∗∗ 20.871∗∗∗
Green to residuals with 8% rent or 16% sales premium from non-green
Lnrent 96.900∗∗∗ 521.650∗∗∗ 21.138∗∗∗ 0.995
PSF 3.593∗ 41.864∗∗∗ 0.330 3.787∗
Y Residuals 3418.60∗∗∗ 2993.05∗∗∗ 289.085∗∗∗ 512.055∗∗∗ 132.511∗∗∗ 120.710∗∗∗ 9.918∗∗∗ 8.650∗∗∗
LnSize 2794.42∗∗∗ 2849.36∗∗∗ 1419.79∗∗∗ 1499.25∗∗∗ 178.901∗∗∗ 188.211∗∗∗ 71.351∗∗∗ 78.865∗∗∗
LnAge 25.509∗∗∗ 83.641∗∗∗ 107.346∗∗∗ 72.231∗∗∗ 435.834∗∗∗ 450.588∗∗∗ 37.433∗∗∗ 31.963∗∗∗
Stories 1747.45∗∗∗ 1617.66∗∗∗ 1063.81∗∗∗ 1178.04∗∗∗ 102.462∗∗∗ 96.388∗∗∗ 33.647∗∗∗ 43.153∗∗∗
Market Dummies X X X X
Fixed Effects X X X X
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Table 22: This table continues Table 21. This table presents results from nonparametric tests comparing
the attributes of green buildings to three sets of non-green buildings. The first set compared green buildings
to all buildings. The second and third sets estimated premiums using different regression models. Model
1 was an OLSDV regression with basic controls, market dummies, and no green variable dummies or own-
ership/buyer/seller control variables. Model 2 mirrored Model, except using fixed effects instead of market
dummies. Models 3 and 4 add the professional ownership/buyer/seller controls for OLSDV and fixed effects
respectively. The second set compared green to the non-green buildings whose residuals of expected rent less
observed rent were the top 20% of the sample. The third set compared green to the non-green buildings whose
residuals of expected rent less observed rent exceeded 8% for rent or 16% for sales. Results are the Kruskal-
Wallis test for differences between the two samples for the subject variable. The null is no difference. ***,**,*
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Class Dual Class Green
variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Green to whole non-green data Set
Lnrent 560.097∗∗∗ 560.097∗∗∗ 2233.09∗∗∗ 2233.09∗∗∗
PSF 259.162∗∗∗ 259.162∗∗∗ 859.229∗∗∗ 859.229∗∗∗
Y Residuals 9.777∗∗∗ 6.939∗∗∗ 182.512∗∗∗ 17.776∗∗∗ 33.106∗∗∗ 8.338∗∗∗ 511.600∗∗∗ 126.284∗∗∗
LnSize 1458.59∗∗∗ 1458.59∗∗∗ 689.111∗∗∗ 689.111∗∗∗ 5970.94∗∗∗ 5970.94∗∗∗ 2714.75∗∗∗ 2714.75∗∗∗
LnAge 83.784∗∗∗ 83.784∗∗∗ 67.509∗∗∗ 67.509∗∗∗ 377.769∗∗∗ 377.769∗∗∗ 253.187∗∗∗ 253.187∗∗∗
Stories 1264.88∗∗∗ 1264.88∗∗∗ 642.587∗∗∗ 642.587∗∗∗ 4497.87∗∗∗ 4497.87∗∗∗ 2101.32∗∗∗ 2101.32∗∗∗
Green to top 20% of residuals from non-green
Lnrent 17.205∗∗∗ 5.409∗∗ 21.806∗∗∗ 517.604∗∗∗
PSF 0.065 9.565∗∗∗ 116.043∗∗∗ 321.878∗∗∗
Y Residuals 657.952∗∗∗ 682.268∗∗∗ 38.460∗∗∗ 160.070∗∗∗ 4772.50∗∗∗ 4304.06∗∗∗ 662.621∗∗∗ 1027.40∗∗∗
LnSize 1171.83∗∗∗ 1147.48∗∗∗ 533.535∗∗∗ 546.024∗∗∗ 4919.51∗∗∗ 4674.78∗∗∗ 1990.22∗∗∗ 2078.96∗∗∗
LnAge 40.211∗∗∗ 65.120∗∗∗ 35.819∗∗∗ 35.992∗∗∗ 202.440∗∗∗ 352.756∗∗∗ 139.968∗∗∗ 140.916∗∗∗
Stories 966.120∗∗∗ 896.841∗∗∗ 472.840∗∗∗ 482.522∗∗∗ 3313.52∗∗∗ 2824.45∗∗∗ 1454.04∗∗∗ 1513.54∗∗∗
Green to residuals with 8% rent or 16% sales premium from non-green
Lnrent 14.480∗∗∗ 3.033∗ 29.480∗∗∗ 442.403∗∗∗
PSF 34.646∗∗∗ 4.696∗∗ 22.360∗∗∗ 26.147∗∗∗
Y Residuals 632.844∗∗∗ 681.420∗∗∗ 4.446∗∗ 110.799∗∗∗ 4857.76∗∗∗ 4309.94∗∗∗ 275.108∗∗∗ 647.740∗∗∗
LnSize 1126.70∗∗∗ 1158.05∗∗∗ 583.048∗∗∗ 598.236∗∗∗ 4830.89∗∗∗ 4798.94∗∗∗ 2201.84∗∗∗ 2317.35∗∗∗
LnAge 42.728∗∗∗ 69.033∗∗∗ 53.938∗∗∗ 41.044∗∗∗ 227.872∗∗∗ 377.618∗∗∗ 214.860∗∗∗ 155.060∗∗∗
Stories 925.649∗∗∗ 912.147∗∗∗ 533.257∗∗∗ 561.156∗∗∗ 3222.88∗∗∗ 2945.52∗∗∗ 1693.36∗∗∗ 1865.38∗∗∗
Market Dummies X X X X
Fixed Effects X X X X
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7.2. Heckman Selection Model
To further examine the question of model endogeneity, I employed Heckman sam-
ple selection models. In order to fit two stage model, I had to simplify the parameters
from my OLSDV and fixed effect regression models. The use of a lnage variable, rather
than categorical age was the most notable change.
I tested the rent data both with, and without the Prof Owner variable in the
first stage equation. Results are shown in Tables 23 and 24. I tested four variables
for sample selection endogeneity. ESTAR, LEED, and Dual certified buildings were
tested independently and also collectively as “Green”.
ρ displays the test for sample selection endogeneity, with the null defined as no
sample bias. Thus a statistically significant ρ indicated sample bias.
Interestingly, evidence of sample bias changed with the inclusion of the Prof Owner
variable. Sample bias did appear in the first test series, Table 23, without Prof
Owner. ESTAR and Dual buildings both demonstrated sample selection bias, and
only LEED buildings did not. Given my earlier results, and the theoretical basis for
missing variables, it was not surprising that the green data set results implied some
endogeneity in the extant literature models.
However, when I included the Prof Owner variable in the first stage estimation in
Table 24, evidence of green building sample bias disappeared. This finding supported
the theoretical inclusion of professional ownership variables in the rent estimations,
and supported my argument that prior work may have suffered endogeneity or missing
variable issues.
The Sales data was tested with professional ownership variables in Table 25. Sev-
eral estimations without the professional ownership variables did not converge, and
results are not reported. However, even with the ownership related variables in place,
the green building sample appeared to have sample bias. Each green building type
individually also showed signs of sample bias.
Again, this is not a surprising result. Although, the exact cause of the sample bias
is an area for further research, earlier results suggested that Professional Buyers looked
to purchase more eco-buildings than non eco-buildings. Increased buyer demand could
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potentially cause green buildings to be over represented in the sales data relative to
the general population.
Table 23: This table presents results from a Heckman two stage test for selection
bias. This table test the rent data Each green variable, ESTAR, LEED, and Dual
was tested. In addition, green variables as a collective were tested for selection bias.
ρ test for selection bias where the null is no bias. Results are the likelihood estimates.
***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Lnrent Green Estar Leed Dual
variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model1b Model2b Model3b Model4b
ρ −0.286∗∗∗ −0.003 0.937∗∗∗ −0.222
(−2.801) (.) (41.111) (−1.173)
Intercept 3.353∗∗∗ 2.593 −1.152∗∗ 1.874∗∗ −9.555∗∗∗ −8.432∗∗∗ −5.311∗∗∗ −14.325
(9.806) (.) (−2.083) (2.309) (−58.267) (−50.983) (−13.121) (−0.183)
lnsize −0.005 0.017 0.273∗∗∗ 0.111∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗
(−0.213) (.) (6.851) (1.892) (48.377) (36.977) (10.996) (27.626)
lnage −0.073∗∗∗ −0.021∗ −0.429∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.052∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ −0.668∗∗∗ −0.037
(−7.927) (−1.658) (−7.915) (−0.635) (−3.627) (6.503) (−21.563) (−1.339)
A Class −0.076 0.066∗∗∗ 0.570∗ 1.212∗∗∗ 1.233∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 4.345
(−1.045) (2.869) (1.902) (17.497) (17.651) (3.090) (0.056)
B Class −0.104 −0.028 0.362 0.601∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.469∗ 3.782
(−1.627) (−0.551) (1.246) (8.976) (9.903) (1.769) (0.048)
Renovated −0.122∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗ −0.036
(−5.841) (−2.829) (−2.151) (−0.723)
Percent Leased 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002
(6.666) (7.068) (2.688) (.)
stories 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002
(6.100) (6.103) (0.359) (.)
NNN −0.226∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗ −0.233∗∗∗
(−12.715) (−11.957) (−2.276) (−5.929)
FSG 0.123∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(8.947) (8.827) (2.238) (2.668)
σ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(38.899) (70.321) (9.857) (22.076)
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Table 24: This table presents results from a Heckman two stage test for selection
bias. This table test the rent data Each green variable, ESTAR, LEED, and Dual
was tested. In addition, green variables as a collective were tested for selection bias. ρ
tests for selection bias where the null is no bias. Results are the likelihood estimates.
***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Lnrent Green Estar Leed Dual
variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model1b Model2b Model3b Model4b
ρ 0.034 −0.028 0.940∗∗∗ −0.065
(0.433) (−0.375) (44.363) (−0.392)
Prof Owner 0.807∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ −0.074 0.544∗∗∗
(34.245) (31.904) (−1.528) (12.102)
Intercept 2.441∗∗∗ 2.658∗∗∗ −1.197∗∗ 1.298∗ −8.928∗∗∗ −7.801∗∗∗ −5.404∗∗∗ −15.356∗∗∗
(9.983) (11.940) (−2.185) (1.870) (−51.714) (−44.502) (−13.214) (−71.376)
lnsize 0.052∗∗∗ 0.014 0.275∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗
(3.096) (0.888) (6.957) (2.965) (41.687) (30.104) (11.102) (25.646)
lnage −0.076∗∗∗ −0.022 −0.431∗∗∗ −0.022 −0.093∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ −0.664∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗
(−8.424) (−1.616) (−8.179) (−0.895) (−6.098) (5.228) (−21.384) (−2.089)
A Class 0.039 0.056 0.581∗ 0.981∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 5.394∗∗∗
(0.588) (0.854) (1.945) (13.491) (13.820) (3.137) (46.209)
B Class −0.041 −0.035 0.367 0.483∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 0.473∗ 4.925∗∗∗
(−0.651) (−0.566) (1.270) (6.869) (7.963) (1.786) (47.035)
Renovated −0.121∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗ −0.045
(−5.815) (−2.834) (−2.164) (−0.892)
Percent Leased 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(6.687) (7.064) (2.790) (2.489)
stories 0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.003
(5.494) (6.086) (0.318) (−1.452)
NNN −0.225∗∗∗ −0.257∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗ −0.234∗∗∗
(−12.684) (−11.958) (−2.338) (−5.961)
FSG 0.125∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(9.052) (8.810) (2.234) (2.713)
σ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗
(81.368) (69.943) (10.148) (34.026)
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Table 25: This table presents results from a Heckman two stage test for selection
bias. This table test the sales data Each green variable, ESTAR, LEED, and Dual
was tested. In addition, green variables as a collective were tested for selection bias.
ρ test for selection where the null is no bias. Results are the likelihood estimates.
***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Lnrent Green Estar Leed Dual
variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model1b Model2b Model3b Model4b
ρ −0.365∗∗∗ −0.402∗∗∗ −0.733∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗
(−4.529) (−4.150) (−5.440) (−2.266)
Prof Buyer 0.580∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.045 0.324∗∗∗
(11.063) (9.580) (0.395) (4.185)
Prof Seller 0.343∗∗∗ 0.160 0.643∗∗∗ 0.120
(3.543) (1.485) (5.039) (0.765)
Prof Both 0.857∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.415 −0.107
(5.141) (4.890) (1.558) (−0.377)
Intercept 876.390∗∗∗ 941.944∗∗∗ 1217.37∗∗∗ 872.025∗∗ −8.445∗∗∗ −7.963∗∗∗ −4.349∗∗∗ −9.552∗∗∗
(7.420) (6.667) (3.432) (2.530) (−38.796) (−32.616) (−12.113) (−23.144)
lnsize 21.594∗∗ 14.841 11.015 33.281 0.614∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.234 0.668∗∗∗
(2.384) (1.425) (0.431) (1.360) (30.640) (22.895) (.) (18.432)
lnage −35.772∗∗∗ −37.080∗∗∗ 11.081 −32.933∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.031 −0.300 −0.208∗∗∗
(−7.542) (−5.420) (0.544) (−2.926) (−7.668) (−1.202) (.) (−5.368)
A Class −18.413 −19.743 −0.179 −23.065 0.854∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗ 0.255∗ 0.380∗∗
(−0.673) (−0.545) (−0.002) (−0.423) (10.610) (10.782) (1.814) (2.399)
B Class −34.510 −25.639 −42.823 −76.480 0.308∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.195∗ −0.001
(−1.375) (−0.774) (−0.662) (−1.429) (4.218) (5.285) (1.718) (−0.004)
stories −2.477∗∗∗ −1.997∗∗∗ −1.691 −3.775∗∗∗
(−5.122) (−3.156) (−0.692) (−4.678)
lnland −59.309∗∗∗ −57.013∗∗∗ −58.430∗∗∗ −64.011∗∗∗
(−17.390) (−13.748) (−4.884) (−8.773)
σ 135.610∗∗∗ 130.488∗∗∗ 233.031∗∗∗ 134.140∗∗∗
(33.151) (23.931) (5.590) (9.467)
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7.3. Professional Owner Interactions
To further explore the relationship between Professional Ownership and rent, in-
teraction terms were included in these regressions. In the submarket fixed effects
models, both Prof Owner * ESTAR and Prof Owner * Dual were significant and neg-
ative. Although at first blush, this may seem counter-intuitive, an examination of the
sum of the variables shows that the interaction simply wipes away the significance
of the green variable. For example, ESTAR is 0.049 and Prof Owner * ESTAR is
−0.045. Together, they offset each other almost completely.
In Table 12 the ESTAR coefficient is not significant. The Prof Owner variable
with the interaction is 0.057, and was 0.051 in the prior table.
The interaction terms seem to offset the significance of the green variable, while
maintaining the significance of the professional ownership.
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Table 26: This table presents a series of fixed effect regressions on lnrent, including
professional ownership interaction variables. Models 1-4 used submarket fixed effects.
Models 3 and 4 were both weighted by lnsize. Models 5 and 6 used market fixed effects.
Models 2, 4, and 6 all include the Prof Owner and interaction variables. Results are
the regression coefficient(T-Value). ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively.
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6
ESTAR 0.038∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.038 0.049
(2.389) (2.036) (2.355) (1.965) (1.536) (1.353)
LEED 0.168∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(6.248) (5.467) (6.160) (5.368) (4.618) (5.000)
Dual 0.031 0.057 0.039 0.066 0.031 0.057
(1.040) (1.419) (1.286) (1.633) (0.655) (1.017)
Prof Owner 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(6.392) (6.470) (3.204)
Prof Owner * ESTAR −0.045∗∗ −0.042∗∗ −0.045∗
(−2.123) (−2.027) (−1.711)
Prof Owner * LEED 0.034 0.037 0.034
(0.854) (0.917) (0.819)
Prof Owner * Dual −0.062∗ −0.064∗ −0.062∗
(−1.774) (−1.826) (−1.781)
Intercept 2.336∗∗∗ 2.393∗∗∗ 2.333∗∗∗ 2.391∗∗∗ 2.336∗∗∗ 2.393∗∗∗
(42.396) (44.983) (40.819) (43.526) (20.503) (23.117)
lnsize 0.026∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.020∗
(4.425) (3.501) (4.408) (3.512) (2.239) (1.886)
age100 −0.015 −0.015 −0.017 −0.018 −0.015 −0.015
(−0.431) (−0.436) (−0.477) (−0.480) (−0.195) (−0.197)
age75 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.036 0.034 0.034
(0.980) (0.975) (1.007) (1.001) (0.395) (0.394)
age50 −0.040 −0.041∗ −0.042 −0.043∗ −0.040 −0.041
(−1.619) (−1.659) (−1.640) (−1.679) (−0.842) (−0.868)
age40 −0.058∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.058∗ −0.060∗
(−3.405) (−3.573) (−3.420) (−3.598) (−1.834) (−1.925)
age30 −0.120∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗
(−9.945) (−10.246) (−10.200) (−10.520) (−4.759) (−4.893)
age20 −0.109∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
(−11.055) (−11.626) (−11.519) (−12.116) (−5.094) (−5.346)
age15 −0.085∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗
(−6.642) (−7.027) (−6.943) (−7.348) (−4.649) (−4.862)
age10 −0.108∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗
(−9.877) (−10.427) (−10.236) (−10.813) (−6.475) (−6.729)
age5 −0.034∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.036∗∗
(−3.753) (−4.001) (−4.083) (−4.365) (−2.397) (−2.573)
Renovated 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.020∗
(2.521) (2.659) (2.172) (2.310) (1.679) (1.779)
Percent Leased 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(17.197) (17.297) (16.850) (16.953) (8.521) (8.552)
stories 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(4.786) (4.921) (4.465) (4.606) (2.328) (2.381)
A Class 0.314∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
(18.751) (18.412) (18.339) (18.002) (10.988) (10.738)
B Class 0.149∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(17.138) (17.020) (16.528) (16.416) (12.007) (11.953)
NNN −0.148∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗
(−14.401) (−14.477) (−14.205) (−14.287) (−5.882) (−5.920)
FSG 0.061∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.061∗ 0.060∗
(5.405) (5.347) (5.036) (4.975) (1.810) (1.794)
Amenity 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006
(0.971) (0.860) (0.933) (0.813) (0.426) (0.377)
R Square 0.234 0.236 0.243 0.245 0.234 0.236
Denominator DF 1458 1458 1458 1458 55 55
Submarket Fixed Effects x x x x
Weighted x x
Market Fixed Effects x x
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8. Conclusion
This paper was the first to demonstrate that some of the Sustainable Real Es-
tate rent premiums, specifically Energy Star and Dual building premiums, previously
shown in the literature were neither theoretically or empirically supported. In addi-
tion, I showed the Dual sales premiums may not exist, and the ESTAR sales premiums
were significant only at a marginal level.
The theoretical argument against Energy Star building premiums can be summa-
rized as a mismatch in financial motivation. The bulk of ESTAR leases, 61%, were
FSG compared to only 14% NNN. In a FSG lease, the tenant receives no benefit from
reduced operating expenses. Consequently, they have no incentive to pay a market
premium for energy savings that ultimately go to the building owner. Essentially, a
commercial broker would be saying to their tenant client, ”I know this building cost
more to rent, but you’re saving the building owner energy costs!”
I presented arguments that the reason for finding of premiums in the extant liter-
ature Eichholtz et al. (2010); Fuerst and McAllister (2011); Pivo and Fisher (2010);
Wiley et al. (2010) may be attributed to a missing variable problem. Owners who
achieve the green certifications may simply be superior owners, and earn premium
rents through enhanced negotiating, managing, and building operation skills. The
Professional Ownership premium may have been misinterpreted as a green premium.
In every regression model, Prof Owner was found to be significant, and in most it
dominated the ESTAR premium.
I presented arguments that the use of OLSDV regression with too many dummy
variables can potentially lead to inconsistent dummy variable estimations (Baltagi
and Kao, 2001). Furthermore, the use of a single linear adjustment to the dependent
variable likely fails to adequately capture the market by market complexities of the
data. The use of fixed effects and a within transformation of each variable with
market fixed effects led to more consistent and reliable building attribute values.
Table 27 summarizes the key finding regarding the rental data. Similar to the
extant literature, using OLSDV regression, I found statistically significant ESTAR
and Dual premiums. However, using the better suited fixed effects method, the
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ESTAR and Dual premiums were no longer statistically significant. The Prof Owner
variable remained significant regardless of method.
Table 27: This table summarizes the key results on the rental data from this paper.
Models 5 and 6 from Table 12, showing the results from a fixed effect regression with
market fixed effects, with and without professional ownership controls are shown.
Models 5 and 6 from Table 10, showing the results from OLSDV regression with mar-
ket dummies, with and without professional ownership controls are shown. Results
were the regression coefficient. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Fixed Effect Fixed Effect OLSDV OLSDV
ESTAR 0.038 0.020 0.028∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
LEED 0.168∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
DUAL 0.031 0.013 0.064∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
Prof Owner 0.051∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
Market Fixed Effects X X
Market Dummies X X
Table 28 summarizes the key finding regarding the sales data. Similar to the
extant literature, using OLSDV regression, I found statistically significant ESTAR
and Dual premiums. However, using the better suited fixed effects method, and
including essential sale condition controls, Dual premiums were no longer statistically
significant; the ESTAR premium did maintain a marginal 10% level of significance.
The Prof buyer/seller variables remained significant regardless of method.
Further investigating the reasoning behind the different findings of OLSDV and
fixed effects, I explored the effect of individual markets. I showed through market
by market regression that potential green building premiums may be localized, but
no evidence suggesting a national premium was found. In fact, some of the markets
even showed negative premiums.
This paper also demonstrated the dramatic effect a couple of markets can have
when using OLSDV. By removing just New York City and San Jose from the re-
gression, which did not disproportionately effect the green building N, the ESTAR
premiums disappeared with Prof Owner controls. The fact the removal of a mere 2
out of 56 markets alters the statistical significance of the variable of interest raised
serious questions as to both the power of the extant findings, and the reliability of
OLSDV as an estimation technique for this data set.
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Table 28: This table summarizes the key results on the sales data from this paper.
Models 1 and 3 from Table 13, showing the results from a fixed effect regression with
market fixed effects, with and without professional buyer/seller and sale condition
controls are shown. Models 1 and 3 from Table 11, showing the results from OLSDV
regression with market dummies, with and without professional buyer/seller and sale
condition controls are shown. Results were the regression coefficient. ***,**,* represent
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Fixed Effect Fixed Effect OLSDV OLSDV
ESTAR 31.24∗∗ 25.56∗ 39.93∗∗∗ 34.92∗∗∗
LEED 87.27∗∗∗ 79.25∗∗∗ 80.08∗∗∗ 75.27∗∗∗
DUAL 40.63 35.33 70.56∗∗∗ 65.67∗∗∗
Prof Buyer 44.60∗∗∗ 38.72∗∗∗
Prof Seller 64.45∗∗∗ 50.59∗∗∗
Prof Both 86.52∗∗ 89.08∗∗∗
Market Fixed Effects X X
Market Dummies X X
Sale Condition Controls
X X
Through logistic regressions in the rental data, I provided strong evidence for
the linkage between professional ownership and rent. The results suggested that
ESTAR and Dual buildings were roughly 4.5 times more likely to be Professionally
Owned than not. Through logistics regression on the sales data, I demonstrated
that professional buyers have an increased appetite for green buildings. Professional
buyers were 2 to 3 times more likely to purchase a green buildings, but no correlation
was found to sell a green buildings.
Finally, robustness tests in the form of non-parametric and Heckman tests for
endogeneity further confirmed the paper’s conclusions.
The findings in this paper counter much of the extant literature regarding sus-
tainable real estate premiums. The exploration of alternate estimation techniques
such as fixed effects, the inclusion of potentially missing variables like professional
ownership, and the detailed exploration of market by market effects represent not
only new contributions to the literature, but starting points for continued research.
Several avenues of new research can be explored through the results in this paper.
In large, national Commercial Real Estate databases, does the use of fixed effects alter
findings in other extant literature? Since this research was confined to office buildings,
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do similar conclusions hold for other property types? Detailed investigations of the
size effect, and how buildings of different scale generate attribute premiums is another
potential avenue for future research. Increased attention to the market by market
differences, and research on the fundamental supply and demand drivers represents
yet another avenue.
Although not primary to the research topics of this paper, the evidence presented
in the sale price and logistic regressions on the sale condition controls provided rich
avenues for discussion and future research.
As a final note, the evidence presented here is not intended to diminish the poten-
tial benefits of green buildings. None of this research or the extant literature suggests
that the buildings are less valuable. In fact, the potential benefits of increased produc-
tivity or CSR policy compliance still exist. All else equal–including rent–tenants may
prefer green buildings. Sales prices for building owners may reflect higher demand or
decreased cost structure.
This article does suggest that market premiums continue to be driven by supply
and demand metrics. At this point, it does not appear the tenants are willing to over-
pay for green buildings. Perhaps the trend towards building green could eventually
force a market discount on non-green buildings. At the moment, the data does not
suggest rental premiums for green buildings as a whole.
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Appendix
Table A: This table lists the variables used in this paper, and their corresponding
field in the CoStar database.
Variable Definition CoStar Field Rent Costar Field Sales
ESTAR 1 if Building is Energy Star Certified, but not Dual energy star energy star
LEED 1 if Building is LEED Certified, but not Dual leed certified leed certified
Dual 1 if Building is both ESTAR and LEED
lnrent Natural Log of Average Weighted Building Rent average weighted rent
PSF Per Square Foot Sales Price Sale price/bldg sf
lnsize Natural Log of Size rentable building area bldg sf
NNN 1 if lease type = Triple Net services
FSG 1 if lease type = Full Service Gross services
Percent Leased Percentage of building leased Q4 2011 percent leased
ren within 10 1 if building was renovated from 2001 forward year renovated
lnland Natural Log of land land area sf
stories Number of Stories in Building number of stories number of floors
A Class 1 if Building is ”A” Class building class building class
B Class 1 if Building is ”B” Class building class building class
amenity 1 if Building contains any amenities like, Bank, Fitness Center,
etc.
Amenities Amenities
age100 1 if Age >= 100 2011-year built 2011-year built
age75 1 if 75>= Age >100 2011-year built 2011-year built
age50 1 if 50>= Age >75 2011-year built 2011-year built
age40 1 if 40>= Age >40 2011-year built 2011-year built
age30 1 if 30>= Age >30 2011-year built 2011-year built
age20 1 if 30>= Age >20 2011-year built 2011-year built
age15 1 if 15>= Age >15 2011-year built 2011-year built
age10 1 if 10>= Age >10 2011-year built 2011-year built
age5 1 if 5>= Age 2011-year built 2011-year built
year2002 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2003 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2004 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2005 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2006 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2007 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2008 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2009 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2010 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2011 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
submarket Submarket for physical building submarket cluster
Market Market for physical building market name market
Prof Owner If number of owner addresses meets criteria from Section 5 owner address from rent data
Prof Seller If building seller corresponds to Prof Owner in rent data set
Prof Buyer If building buyer corresponds to Prof Owner in rent data set
Prof Both If building buyer and seller correspond to Prof Owner in rent
data set
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Table B: LEED Federal Regulation The following legislation or directives have been passed at the federal level11
Agency Date of passage/
effective date
Description
Department of the In-
terior
JUN 20, 2008 The Department of the Interior adopted its Sustainable Buildings Implementation Plan,
which requires that all new construction and major renovation building projects with
gross construction costs greater than $2,000,000 achieve LEED Certified or one Green
Globe.
U.S. Department of
Energy
FEB 29, 2008 Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman issued a memorandum to DOE leadership directing
heads of departments to adhere to Executive Order 13423, Strengthening Federal Environ-
mental, Energy and Transportation Management (72 FR 3919; Jan. 24, 2007) by building
all new Department buildings of $5 million or greater to earn LEED Gold certification.
U.S. Department of
Health and Human
Services
Nov 7 2007 The Department of Health and Human Services issued a Sustainable Buildings Imple-
mentation Plan, requiring new construction or major renovation projects of HHS-owned
buildings built with at least $3 million of Federal funds to earn LEED certification, Green
Globes certification, or certification by another nationally recognized green building stan-
dard.
National Aeronautics
and Space Adminis-
tration
JUN 13, 2006 New construction and major renovations of NASA facilities projects planned for FY 2006
and beyond are required to meet LEED Silver certification, and strive for LEED Gold.
FY 2004 and FY 2005 projects will strive to meet LEED Silver certification. All other
building projects will strive to follow the LEED rating system as much as possible. The
LEED goal for NASA facilities projects will be reviewed, renewed or changed every three
years.
11Data from http://www.usgbc.org/PublicPolicy/SearchPublicPolicies.aspx?PageID=1776 retrieved 10/2/2011
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Smithsonian Institu-
tion
NOV 13, 2006 The Smithsonian Institution issued “Smithsonian Directive 422” in response to Execu-
tive Order 13123: Greening the Government through Efficient Energy Management. The
directive articulates the Smithsonian’s goal to design, build, and maintain facilities that
are eligible for, and that obtain, LEED certification. Initially, the Smithsonian requires
all new buildings and renovation work to aim for a minimum of LEED certification. In
addition, the Smithsonian will integrate the LEED checklist and guidelines into the plan-
ning, engineering, design, construction, deconstruction, and maintenance of Smithsonian
facilities.
U.S. Department of
Agriculture
JUN 19, 2006 The U.S. Department of Agriculture issued a Departmental Regulation that requires new
construction or major renovation of covered facilities to earn a minimum of LEED Silver
certification. The USDA has integrated these requirements, along with strategies for
improving energy and water use in existing buildings, into their August 2007 Sustainable
Buildings Implementation Plan.
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
FY 2006 The Environmental Protection Agency requires all its new facility construction and new
building acquisition projects 20,000 square feet or larger achieve LEED Gold certification.
The Agency currently has multiple projects registered for LEED for New Construction
certification and supported the development of LEED for Existing Buildings. The Agency
requires GSA to provide new major office leases that meet the Energy Star requirements.
EPA’s Chelmsford, MA lab is the first Gold-rated federal building.
U.S. Army n/a The Army adopted LEED into its Sustainable Project Rating Tool (SPiRiT), but does
not require certification of its projects. In January 2006, the Army issued a memorandum
stating that it will transition from SPiRiT to LEED beginning in FY 2008. All new
vertical construction projects will achieve LEED Silver certification. Additionally, the
Army will adopt LEED for Homes when it is released.
U.S. Department of
Agriculture
n/a U.S. Forest Service requires all new construction of office buildings, visitor centers, re-
search facilities, and climate controlled warehouses 2,500 sq ft or greater in size to earn
LEED Silver certification. The Forest Service Rocky Mountain Region hosts an annual
Sustainable Operations Summit to share lessons and strategies.
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U.S. Air Force n/a The Air Force has developed a LEED Application Guide for Lodging projects and has
conducted LEED training seminars for its design and construction personnel. The Air
Force encourages the use of LEED for new or major renovations for MILCON projects and
has created an online design guide for sustainable development structured after LEED.
An online Sustainable Training course is also being developed.
U.S. General Services
Administration
n/a In order to objectively measure its sustainable design achievements, GSA decided in 2000
that beginning in 2003 all capital building projects must earn LEED Certified, with a
target of LEED Silver. In 2008, in response to the changing market, GSA began requiring
all lease construction to earn LEED Silver certification.
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ESSAY 2
Size Does Matter:
Portfolio weighting and size differentiation in sustainable real estate.
Abstract
This paper demonstrated clear differences in the potential sustainability premiums
across different size categories of buildings. This paper provided evidence that the
premiums in the extant literature may have been driven by the smaller subset of
buildings, and that larger buildings demonstrated neither rent nor sales premiums.
This paper also proposed that value weighting real estate portfolio estimations pro-
vides important information as to the economic impact of attributes in the hedonic
regressions.
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1. Introduction
When it comes to sustainable real estate market premiums, size does matter.
Most of the prior literature examined sustainable real estate as a uniform body; this
research showed that premiums, or the lack thereof, vary with different size categories
of buildings. This paper also provided support that a heterogenous relationship exists
between size and sales/rent.
Both econometric and economic issues exist when evaluating a diverse set of build-
ings. From an econometric perspective, sales per square foot (PSF) varies with size.
In general, larger buildings tend to sell at larger nominal prices, but lower PSF prices
than smaller buildings. The assumption of independence for the independent variables
used in most sales regressions, PSF or sale price, may be erroneous.
Economically, the issue of equal weight versus value weight in a real estate port-
folio has received little academic attention. Although the bulk of the extant finance
literature in stocks, bonds, etc., addresses both equal and value weights. The issues
remains unexplored, at least in sustainable real estate. Value weighting matters at
its most basic level because an investor can not easily purchase one floor of a twenty
story buildings as an equal investment to a smaller building.
This article investigated whether sustainable real estate premiums persisted across
all building size categories, or if they were localized to specific sizes. The results
indicated that Energy Star rent premiums were localized to smaller buildings. They
also suggested that Dual and LEED buildings’ economic premiums were driven by
the smaller buildings in their data sets as well.
The results lend further support to the management theory put forth by Robinson,
2013. The findings also set a precedent that future research should consider equal
weight and value weight analyses.
2. Literature Review
Sustainable real estate typically describes buildings with an Energy Star (ES-
TAR), Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED), or both designa-
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tions.1 Trends in commercial real estate have driven increased attention of academic
researchers; LEED-certified buildings now account for nearly one-third of new con-
struction in the U.S. (Kok, McGraw, and Quigley, 2011). Several articles provided
empirical support for sustainable building sales, leasing and cap rate premium. No-
table examples include Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley (2010); Fuerst and McAllister
(2011); Miller, Spivey, and Florance (2008); Pivo and Fisher (2010); Wiley, Benefield,
and Johnson (2010) all of whom found support for market premiums.
Sustainable buildings tend to be larger than average size buildings. Figure 1 shows
the percentage of the building population for Green, or sustainable buildings, versus
the general population.
Figure 1: Green Building and Traditional Building Size Distributions. Source: CoStar
Group Q4 2011
The graph shows that nearly 80% of the non-eco building sample is 75,000 SF
1See section 3 for detailed descriptions of Energy Star and LEED
79
or smaller. By contrast, 84% of the green building population measures larger than
75,000 SF.
A brief analysis of the means and standard deviations reveals the discrepancy
again. Table 1 shows that the eco-buildings as whole are notably larger. The subject
rent sample contains all buildings in a market greater than 10,000 Square Feet (SF).
The Eco building population had a mean size of 264,398 SF and standard deviation
of 276,175 SF, compared to a mean of 56,239 SF and standard deviation of 88,819
SF for the non-green sample. The sales sample showed a similar discrepancy with
means of 55,071 SF and 320,323 SF for the general population and Eco buildings,
and standard deviations of 107,156 SF and 314,712 SF respectively.
Table 1: Mean and Standard Deviations for the general building population and eco-
building population. Eco buildings are ESTAR, LEED, or Dual. The general building
population included all buildings over 10,000 SF.
Rent Sales
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Building Population 56,239 88,819 55,071 314,712
Eco-Buildings 264,398 276,175 320,323 107,156
The bulk of the current published research on sustainability premiums treats the
portfolio of green real estate effectively as an equal weight portfolio (Eichholtz et al.,
2010; Fuerst and McAllister, 2011; Pivo and Fisher, 2010; Wiley et al., 2010). In
other words, each observation represents an equal weight in the regressions. Potential
economic issues, such as such as ignoring investment size, and econometric issues,
such as introducing additional heteroscedasticity, arise from the exclusive use of equal
weighting. The idea of segmenting real estate regressions by size has also been seen
in the literature (Simons and El Jaouhari, 2004).
In an economic sense, real estate assets are investment assets like any other fi-
nancial investment. An investor attempts to generate returns whether they purchase
stocks, bonds, or real estate assets. The predominant research method in the extant
investment literature for stock and bond portfolios involves examining both an equal
weight and a value weighted portfolio. Real estate assets should be treated no dif-
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ferently. Most real estate portfolios do not hold equal funds in each property, and
the bulk of funds are heavily skewed towards larger properties (Schuck and Brown,
1997).
It is well known in the finance investment literature that equal-weight returns
produce different results than value-weight returns (Brown and Warner, 1980; Fama,
1998; Fama and French, 1988). The practice of giving every observation equal weight
suggests that an investor would generate the same effective return by purchasing five
$200,000 real estate assets as they would by purchasing one $1,000,000 real estate
asset, holding portfolio diversification effects constant.
From an investment perspective, value weighting more realistically imitates an in-
vestor experience for real estate valuation estimations. In the stock market, investors
could choose to allocate funds in any combination between a stock with a large stock
market capitalization (large cap) and one with a small stock market capitalization
(small cap). In selecting a real estate asset, investors must choose to purchase one
asset over another. Investors just cannot choose to buy one share of a 500,000 SF
building in the same way they might buy one share of a large cap stock.2 Therefore,
the relative effect of large buildings on the portfolio of an equal weighted estima-
tion systematically biases the achievable market returns relative to a value weighted
measure. In the end, the existence of rental or sales premiums matters for potential
investment opportunities.
Also, from an econometric perspective, the existing literature appears to overlook
the size of buildings as an issue other than as a control variable. The basic assumption
of independence does not truly hold for either rent or sales prices and size. Rent tends
to increase with larger buildings for a variety of reasons including view premiums,
2The author recognize that the existence of Tenant-in-Common (TIC), and Real Estate Invest-
ment Trusts (REIT) do permit some buyers to purchase limited shares of real estate assets. However,
REITs provide indirect ownership of real estate through equity holdings, while the direct investment
in real estate assets is managed through fiduciary responsibility obligations as individual investments
in the portfolio. Tenant-In-Common Association (TICA) recently changed their name to Real Es-
tate Investment Securities Association (REISA), and there currently exists debate whether TICs are
direct or indirect real estate investment. Furthermore, TIC investments represent a comparatively
small portion of the market.
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amenities, and the tendency for vertical buildings to be located in premium areas.
Also, price per square foot tends to decrease with size. Smaller buildings, on average,
have lower PSF prices than larger buildings.
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 1, the ESTAR population is not uniformly dis-
tributed along the building population size distribution. Weighting is a common
method to reduce issues of heteroscedasticity.
For the sales data, the weighted regressions use nominal price as the weight. Since
the rental data set does not include price, size was proxied as value for the weighting
variable. Although not a perfect proxy for price due to the non-linear relationship
between size and price, it represents a reasonable value weight for the portfolio. This
more heavily weights the larger, and more costly assets in the regression, in a similar
manner to how they would be weighted in an economic investment portfolio.
3. Data
The primary data source for my analysis was sales and rental observations from
CoStar.3 CoStar contains over 2.8 Million US Commercial properties, including sales
and leasing information. Data includes, but is not limited to location, physical build-
ings characteristics, tenants, and lease details. My sample was from Q4 2011 for the
rent data, and 2001 to 2011 for the sales data. Key variables include those typical
found in a real estate regression, such as Size, Age, Building Class (A,B,C), Market,
and Rent or PSF as the independent variable. A detailed list of variables used in this
research can be found in the Appendix, Table A.
Descriptive Statistics
The rent data was cleaned to include only data with a size and rent fields existing,
and the sales data cleaned to only include data with sale price and size fields in
place. The data consists of 48,733 rent observations across 56 defined markets drawn
from the top 50 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) in the United States; all rent
observations are from Q4 2011. The sales data covers from 2001 to 2011, also in the
3Source: CoStar Group, Inc.
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top 50 MSA’s (56 defined markets) in the United States. The sales data has 26,248
observations.
Table 2 summarizes the rent data size and rent by eco-building type. Clear differ-
ences in the mean size mean and rent are observed between non-Eco and Eco-labeled
buildings.
Table 3 summarizes the sales data by green building type. As with rent, clear
differences are observed in both Per Square Foot (PSF) sales price and size between
non-Eco and Eco buildings.
Several extremely small minimum PSF prices observed in the data were verified
as reasonable. There are approximately 20 sales under $1.00 PSF. All but one occur
during the financial crisis period, and several are noted as auction or distress sales,
which is controlled for in several of the regression specifications. Even though portfolio
sales were explicitly exempted from the sales sample, several sales of over $1 Billion
dollars were removed, and assumed to be part of a portfolio sale.
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Table 2: Rental Descriptive Statistics. The following table provides descriptive statistics for the rental data set. The rental
data set was from Q4 2011, and including the all office buildings over 10,000 SF from the top 50 MSA by population. Source:
CoStar Group, Inc.
Size Rent
n mean std max min mean std max min
No Eco-Label 45,354 56,239 88,819 3,781,045 10,000 18.62 10.23 600 0.95
All Eco 3,379 264,398 276,175 4,000,000 10,000 25.48 12.73 253.55 5.46
ESTAR Certified 2,473 228,464 233,246 2,650,000 10,000 24.56 11.0093 250 5.46
LEED Certified 278 223,761 331,746 4,000,000 10,524 28.55 16.7803 253.55 6.48
Dual Certified 628 423,892 341,333 1,721,242 33,851 27.72 16.0813 250 8.50
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Table 3: Sales Descriptive Statistics. The following table provides descriptive statistics for the sales data set. The sales data
set was from 2001 through 2011, and included all office buildings sales over 10,000 SF from the top 50 MSA by population.
Source: CoStar Group, Inc
The small minimum PSF prices were verified. There are approximately 20 sales under $1.00 PSF.
All but one occur during the financial crisis period, and several are noted as auction or distress sales.
PSF Size
eco n mean std max min mean std max min
No Eco-Label 24,875 140 130 3,888 0.0002 55,071 107,156 4,400,000 10,000
All Eco Buildings 1,382 231 145 914 1.85 320,323 314,712 2,958,981 10,000
Energy Star Certified 933 223 138 914 11.71 295,062 288,209 2,650,000 10,172
LEED Certified 158 247 197 901 3.99 205,873 300,399 2,550,000 10,000
Dual Certified 295 257 145 830 1.85 481,173 384,689 2,958,981 11,785
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Energy Star for Buildings
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy
jointly manage the Energy Star program. Energy Star is available for 13 types of com-
mercial buildings, including retail stores, hotels, schools, and supermarkets. Nearly
9,000 buildings across the nation have earned the Energy Star for superior energy
efficiency over the past decade and the numbers continue to climb daily. Energy Star
buildings typically use 35 percent less energy and emit 35 percent less carbon dioxide
into the atmosphere than average buildings (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
2009).
Under the program, the energy performance of a building is scored on a 1-100
scale; buildings scored 75 or above are recognized as Energy Star Certified Buildings.
The numbers directly relate to percentage ratings. For example, a building that has
a score of 80 means the building is in the top 20% of facilities in the country for
energy performance. The score is calculated by estimating how much energy the
building would use if it were the best- or worst-performing building of its type (along
with levels in between) in terms of its size, location, and number of occupants. The
rating system then compares the actual energy data input to the internal database
to determine where the building ranks relative to other similar buildings (Ciochetti
and McGowan, 2010).
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED)
The U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) operates the LEED Green Building
Rating System as an independent third party. They are a non-profit organization with
a stated mission, “To transform the way buildings and communities are designed,
built and operated, enabling an environmentally and socially responsible, healthy,
and prosperous environment that improves the quality of life.”
LEED promotes a whole-building approach to sustainability by examining five
categories of building performance:
1. sustainable site development,
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2. water efficiency,
3. energy efficiency,
4. materials selection,
5. and indoor environmental quality (U.S. Green Building Council, 2009).
Building owners earn points in each of the five categories, with allocation of points
between credits based on the potential environmental impacts and human benefits of
each credit with respect to a set of impact categories. In addition, properties can earn
credit for regionally specific innovations that may relate to climate, transportation,
or other related issues. Depending on the number of total points earned, buildings
can achieve LEED levels of certified, silver, gold or platinum.
The certified level indicates conformance with minimum requirements for LEED
certification, and the platinum certification level indicates outstanding levels in vir-
tually all categories.
4. Research Methods
To investigate the impact of size, I divided the data into thirds using two different
methods. First, I divided evenly by the Energy Star distribution. Since ESTAR
contains the highest percentage of eco buildings, it seemed the most logical choice.
When the data was evenly divided by the ESTAR distribution, the heavy skew
towards larger building was evidenced by the building populations. Buildings in the
smallest third of ESTAR sizes numbered 41,360, or 85% of the buildings. The largest
third of ESTAR buildings compared in size to only 2,825 of the general building
population, or under 6% of all buildings greater than 10,000 SF. Also, in the largest
category, with buildings over 224,555 SF, nearly half were green certified in some way.
Similarly, nearly half the sales in the largest category were green certified.
The second method of grouping was to evenly divide the population into thirds by
population buildings size. Dividing the data into three evenly distributed subsections
by size showed a skewed distribution of green buildings. The large majority of green
buildings appeared in the largest section. 2,257 of the ESTAR buildings were in the
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largest third compared to only 30 in the smallest third. Similarly the Dual certified
buildings were skewed 621 in the largest third to zero in the smallest.
Table 4: This table shows the distribution of green buildings types and professional
ownership controls for the two size sectioning methods. The ESTAR method divides
the ESTAR population into even thirds, and allows the building population to fit into
their respective size categories. The by size method divides the building population
of all buildings greater than 10,000 SF into even thirds, and the green buildings fit
into their respective size categories. Some buildings at the segment break points were equal, and caused
the sections to be off by one or two buildings from exactly thirds.
Rent
ESTAR by Thirds Size by Thirds
<112,816 SF <Middle> > 224,555 SF < 21,212 SF <Middle> > 53,758 SF
ESTAR 825 824 824 30 186 2,257
LEED 114 82 82 11 38 229
Dual 68 147 413 0 7 621
Non-Eco 40,353 3,495 1,506 16,203 16,014 13,137
Building N 41,360 4,548 2,825 16,244 16,245 16,244
Prof Owner 4,887 1,964 1,473 568 1,872 5,884
Sales
ESTAR by Thirds Size by Thirds
<151,775 SF <Middle> > 280,563 SF <17,435 SF <Middle> > 44,019 SF
ESTAR 311 310 312 10 24 899
LEED 93 35 30 14 26 118
Dual 32 71 192 5 4 286
Non-Eco 23,093 1,122 660 8,724 8,709 7,442
Building N 23,529 1,538 1,194 8,753 8,763 8,745
Prof Seller 180 55 51 15 45 226
Prof Buyer 434 211 204 18 60 771
Prof Both 23 21 23 0 1 66
Fixed Effect Regression
The rent and sales models are of a standard one stage semi-log hedonic regression
form:
ln(Rjt) = αj + βjXi + φjZi + εj (1)
PSFjt = αj + βjXi + φjZi + εj (2)
where:
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ln (Rjt) = natural log of average rent per square foot in a given building j
(PSFjt) = sales price per square foot in a given building j
Xi = a vector of the property specific explanatory variables
βi = the regression-derived coefficient for property characteristic i
Zi =a vector of time and non-property variables
φi = the regression-derived coefficient for time and non-property vari-
able i
εj = random error term
j, t = property and time variables respectively
Fixed effects by market were included each regression; this method was shown
to be a better estimation technique for national commercial real estate (CRE) by
Robinson, 2013.4 Fixed effects transform the variables prior to the regression by
altering them based on the mean of the specific market.
A detailed list of the variables used, along with their corresponding fields in the
CoStar database can be found in the Appendix, Table A.
Weighted Regressions
As discussed earlier, both economic and econometric issues arise from assuming
the independence of size. A simple transformation of the basic hedonic regressions
from equations 1 and 2 allowed re-estimation of the original equations with value
weights.
The sales data contained price information, and price was used as the weight.
Since the rent data did contain price information, the weighting for the rent data was
by its size. Although size does not represent a perfect proxy for price, it does act as
a reasonable proxy.
Define:
Sizetotal =
N∑
j
Sizej (3)
where Sizej = the size for property j, and
4Standard ordinary least squares regression results are available upon request.
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wj =
Sizej
Sizetotal
(4)
In other words wj represents the size weight of the building in the portfolio of
buildings being estimated. The formula definitions are the same as above:
ln(Rjt) = (αj + betajXi + φjZi + εj) ∗ wj (5)
ln(PSFjt) = (αj + betajXi + φjZi + εj) ∗ wj (6)
Professional Management Variables
Robinson, 2013 introduced the Professional ownership variable, and demonstrated
its significance in estimating sustainability premiums. He found that professional
management added 5.1% to rent, and that professional sellers added $67 PSF to a
sales price; both variables were significant at the 1% level. The question the vari-
able addresses is whether in green real estate, eco-labeling itself created a premium,
or if developers/managers of newer, well located buildings, that tended to capture
ceterus paribus rent premiums, enhance their offerings with LEED or Energy Star
certifications?
Following Robinson, 2013, I addressed the issue of management through a pro-
fessional ownership dummy variable. This helped assess whether the developers and
managers who own and operate these buildings exhibited superior site selection, con-
struction or management, or if the presence of green certification in and of itself
created a market premium.
Prof Owner: The Prof Owner, professional ownership variable, used in the rent
regressions is a binary dummy variable equal to 1 when an ownership group, as listed
by their address in CoStar,5 owned 6 or more physical properties totalling greater
than 500,000 SF. Thus a group that owned 10 small buildings would not qualify via
the SF hurdle. Furthermore, a group that owned one or two large buildings would
not qualify via the number of properties hurdle.
55,884 observations had no address field, and were set to zero
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These measures are intended to capture ownership groups whose total holdings
qualify them as professional owners. The number and scale of commercial property
holdings would require, at a minimum, several full time staff members to effectively
operate and manage. The dummy variable is set to zero otherwise. While some of
the non-Prof Owners may in fact be better owner operators than some of the Prof
Owners, the dummy variable’s purpose is test for statistical significance of professional
ownership at a macro level.
8,327 observations, owned by a total of 435 ownership groups qualified as pro-
fessionally owned. Professionally owned buildings represented 17% of the building
population.
However, professional owned buildings represented a considerably larger portion
of green buildings., 70% of Energy Star population, 62% of the LEED population,
and 74% of the Dual population were professionally owned..
Prof Seller: A Professional Seller variable was set to one when the seller of a
property correlated to the rent database as a Professional Owner. It was set to zero
otherwise. One potential hazard with this method is that ownership groups may or
may not have qualified at the time of sale. The rent database available covers only
Q4 2011, while the sales data covers ten years. Using the rent database to correlate
professional ownership uses owners who qualify as of Q4 2011, and who may or may
not have qualified at the time of sale. Additionally, some building owners who may
have qualified as professional at the time of sale, might no longer be so in Q4 2011.
However, I believe the noise around the estimate should be minimal.
Prof Buyer: A Professional Buyer variable was set to one when the seller of a
property correlated to the rent database as a Professional Owner. It was set to zero
otherwise. As with Professional Sellers, there may be some omitted or erroneously
added observations due to time lag.
Prof Both: A Professional Both variable was set to one when both the buyer
and seller were categorized as professional
91
5. Results
Table 5 shows results from regressions with market fixed effects, sorted into equal
thirds by the ESTAR distribution. In other words, the number of Energy Star build-
ings was equally divided among the three samples, but the building distribution could
vary. Table 6 similarly shows results from regression with market fixed effects, but
divided into equal sections by the size of the building population. In other words, the
building population were evenly divided by size, while the green population varied.6
6The populations are not exactly equal due to some overlap in the size of buildings.
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Table 5: This table presents results from fixed effect regressions by market on lnrent of the building population split into thirds
by the size of Energy Star (ESTAR) buildings. The smallest third contains the smallest third of the Energy Star buildings,
and all buildings under 125,000 SF. In this regressions the ESTAR N is uniformly distributed, but the building population is
skewed. In each size category, results are presented first with and without the Prof Owner variable. Next results are presented
with the same regression weighted by lnsize, both with and without the Prof Owner variable.***,**,* represent statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Smallest 1/3 ESTAR Buildings (<112,816 SF) Mid 1/3 ESTAR Buildings Largest 1/3 (>224,555 SF)
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
ESTAR 0.042∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.014 0.028 0.014 0.028 0.022 0.038 0.041 0.060∗
(2.248) (3.644) (2.653) (4.168) (0.749) (1.418) (0.728) (1.449) (0.510) (0.925) (1.096) (1.676)
LEED 0.137∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.112 0.128∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(4.545) (4.561) (4.944) (5.046) (3.924) (3.888) (3.980) (3.942) (1.509) (1.797) (2.930) (3.239)
Dual 0.014 0.029 −0.005 0.012 0.069 0.087∗ 0.064 0.083∗ 0.086 0.107∗∗ 0.100∗ 0.124∗∗
(0.339) (0.680) (−0.099) (0.255) (1.358) (1.835) (1.273) (1.785) (1.592) (2.090) (1.815) (2.432)
Prof Owner 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(3.700) (3.605) (2.588) (2.616) (2.928) (2.717)
Intercept 2.660∗∗∗ 2.602∗∗∗ 2.536∗∗∗ 2.485∗∗∗ 3.093∗∗∗ 3.068∗∗∗ 3.058∗∗∗ 3.033∗∗∗ 2.131∗∗∗ 2.137∗∗∗ 2.375∗∗∗ 2.386∗∗∗
(26.419) (25.482) (28.424) (27.255) (5.930) (5.882) (5.834) (5.780) (8.959) (9.168) (9.652) (9.901)
lnsize −0.007 −0.001 0.001 0.006 −0.032 −0.030 −0.031 −0.028 0.040∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.018 0.018
(−0.632) (−0.081) (0.112) (0.670) (−0.753) (−0.691) (−0.714) (−0.651) (2.119) (2.120) (0.863) (0.864)
age100 −0.108 −0.107 −0.074 −0.074 −0.055 −0.054 −0.048 −0.046 −0.199 −0.206 −0.208 −0.216
(−1.593) (−1.573) (−1.224) (−1.206) (−0.373) (−0.362) (−0.333) (−0.322) (−1.356) (−1.409) (−1.489) (−1.559)
age75 −0.099∗ −0.098∗ −0.056 −0.055 −0.032 −0.029 −0.010 −0.007 0.001 −0.001 0.011 0.009
(−1.764) (−1.736) (−1.001) (−0.983) (−0.310) (−0.279) (−0.091) (−0.061) (0.007) (−0.009) (0.082) (0.064)
age50 −0.078 −0.077 −0.054 −0.052 −0.136∗∗ −0.133∗∗ −0.118∗∗ −0.115∗∗ −0.054 −0.061 −0.080 −0.090
(−1.609) (−1.565) (−1.044) (−1.015) (−2.359) (−2.345) (−2.181) (−2.152) (−0.377) (−0.419) (−0.571) (−0.633)
age40 −0.109∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗ −0.072∗∗ −0.107∗∗ −0.101∗∗ −0.088∗∗ −0.082∗ −0.140 −0.137 −0.167∗∗ −0.164∗∗
(−2.952) (−2.859) (−2.372) (−2.304) (−2.561) (−2.321) (−2.142) (−1.911) (−1.524) (−1.472) (−2.490) (−2.363)
age30 −0.156∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.270∗∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗
(−5.699) (−5.562) (−4.665) (−4.554) (−3.955) (−3.784) (−3.648) (−3.449) (−5.817) (−5.767) (−6.344) (−6.295)
age20 −0.131∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.309∗∗∗ −0.304∗∗∗ −0.283∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗
(−5.919) (−5.591) (−4.582) (−4.342) (−5.306) (−5.067) (−4.922) (−4.625) (−7.213) (−7.163) (−7.546) (−7.569)
age15 −0.091∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.351∗∗∗ −0.343∗∗∗ −0.318∗∗∗ −0.309∗∗∗
(−4.251) (−3.962) (−3.649) (−3.427) (−3.812) (−3.407) (−3.726) (−3.301) (−7.410) (−7.156) (−8.034) (−7.820)
R Square 0.222 0.220 0.194 0.192 0.227 0.223 0.229 0.224 0.237 0.231 0.234 0.227
Model N 41, 266 41, 266 41, 266 41, 266 4, 542 4, 542 4, 542 4, 542 2, 822 2, 822 2, 822 2, 822
ESTAR-N 825 825 825 825 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824
LEED-N 114 114 114 114 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
Dual-N 68 68 68 68 147 147 147 147 413 413 413 413
Non-Eco-N 40,353 40,353 40,353 40,353 3,577 3,577 3,577 3,577 1,506 1,506 1,506
Prof Owner 4,887 4,887 4,887 4,887 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,473 1,473 1,473 1473
Weighting X X X X X X
Market Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
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Smallest 1/3 ESTAR Buildings (<112,816 SF) Mid 1/3 ESTAR Buildings Largest 1/3 (>224,555 SF)
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
age10 −0.125∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗ −0.298∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗
(−7.045) (−6.531) (−5.634) (−5.287) (−5.582) (−5.314) (−5.382) (−5.098) (−5.092) (−5.147) (−6.582) (−6.664)
age5 −0.055∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.028∗ −0.027∗ −0.068∗∗ −0.056∗ −0.063∗ −0.051 −0.091∗ −0.088 −0.104∗∗ −0.100∗∗
(−3.670) (−3.479) (−1.946) (−1.849) (−2.120) (−1.765) (−1.977) (−1.602) (−1.683) (−1.662) (−2.278) (−2.219)
Renovated 0.024∗ 0.022∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.021 −0.071∗ −0.070∗ −0.054∗ −0.052
(1.934) (1.769) (2.627) (2.496) (2.252) (2.084) (1.681) (1.499) (−1.791) (−1.797) (−1.693) (−1.624)
Percent Leased 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(8.886) (8.841) (9.495) (9.456) (4.499) (4.502) (4.647) (4.651) (3.922) (3.817) (4.368) (4.252)
stories 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(4.372) (4.292) (4.815) (4.735) (3.574) (3.547) (3.478) (3.451) (0.426) (0.400) (0.606) (0.566)
A Class 0.298∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗
(8.603) (8.839) (10.508) (10.817) (6.612) (6.675) (6.976) (7.044) (6.232) (6.406) (6.170) (6.165)
B Class 0.145∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗ 0.184∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(7.813) (7.900) (10.278) (10.345) (2.949) (2.937) (3.323) (3.298) (2.550) (2.578) (2.727) (2.686)
NNN −0.163∗∗∗ −0.163∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ −0.305∗∗ −0.300∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗ −0.282∗∗∗
(−6.726) (−6.643) (−6.744) (−6.674) (−4.155) (−4.163) (−4.216) (−4.219) (−2.652) (−2.610) (−2.856) (−2.814)
FSG 0.046 0.047 0.053∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.054 0.056 0.052 0.054 0.003 0.005 0.031 0.034
(1.395) (1.412) (2.059) (2.071) (0.755) (0.777) (0.743) (0.765) (0.025) (0.044) (0.288) (0.308)
Amenity −0.003 −0.002 0.001 0.001 −0.035 −0.033 −0.038 −0.036 0.011 0.021 0.010 0.020
(−0.172) (−0.142) (0.065) (0.095) (−1.387) (−1.307) (−1.555) (−1.489) (0.248) (0.448) (0.229) (0.436)
R Square 0.222 0.220 0.194 0.192 0.227 0.223 0.229 0.224 0.237 0.231 0.234 0.227
Model N 41, 266 41, 266 41, 266 41, 266 4, 542 4, 542 4, 542 4, 542 2, 822 2, 822 2, 822 2, 822
ESTAR-N 825 825 825 825 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824
LEED-N 114 114 114 114 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
Dual-N 68 68 68 68 147 147 147 147 413 413 413 413
Non-Eco-N 40,353 40,353 40,353 40,353 3,577 3,577 3,577 3,577 1,506 1,506 1,506
Prof Owner 4,887 4,887 4,887 4,887 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,473 1,473 1,473 1473
Weighting X X X X X X
Market Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
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Table 6: This table presents results from fixed effect regressions by market on lnrent of the building population split into thirds
by size. In each size category, results are presented first with and without the Prof Owner variable. Next results are presented
with the same regression weighted by lnsize, both with and without the Prof Owner variable. The ”N” for each sustainable real
estate building type is listed at the bottom of the table. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Smallest 1/3 Buildings > 21,212 SF Mid 1/3 Buildings Largest 1/3 Buildings > 53,758 SF
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
ESTAR 0.300∗∗ 0.318∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.319∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.030 0.048∗∗ 0.030 0.047∗∗
(2.245) (2.494) (2.238) (2.487) (3.441) (4.799) (3.499) (4.905) (1.653) (2.458) (1.584) (2.366)
LEED 0.069 0.072 0.070 0.073 0.126∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.924) (0.978) (0.936) (0.994) (2.099) (2.164) (2.066) (2.131) (4.233) (4.184) (4.226) (4.190)
Dual 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.006 0.013 0.061 0.079∗∗ 0.063 0.082∗∗
(.) (.) (.) (.) (0.031) (0.088) (0.054) (0.115) (1.583) (2.185) (1.612) (2.206)
Prof Owner 0.046∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(2.417) (2.440) (3.029) (3.030) (3.158) (3.126)
Intercept 2.240∗∗∗ 2.228∗∗∗ 2.242∗∗∗ 2.230∗∗∗ 2.516∗∗∗ 2.429∗∗∗ 2.514∗∗∗ 2.427∗∗∗ 2.785∗∗∗ 2.731∗∗∗ 2.747∗∗∗ 2.694∗∗∗
(13.436) (13.329) (13.464) (13.356) (16.827) (16.288) (16.755) (16.196) (7.755) (7.370) (7.695) (7.313)
lnsize 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.003 0.011 0.003 0.011 −0.007 −0.002 −0.004 0.001
(1.235) (1.310) (1.227) (1.304) (0.168) (0.736) (0.180) (0.750) (−0.253) (−0.079) (−0.138) (0.029)
age100 −0.066 −0.065 −0.067 −0.066 −0.117∗ −0.115∗ −0.117∗ −0.115∗ −0.086 −0.085 −0.085 −0.084
(−1.541) (−1.521) (−1.570) (−1.548) (−1.729) (−1.691) (−1.731) (−1.693) (−0.791) (−0.783) (−0.772) (−0.764)
age75 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 −0.100∗∗ −0.098∗∗ −0.102∗∗ −0.099∗∗ −0.007 −0.005 −0.002 −0.000
(0.196) (0.207) (0.203) (0.214) (−2.136) (−2.079) (−2.172) (−2.116) (−0.072) (−0.050) (−0.023) (−0.003)
age50 −0.022 −0.021 −0.022 −0.022 −0.082 −0.080 −0.082 −0.080 −0.085 −0.084 −0.082 −0.081
(−0.397) (−0.385) (−0.401) (−0.388) (−1.544) (−1.505) (−1.549) (−1.510) (−1.478) (−1.454) (−1.354) (−1.334)
age40 −0.038 −0.038 −0.039 −0.038 −0.093∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗
(−1.261) (−1.241) (−1.270) (−1.250) (−2.795) (−2.663) (−2.820) (−2.687) (−2.682) (−2.511) (−2.686) (−2.508)
age30 −0.076∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗
(−2.739) (−2.687) (−2.758) (−2.704) (−4.939) (−4.747) (−4.977) (−4.782) (−6.303) (−6.032) (−6.358) (−6.081)
age20 −0.077∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗
(−3.312) (−3.206) (−3.320) (−3.212) (−4.373) (−4.076) (−4.407) (−4.107) (−8.695) (−8.265) (−8.758) (−8.344)
age15 −0.077∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗ −0.051∗∗ −0.056∗∗ −0.051∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗
(−3.203) (−3.114) (−3.191) (−3.100) (−2.400) (−2.162) (−2.412) (−2.175) (−7.442) (−6.757) (−7.701) (−6.992)
age10 −0.060∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗
(−3.354) (−3.331) (−3.358) (−3.334) (−3.627) (−3.285) (−3.646) (−3.297) (−10.104) (−9.680) (−10.074) (−9.680)
age5 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.021 −0.019 −0.022 −0.019 −0.110∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗
R Square 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.165 0.163 0.166 0.164 0.252 0.248 0.253 0.249
Model N 16, 186 16, 186 16, 186 16, 186 16, 219 16, 219 16, 219 16, 219 16, 225 16, 225 16, 225 16, 045
ESTAR-N 30 30 30 30 186 186 186 186 2,257 2,257 2,257 2,257
LEED-N 11 11 11 11 38 38 38 38 229 229 229 229
Dual-N 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 7 621 621 621 621
Non-Eco-N 16,203 16,203 16,203 16,203 16,014 16,014 16,014 16,014 13,137 13,137 13,137 13,137
Prof Owner 568 568 568 568 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872 5,884 5,884 5,884 5,884
Weighting X X X X X X
Market Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
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Smallest 1/3 Buildings > 21,212 SF Mid 1/3 Buildings Largest 1/3 Buildings > 53,758 SF
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
(−0.250) (−0.239) (−0.250) (−0.238) (−1.163) (−1.030) (−1.207) (−1.072) (−5.618) (−5.122) (−5.612) (−5.102)
Renovated 0.056∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.002 −0.000 0.000 −0.002
(2.681) (2.683) (2.703) (2.706) (2.586) (2.462) (2.591) (2.462) (0.134) (−0.005) (0.001) (−0.129)
Percent Leased 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(8.915) (8.934) (8.911) (8.930) (9.047) (8.928) (9.064) (8.946) (6.002) (5.945) (5.895) (5.836)
stories 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.007∗
(4.332) (4.315) (4.329) (4.311) (4.568) (4.497) (4.560) (4.489) (2.114) (2.055) (1.988) (1.930)
A Class 0.554∗∗ 0.560∗∗ 0.554∗∗ 0.560∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(2.518) (2.493) (2.500) (2.475) (10.153) (10.542) (10.073) (10.463) (8.489) (8.687) (8.746) (8.938)
B Class 0.127∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(10.754) (10.737) (10.797) (10.780) (8.570) (8.768) (8.536) (8.735) (5.313) (5.362) (5.452) (5.496)
NNN −0.082∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗ −0.238∗∗∗ −0.238∗∗∗
(−5.185) (−5.188) (−5.185) (−5.189) (−6.899) (−6.683) (−6.885) (−6.666) (−4.406) (−4.371) (−4.302) (−4.269)
FSG 0.054∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.050∗ 0.050∗ 0.050∗ 0.050∗ 0.043 0.045 0.043 0.045
(2.980) (2.995) (2.975) (2.990) (1.969) (1.971) (1.955) (1.956) (0.667) (0.687) (0.650) (0.671)
Amenity 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.006 −0.005 −0.006 −0.005
(0.299) (0.306) (0.296) (0.303) (−0.034) (0.018) (−0.050) (0.003) (−0.341) (−0.268) (−0.321) (−0.244)
R Square 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.165 0.163 0.166 0.164 0.252 0.248 0.253 0.249
Model N 16, 186 16, 186 16, 186 16, 186 16, 219 16, 219 16, 219 16, 219 16, 225 16, 225 16, 225 16, 045
ESTAR-N 30 30 30 30 186 186 186 186 2,257 2,257 2,257 2,257
LEED-N 11 11 11 11 38 38 38 38 229 229 229 229
Dual-N 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 7 621 621 621 621
Non-Eco-N 16,203 16,203 16,203 16,203 16,014 16,014 16,014 16,014 13,137 13,137 13,137 13,137
Prof Owner 568 568 568 568 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872 5,884 5,884 5,884 5,884
Weighting X X X X X X
Market Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
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Table 7: This table presents results from fixed effect regressions by market on sales PSF of the building population split into
thirds by the ESTAR distribution. In each size category results are presented first with the core controls, then with professional
ownership controls added, then with sale condition controls also added, and finally weighted by price with all controls. ***,**,*
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
size<=151,775 Medium size>=280,563
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
ESTAR 37.117∗∗∗ 26.444∗∗∗ 27.926∗∗∗ 10.096 33.862∗∗∗ 33.262∗∗∗ 34.758∗∗∗ 30.648∗∗∗ −3.258 −7.352 −7.369 −99.428∗∗∗
(4.589) (3.608) (3.711) (0.908) (4.208) (4.169) (4.176) (2.975) (−0.089) (−0.208) (−0.229) (−3.187)
LEED 69.178∗∗∗ 67.784∗∗ 66.177∗∗ 71.302∗∗ 71.291∗∗ 64.927∗∗ 73.117∗∗ 83.853∗∗∗ 67.103∗ 60.091 58.835∗ −16.516
(2.676) (2.664) (2.621) (2.178) (2.220) (2.299) (2.523) (3.179) (1.809) (1.584) (1.723) (−0.392)
Dual 27.137 25.954 25.123 −9.148 63.001∗∗∗ 64.879∗∗∗ 62.386∗∗∗ 48.626∗∗∗ 5.675 1.652 2.219 −108.94∗∗∗
(1.504) (1.492) (1.470) (−0.210) (4.879) (4.963) (4.554) (2.762) (0.139) (0.041) (0.060) (−3.314)
Prof Buyer 62.006∗∗∗ 62.935∗∗∗ 34.438∗∗∗ 18.005 18.866 12.873 7.304 7.582 −12.110
(6.171) (6.434) (3.645) (1.161) (1.160) (0.716) (0.604) (0.612) (−0.591)
Prof Seller 43.338∗∗∗ 41.561∗∗∗ 69.864∗∗∗ 90.685∗∗∗ 85.504∗∗∗ 96.476∗∗∗ 83.489∗∗∗ 77.083∗∗∗ 52.376∗
(3.499) (3.560) (2.985) (3.180) (2.965) (5.808) (3.298) (3.312) (1.959)
Prof Both 49.579 52.176 −19.032 36.127 34.523 2.529 118.446∗∗ 115.346∗∗ 192.002∗∗
(1.102) (1.169) (−0.304) (0.998) (0.965) (0.141) (2.446) (2.269) (2.441)
Intercept 357.583∗∗∗ 375.633∗∗∗ 377.120∗∗∗ 832.197∗∗∗ 529.275∗∗∗ 500.013∗∗∗ 518.807∗∗∗ 1003.42∗∗∗ −214.04 −224.34 −228.44 −668.90∗∗∗
(5.449) (5.616) (5.215) (2.977) (3.103) (2.845) (3.213) (3.110) (−0.699) (−0.738) (−0.680) (−4.242)
lnsize −18.383∗∗∗ −20.258∗∗∗ −21.386∗∗∗ −34.298∗∗ −6.782 −4.854 −5.918 −30.146 63.044∗∗ 62.924∗∗ 63.747∗∗ 139.923∗∗∗
(−5.002) (−5.612) (−5.345) (−2.092) (−0.295) (−0.211) (−0.285) (−0.953) (2.304) (2.308) (2.158) (10.507)
age100 30.948 30.900 30.762 151.669 −5.780 −2.684 −7.809 53.979 −52.164 −45.289 −43.156 54.317
(0.870) (0.867) (0.870) (1.450) (−0.124) (−0.062) (−0.179) (1.508) (−0.899) (−0.817) (−0.718) (1.299)
age75 19.138 19.394 19.644 99.752 −29.106 −22.365 −26.879 50.834 −83.811∗∗ −80.901∗∗ −85.239∗∗∗ −55.691
(0.720) (0.729) (0.751) (1.338) (−0.689) (−0.548) (−0.642) (1.116) (−2.623) (−2.653) (−2.922) (−1.309)
age50 8.103 7.514 7.924 67.474 −78.639∗∗∗ −71.070∗∗∗ −70.562∗∗∗ −103.40∗∗∗ −98.621∗∗∗ −96.169∗∗∗ −94.703∗∗∗ 47.521
(0.630) (0.589) (0.634) (0.831) (−3.121) (−3.171) (−2.996) (−3.489) (−3.568) (−3.532) (−3.087) (1.083)
age40 2.616 1.723 2.579 −17.767 −51.413∗∗∗ −43.760∗∗ −48.237∗∗∗ −21.320 −68.187∗∗ −67.179∗∗ −72.259∗∗ 35.204
(0.282) (0.190) (0.290) (−0.894) (−3.230) (−2.622) (−2.875) (−0.697) (−2.376) (−2.553) (−2.653) (1.170)
age30 5.171 4.581 5.079 −18.500 −43.324∗∗∗ −37.599∗∗ −40.938∗∗ −52.977∗∗ −114.18∗∗∗ −111.67∗∗∗ −112.95∗∗∗ −80.585∗
(0.533) (0.476) (0.530) (−0.833) (−2.687) (−2.326) (−2.479) (−2.303) (−4.797) (−5.237) (−5.231) (−1.771)
age20 14.315 13.275 13.208 −8.092 −36.932∗∗ −33.663∗∗ −37.004∗∗ −51.302∗∗∗ −109.01∗∗∗ −106.94∗∗∗ −107.86∗∗∗ −88.269∗∗∗
(1.561) (1.462) (1.475) (−0.390) (−2.446) (−2.231) (−2.605) (−3.496) (−4.383) (−4.436) (−4.451) (−2.994)
age15 35.240∗∗∗ 34.764∗∗∗ 32.211∗∗∗ 43.680 −12.714 −9.419 −19.949 −32.195 −92.839∗∗∗ −96.109∗∗∗ −98.277∗∗∗ −85.002∗
(3.425) (3.366) (3.160) (1.075) (−0.797) (−0.587) (−1.136) (−1.501) (−2.901) (−3.258) (−3.375) (−1.689)
R Square 0.112 0.116 0.132 0.237 0.293 0.308 0.336 0.455 0.248 0.261 0.276 0.498
Model N 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175
ESTAR-N 311 311 311 311 310 310 310 310 312 312 312 312
LEED N 93 93 93 93 35 35 35 35 30 30 30 30
Dual-N 32 32 32 32 71 71 71 71 192 192 192 192
Non-Eco-N 23,093 23,093 23,093 23,093 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 660 660 660 660
Prof Seller N 180 180 180 180 55 55 55 55 51 51 51 51
Prof Buyer N 434 434 434 434 211 211 211 211 204 204 204 204
Prof Both N 23 23 23 23 21 21 21 21 23 23 23 23
Market Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
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size<=151,775 Medium size>=280,563
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
age10 46.378∗∗∗ 45.804∗∗∗ 44.074∗∗∗ 43.085 24.101 28.228 18.202 6.411 −55.154∗ −58.425∗∗ −58.417∗∗ −16.882
(4.568) (4.515) (4.402) (1.651) (1.180) (1.421) (1.014) (0.374) (−1.887) (−2.343) (−2.219) (−0.449)
age5 46.093∗∗∗ 45.656∗∗∗ 44.051∗∗∗ 45.536∗∗∗ 40.290∗∗ 43.615∗∗ 32.520∗∗ 10.688 8.763 9.718 10.963 53.003
(5.669) (5.637) (5.575) (2.739) (2.184) (2.536) (2.119) (0.706) (0.311) (0.372) (0.402) (1.520)
stories 8.881∗∗∗ 8.868∗∗∗ 9.285∗∗∗ 15.471∗∗∗ −0.342 −0.382 −0.241 2.434 −1.392 −1.435 −1.415 −2.513∗∗
(2.884) (2.885) (3.026) (7.857) (−0.150) (−0.176) (−0.115) (1.366) (−1.191) (−1.342) (−1.358) (−2.591)
A Class 67.296∗∗∗ 63.792∗∗∗ 64.175∗∗∗ 95.620∗∗ 88.541∗∗∗ 85.340∗∗∗ 83.628∗∗∗ 144.390∗∗∗ 132.071∗∗∗ 129.015∗∗∗ 115.274∗∗∗ 139.124∗∗∗
(9.177) (9.328) (8.968) (2.470) (4.137) (4.244) (4.098) (4.791) (3.943) (3.949) (4.095) (4.036)
B Class 26.151∗∗∗ 25.886∗∗∗ 25.325∗∗∗ 35.894∗∗ 44.618∗∗∗ 41.840∗∗∗ 41.411∗∗ 93.849∗∗∗ 52.273∗ 50.724∗ 39.844∗ 5.072
(8.387) (8.422) (8.363) (2.519) (2.915) (2.845) (2.606) (3.639) (1.881) (1.957) (1.963) (0.105)
lnland −11.802∗ −11.583∗ −11.486∗ −37.788∗∗ −34.196∗∗ −33.541∗∗∗ −33.999∗∗∗ −51.157∗∗∗ −40.900∗∗∗ −39.757∗∗∗ −39.815∗∗∗ −84.874∗∗∗
(−1.867) (−1.838) (−1.849) (−2.317) (−2.564) (−2.790) (−2.775) (−4.920) (−3.160) (−3.241) (−3.341) (−4.632)
Amenity 4.003 3.593 3.122 −20.519∗ 42.032∗∗∗ 37.944∗∗∗ 40.471∗∗∗ 16.969 52.945 52.154 52.641 74.568
(1.065) (0.942) (0.870) (−1.744) (4.078) (3.648) (3.738) (1.180) (1.312) (1.276) (1.136) (1.102)
Year 2002 7.254 7.119 7.051 67.240 22.693∗∗ 20.437∗∗ 16.332 −4.467 −18.461 −18.589 −18.585 −9.081
(1.221) (1.201) (1.235) (1.117) (2.438) (2.162) (1.658) (−0.336) (−1.245) (−1.207) (−1.072) (−0.128)
Year 2003 6.533 6.364 6.775 −3.670 2.124 0.814 1.389 −21.464 −13.557 −11.065 1.116 1.114
(1.293) (1.261) (1.360) (−0.282) (0.154) (0.061) (0.115) (−1.458) (−0.497) (−0.412) (0.039) (0.016)
Year 2004 12.249∗∗ 12.062∗∗ 12.978∗∗∗ 1.064 16.738 16.210 16.919 7.490 −15.829 −12.685 −10.794 −18.563
(2.633) (2.571) (2.912) (0.082) (1.129) (1.148) (1.236) (0.650) (−0.694) (−0.559) (−0.457) (−0.284)
Year 2005 27.578∗∗∗ 27.032∗∗∗ 28.594∗∗∗ 42.650∗ 36.095∗∗∗ 34.488∗∗∗ 34.185∗∗ 23.193 4.741 2.915 9.057 −22.654
(3.627) (3.592) (4.038) (1.711) (2.877) (2.913) (2.656) (1.510) (0.204) (0.127) (0.372) (−0.502)
Year 2006 50.079∗∗∗ 49.587∗∗∗ 50.395∗∗∗ 84.514∗∗ 58.528∗∗∗ 55.334∗∗∗ 56.211∗∗∗ 60.009∗∗∗ 29.768 29.620 33.163 54.618
(4.329) (4.318) (4.516) (2.005) (3.524) (3.704) (3.542) (3.330) (1.285) (1.299) (1.355) (0.839)
Year 2007 58.145∗∗∗ 56.636∗∗∗ 58.753∗∗∗ 78.633∗∗ 67.315∗∗∗ 63.135∗∗∗ 65.003∗∗∗ 100.140∗∗∗ 53.283 52.134 59.256 146.956
(5.035) (4.984) (5.478) (2.557) (2.972) (2.934) (2.923) (2.753) (1.498) (1.453) (1.514) (1.418)
Year 2008 64.706∗∗∗ 61.039∗∗∗ 64.188∗∗∗ 118.237∗∗ 79.445∗∗∗ 67.556∗∗∗ 70.931∗∗∗ 98.155∗∗∗ 120.813∗ 108.879 116.242 275.697∗
(3.995) (3.846) (4.289) (2.443) (3.504) (3.176) (3.235) (3.603) (1.772) (1.561) (1.576) (1.955)
Year 2009 55.549∗∗∗ 53.020∗∗∗ 55.838∗∗∗ 118.237∗∗ 105.346∗∗∗ 94.549∗∗∗ 94.463∗∗∗ 145.305∗∗∗ 71.348 65.682 68.657 276.079∗∗
(3.808) (3.687) (4.138) (2.129) (3.120) (3.217) (3.306) (4.403) (1.176) (1.097) (1.083) (2.049)
Year 2010 18.717 15.907 23.707∗∗ 78.164∗∗ 42.960∗ 32.199 48.460∗∗ 108.443∗∗∗ 37.610 29.907 47.782∗ 53.637
(1.620) (1.412) (2.287) (2.206) (1.713) (1.636) (2.269) (2.707) (1.294) (1.060) (1.767) (0.814)
Year 2011 20.487 17.517 28.054∗ 145.174∗∗ 61.036∗∗ 47.664∗∗ 65.967∗∗∗ 101.704∗∗∗ 55.853∗∗ 40.280 57.716∗∗ 78.696
(1.243) (1.081) (1.882) (2.089) (2.194) (2.076) (2.843) (3.598) (2.073) (1.626) (2.107) (1.174)
1031 31.110∗∗∗ 3.521 13.902 −8.872 39.635∗∗∗ 13.873
R Square 0.112 0.116 0.132 0.237 0.293 0.308 0.336 0.455 0.248 0.261 0.276 0.498
Model N 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175
ESTAR-N 311 311 311 311 310 310 310 310 312 312 312 312
LEED N 93 93 93 93 35 35 35 35 30 30 30 30
Dual-N 32 32 32 32 71 71 71 71 192 192 192 192
Non-Eco-N 23,093 23,093 23,093 23,093 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 660 660 660 660
Prof Seller N 180 180 180 180 55 55 55 55 51 51 51 51
Prof Buyer N 434 434 434 434 211 211 211 211 204 204 204 204
Prof Both N 23 23 23 23 21 21 21 21 23 23 23 23
Market Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
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size<=151,775 Medium size>=280,563
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
(6.458) (0.262) (1.400) (−0.616) (2.983) (0.757)
Assemblage 29.671∗∗ 9.563 5.514 −56.265 175.667∗∗∗ 97.760∗∗
(2.150) (0.453) (0.135) (−0.613) (3.616) (2.162)
Build to Suit 42.339∗∗∗ 17.236 7.135 32.736 −106.34∗ −8.180
(4.841) (1.186) (0.238) (0.860) (−1.917) (−0.105)
Business Value 22.515 193.180 150.328∗∗∗ 70.442 −7.450 −94.045
(0.927) (1.257) (3.732) (0.907) (−0.111) (−0.763)
Condo Conversion 42.132 128.739 −9.481 −66.914∗∗ 85.651 139.670∗∗∗
(1.394) (1.368) (−0.393) (−2.395) (1.007) (3.108)
Contamination −38.081∗ −139.86 0.000 0.000 −96.550 −173.22∗∗∗
(−1.702) (−1.525) (.) (.) (−1.287) (−2.673)
Deed Restriction −7.611 −6.043 0.000 0.000 −150.11∗∗ −147.04
(−0.578) (−0.197) (.) (.) (−2.576) (−1.617)
Deferred Maintenance −25.457∗∗∗ −3.334 −32.677 5.550 −49.380 −73.208
(−4.208) (−0.142) (−1.081) (0.060) (−1.657) (−1.055)
Distressed Sale −25.425∗∗∗ −71.629∗∗ −54.306 −125.33∗∗∗ −31.487 320.907∗∗∗
(−3.853) (−2.354) (−1.578) (−4.390) (−1.022) (5.953)
Ground Lease 46.804∗∗ 120.952∗∗ −4.507 −9.229 17.261 43.518
(2.474) (2.065) (−0.295) (−0.418) (0.832) (1.172)
High Vacancy −0.703 36.156 −71.011∗∗∗ −100.17∗∗∗ −45.951∗∗ −120.60∗∗∗
(−0.046) (0.564) (−7.752) (−7.606) (−2.574) (−3.903)
Historical −19.201 −18.053 −4.582 −108.51∗∗ −24.699 −26.537
(−1.353) (−0.264) (−0.077) (−2.204) (−0.304) (−0.576)
Investor NNN 33.336∗∗∗ 43.476∗∗ 10.221 12.689 −2.047 −39.048
(6.539) (2.303) (0.739) (0.715) (−0.146) (−1.292)
Land Contract −61.937∗∗∗ −148.72∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(−6.185) (−3.559) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Option Sale 19.640∗∗ −33.519 63.511 120.812∗∗ −72.012∗ −115.34∗∗
(2.352) (−1.154) (1.175) (2.475) (−1.822) (−2.028)
Partial Interest −12.478 292.332 12.887 20.613 −17.926 −137.31∗∗
(−0.405) (1.346) (0.202) (0.274) (−0.562) (−2.216)
Redevelopment 47.718 59.085∗∗ −22.832 −32.223 −90.942∗∗ −129.31∗∗
(1.625) (2.407) (−0.943) (−0.503) (−2.429) (−2.046)
REO −54.813∗∗∗ −149.39∗∗∗ −78.424∗∗∗ −164.68∗∗∗ −13.062 −54.913∗∗
(−5.548) (−3.415) (−3.000) (−3.997) (−0.241) (−2.046)
R Square 0.112 0.116 0.132 0.237 0.293 0.308 0.336 0.455 0.248 0.261 0.276 0.498
Model N 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175
ESTAR-N 311 311 311 311 310 310 310 310 312 312 312 312
LEED N 93 93 93 93 35 35 35 35 30 30 30 30
Dual-N 32 32 32 32 71 71 71 71 192 192 192 192
Non-Eco-N 23,093 23,093 23,093 23,093 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 660 660 660 660
Prof Seller N 180 180 180 180 55 55 55 55 51 51 51 51
Prof Buyer N 434 434 434 434 211 211 211 211 204 204 204 204
Prof Both N 23 23 23 23 21 21 21 21 23 23 23 23
Market Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
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size<=151,775 Medium size>=280,563
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
Sale Leaseback 19.426∗∗∗ 14.377 23.598 46.273 12.207 −39.487
(4.240) (0.738) (1.302) (1.621) (0.805) (−1.139)
Shell Condition 21.243 −46.434∗ −24.369∗ −51.526∗∗ −101.87∗∗∗ −275.38∗∗∗
(1.653) (−1.760) (−1.736) (−2.508) (−3.065) (−4.504)
Short Sale −48.647∗∗∗ −158.46∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 −55.253∗ −52.707
(−3.062) (−3.901) (.) (.) (−1.869) (−1.556)
Single Tenant 9.087∗∗∗ 25.959∗ 6.077 11.625 11.573 36.757
(2.727) (1.999) (0.733) (0.948) (0.447) (0.988)
Tenant Purchase 8.286∗ 17.946∗∗ 37.130 76.932∗∗∗ 54.107 62.278
(1.697) (2.131) (1.481) (3.137) (1.536) (1.235)
R Square 0.112 0.116 0.132 0.237 0.293 0.308 0.336 0.455 0.248 0.261 0.276 0.498
Model N 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175
ESTAR-N 311 311 311 311 310 310 310 310 312 312 312 312
LEED N 93 93 93 93 35 35 35 35 30 30 30 30
Dual-N 32 32 32 32 71 71 71 71 192 192 192 192
Non-Eco-N 23,093 23,093 23,093 23,093 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 660 660 660 660
Prof Seller N 180 180 180 180 55 55 55 55 51 51 51 51
Prof Buyer N 434 434 434 434 211 211 211 211 204 204 204 204
Prof Both N 23 23 23 23 21 21 21 21 23 23 23 23
Market Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
100
Table 8: This table presents results from fixed effect regressions by market on sales PSF of the building population split into
thirds by size. In each size category results are presented first with the core controls, then with professional ownership controls
added, then with sale condition controls also added, and finally weighted by price with all controls. ***,**,* represent statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
>17,435 SF Medium >44,019 SF
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
ESTAR −33.600∗ −33.257∗ −30.937 −78.067∗∗∗ 77.326∗∗∗ 61.485∗∗ 64.236∗∗ 88.994∗ 26.742∗∗ 22.079∗ 22.162∗ −63.981∗∗
(−1.870) (−1.852) (−1.569) (−3.202) (3.015) (2.117) (2.255) (1.849) (2.008) (1.833) (1.841) (−2.014)
LEED 19.430 20.034 13.209 112.383 54.839 55.035 57.404 131.717∗∗ 87.599∗∗∗ 80.738∗∗∗ 81.229∗∗∗ 11.486
(0.388) (0.401) (0.258) (1.203) (1.440) (1.443) (1.562) (2.132) (5.458) (5.690) (5.690) (0.316)
Dual −9.286 −8.992 −33.971 −141.42 −49.176∗∗ −48.246∗∗ −56.240∗ −66.741∗∗ 39.549∗ 35.814 35.179 −78.617∗∗
(−0.311) (−0.300) (−0.820) (−1.159) (−2.511) (−2.450) (−1.688) (−2.104) (1.690) (1.572) (1.574) (−2.412)
Prof Buyer 209.315∗∗∗ 212.689∗∗∗ 344.407 124.069∗∗∗ 125.297∗∗∗ 272.399 27.708∗∗∗ 28.473∗∗∗ 0.782
(2.776) (2.698) (1.200) (3.481) (3.452) (1.635) (2.931) (3.009) (0.040)
Prof Seller 18.920 22.199 5.054 31.086∗∗ 28.348∗ −6.306 72.260∗∗∗ 68.176∗∗∗ 60.985∗∗∗
(0.775) (0.875) (0.219) (2.112) (1.997) (−0.159) (4.018) (3.849) (2.753)
Prof Both 0.000 0.000 0.000 −107.07∗∗∗ −130.02∗∗∗ −491.96∗∗ 78.632∗∗ 78.004∗∗ 150.115∗∗
(.) (.) (.) (−11.823) (−4.211) (−2.649) (2.070) (2.063) (2.619)
Intercept 443.192∗∗∗ 445.988∗∗∗ 458.706∗∗∗ 862.363∗∗ 407.848∗∗∗ 416.662∗∗∗ 408.203∗∗∗ 1614.32∗ 233.033∗∗∗ 247.762∗∗∗ 241.093∗∗∗ 158.348∗∗
(5.717) (5.817) (5.018) (2.539) (3.115) (3.149) (2.945) (1.862) (3.834) (4.373) (4.349) (2.147)
lnsize −39.744∗∗∗ −40.140∗∗∗ −42.450∗∗∗ −84.103∗∗ −28.961∗∗ −29.830∗∗ −30.164∗∗ −136.91∗ 12.773 11.139 11.299 60.633∗∗∗
(−4.440) (−4.528) (−3.963) (−2.207) (−2.454) (−2.521) (−2.453) (−1.749) (1.082) (1.050) (1.070) (6.596)
age100 25.108 23.873 23.472 104.870∗ 23.800 23.197 23.090 250.086 1.008 2.820 3.228 53.793
(1.061) (1.026) (0.998) (1.781) (0.649) (0.633) (0.644) (1.479) (0.026) (0.074) (0.086) (1.357)
age75 27.362 26.710 23.745 68.600∗∗ 14.534 14.553 14.933 177.255 −8.284 −6.799 −5.411 1.133
(1.260) (1.227) (1.207) (2.395) (0.512) (0.513) (0.541) (1.562) (−0.258) (−0.216) (−0.177) (0.051)
age50 21.694 20.990 20.761 129.590∗∗∗ 2.284 1.745 2.624 23.131 −28.023 −27.842 −26.260 47.898
(1.265) (1.244) (1.228) (2.730) (0.226) (0.171) (0.272) (0.614) (−1.368) (−1.369) (−1.300) (1.176)
age40 4.704 4.267 3.715 −0.504 3.159 3.146 4.971 −1.818 −15.420 −16.580 −16.190 46.340
(0.420) (0.381) (0.340) (−0.026) (0.335) (0.331) (0.546) (−0.103) (−1.254) (−1.399) (−1.407) (1.567)
age30 14.519 13.930 12.767 13.941 3.351 3.252 3.841 3.896 −26.315∗∗ −26.776∗∗ −25.776∗∗ −73.198∗∗∗
(1.242) (1.199) (1.140) (0.653) (0.335) (0.322) (0.389) (0.151) (−2.411) (−2.465) (−2.536) (−3.105)
age20 17.827 16.998 16.367 9.084 14.827 14.241 13.588 21.345 −16.402 −18.192∗ −17.946∗ −71.104∗∗∗
(1.559) (1.499) (1.511) (0.546) (1.609) (1.515) (1.495) (0.886) (−1.621) (−1.800) (−1.853) (−4.158)
age15 35.244∗∗∗ 34.771∗∗∗ 30.676∗∗ 34.532 36.896∗∗∗ 35.896∗∗∗ 33.753∗∗∗ 38.892 10.411 9.576 6.867 −38.432
(2.783) (2.768) (2.483) (1.370) (3.461) (3.369) (3.242) (1.561) (0.840) (0.767) (0.569) (−0.996)
age10 49.112∗∗∗ 48.702∗∗∗ 49.093∗∗∗ 75.489∗∗∗ 44.467∗∗∗ 44.599∗∗∗ 42.345∗∗∗ 53.633∗∗ 28.912∗∗ 27.447∗∗ 24.979∗∗ 2.053
R Square 0.114 0.120 0.151 0.563 0.106 0.113 0.131 0.290 0.209 0.219 0.233 0.415
Model N 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579
ESTAR-N 10 10 10 10 24 24 24 24 899 899 899 899
Dual-N 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 286 286 286 286
LEED N 14 14 14 14 26 26 26 26 118 118 118 118
Prof Seller N 15 15 15 15 45 45 45 45 226 226 226 226
Prof Buyer N 18 18 18 18 60 60 60 60 771 771 771 771
Prof Both N 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 66 66 66 66
Market Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
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>17,435 SF Medium >44,000 SF
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
(3.545) (3.542) (3.495) (2.711) (4.751) (4.671) (4.528) (2.217) (2.326) (2.172) (2.111) (0.111)
age5 50.276∗∗∗ 49.660∗∗∗ 47.798∗∗∗ 60.979∗∗∗ 41.814∗∗∗ 41.910∗∗∗ 41.070∗∗∗ 43.827∗∗ 44.327∗∗∗ 43.800∗∗∗ 40.951∗∗∗ 46.658∗∗
(4.298) (4.287) (4.329) (3.015) (4.241) (4.204) (4.256) (2.282) (4.171) (4.217) (4.092) (2.260)
stories 29.093∗ 28.698 29.150∗ 80.685∗∗∗ 14.381∗∗ 14.231∗∗ 14.750∗∗ 33.458∗∗∗ 0.730 0.714 0.750 0.151
(1.684) (1.670) (1.745) (4.024) (2.317) (2.330) (2.432) (10.940) (0.502) (0.510) (0.534) (0.148)
A Class 75.449 75.387 72.849 133.546 46.525∗∗∗ 45.263∗∗∗ 47.175∗∗∗ 80.019∗∗ 87.407∗∗∗ 85.054∗∗∗ 84.150∗∗∗ 141.380∗∗∗
(1.126) (1.128) (1.067) (1.259) (3.344) (3.418) (3.663) (2.297) (8.695) (8.926) (8.941) (6.648)
B Class 22.440∗∗∗ 22.399∗∗∗ 21.675∗∗∗ 21.216∗∗ 23.679∗∗∗ 22.934∗∗∗ 22.230∗∗∗ 13.076∗ 43.947∗∗∗ 43.190∗∗∗ 42.599∗∗∗ 58.870∗∗∗
(6.050) (6.045) (5.895) (2.031) (7.648) (7.585) (7.270) (1.811) (7.152) (7.256) (7.343) (6.274)
lnland −5.325 −5.093 −4.920 −12.727 −7.518 −7.412 −7.261 −19.623 −27.238∗∗∗ −26.605∗∗∗ −26.611∗∗∗ −66.482∗∗∗
(−1.473) (−1.408) (−1.388) (−1.513) (−1.544) (−1.523) (−1.494) (−1.501) (−3.246) (−3.426) (−3.441) (−4.430)
Amenity 4.154 4.331 3.311 −20.436 4.877 4.813 3.874 −19.411 10.494∗∗ 9.082∗∗ 10.434∗∗ 10.285
(0.757) (0.794) (0.676) (−1.548) (1.326) (1.298) (1.089) (−1.289) (2.318) (2.036) (2.326) (0.434)
Year 2002 10.919∗ 10.867∗ 11.106∗∗ 35.658 3.791 3.886 4.639 10.418 8.020 7.226 4.684 27.272
(1.812) (1.805) (2.058) (1.047) (0.657) (0.674) (0.895) (0.806) (1.281) (1.174) (0.817) (0.595)
Year 2003 10.642∗ 10.564∗ 11.566∗ 10.652 12.378∗∗ 12.554∗∗ 13.087∗∗ 16.832 −9.603 −9.733 −9.822 −28.270
(1.834) (1.835) (1.997) (0.427) (2.055) (2.082) (2.287) (0.993) (−1.510) (−1.555) (−1.564) (−1.060)
Year 2004 22.019∗∗∗ 21.950∗∗∗ 22.656∗∗∗ 20.478 11.213∗∗ 11.319∗∗ 12.483∗∗ 3.992 −0.278 −0.425 −0.343 −26.504
(3.558) (3.572) (4.206) (1.312) (2.025) (2.032) (2.310) (0.183) (−0.039) (−0.061) (−0.049) (−1.109)
Year 2005 41.685∗∗∗ 41.591∗∗∗ 42.450∗∗∗ 56.462∗ 21.018∗∗∗ 20.702∗∗∗ 23.137∗∗∗ 22.756 14.720∗ 13.507∗ 14.294∗ −5.727
(4.531) (4.548) (5.216) (1.887) (2.910) (2.886) (3.403) (0.904) (1.784) (1.688) (1.805) (−0.284)
Year 2006 61.119∗∗∗ 60.508∗∗∗ 60.166∗∗∗ 93.467∗∗ 50.623∗∗∗ 49.760∗∗∗ 51.365∗∗∗ 92.890∗∗ 35.428∗∗∗ 34.093∗∗∗ 34.392∗∗∗ 50.047
(5.514) (5.515) (5.677) (2.300) (4.409) (4.495) (4.755) (2.095) (2.882) (2.827) (2.854) (1.514)
Year 2007 70.611∗∗∗ 70.221∗∗∗ 70.146∗∗∗ 95.295∗∗∗ 61.959∗∗∗ 61.591∗∗∗ 63.862∗∗∗ 104.329∗∗ 44.238∗∗∗ 40.509∗∗∗ 42.649∗∗∗ 108.411∗
(5.760) (5.779) (6.653) (4.096) (4.643) (4.643) (5.057) (2.533) (3.111) (2.879) (2.992) (1.680)
Year 2008 67.184∗∗∗ 65.708∗∗∗ 67.681∗∗∗ 104.136∗∗∗ 68.317∗∗∗ 65.718∗∗∗ 69.050∗∗∗ 146.157∗∗ 66.826∗∗∗ 57.891∗∗ 61.065∗∗ 192.260∗
(5.173) (5.261) (6.182) (3.083) (3.422) (3.359) (3.697) (2.394) (2.748) (2.364) (2.462) (1.993)
Year 2009 69.951∗∗∗ 68.124∗∗∗ 69.727∗∗∗ 160.335∗∗∗ 49.727∗∗∗ 48.262∗∗∗ 51.124∗∗∗ 107.978∗∗ 55.216∗∗∗ 47.249∗∗ 49.385∗∗ 184.961∗∗
(3.717) (3.720) (4.514) (3.616) (3.686) (3.647) (4.189) (2.256) (2.831) (2.499) (2.576) (2.274)
Year 2010 26.614∗∗ 25.968∗∗ 31.589∗∗∗ 67.777∗∗ 15.103 13.287 20.947∗∗ 49.222∗ 19.568 11.342 23.958 68.581∗∗
(2.313) (2.287) (3.357) (2.603) (1.334) (1.198) (2.060) (1.702) (1.280) (0.791) (1.632) (2.250)
Year 2011 24.959 24.312 31.404∗∗ 100.641∗∗ 15.252 13.255 23.394 174.983∗ 32.955∗∗ 22.424 39.707∗∗∗ 72.475∗∗∗
(1.529) (1.514) (2.280) (2.275) (0.846) (0.744) (1.423) (1.845) (2.062) (1.592) (2.743) (2.844)
1031 35.986∗∗∗ 13.357 34.635∗∗∗ 24.802∗∗ 23.441∗∗∗ 8.265
(5.299) (0.600) (6.168) (2.012) (5.498) (0.689)
Assemblage 51.815∗∗ 81.440∗∗ 18.592 −33.850 −5.107 −21.399
R Square 0.114 0.120 0.151 0.563 0.106 0.113 0.131 0.290 0.209 0.219 0.233 0.415
Model N 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579
ESTAR-N 10 10 10 10 24 24 24 24 899 899 899 899
Dual-N 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 286 286 286 286
LEED N 14 14 14 14 26 26 26 26 118 118 118 118
Prof Seller N 15 15 15 15 45 45 45 45 226 226 226 226
Prof Buyer N 18 18 18 18 60 60 60 60 771 771 771 771
Prof Both N 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 66 66 66 66
Market Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
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>17,435 SF Medium >44,000 SF
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
(2.271) (2.426) (1.158) (−0.688) (−0.213) (−0.367)
Build to Suit 32.206 29.643 72.752∗∗∗ 49.946∗∗ 2.696 0.575
(1.545) (1.029) (4.288) (2.286) (0.183) (0.020)
Business Value −18.017 −124.38 18.647 13.262 89.793 16.995
(−1.102) (−1.523) (1.284) (0.531) (1.228) (0.168)
Condo Conversion 175.560 554.201∗∗∗ 18.123 −53.455 25.727 70.370
(1.051) (4.235) (1.072) (−0.771) (0.857) (1.107)
Contamination −46.436∗ −137.87∗∗∗ −30.784 −223.39 −64.050∗∗∗ −149.14∗∗∗
(−1.794) (−2.985) (−0.984) (−1.204) (−3.274) (−4.922)
Deed Restriction −16.423 −71.986 −7.579 −44.110 −13.205 −10.330
(−0.443) (−0.650) (−0.596) (−1.448) (−0.524) (−0.160)
Deferred Maintenance −25.024∗∗ −68.608∗∗ −26.953∗∗∗ −75.923 −23.664∗∗∗ −12.090
(−2.648) (−2.557) (−2.685) (−1.403) (−4.599) (−0.272)
Distressed Sale −29.633∗∗ 42.682 −10.773 −22.115 −35.030∗∗∗ 332.558∗∗∗
(−2.353) (0.503) (−1.067) (−0.668) (−2.992) (4.666)
Ground Lease 259.198 1380.62∗∗ 40.552∗ 174.434∗∗ 13.964 37.800
(1.275) (2.665) (1.771) (2.089) (1.199) (1.407)
High Vacancy 55.956 135.185∗∗∗ 31.115 377.788∗ −44.493∗∗∗ −118.82∗∗∗
(1.403) (3.863) (0.982) (1.734) (−5.945) (−5.074)
Historical −36.160 −254.12∗∗ −29.927 −144.81∗∗ −0.764 −23.803
(−1.053) (−2.303) (−1.421) (−2.358) (−0.035) (−0.389)
Investor NNN 40.002∗∗∗ 58.877∗∗∗ 27.538∗∗∗ 15.866 19.300∗ −23.229
(5.840) (3.073) (6.065) (1.528) (1.836) (−0.940)
Land Contract −53.000∗∗∗ −62.880∗∗∗ −61.847∗∗∗ −148.78∗∗∗ −49.444∗∗∗ −24.398
(−7.282) (−6.084) (−5.068) (−2.873) (−6.282) (−0.805)
Option Sale 29.027∗∗ −1.241 9.427 −69.351 9.292 −49.286
(2.345) (−0.041) (0.637) (−1.359) (0.507) (−0.950)
Partial Interest 77.330 2139.91∗∗∗ −29.632∗ −12.211 −16.252 −107.75∗
(0.589) (2.998) (−1.849) (−0.429) (−1.047) (−1.739)
Redevelopment 147.789∗ 524.912∗∗ 29.434 73.624∗∗ −27.517∗∗∗ −109.71∗∗∗
(1.886) (2.318) (1.240) (2.426) (−2.770) (−4.638)
REO −62.954∗∗∗ −100.62∗∗∗ −49.703∗∗∗ −211.33∗∗ −57.506∗∗∗ −92.717∗∗∗
(−5.189) (−4.855) (−4.020) (−2.586) (−5.883) (−3.175)
Sale Leaseback 4.516 −38.647 30.346∗∗∗ 46.377 22.663∗∗∗ −4.882
(0.593) (−1.512) (2.847) (0.761) (3.245) (−0.255)
Shell Condition 64.789∗∗ 97.867∗∗ 12.399 −10.704 −39.457∗∗ −99.851∗∗∗
R Square 0.114 0.120 0.151 0.563 0.106 0.113 0.131 0.290 0.209 0.219 0.233 0.415
Model N 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579
ESTAR-N 10 10 10 10 24 24 24 24 899 899 899 899
Dual-N 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 286 286 286 286
LEED N 14 14 14 14 26 26 26 26 118 118 118 118
Prof Seller N 15 15 15 15 45 45 45 45 226 226 226 226
Prof Buyer N 18 18 18 18 60 60 60 60 771 771 771 771
Prof Both N 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 66 66 66 66
Market Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
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>17,435 SF Medium >44,000 SF
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
(2.192) (2.152) (0.860) (−0.470) (−2.388) (−3.368)
Short Sale −45.184 −185.32 −68.970∗∗ −232.95∗∗ −39.445∗ −98.297∗∗
(−1.320) (−1.449) (−2.491) (−2.610) (−1.709) (−2.634)
Single Tenant 9.046∗∗ 17.013∗∗ 10.366∗ 57.492 4.487 9.959
(2.646) (2.267) (1.864) (1.469) (1.474) (1.000)
Tenant Purchase −8.276 −23.965 17.079∗∗ −12.600 27.444∗∗∗ 74.342∗∗
(−1.304) (−1.294) (2.421) (−0.414) (3.364) (2.142)
R Square 0.114 0.120 0.151 0.563 0.106 0.113 0.131 0.290 0.209 0.219 0.233 0.415
Model N 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579
ESTAR-N 10 10 10 10 24 24 24 24 899 899 899 899
Dual-N 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 286 286 286 286
LEED N 14 14 14 14 26 26 26 26 118 118 118 118
Prof Seller N 15 15 15 15 45 45 45 45 226 226 226 226
Prof Buyer N 18 18 18 18 60 60 60 60 771 771 771 771
Prof Both N 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 66 66 66 66
Market Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
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5.1. Model Overview
In the rental tables, Tables 5 and 6, the control variables behaved as expected.
Size, when significant, tended to increase rent. Higher class buildings increased rent,
and older buildings decreased rent. The R-Square in 20% range compared favorably
to other fixed effect models (Robinson, 2013). Interestingly, in the size distributed
model, Table 8, the R-Square for the lower sized buildings was much smaller, 11% than
for the larger buildings, 25%. Since the expectation would be for homogeneity in the
smaller sample, perhaps rents were driven more by location than by distinguishable
building attributes.
In the sales tables, Tables 7 and 8, control variables were also largely as expected.
Size tended to decrease the PSF price, consistent with smaller buildings selling at
higher PSF prices. Although in the largest section, buildings over 280,563 square
feet, size increased the PSF price. This indicates that after a tipping point, size more
likely suggests premium locations demanding vertical construction, and PSF increases
for the largest subsection. Building class increases PSF prices and age decreased
it. Consistent with vertical build, excess land decreased PSF prices, suggesting less
density around the buildings. The R-Sqaured for the sales models were also consistent
with prior fixed effect models. However, weighting by sale price dramatically increased
the R-Square to 50% or better. Adding more weight to the economically significant
observations would naturally increase the R-Square, but the scale was larger than
anticipated.
5.2. Energy Star
Rent (Tables 5 and 6)
The results divided by ESTAR thirds suggested that only the smallest third of ES-
TAR buildings, those less than 112,816 SF, possessed sustainability rental premiums.
The largest size buildings had no premiums, and the middle buildings only showed
premiums with no professional management control.
The smallest 1/3 of ESTAR buildings, those less than 112,816 SF, demonstrated
premiums ranging from 3% to 4%. With the professional ownership control included,
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the premiums were closer to 3%. The results from the smallest size category, which
consisted of 41,360 were strikingly similar to results of the whole population regres-
sion. The middle third showed no statistically significant premiums; the largest third
of the ESTAR distribution also showed no evidence of statistically significant premi-
ums.
Results from Table 6, divided by size, confirmed this trend. The smallest and
middle third of the building distributions offered evidence of whopping 30% and
10% premiums respectively. Note that the smallest and middle third distribution by
size contain a total of 216 Energy Star buildings, and that this entire population was
contained in the smallest third of the Energy Star distribution in Table 5. The largest
third of buildings, those over 53,758 SF, demonstrated no evidence of rent premiums,
except in the weighted regressions.
The economically large premium in the smallest third of the size distribution
derived from only 30 ESTAR buildings. Only 186 ESTAR buildings, the ESTAR
building ”N” in the middle third, provided evidence of the 10% premium. 91% of the
ESTAR distribution, the 2,257 ESTAR buildings in the largest third of the overall
building population, showed no statistically significant premium with the professional
ownership control.
As discussed earlier, smaller buildings in a portfolio impact the economic returns
much less than the larger buildings. The results here support examination of green
premiums in a weighted or size distributed analysis.
Sales (Tables 7 and 8)
The ESTAR sales portfolio downloaded from CoStar consisted primarily of larger
buildings, with the threshold for the bottom third at 151,775 SF. The results from
regressions with market fixed effects shown in Table 7, divided by ESTAR, told a
similar tale as the rent results. ESTAR sales premiums did not exist in the largest
ESTAR buildings. However, the smallest and middle third of the ESTAR distribution
showed PSF sales premiums ranging from $26 to $37 dollars. The premiums, although
varying slightly in economic range, remained consistent with professional buyer/seller
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controls, and market controls.
However, weighting by price significantly impacted the estimated premiums, espe-
cially in the small and large portfolios. The premiums in the building sample under
151,775 SF disappeared when price weighted. Thus on an economic basis, the portfo-
lio exhibited no premiums in the smallest section. In the largest, premiums actually
came out negative and significant–a somewhat surprising result.
There are two likely explanation for the negative weighted premiums. The first
was that the largest sales dominated the regression disproportionately given the small
overall building N. Nine of the highest non-green sales totaled $13.9 Billion, which
represented 8.6% and 4.8% of the by ESTAR and by Size distributions respectively.
The second potential explanation is that, although fixed effect models better explain
large national data sets, the results can become less consistent with market N’s un-
der 5-10 (Hox, 2010). Simple OLSDV regressions results7 showed only one negative
premium, ESTAR, and it was not significant.
In the middle portfolio, price weighting had no substantive effect. However, the
variances of value and size, and consequent effect of weighting, were smallest in the
middle section.
This general pattern of smaller and mid-size buildings showing premiums, but not
the larger supports the superior management theory because the largest buildings,
those over 280,000 SF will virtually require some full time staff to operate. The
professional ownership control captured professional real estate owners, but the vast
majority of office building larger than 280,000 SF will be professionally managed at a
minimum. Thus, even though professional ownership was controlled for, the premiums
in the smaller portions of the ESTAR building distribution might still be attributed
somewhat to professional ownership.
Endogeneity in the ESTAR sample could be another possible explanation. Owners
willing to go through the ESTAR certification process, and operating the building as
such, might well exhibit superior site selection in purchasing as well. This theory
7Results in Appendix
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could potentially explain the large buyer premiums shown throughout the data.
Surprisingly, the models distributed by building population, Table 6, showed
mildly significant negative premiums for the smallest ESTAR buildings. However
the significance washed away the with sale condition controls. Since only 10 ESTAR
buildings were represented in that subsection, the findings could be building specific.
An examination showed that several of the ESTAR buildings in the smallest sample
had mean PSF sales prices less than their respective markets means. The findings
more likely represented building specific than categorical implications.
The middle building distribution yielded high premiums of $64 to $77 PSF, but
again only 24 sales. The vast majority, 899 sales or 96%, of the sales were in the
largest third of the sale population.
In the largest portion, premiums ranging from $22 to $26 PSF were significant,
but only at 10% with controls. However, the price weighted regression premiums
were negative, with no statistical significance. This pattern supports the theory that
smaller and middle buildings drove the premium. It also supports the theory that
the economic impact of potential sustainability premiums needs to be examined when
analyzing data sets.
5.3. LEED
Rent (Tables 5 and 6)
LEED certified buildings also generated consistent premiums among the the smaller
sized buildings. In the sample split by ESTAR distribution, premiums of 13% were
evidenced in the smallest third, but no statistically significant premiums in the middle
and larger thirds.
In the regression split by building population, the 11 LEED buildings in the small-
est third did not exhibit a premium, the middle 38 exhibited significant premiums
of 12% to 15% when size weighted. The remaining 229, or 82%, showed 15%-16%
premiums.
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Sales (Tables 7 and 8)
LEED buildings relative to the ESTAR distribution were proportionally smaller
with 93 of 168 buildings falling under 151,775 SF. LEED premiums remained signif-
icant, positive, and in a narrow range of $64 to $73 PSF across all the the smallest
and medium sections in the Energy star distribution. The largest third showed only
mildly significant premiums, and none in the model with professional ownership, but
no sale condition controls. As with ESTAR, the weighted model was negative, but
not statistically significant in this case.
In the size distributed model, the LEED buildings for the smallest two sections
showed no significant premiums, except in the price weighted medium regression.
However, only 14 and 26 buildings respectively, were in the two sections. The largest
section held 286 LEED buildings and was statistically significant in the first three
regressions.
Interestingly, the price weighted model again showed no statistically significant
premiums, and this time with the bulk of the LEED buildings.
5.4. Dual Buildings
Rent (Tables 5 and 6)
By contrast, the Dual results showed no significance in the lower two portions,
but did show significance in the largest third. However, since the population was split
by ESTAR, the Dual population skewed heavily in the largest portion. Roughly 2/3
of the Dual population appeared in the largest size category. Size weighting did little
to impact any of the dual premiums.
In the largest buildings, the premium was not significant with ownership control,
and only significant, at the 10% level, without it.
The distribution of Dual buildings in the size distributed model put no buildings in
the smallest section, only 7 of the buildings in the middle section, and the remaining
621 into the largest portion. No premiums were observed with the ownership controls.
However, premiums of up to 9.8% were observed with no ownership control.
The findings for LEED premiums, but not Dual premiums, seemed counter intu-
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itive at first. After all, Dual buildings by definition also were LEED buildings. The
most plausible explanation relates to which buildings are more likely to be LEED
only, and which Dual. When the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) launched
LEED for Existing Buildings (LEED-EB) v2.0 in 2005, the minimum required En-
ergy Star score was 60. Under v3.0, established in 2009, it is 69, and the proposal for
LEED v2012 sets the minimum at 75. Thus many of the LEED-only buildings were
likely to have achieved their certification pre-2009, as opposed to the Dual buildings.
The economically high premiums for the LEED only buildings may partly be a
factor of the lease timing within the buildings. Office leases are typically 3-5 years,
and many of the LEED only buildings may still be operating under leases signed
during the 2000’s real estate boom.
Sales (Tables 7 and 8)
Dual buildings skewed even larger relative to the ESTAR distribution, with 192
of the 295 buildings in the largest section. The middle section, consisting of 71
buildings, showed statistically significant premiums. However, neither the smallest
32 Dual buildings, nor the largest 192 showed any statistically significant premiums.
Only the middle portion, containing 71 of the buildings demonstrated significant
premiums.
In the price weighted regressions, like the ESTAR, the premiums were actually
negative and significant. As with the ESTAR, the most plausible explanations were
the heavily weighted higher sales, and potential fixed effect inconsistencies with the
small N. Again, the OLSDV results8 did not yield negative premiums.
In the building population model, premiums were negative for the small and mid-
dle sections, and significant for the middle. However, the Dual sample consisted of
only 5 and 4 buildings respectively. As above, the findings were from only a small
number of sale observations. Again, specific buildings sales were less than their mar-
ket means and the findings are more likely building specific than categorical.
The larger sample, containing the remaining 286, did not show significant premi-
8Available in Appendix
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ums in any of the models with ownership or condition controls. As in the prior model,
price weighted premiums were negative and significant.
As with the ESTAR results, the most plausible explanation for the negative
weighted premiums was that the largest sales dominated the regression dispropor-
tionately given the small overall building N. Similarly, winsorizing, reduced the scale,
but not significance of the negative impact. A few large sales likely significantly
impacted the overall weighted results.
5.5. Professional Ownership Related Variables
Rent (Tables 5 and 6)
Prof Owner was positive significant the two smaller portions of the ESTAR dis-
tribution, but not the largest. The most plausible reason for the lack of significance
in the ESTAR distributed model would be that virtually all buildings over 224,000
SF would require professional management.
In the size distributed model, Prof Owner was positive significant in all specifica-
tions ranging from 4% to 5% premiums. As discussed earlier, the ownership variable
dominated the ESTAR premiums in largest sample, where the vast majority of ES-
TAR buildings resided.
Overall the results strongly support the existence of the professional ownership
premium. They also support the argument that professional ownership may be the
active agent of the sustainability premiums.
Sales (Tables 7 and 8)
In the ESTAR size distributed model, Prof Buyer was positive significant in the
smallest portion–contrary to expectations. One possible explanation is that despite
the controls, buyers are acquiring premium properties in a market. The premium
locations within a market may not be fully captured in the regressions, and the buyer
premium could be attributed to the Prof Buyer’s preference for those locations within
a submarket.
The Prof Seller premium was significant positive in all specifications for the ES-
TAR distributed model, and further confirms the theory that superior negotiating
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power yields higher pricing. However, the seller premiums were not significant in the
smallest building sizes in the size distributed model. The building size for the smallest
section was only 17,435, and the Prof Seller N was only 15; the lack of significance
was likely due to the small N and low professional ownership N.
The Prof Both variable was not significant in the ESTAR size distributed sample,
although the sign of the coefficient was positive in most specifications. In the building
size distributed sample the middle section did show significant negative, but the
sample was only one building. The largest section, containing all but one of the Prof
Both properties was similarly insignificant.
6. Robustness Checks
Quantile Regression
Quantile regression presents estimates of the dependent variables at various points
over their conditional distributions. Its use here provided some insight regarding the
behavior of property level characteristics across their distributions, and added to
the body of knowledge regarding green real estate. Quantile was regression first
introduced in its modern form by Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978).
The ESTAR results demonstrated a pattern showing that sustainability premiums
were more evident on buildings in the lower portions of the distribution . Not only did
the coefficients decrease as the rent increased, but their significance dissipated. The
LEED and Dual variables followed a similar, but less pronounced pattern. Again,
this provided some clues that size may be an issue to closely analyze in the green
buildings. ESTAR graphical results are shown in Figure 2
In fact, few of the variables in the regression equation appeared to have uniform
estimates across their conditional distributions, and the means in the macro regression
may be misleading as consistent effects on the buildings. Figure 3 shows graphical
results for LEED, Dual and Prof Owner.9 The sales data results for the green and
ownership variables are presented Tables 10.
9Graphical results for all variables are available from the author by request.
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Figure 2: ESTAR Rent Quantile Results. Model 1 is with Prof Owner, and Model 2
without.
On the sales side, the impact of Energy Star seemed to decrease with PSF sales,
while the impact of LEED and Dual seemed to increase with PSF sales. All three
green variables also seemed to increase their effect with increases in PSF sales, but
the increases were not as uniform.
As in the rent data, many of the variables did not have uniform estimates across
their conditional distributions, suggesting an area of future research may be a detailed
exploration of the size effect for all hedonic coefficients.
Results for the green variables and Prof Owner are presented in Table 9.
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Figure 3: LEED, Dual and Prof Owner Rent Quantile Results. Model 1 is with Prof
Owner, and Model 2 without.
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Table 9: This table presents results from quantile regressions on lnrent. In each
quantile, two models are shown for the variables of interest. Models 1 includes the
Prof Owner variable, while Model 2 does not. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels respectively.
ESTAR LEED Dual Prof Owner
Quantile Model1 Model2 Model1 Model2 Model1 Model2 Model1
0.05 0.021 0.032∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
0.1 0.025∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
0.15 0.032∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
0.2 0.034∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
0.25 0.031∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
0.3 0.027∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
0.35 0.026∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
0.4 0.022∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
0.45 0.024∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
0.5 0.026∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
0.55 0.025∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
0.6 0.026∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
0.65 0.021∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
0.7 0.021∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
0.75 0.018∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.007∗
0.8 0.014∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.006
0.85 0.010 0.012 0.073∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.005
0.9 0.002 0.004 0.061∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.021 0.019 0.010∗
0.95 0.001 0.004 0.022 0.030 0.005 0.009 0.007
Prof Owner x x x x
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Table 10: This table presents results from quantile regressions on PSF. In each quantile, two models are shown for the variables
of interest. . Models 1 and 2 include fixed effects by market, and Model 2 includes the Sale condition controls. ***,**,* represent
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
ESTAR LEED Dual Prof Buyer Prof Seller Prof Both
Quantile Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
0.05 30.12∗∗∗ 29.77∗∗∗ 4.12 4.72 33.36∗∗∗ 31.09∗∗∗ 23.16∗∗∗ 23.26∗∗∗ 24.98∗∗∗ 30.87∗∗∗ 28.83∗∗∗ 52.87∗∗∗
0.05 (15.97) (16.74) (1.00) (1.21) (10.44) (10.32) (12.30) (13.10) (8.17) (10.72) (4.63) (9.01)
0.1 28.72∗∗∗ 29.80∗∗∗ 9.58∗∗ 10.73∗∗ 36.21∗∗∗ 37.23∗∗∗ 21.78∗∗∗ 22.55∗∗∗ 31.62∗∗∗ 32.30∗∗∗ 51.27∗∗∗ 50.02∗∗∗
0.1 (15.03) (15.29) (2.29) (2.52) (11.19) (11.27) (11.42) (11.58) (10.22) (10.23) (8.13) (7.78)
0.15 27.80∗∗∗ 27.79∗∗∗ 5.96 7.67∗ 40.44∗∗∗ 41.55∗∗∗ 23.66∗∗∗ 22.35∗∗∗ 32.84∗∗∗ 33.45∗∗∗ 45.67∗∗∗ 46.82∗∗∗
0.15 (13.86) (14.40) (1.36) (1.82) (11.90) (12.70) (11.82) (11.59) (10.11) (10.70) (6.90) (7.35)
0.2 27.31∗∗∗ 26.38∗∗∗ 9.70∗∗ 15.05∗∗∗ 46.64∗∗∗ 45.39∗∗∗ 20.55∗∗∗ 22.50∗∗∗ 26.68∗∗∗ 28.62∗∗∗ 37.43∗∗∗ 42.10∗∗∗
0.2 (13.41) (13.56) (2.18) (3.54) (13.52) (13.77) (10.11) (11.59) (8.09) (9.09) (5.57) (6.56)
0.25 28.44∗∗∗ 27.96∗∗∗ 17.88∗∗∗ 22.99∗∗∗ 47.80∗∗∗ 48.60∗∗∗ 23.93∗∗∗ 23.30∗∗∗ 28.00∗∗∗ 26.63∗∗∗ 33.20∗∗∗ 34.15∗∗∗
0.25 (13.75) (14.06) (3.96) (5.29) (13.64) (14.42) (11.60) (11.74) (8.36) (8.27) (4.86) (5.21)
0.3 31.97∗∗∗ 30.85∗∗∗ 28.28∗∗∗ 28.43∗∗∗ 49.96∗∗∗ 51.90∗∗∗ 21.86∗∗∗ 22.45∗∗∗ 26.94∗∗∗ 25.41∗∗∗ 34.84∗∗∗ 33.65∗∗∗
0.3 (14.72) (14.93) (5.96) (6.30) (13.58) (14.82) (10.08) (10.88) (7.66) (7.59) (4.86) (4.94)
0.35 31.03∗∗∗ 28.50∗∗∗ 27.83∗∗∗ 29.96∗∗∗ 54.34∗∗∗ 50.13∗∗∗ 21.83∗∗∗ 22.36∗∗∗ 28.14∗∗∗ 26.46∗∗∗ 37.90∗∗∗ 34.43∗∗∗
0.35 (15.42) (13.96) (6.33) (6.72) (15.93) (14.50) (10.87) (10.97) (8.63) (8.01) (5.70) (5.11)
0.4 30.36∗∗∗ 29.12∗∗∗ 30.89∗∗∗ 39.18∗∗∗ 52.45∗∗∗ 52.72∗∗∗ 21.39∗∗∗ 21.40∗∗∗ 28.05∗∗∗ 26.87∗∗∗ 49.30∗∗∗ 55.44∗∗∗
0.4 (14.47) (13.79) (6.74) (8.50) (14.75) (14.74) (10.21) (10.16) (8.25) (7.86) (7.12) (7.97)
0.45 28.97∗∗∗ 27.74∗∗∗ 35.54∗∗∗ 37.50∗∗∗ 52.98∗∗∗ 50.74∗∗∗ 22.09∗∗∗ 22.78∗∗∗ 29.36∗∗∗ 25.66∗∗∗ 57.14∗∗∗ 60.81∗∗∗
0.45 (12.90) (12.79) (7.24) (7.92) (13.92) (13.81) (9.85) (10.52) (8.07) (7.31) (7.71) (8.50)
0.5 27.37∗∗∗ 26.49∗∗∗ 47.61∗∗∗ 46.06∗∗∗ 51.69∗∗∗ 55.42∗∗∗ 22.21∗∗∗ 21.55∗∗∗ 29.21∗∗∗ 26.94∗∗∗ 61.62∗∗∗ 57.59∗∗∗
0.5 (11.50) (11.11) (9.16) (8.85) (12.82) (13.72) (9.35) (9.05) (7.58) (6.98) (7.85) (7.32)
0.55 27.31∗∗∗ 26.05∗∗∗ 48.79∗∗∗ 50.92∗∗∗ 56.38∗∗∗ 55.76∗∗∗ 22.74∗∗∗ 24.07∗∗∗ 29.37∗∗∗ 25.91∗∗∗ 58.59∗∗∗ 60.24∗∗∗
0.55 (11.38) (10.92) (9.31) (9.78) (13.87) (13.81) (9.50) (10.11) (7.56) (6.71) (7.40) (7.66)
0.6 28.22∗∗∗ 28.39∗∗∗ 69.14∗∗∗ 67.20∗∗∗ 57.48∗∗∗ 55.63∗∗∗ 23.28∗∗∗ 24.72∗∗∗ 29.61∗∗∗ 27.04∗∗∗ 105.95∗∗∗ 107.64∗∗∗
0.6 (10.67) (11.29) (11.96) (12.24) (12.82) (13.06) (8.82) (9.85) (6.91) (6.64) (12.13) (12.98)
0.65 28.41∗∗∗ 28.34∗∗∗ 85.54∗∗∗ 84.65∗∗∗ 63.51∗∗∗ 59.53∗∗∗ 23.32∗∗∗ 25.50∗∗∗ 29.79∗∗∗ 26.81∗∗∗ 104.89∗∗∗ 108.01∗∗∗
0.65 (10.60) (11.12) (14.60) (15.21) (13.98) (13.79) (8.71) (10.02) (6.86) (6.50) (11.85) (12.85)
0.7 29.86∗∗∗ 28.88∗∗∗ 110.27∗∗∗ 99.55∗∗∗ 64.75∗∗∗ 62.21∗∗∗ 27.55∗∗∗ 26.78∗∗∗ 29.54∗∗∗ 25.03∗∗∗ 118.83∗∗∗ 114.40∗∗∗
0.7 (9.93) (9.93) (16.78) (15.68) (12.71) (12.63) (9.18) (9.23) (6.07) (5.32) (11.97) (11.93)
0.75 29.58∗∗∗ 30.78∗∗∗ 107.38∗∗∗ 103.75∗∗∗ 63.98∗∗∗ 61.60∗∗∗ 34.48∗∗∗ 30.97∗∗∗ 33.51∗∗∗ 31.83∗∗∗ 108.80∗∗∗ 104.73∗∗∗
0.75 (9.05) (10.14) (15.04) (15.65) (11.56) (11.98) (10.57) (10.22) (6.33) (6.48) (10.09) (10.46)
0.8 28.22∗∗∗ 28.46∗∗∗ 131.36∗∗∗ 124.74∗∗∗ 68.82∗∗∗ 66.73∗∗∗ 34.73∗∗∗ 35.73∗∗∗ 39.13∗∗∗ 30.94∗∗∗ 125.45∗∗∗ 121.90∗∗∗
0.8 (7.72) (8.04) (16.45) (16.14) (11.12) (11.13) (9.52) (10.12) (6.61) (5.40) (10.40) (10.45)
0.85 23.62∗∗∗ 26.68∗∗∗ 125.50∗∗∗ 121.47∗∗∗ 72.08∗∗∗ 75.02∗∗∗ 38.64∗∗∗ 40.14∗∗∗ 48.53∗∗∗ 48.77∗∗∗ 113.80∗∗∗ 110.23∗∗∗
0.85 (6.03) (7.04) (14.66) (14.69) (10.86) (11.69) (9.88) (10.62) (7.65) (7.95) (8.80) (8.83)
0.9 20.18∗∗∗ 19.77∗∗∗ 130.90∗∗∗ 113.78∗∗∗ 64.42∗∗∗ 66.71∗∗∗ 42.36∗∗∗ 43.91∗∗∗ 56.83∗∗∗ 61.30∗∗∗ 102.38∗∗∗ 100.19∗∗∗
0.9 (4.13) (4.39) (12.25) (11.56) (7.77) (8.74) (8.68) (9.76) (7.17) (8.40) (6.34) (6.74)
0.95 25.95∗∗∗ 25.22∗∗∗ 151.03∗∗∗ 153.58∗∗∗ 64.99∗∗∗ 73.50∗∗∗ 39.20∗∗∗ 47.05∗∗∗ 39.20∗∗∗ 47.05∗∗∗ 67.67∗∗∗ 88.30∗∗∗
0.95 (3.58) (4.03) (9.53) (11.24) (5.29) (6.93) (5.41) (7.53) (5.41) (7.53) (2.83) (4.28)
Sale Condition X X X x x x
Controls
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7. Conclusion
This paper presented arguments that real estate portfolios should be examined
from an economic perspective in addition to an equal weight. Assuming that every
observation maintains an equal weight could lead to economically unjustified findings
and econometrically biased results. Real Estate investments require capital, as do
any financial investments, and returns should be examined from a value weighted
perspective. Additionally, the large variance of properties in a national database
could produce inconsistent estimators in a regression.
The extant literature in sustainable real estate found uniform support for green
market premiums (Eichholtz et al., 2010; Fuerst and McAllister, 2011; Miller et al.,
2008; Pivo and Fisher, 2010; Wiley et al., 2010). Prior authors failed to consider
well-established investment literature (Brown and Warner, 1980; Fama, 1998; Fama
and French, 1988) findings that the assumption of equal weights may lead to biased
results. At a minimum the extant literature suggests examining both equal and value
weight portfolios.
The finding in this article also strongly supported the presence of a professional
management premium, and the possibility that professional management represents
the agent of sustainability premiums. These results showing ownership rental premi-
ums across size categories support and are consistent with the findings in Robinson
(2013). The key results have been summarized in Tables 11 and 12 for rental and
sales data respectively.
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Table 11: This table summarizes the results from the rent regressions with market fixed effects in Tables 5 and 6. All variables
significant at a 5% or better level were bolded. Results for each size bracket are from the first and third models in that bracket;
each included the professional ownership control, and the latter was weighted by size. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels respectively.
ESTAR by Thirds Table 5
<112,816 SF <Middle> >224,555 SF
Model1 Model3 Model5 Model7 Model9 Model11
ESTAR 0.042∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.014 0.014 0.022 0.041
LEED 0.137∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.112 0.151∗∗∗
Dual 0.014 −0.005 0.069 0.064 0.086 0.100∗
Prof Owner 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
Size by Thirds Table 6
< 21,212 SF <Middle> > 53,758 SF
Model1 Model3 Model5 Model7 Model9 Model11
ESTAR 0.300∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.030 0.030
LEED 0.069 0.070 0.126∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
Dual 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.061 0.063
Prof Owner 0.046∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
Weighted X X X
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Table 12: This table summarizes the results from the sales regressions with market fixed effects in Tables 7 and 8. All variables
significant at a 5% or better level were bolded. Results for each size bracket are from the third and fourth models in that
bracket; each included the professional ownership controls and sale condition controls, the latter was weighted by sale price.
***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
ESTAR by Thirds Table 7
<151,775 SF <Middle> < 280,563 SF
Model3 Model4 Model7 Model8 Model11 Model12
ESTAR 27.926∗∗∗ 10.096 34.758∗∗∗ 30.648∗∗∗ −7.369 −99.428∗∗∗
LEED 66.177∗∗ 71.302∗∗ 73.117∗∗ 83.853∗∗∗ 58.835∗ −16.516
Dual 25.123 −9.148 62.386∗∗∗ 48.626∗∗∗ 2.219 −108.94∗∗∗
Prof Seller 62.935∗∗∗ 34.438∗∗∗ 18.866 12.873 7.582 −12.110
Prof Buyer 41.561∗∗∗ 69.864∗∗∗ 85.504∗∗∗ 96.476∗∗∗ 77.083∗∗∗ 52.376∗
Prof Both 52.176 −19.032 34.523 2.529 115.346∗∗ 192.002∗∗
Size by Thirds Table 8
Model3 Model4 Model7 Model8 Model11 Model12
<17,435 SF <Middle> >44,019 SF
ESTAR −30.937 −78.067∗∗∗ 64.236∗∗ 88.994∗ 22.162∗ −63.981∗∗
LEED 13.209 112.383 57.404 131.717∗∗ 81.229∗∗∗ 11.486
Dual −33.971 −141.42 −56.240∗ −66.741∗∗ 35.179 −78.617∗∗
Prof Seller 212.689∗∗∗ 344.407 125.297∗∗∗ 272.399 28.473∗∗∗ 0.782
Prof Buyer 22.199 5.054 28.348∗ −6.306 68.176∗∗∗ 60.985∗∗∗
Prof Both 0.000 0.000 −130.02∗∗∗ −491.96∗∗ 78.004∗∗ 150.115∗∗
Weighted X X X
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The results from the empirical tests demonstrated clear patterns in the distribution
of ESTAR rental premiums. The smaller buildings drove the premiums, while the
larger buildings provided no evidence of sustainability premiums. Since nearly half of
the buildings over 225,000 SF achieved some level of green designation, perhaps the
green designation is becoming more of an expectation in that segment. Considering
the distribution of buildings, it was not surprising that the largest buildings rents
appeared unaffected by any green designation. Perhaps the largest buildings, which
tend to be located in “A” locations, achieve market premiums based on location, and
green designations are of little incremental effect. In addition, the findings here of 4%
to 5% premiums for only the smallest ESTAR buildings are economically realistic.
LEED premiums were consistently found across most size categories, although
Dual ESTAR/LEED buildings demonstrated limited significance. This finding sup-
ported the theory that LEED building premiums may have been driven by the timing
of their lease-up during the last real estate boom, and not necessarily by their green
designations.
Similar to the rental database, the largest building sales regressions showed that
ESTAR held no premiums for the largest buildings. The economic impact clearly
shows in the sales premiums. An investment choice to purchase a $100 Million dollar
buildings represents a drastically different choice than to purchase 10 unique $10
Million dollar buildings. In fact, weighting by price had dramatic effect in most of
the size categories. While some sustainability premiums were found, the economic
impact of those was less for the smaller size categories.
Only LEED stand-alone buildings seemed to hold cross all size categories. How-
ever, this could be a legacy of lease contracts signed during the peak of the last real
estate cycle. Dual buildings showed premiums in the mid-size buildings, but the bulk
of their distribution was in the largest section, which showed no premiums.
The quantile regression results confirmed this pattern; they clearly showed varia-
tions along the conditional means. Each of the premiums shown by the sustainability
categories tailed off at the upper end of their distributions. Not only does the quan-
tile regression support the findings that stratified size and economic attributes effect
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premium analysis, but they raise questions regarding the overall viability of OLSDV
regression as an efficient tool to research a broad swath of buildings. OLSDV assumes
some level of consistent variance around the mean, but as conditional distributions
vary, the reliability of those estimators was called into question.
This paper provided evidence that potential market premiums, at least specific to
green premiums, were size and/or price dependent. It demonstrated clear evidence
that value weighting alters regression results in real estate sales portfolios.
Future research could explore the size and price effect in more detail and examine
the specific demand and supply factors that drive the existence or lack of premi-
ums. This paper offers a additional information into the size effects of buildings, and
provides a basis for future research in real estate value weighting.
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8. Appendix
Table A: This table lists the variables used in this paper, and their corresponding
field in the CoStar database.
Variable Definition CoStar Field Rent Costar Field Sales
ESTAR 1 if Building is Energy Star Certified, but not Dual energy star energy star
LEED 1 if Building is LEED Certified, but not Dual leed certified leed certified
Dual 1 if Building is both ESTAR and LEED
lnrent Natural Log of Average Weighted Building Rent average weighted rent
PSF Per Square Foot Sales Price Sale price/bldg sf
lnsize Natural Log of Size rentable building area bldg sf
NNN 1 if lease type = Triple Net services
FSG 1 if lease type = Full Service Gross services
Percent Leased Percentage of building leased Q4 2011 percent leased
ren within 10 1 if building was renovated from 2001 forward year renovated
lnland Natural Log of land land area sf
stories Number of Stories in Building number of stories number of floors
A Class 1 if Building is ”A” Class building class building class
B Class 1 if Building is ”B” Class building class building class
amenity 1 if Building contains any amenities like, Bank, Fitness Center,
etc.
Amenities Amenities
age100 1 if Age >= 100 2011-year built 2011-year built
age75 1 if 75>= Age >100 2011-year built 2011-year built
age50 1 if 50>= Age >75 2011-year built 2011-year built
age40 1 if 40>= Age >40 2011-year built 2011-year built
age30 1 if 30>= Age >30 2011-year built 2011-year built
age20 1 if 30>= Age >20 2011-year built 2011-year built
age15 1 if 15>= Age >15 2011-year built 2011-year built
age10 1 if 10>= Age >10 2011-year built 2011-year built
age5 1 if 5>= Age 2011-year built 2011-year built
year2002 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2003 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2004 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2005 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2006 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2007 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2008 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2009 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2010 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
year2011 1 If sale occurred during this year sale date
submarket Submarket for physical building submarket cluster
Market Market for physical building market name market
Prof Owner If number of owner addresses meets criteria from Section 4 owner address from rent data
Prof Seller If building seller corresponds to Prof Owner in rent data set
Prof Buyer If building buyer corresponds to Prof Owner in rent data set
Prof Both If building buyer and seller correspond to Prof Owner in rent
data set
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Table B: This table presents results from regressions on lnrent of the building population split into thirds by size. In each size
category, results are presented first with and without the Prof Owner variable in an OLS regression with submarket dummies
included. Models 1 and 2,5 and 6,9 and 10 are of this form for their respective size group. Next results are presented with the
same regression weighted by lnsize, both with and without the Prof Owner variable.***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels respectively.
Smallest 1/3 Buildings > 21,212 SF Mid 1/3 Buildings Largest 1/3 Buildings > 53,758 SF
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
Intercept 2.782∗∗∗ 2.781∗∗∗ 2.783∗∗∗ 2.782∗∗∗ 2.880∗∗∗ 2.765∗∗∗ 2.880∗∗∗ 2.762∗∗∗ 2.846∗∗∗ 2.792∗∗∗ 2.841∗∗∗ 2.787∗∗∗
(16.554) (16.547) (16.559) (16.552) (27.921) (27.312) (27.960) (27.332) (42.552) (42.241) (42.912) (42.610)
ESTAR 0.125∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(2.205) (2.269) (2.170) (2.232) (2.015) (2.714) (2.051) (2.759) (2.790) (3.489) (2.807) (3.487)
LEED 0.042 0.042 0.041 0.041 0.132∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.475) (0.478) (0.465) (0.468) (3.023) (3.038) (3.023) (3.037) (3.233) (3.297) (3.202) (3.268)
Dual 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.034 −0.030 −0.033 −0.029 0.045∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(.) (.) (.) (.) (−0.339) (−0.304) (−0.333) (−0.298) (4.458) (4.887) (4.773) (5.203)
Prof Owner 0.008 0.008 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.610) (0.604) (3.666) (3.696) (3.008) (2.928)
lnsize 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(2.079) (2.095) (2.072) (2.089) (2.856) (3.173) (2.861) (3.180) (8.189) (8.449) (8.512) (8.766)
age100 −0.126∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗ −0.243∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗ −0.243∗∗∗
(−7.961) (−7.957) (−8.002) (−7.998) (−12.945) (−12.870) (−12.973) (−12.897) (−18.214) (−18.143) (−18.164) (−18.094)
age75 −0.127∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗
(−8.401) (−8.394) (−8.402) (−8.395) (−13.981) (−13.857) (−13.999) (−13.874) (−21.349) (−21.258) (−21.212) (−21.122)
age50 −0.183∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.251∗∗∗ −0.250∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗
(−14.988) (−14.981) (−14.991) (−14.984) (−15.433) (−15.312) (−15.409) (−15.286) (−18.372) (−18.295) (−18.507) (−18.433)
age40 −0.146∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗
(−13.143) (−13.136) (−13.157) (−13.150) (−15.929) (−15.768) (−15.960) (−15.796) (−23.020) (−22.888) (−23.048) (−22.917)
age30 −0.138∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗ −0.237∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗∗
(−15.340) (−15.330) (−15.360) (−15.350) (−19.594) (−19.452) (−19.603) (−19.460) (−24.971) (−24.815) (−24.877) (−24.723)
age20 −0.126∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.207∗∗∗
(−15.559) (−15.548) (−15.575) (−15.565) (−19.286) (−19.072) (−19.311) (−19.095) (−24.841) (−24.657) (−24.748) (−24.570)
R Square 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.577 0.576 0.578 0.577 0.729 0.728 0.732 0.731
Model N 16, 186 16, 186 16, 186 16, 186 16, 219 16, 219 16, 219 16, 219 16, 225 16, 225 16, 225 16, 045
ESTAR-N 30 30 30 30 186 186 186 186 2,257 2,257 2,257 2,257
LEED-N 11 11 11 11 38 38 38 38 229 229 229 229
Dual-N 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 7 621 621 621 621
Non-Eco-N 16,203 16,203 16,203 16,203 16,014 16,014 16,014 16,014 13,137 13,137 13,137 13,137
Prof Owner 568 568 568 568 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872 5,884 5,884 5,884 5,884
Weighting X X X X X X
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Smallest 1/3 Buildings Mid 1/3 Buildings Largest 1/3 Buildings
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
age15 −0.074∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗
(−5.062) (−5.044) (−5.038) (−5.021) (−5.643) (−5.487) (−5.636) (−5.479) (−12.210) (−12.067) (−12.305) (−12.167)
age10 −0.048∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗
(−4.474) (−4.471) (−4.472) (−4.469) (−8.272) (−8.150) (−8.310) (−8.187) (−15.417) (−15.247) (−15.290) (−15.127)
age5 −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.020∗∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗
(−0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (−2.142) (−2.181) (−2.175) (−2.217) (−9.972) (−9.928) (−9.901) (−9.860)
Renovated 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(4.826) (4.825) (4.837) (4.836) (5.272) (5.186) (5.273) (5.187) (4.078) (4.056) (3.957) (3.938)
Percent Leased 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(11.012) (11.014) (11.017) (11.019) (12.155) (12.065) (12.167) (12.075) (9.463) (9.404) (9.418) (9.361)
stories 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(3.758) (3.738) (3.778) (3.758) (7.663) (7.613) (7.698) (7.652) (3.526) (3.498) (3.386) (3.361)
A Class 0.245∗∗ 0.245∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(2.056) (2.059) (2.075) (2.078) (20.341) (20.433) (20.465) (20.557) (28.778) (28.970) (28.629) (28.817)
B Class 0.097∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(18.551) (18.571) (18.568) (18.587) (21.310) (21.379) (21.312) (21.378) (18.274) (18.306) (18.160) (18.190)
NNN −0.058∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗
(−9.479) (−9.483) (−9.499) (−9.503) (−18.445) (−18.442) (−18.509) (−18.509) (−23.143) (−23.137) (−23.066) (−23.059)
FSG 0.092∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(16.241) (16.245) (16.294) (16.298) (18.572) (18.482) (18.571) (18.478) (20.319) (20.201) (20.515) (20.399)
Amenity 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.010∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.864) (0.873) (0.836) (0.845) (0.702) (0.842) (0.702) (0.845) (1.941) (1.979) (1.932) (1.970)
R Square 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.577 0.576 0.578 0.577 0.729 0.728 0.732 0.731
Model N 16, 186 16, 186 16, 186 16, 186 16, 219 16, 219 16, 219 16, 219 16, 225 16, 225 16, 225 16, 045
ESTAR-N 30 30 30 30 186 186 186 186 2,257 2,257 2,257 2,257
LEED-N 11 11 11 11 38 38 38 38 229 229 229 229
Dual-N 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 7 621 621 621 621
Non-Eco-N 16,203 16,203 16,203 16,203 16,014 16,014 16,014 16,014 13,137 13,137 13,137 13,137
Prof Owner 568 568 568 568 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872 5,884 5,884 5,884 5,884
Weighting X X X X X X
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Table C: This table presents results from regressions on lnrent of the building population split into thirds by the size of Energy
Star (ESTAR) buildings. The smallest third contains the smallest third of the Energy Star buildings, and all builings in the
same size category. In this regressions the ESTAR N is uniformly distributed, but the building population is skewed. In each size
category, results are presented first with and without the Prof Owner variable in an OLS regression with submarket dummies
included. Models 1,2,5,6,9,10 are of this form for their respective size group. Next results are presented with the same regression
weighted by lnsize, both with and without the Prof Owner variable.***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Smallest 1/3 ESTAR Buildings (<125,000 SF) Mid 1/3 ESTAR Buildings Largest 1/3 (>256,150 SF)
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
ESTAR 37.117∗∗∗ 21.015∗∗∗ 22.352∗∗∗ 12.513∗ 33.862∗∗∗ 31.754∗∗∗ 31.704∗∗∗ 32.042∗∗∗ 8.814 14.501 13.488 0.417
(5.162) (3.364) (3.598) (1.768) (4.180) (4.477) (4.509) (3.908) (0.738) (1.370) (1.269) (0.033)
LEED 69.178∗∗∗ 62.803∗∗∗ 62.871∗∗∗ 77.916∗∗∗ 71.291∗∗∗ 56.162∗∗∗ 60.646∗∗∗ 72.862∗∗∗ 78.554∗∗ 34.271 31.429 28.535
(5.380) (5.675) (5.711) (5.160) (3.288) (3.047) (3.268) (3.792) (2.511) (1.275) (1.173) (1.093)
Dual 27.137 18.400 18.623 −20.741 63.001∗∗∗ 48.201∗∗∗ 44.495∗∗∗ 45.314∗∗∗ 16.631 23.305∗ 20.549 0.834
(1.258) (0.993) (1.010) (−0.977) (4.170) (3.683) (3.431) (3.392) (1.171) (1.814) (1.597) (0.054)
Prof Buyer 56.406∗∗∗ 57.235∗∗∗ 52.438∗∗∗ 10.016 10.615 5.691 0.306 −0.120 −21.820∗
(10.659) (10.863) (8.142) (1.251) (1.338) (0.627) (0.027) (−0.011) (−1.729)
Prof Seller 40.244∗∗∗ 37.967∗∗∗ 71.968∗∗∗ 61.590∗∗∗ 57.811∗∗∗ 66.334∗∗∗ 52.514∗∗∗ 48.005∗∗ 11.621
(5.061) (4.800) (6.697) (4.280) (4.062) (4.552) (2.617) (2.386) (0.576)
Prof Both 54.551∗∗ 56.645∗∗∗ 33.888 17.652 17.154 −14.048 64.156∗∗ 66.996∗∗ 80.936∗∗∗
(2.491) (2.602) (1.454) (0.781) (0.767) (−0.591) (2.162) (2.275) (2.780)
Intercept 357.583∗∗∗ 309.908∗∗∗ 313.133∗∗∗ 729.289∗∗∗ 529.275∗∗ 379.755∗ 424.725∗∗ 884.901∗∗∗ 211.740 202.838 161.998 884.956∗∗∗
(25.507) (19.257) (19.486) (20.681) (2.375) (1.938) (2.191) (3.669) (1.275) (1.302) (1.028) (4.420)
lnsize −18.383∗∗∗ −27.882∗∗∗ −28.299∗∗∗ −68.183∗∗∗ −6.782 −11.858 −14.752 −47.073∗∗ 28.629∗∗ 0.809 5.356 −56.254∗∗∗
(−10.577) (−18.368) (−18.648) (−22.465) (−0.366) (−0.742) (−0.934) (−2.426) (2.000) (0.064) (0.422) (−3.807)
age100 30.948∗∗∗ 9.866∗∗ 9.012∗∗ 21.182∗∗ −5.780 −27.346 −29.947 −7.082 −47.579 −103.01∗∗∗ −103.26∗∗∗ −43.208
(6.109) (2.196) (2.006) (2.042) (−0.253) (−1.359) (−1.474) (−0.295) (−1.275) (−3.190) (−3.131) (−1.177)
age75 19.138∗∗∗ −8.091∗∗ −8.546∗∗ −38.195∗∗∗ −29.106 −43.934∗∗ −49.474∗∗∗ −10.681 −83.654∗∗∗ −156.45∗∗∗ −161.72∗∗∗ −216.67∗∗∗
(4.100) (−1.969) (−2.080) (−3.907) (−1.488) (−2.536) (−2.844) (−0.488) (−2.827) (−6.012) (−6.045) (−7.210)
age50 8.103∗ 1.071 1.280 30.815∗∗∗ −78.639∗∗∗ −64.633∗∗∗ −64.973∗∗∗ −105.04∗∗∗ −102.07∗∗∗ −167.52∗∗∗ −168.01∗∗∗ −130.34∗∗∗
(1.825) (0.277) (0.331) (3.105) (−3.601) (−3.438) (−3.459) (−4.141) (−3.249) (−6.107) (−5.956) (−4.029)
R Square 0.112 0.348 0.357 0.417 0.293 0.525 0.548 0.608 0.246 0.505 0.526 0.602
Model N 41, 266 41, 266 41, 266 41, 266 4, 542 4, 542 4, 542 4, 542 2, 822 2, 822 2, 822 2, 822
ESTAR-N 825 825 825 825 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824
LEED-N 114 114 114 114 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
Dual-N 68 68 68 68 147 147 147 147 413 413 413 413
Non-Eco-N 40,353 40,353 40,353 40,353 3,577 3,577 3,577 3,577 1,506 1,506 1,506
Prof Owner 4,887 4,887 4,887 4,887 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,473 1,473 1,473 1473
Weighting X X X X X X
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Smallest 1/3 ESTAR Buildings (<125,000 SF) Mid 1/3 ESTAR Buildings Largest 1/3 (>256,150 SF)
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
age40 2.616 −4.829 −4.202 −14.853 −51.413∗∗∗ −48.529∗∗∗ −52.883∗∗∗ −35.844∗ −90.962∗∗∗ −141.95∗∗∗ −148.80∗∗∗ −202.47∗∗∗
(0.619) (−1.310) (−1.139) (−1.620) (−2.665) (−2.914) (−3.168) (−1.703) (−3.034) (−5.529) (−5.628) (−6.829)
age30 5.171 −4.288 −3.273 −20.446∗∗ −43.324∗∗ −31.024∗∗ −36.549∗∗ −50.680∗∗∗ −112.68∗∗∗ −127.49∗∗∗ −131.92∗∗∗ −153.64∗∗∗
(1.352) (−1.284) (−0.978) (−2.441) (−2.439) (−2.028) (−2.356) (−2.605) (−4.009) (−5.312) (−5.345) (−5.651)
age20 14.315∗∗∗ 1.381 1.865 −20.199∗∗∗ −36.932∗∗ −30.095∗∗ −34.769∗∗ −52.328∗∗∗ −107.18∗∗∗ −116.22∗∗∗ −121.98∗∗∗ −137.56∗∗∗
(3.943) (0.435) (0.586) (−2.621) (−2.293) (−2.183) (−2.480) (−3.130) (−4.020) (−5.110) (−5.188) (−5.344)
age15 35.240∗∗∗ 24.408∗∗∗ 22.919∗∗∗ 19.338∗ −12.714 −12.902 −21.610 −33.726 −98.502∗∗∗ −113.33∗∗∗ −121.06∗∗∗ −122.27∗∗∗
(6.367) (5.107) (4.800) (1.822) (−0.537) (−0.637) (−1.067) (−1.404) (−2.885) (−3.892) (−4.103) (−3.629)
age10 46.378∗∗∗ 36.665∗∗∗ 35.458∗∗∗ 21.049∗∗ 24.101 30.088∗ 18.737 6.720 −61.176∗ −73.604∗∗ −80.146∗∗∗ −84.785∗∗
(10.224) (9.256) (8.951) (2.444) (1.326) (1.944) (1.195) (0.367) (−1.722) (−2.419) (−2.586) (−2.215)
age5 46.093∗∗∗ 34.341∗∗∗ 33.247∗∗∗ 26.429∗∗∗ 40.290∗∗ 53.398∗∗∗ 42.297∗∗∗ 20.315 −0.327 −24.286 −29.750 −35.412
(10.459) (8.932) (8.662) (3.124) (2.216) (3.449) (2.707) (1.133) (−0.010) (−0.908) (−1.088) (−1.223)
stories 8.881∗∗∗ 2.724∗∗∗ 3.002∗∗∗ 8.545∗∗∗ −0.342 0.615 0.730 2.848∗∗∗ −1.279∗∗ 0.072 0.175 1.427∗∗∗
(17.447) (5.976) (6.603) (15.037) (−0.521) (1.052) (1.255) (4.888) (−2.266) (0.143) (0.351) (2.861)
A Class 67.296∗∗∗ 70.511∗∗∗ 70.639∗∗∗ 133.951∗∗∗ 88.541∗∗∗ 56.792∗∗∗ 58.677∗∗∗ 121.879∗∗∗ 121.270∗∗∗ 65.771∗∗∗ 58.485∗∗ 42.775
(16.424) (19.718) (19.846) (22.303) (6.058) (4.425) (4.579) (6.183) (4.471) (2.816) (2.453) (0.935)
B Class 26.151∗∗∗ 26.676∗∗∗ 26.559∗∗∗ 57.293∗∗∗ 44.618∗∗∗ 31.925∗∗∗ 33.720∗∗∗ 86.083∗∗∗ 50.423∗ 26.064 17.915 −6.116
(13.915) (16.312) (16.315) (13.698) (3.308) (2.746) (2.917) (4.673) (1.917) (1.166) (0.787) (−0.134)
lnland −11.802∗∗∗ 3.475∗∗∗ 3.117∗∗∗ 1.770 −34.196∗∗∗ −15.371∗∗∗ −16.324∗∗∗ −26.661∗∗∗ −38.807∗∗∗ −11.463∗∗∗ −11.829∗∗∗ −10.933∗
(−11.644) (3.851) (3.470) (0.925) (−10.823) (−5.228) (−5.573) (−7.463) (−8.196) (−2.606) (−2.663) (−1.740)
Amenity 4.003∗∗ 5.483∗∗∗ 5.799∗∗∗ 0.962 42.032∗∗∗ 34.191∗∗∗ 38.049∗∗∗ 20.596∗ 55.113∗∗∗ 89.920∗∗∗ 93.764∗∗∗ 130.849∗∗∗
(2.372) (3.649) (3.879) (0.281) (4.652) (4.364) (4.840) (1.813) (3.507) (6.664) (6.871) (6.256)
Year 2002 7.254∗ 2.355 2.115 48.707∗∗∗ 22.693 −2.707 −4.967 −21.858 −16.095 −9.985 −9.163 33.417
(1.687) (0.636) (0.574) (5.518) (1.236) (−0.173) (−0.321) (−1.035) (−0.529) (−0.388) (−0.357) (0.886)
Year 2003 6.533 2.208 2.446 −10.469 2.124 1.766 1.687 −16.745 −12.624 −8.960 7.706 32.759
(1.546) (0.607) (0.676) (−1.173) (0.121) (0.118) (0.114) (−0.779) (−0.453) (−0.379) (0.325) (0.975)
Year 2004 12.249∗∗∗ 8.052∗∗ 8.473∗∗ −7.276 16.738 15.629 17.844 9.828 −12.738 −22.605 −13.623 15.795
(3.050) (2.327) (2.461) (−0.877) (1.025) (1.117) (1.291) (0.507) (−0.484) (−1.015) (−0.612) (0.487)
Year 2005 27.578∗∗∗ 24.766∗∗∗ 25.670∗∗∗ 31.758∗∗∗ 36.095∗∗ 29.310∗∗ 30.535∗∗ 28.959∗ 3.987 1.695 9.254 15.725
R Square 0.112 0.348 0.357 0.417 0.293 0.525 0.548 0.608 0.246 0.505 0.526 0.602
Model N 41, 266 41, 266 41, 266 41, 266 4, 542 4, 542 4, 542 4, 542 2, 822 2, 822 2, 822 2, 822
ESTAR-N 825 825 825 825 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824
LEED-N 114 114 114 114 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
Dual-N 68 68 68 68 147 147 147 147 413 413 413 413
Non-Eco-N 40,353 40,353 40,353 40,353 3,577 3,577 3,577 3,577 1,506 1,506 1,506
Prof Owner 4,887 4,887 4,887 4,887 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,473 1,473 1,473 1473
Weighting X X X X X X
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Smallest 1/3 ESTAR Buildings (<125,000 SF) Mid 1/3 ESTAR Buildings Largest 1/3 (>256,150 SF)
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
(7.146) (7.447) (7.750) (4.084) (2.494) (2.379) (2.501) (1.662) (0.160) (0.080) (0.435) (0.497)
Year 2006 50.079∗∗∗ 44.687∗∗∗ 45.518∗∗∗ 66.503∗∗∗ 58.528∗∗∗ 52.445∗∗∗ 53.443∗∗∗ 61.130∗∗∗ 29.289 39.734∗ 47.702∗∗ 99.225∗∗∗
(12.973) (13.414) (13.702) (8.970) (4.250) (4.468) (4.598) (3.697) (1.176) (1.873) (2.244) (3.161)
Year 2007 58.145∗∗∗ 57.838∗∗∗ 59.491∗∗∗ 69.541∗∗∗ 67.315∗∗∗ 67.920∗∗∗ 71.616∗∗∗ 106.076∗∗∗ 47.955∗∗ 61.926∗∗∗ 72.587∗∗∗ 151.601∗∗∗
(15.272) (17.570) (18.100) (9.558) (4.920) (5.776) (6.147) (6.493) (1.981) (2.991) (3.491) (5.004)
Year 2008 64.706∗∗∗ 66.035∗∗∗ 68.551∗∗∗ 93.634∗∗∗ 79.445∗∗∗ 76.937∗∗∗ 81.889∗∗∗ 111.152∗∗∗ 102.450∗∗∗ 100.941∗∗∗ 112.147∗∗∗ 232.841∗∗∗
(17.324) (20.304) (21.097) (12.951) (5.826) (6.468) (6.939) (6.746) (4.241) (4.816) (5.322) (7.741)
Year 2009 55.549∗∗∗ 66.384∗∗∗ 68.690∗∗∗ 113.223∗∗∗ 105.346∗∗∗ 103.353∗∗∗ 104.001∗∗∗ 144.611∗∗∗ 50.489∗ 69.164∗∗∗ 79.435∗∗∗ 186.813∗∗∗
(13.863) (18.967) (19.663) (14.510) (6.638) (7.523) (7.646) (8.031) (1.781) (2.815) (3.235) (5.539)
Year 2010 18.717∗∗∗ 27.676∗∗∗ 33.110∗∗∗ 53.321∗∗∗ 42.960∗∗∗ 38.969∗∗∗ 55.416∗∗∗ 121.177∗∗∗ 38.615 18.173 36.392 85.285∗∗∗
(4.802) (8.106) (9.614) (6.500) (2.805) (2.952) (4.117) (6.344) (1.461) (0.800) (1.565) (2.586)
Year 2011 20.487∗∗∗ 24.344∗∗∗ 32.156∗∗∗ 114.108∗∗∗ 61.036∗∗∗ 42.060∗∗∗ 58.157∗∗∗ 92.203∗∗∗ 62.385∗∗ 29.969 54.327∗∗ 121.956∗∗∗
(4.447) (6.078) (7.899) (12.239) (3.681) (2.935) (4.000) (4.765) (2.373) (1.327) (2.359) (3.881)
1031 16.155∗∗∗ −0.949 6.177 −14.825 22.138 −12.141
(6.645) (−0.191) (0.511) (−1.019) (1.285) (−0.598)
Assemblage 32.413∗∗∗ 35.140 −3.291 −30.056 177.974 180.837
(3.232) (1.515) (−0.072) (−0.518) (1.288) (1.080)
Build to Suit 45.582∗∗∗ 12.092 −15.136 9.197 −135.09 −256.36
(3.770) (0.568) (−0.421) (0.185) (−1.412) (−1.445)
Business Value 12.077 169.041∗∗∗ 111.450 38.665 36.670 −47.616
(0.615) (4.136) (1.595) (0.560) (0.372) (−0.343)
Condo Conversion 33.352∗∗∗ 116.203∗∗∗ 3.446 −42.953 20.206 −35.749
(2.943) (6.936) (0.134) (−1.129) (0.305) (−0.400)
Contamination −41.025∗ −97.309 0.000 0.000 −0.256 −20.679
(−1.675) (−1.061) (.) (.) (−0.002) (−0.073)
Deed Restriction −4.675 −8.415 0.000 0.000 −38.923 −32.648
(−0.163) (−0.135) (.) (.) (−0.277) (−0.018)
Deferred Maintenance −14.311∗∗∗ 5.360 0.623 42.592 11.904 27.008
(−2.845) (0.439) (0.022) (0.806) (0.322) (0.539)
R Square 0.112 0.348 0.357 0.417 0.293 0.525 0.548 0.608 0.246 0.505 0.526 0.602
Model N 41, 266 41, 266 41, 266 41, 266 4, 542 4, 542 4, 542 4, 542 2, 822 2, 822 2, 822 2, 822
ESTAR-N 825 825 825 825 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824
LEED-N 114 114 114 114 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
Dual-N 68 68 68 68 147 147 147 147 413 413 413 413
Non-Eco-N 40,353 40,353 40,353 40,353 3,577 3,577 3,577 3,577 1,506 1,506 1,506
Prof Owner 4,887 4,887 4,887 4,887 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,473 1,473 1,473 1473
Weighting X X X X X X
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Smallest 1/3 ESTAR Buildings (<125,000 SF) Mid 1/3 ESTAR Buildings Largest 1/3 (>256,150 SF)
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
Distressed Sale −27.862∗∗∗ −67.654∗∗∗ −18.750 −103.26∗ −68.916∗∗ −86.219∗∗
(−3.686) (−3.481) (−0.490) (−1.692) (−2.565) (−2.055)
Ground Lease 32.085∗∗∗ 107.876∗∗∗ −21.278 −22.546 −35.142∗ −39.545∗
(3.882) (8.937) (−1.544) (−1.346) (−1.763) (−1.837)
High Vacancy −6.233 30.173∗∗∗ −63.149∗∗∗ −98.642∗∗∗ −49.792∗∗ −69.973∗∗
(−1.150) (2.894) (−5.212) (−5.283) (−2.180) (−2.021)
Historical 13.912 70.909∗∗∗ 16.042 −52.917 21.782 36.102
(1.028) (3.175) (0.352) (−0.989) (0.355) (0.535)
Investor NNN 31.323∗∗∗ 28.993∗∗∗ 20.137 14.124 34.660∗ 13.315
(7.090) (3.441) (1.393) (0.795) (1.727) (0.521)
Land Contract −19.796 −64.197 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(−1.200) (−0.847) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Option Sale 10.215 −27.833 41.506 95.287∗∗∗ −14.833 1.513
(1.145) (−1.526) (1.550) (3.201) (−0.344) (0.026)
Partial Interest −48.897∗∗∗ 235.055∗∗∗ −36.445 −20.371 −71.259∗∗∗ −144.33∗∗∗
(−4.518) (10.985) (−1.625) (−0.792) (−3.544) (−7.684)
Redevelopment 35.321∗∗∗ 22.694 −17.457 −44.846 −100.13∗∗ −138.94
(4.221) (1.419) (−0.718) (−1.043) (−2.279) (−1.258)
REO −40.199∗∗∗ −92.621∗∗∗ −70.511∗∗∗ −128.65∗∗ 16.249 −12.716
(−6.092) (−5.127) (−2.923) (−2.563) (0.379) (−0.253)
Sale Leaseback 12.457∗∗∗ 7.669 27.953∗∗ 48.142∗∗∗ 1.162 −51.203∗∗
(2.584) (0.819) (1.972) (2.637) (0.063) (−2.269)
Shell Condition 3.916 −52.309∗∗ −77.977 −126.66 −34.148 −112.47
(0.326) (−2.052) (−1.548) (−1.616) (−0.255) (−0.228)
Short Sale −35.725∗ −129.46∗∗ 0.000 0.000 3.106 −19.940
(−1.843) (−2.349) (.) (.) (0.024) (−0.215)
Single Tenant 8.712∗∗∗ 23.520∗∗∗ 4.393 11.441 22.797 87.565∗∗∗
(4.912) (5.893) (0.536) (1.068) (1.462) (3.889)
Tenant Purchase 9.286∗∗ 21.938∗∗ 46.811∗∗ 75.623∗∗∗ 23.428 59.957
R Square 0.112 0.348 0.357 0.417 0.293 0.525 0.548 0.608 0.246 0.505 0.526 0.602
Model N 41, 266 41, 266 41, 266 41, 266 4, 542 4, 542 4, 542 4, 542 2, 822 2, 822 2, 822 2, 822
ESTAR-N 825 825 825 825 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824
LEED-N 114 114 114 114 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
Dual-N 68 68 68 68 147 147 147 147 413 413 413 413
Non-Eco-N 40,353 40,353 40,353 40,353 3,577 3,577 3,577 3,577 1,506 1,506 1,506
Prof Owner 4,887 4,887 4,887 4,887 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,473 1,473 1,473 1473
Weighting X X X X X X
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Smallest 1/3 ESTAR Buildings (<125,000 SF) Mid 1/3 ESTAR Buildings Largest 1/3 (>256,150 SF)
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
(2.101) (2.278) (2.409) (3.167) (0.737) (1.433)
R Square 0.112 0.348 0.357 0.417 0.293 0.525 0.548 0.608 0.246 0.505 0.526 0.602
Model N 41, 266 41, 266 41, 266 41, 266 4, 542 4, 542 4, 542 4, 542 2, 822 2, 822 2, 822 2, 822
ESTAR-N 825 825 825 825 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824
LEED-N 114 114 114 114 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
Dual-N 68 68 68 68 147 147 147 147 413 413 413 413
Non-Eco-N 40,353 40,353 40,353 40,353 3,577 3,577 3,577 3,577 1,506 1,506 1,506
Prof Owner 4,887 4,887 4,887 4,887 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,473 1,473 1,473 1473
Prof Owner-N 5260 5260 5260 5260 1880 1880 1880 1880 1184 1184 1184 1184
Weighting X X X X X X
131
Table D: This table presents results from OLS regressions on sales PSF of the building population split into thirds by size. No
controls were in Model 1, 5, and 9. Models 2, 6, and 10 include market dummy controls. Models 3, 7, and 11 also include
market dummy controls and sale condition control dummies. Models 4, 8, and 12 include market dummy controls, sale condition
controls, and are weighted by lnsize. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
>17,435 SF Medium >44,000 SF
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
ESTAR −33.600 −25.681 −25.887 −59.177 77.326∗∗∗ 40.327∗ 40.770∗ 93.014∗∗∗ 30.893∗∗∗ 26.899∗∗∗ 26.964∗∗∗ 15.550∗∗∗
(−0.864) (−0.790) (−0.805) (−0.863) (3.112) (1.909) (1.942) (2.718) (6.328) (6.204) (6.264) (3.065)
LEED 19.430 37.227 34.893 123.834∗∗ 54.839∗∗ 45.461∗∗ 48.465∗∗ 129.350∗∗∗ 90.374∗∗∗ 70.923∗∗∗ 72.410∗∗∗ 54.687∗∗∗
(0.590) (1.353) (1.280) (2.520) (2.293) (2.241) (2.403) (3.341) (7.417) (6.653) (6.852) (5.035)
Dual −9.286 −27.402 −47.991 −139.78∗ −49.176 −14.033 −16.452 32.254 43.869∗∗∗ 51.214∗∗∗ 49.693∗∗∗ 25.175∗∗∗
(−0.169) (−0.598) (−1.057) (−1.650) (−0.811) (−0.273) (−0.322) (0.231) (5.338) (7.049) (6.894) (3.704)
Prof Buyer 206.732∗∗∗ 207.150∗∗∗ 358.974∗∗∗ 103.720∗∗∗ 105.510∗∗∗ 262.662∗∗∗ 22.276∗∗∗ 22.625∗∗∗ −10.859∗∗
(8.479) (8.576) (12.418) (7.655) (7.817) (12.580) (5.037) (5.153) (−2.079)
Prof Seller 21.271 23.054 13.781 25.107 22.896 10.371 56.163∗∗∗ 52.544∗∗∗ 32.656∗∗∗
(0.774) (0.849) (0.298) (1.621) (1.487) (0.334) (7.415) (6.989) (3.897)
Prof Both 0.000 0.000 0.000 −79.580 −91.333 −353.13 60.719∗∗∗ 61.847∗∗∗ 68.858∗∗∗
(.) (.) (.) (−0.774) (−0.891) (−1.023) (4.403) (4.526) (5.322)
Intercept 443.192∗∗∗ 300.038∗∗∗ 313.185∗∗∗ 430.658∗∗∗ 407.848∗∗∗ 339.426∗∗∗ 332.560∗∗∗ 1097.56∗∗∗ 258.120∗∗∗ 182.970∗∗∗ 179.198∗∗∗ 575.601∗∗∗
(5.794) (4.533) (4.781) (3.338) (7.734) (7.121) (6.995) (10.040) (8.322) (5.661) (5.565) (10.819)
lnsize −39.744∗∗∗ −35.135∗∗∗ −36.436∗∗∗ −53.209∗∗∗ −28.961∗∗∗ −32.379∗∗∗ −31.984∗∗∗ −121.74∗∗∗ 11.578∗∗∗ −1.134 −0.818 −12.491∗∗∗
(−4.805) (−5.076) (−5.321) (−3.963) (−5.241) (−6.898) (−6.831) (−11.373) (3.790) (−0.419) (−0.304) (−3.441)
age100 25.108∗∗∗ 1.838 0.938 −8.695 23.800∗∗∗ 10.340 9.700 110.422∗∗∗ 0.772 −22.892∗∗∗ −23.771∗∗∗ −72.507∗∗∗
(3.116) (0.263) (0.135) (−0.631) (2.818) (1.401) (1.314) (6.181) (0.080) (−2.653) (−2.754) (−5.386)
age75 27.362∗∗∗ −1.095 −3.288 −23.708∗ 14.534∗ −7.262 −7.490 41.377∗∗ −7.600 −42.422∗∗∗ −43.298∗∗∗ −155.25∗∗∗
(3.714) (−0.173) (−0.524) (−1.849) (1.884) (−1.087) (−1.120) (2.465) (−0.889) (−5.516) (−5.619) (−13.298)
age50 21.694∗∗∗ 6.446 6.388 85.560∗∗∗ 2.284 −2.270 −1.453 8.964 −29.698∗∗∗ −39.339∗∗∗ −38.614∗∗∗ −114.73∗∗∗
(3.315) (1.149) (1.148) (7.336) (0.308) (−0.356) (−0.228) (0.551) (−3.223) (−4.849) (−4.773) (−8.945)
age40 4.704 −6.050 −6.201 −7.544 3.159 −4.732 −3.059 −1.254 −19.429∗∗ −30.994∗∗∗ −31.653∗∗∗ −140.09∗∗∗
(0.738) (−1.108) (−1.142) (−0.656) (0.452) (−0.788) (−0.508) (−0.081) (−2.301) (−4.175) (−4.267) (−12.267)
Model N 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579
ESTAR-N 10 10 10 10 24 24 24 24 899 899 899 899
Dual-N 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 286 286 286 286
LEED N 14 14 14 14 26 26 26 26 118 118 118 118
Prof Seller N 15 15 15 15 45 45 45 45 226 226 226 226
Prof Buyer N 18 18 18 18 60 60 60 60 771 771 771 771
Prof Both N 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 66 66 66 66
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
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>17,435 SF Medium >44,000 SF
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
age30 14.519∗∗ −1.670 −1.377 −1.830 3.351 −5.625 −4.560 −9.353 −26.059∗∗∗ −26.817∗∗∗ −26.569∗∗∗ −123.88∗∗∗
(2.497) (−0.333) (−0.276) (−0.176) (0.530) (−1.036) (−0.834) (−0.670) (−3.408) (−3.994) (−3.948) (−11.740)
age20 17.827∗∗∗ 3.493 3.669 −3.219 14.827∗∗ 3.179 3.363 8.596 −16.062∗∗ −25.745∗∗∗ −26.296∗∗∗ −112.38∗∗∗
(3.181) (0.723) (0.764) (−0.323) (2.463) (0.613) (0.644) (0.650) (−2.262) (−4.134) (−4.201) (−11.641)
age15 35.244∗∗∗ 20.949∗∗∗ 18.780∗∗ 13.922 36.896∗∗∗ 26.055∗∗∗ 25.029∗∗∗ 14.041 8.340 4.946 2.400 −77.814∗∗∗
(4.017) (2.830) (2.557) (0.965) (4.058) (3.366) (3.231) (0.775) (0.826) (0.562) (0.273) (−6.013)
age10 49.112∗∗∗ 37.184∗∗∗ 37.459∗∗∗ 49.749∗∗∗ 44.467∗∗∗ 37.825∗∗∗ 36.355∗∗∗ 38.486∗∗ 28.084∗∗∗ 20.499∗∗∗ 17.276∗∗ −57.348∗∗∗
(6.586) (5.833) (5.919) (4.023) (5.878) (5.834) (5.591) (2.522) (3.420) (2.840) (2.396) (−4.961)
age5 50.276∗∗∗ 34.330∗∗∗ 33.340∗∗∗ 32.557∗∗∗ 41.814∗∗∗ 36.429∗∗∗ 36.064∗∗∗ 36.986∗∗ 42.672∗∗∗ 32.379∗∗∗ 29.126∗∗∗ −18.579∗
(7.231) (5.752) (5.618) (2.846) (5.719) (5.800) (5.743) (2.506) (5.204) (4.514) (4.071) (−1.745)
stories 29.093∗∗∗ 7.722∗∗∗ 8.215∗∗∗ 13.432∗∗∗ 14.381∗∗∗ 5.204∗∗∗ 5.495∗∗∗ 7.621∗∗∗ 0.276 0.410∗ 0.551∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗
(16.470) (4.802) (5.161) (4.591) (12.320) (5.035) (5.336) (3.948) (1.018) (1.678) (2.268) (3.277)
A Class 75.449 75.117∗ 70.015∗ 117.904∗ 46.525∗∗∗ 57.992∗∗∗ 58.930∗∗∗ 110.203∗∗∗ 87.529∗∗∗ 71.459∗∗∗ 71.274∗∗∗ 100.597∗∗∗
(1.502) (1.788) (1.686) (1.698) (4.346) (6.341) (6.482) (6.195) (16.172) (14.781) (14.835) (9.535)
B Class 22.440∗∗∗ 23.262∗∗∗ 23.011∗∗∗ 34.168∗∗∗ 23.679∗∗∗ 22.508∗∗∗ 22.178∗∗∗ 24.156∗∗∗ 44.362∗∗∗ 35.722∗∗∗ 35.621∗∗∗ 56.352∗∗∗
(7.790) (9.510) (9.507) (7.250) (7.908) (8.721) (8.629) (3.860) (9.954) (9.131) (9.181) (5.720)
lnland −5.325∗∗∗ 7.913∗∗∗ 7.393∗∗∗ 9.642∗∗∗ −7.518∗∗∗ 6.388∗∗∗ 6.050∗∗∗ 15.688∗∗∗ −28.011∗∗∗ −9.741∗∗∗ −9.935∗∗∗ −28.211∗∗∗
(−3.133) (5.381) (5.076) (3.237) (−4.309) (4.188) (3.984) (4.366) (−18.767) (−7.069) (−7.244) (−13.732)
Amenity 4.154 1.212 1.117 −11.690∗∗ 4.877∗ 5.451∗∗ 5.416∗∗ −7.012 10.707∗∗∗ 18.167∗∗∗ 19.825∗∗∗ 47.610∗∗∗
(1.535) (0.513) (0.478) (−2.541) (1.789) (2.269) (2.265) (−1.247) (3.217) (6.144) (6.739) (7.787)
Year 2002 10.919 7.461 7.511 26.084∗∗ 3.791 −0.096 0.474 −7.625 8.322 0.760 −1.083 32.129∗∗
(1.538) (1.257) (1.279) (1.966) (0.534) (−0.016) (0.079) (−0.477) (1.107) (0.116) (−0.167) (2.536)
Year 2003 10.642 7.516 8.136 6.188 12.378∗ 6.235 6.634 −1.548 −9.613 −7.992 −7.791 1.331
(1.548) (1.306) (1.426) (0.479) (1.789) (1.059) (1.132) (−0.102) (−1.282) (−1.221) (−1.200) (0.111)
Year 2004 22.019∗∗∗ 18.128∗∗∗ 18.547∗∗∗ 14.264 11.213∗ 10.361∗ 10.913∗∗ 4.753 0.429 −4.877 −4.151 −8.657
(3.291) (3.235) (3.341) (1.160) (1.725) (1.874) (1.983) (0.330) (0.062) (−0.800) (−0.687) (−0.764)
Year 2005 41.685∗∗∗ 39.641∗∗∗ 40.054∗∗∗ 50.234∗∗∗ 21.018∗∗∗ 20.333∗∗∗ 21.956∗∗∗ 14.624 15.476∗∗ 12.668∗∗ 13.334∗∗ 17.418
(6.497) (7.379) (7.516) (4.341) (3.341) (3.801) (4.118) (1.060) (2.353) (2.209) (2.344) (1.623)
Year 2006 61.119∗∗∗ 55.559∗∗∗ 56.112∗∗∗ 78.735∗∗∗ 50.623∗∗∗ 46.014∗∗∗ 48.014∗∗∗ 71.788∗∗∗ 35.738∗∗∗ 32.755∗∗∗ 32.884∗∗∗ 72.376∗∗∗
Model N 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579
ESTAR-N 10 10 10 10 24 24 24 24 899 899 899 899
Dual-N 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 286 286 286 286
LEED N 14 14 14 14 26 26 26 26 118 118 118 118
Prof Seller N 15 15 15 15 45 45 45 45 226 226 226 226
Prof Buyer N 18 18 18 18 60 60 60 60 771 771 771 771
Prof Both N 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 66 66 66 66
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
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>17,435 SF Medium >44,000 SF
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
(9.258) (10.035) (10.219) (6.784) (8.033) (8.566) (8.953) (5.381) (5.644) (5.923) (5.987) (7.002)
Year 2007 70.611∗∗∗ 71.693∗∗∗ 72.294∗∗∗ 88.895∗∗∗ 61.959∗∗∗ 60.977∗∗∗ 62.780∗∗∗ 84.366∗∗∗ 43.955∗∗∗ 45.283∗∗∗ 47.492∗∗∗ 111.343∗∗∗
(10.780) (13.037) (13.215) (7.750) (9.983) (11.522) (11.876) (6.477) (7.070) (8.300) (8.759) (11.064)
Year 2008 67.184∗∗∗ 74.915∗∗∗ 76.660∗∗∗ 100.093∗∗∗ 68.317∗∗∗ 67.333∗∗∗ 70.309∗∗∗ 109.448∗∗∗ 64.511∗∗∗ 60.720∗∗∗ 64.195∗∗∗ 155.655∗∗∗
(10.560) (13.932) (14.305) (8.832) (11.159) (12.841) (13.420) (8.498) (10.469) (11.088) (11.795) (15.471)
Year 2009 69.951∗∗∗ 83.584∗∗∗ 85.004∗∗∗ 155.653∗∗∗ 49.727∗∗∗ 61.856∗∗∗ 64.360∗∗∗ 94.123∗∗∗ 53.235∗∗∗ 59.849∗∗∗ 62.716∗∗∗ 131.344∗∗∗
(10.524) (14.779) (15.105) (13.208) (7.626) (11.028) (11.491) (6.852) (7.601) (9.620) (10.150) (11.792)
Year 2010 26.614∗∗∗ 40.480∗∗∗ 44.178∗∗∗ 68.068∗∗∗ 15.103∗∗ 28.099∗∗∗ 33.492∗∗∗ 32.816∗∗ 19.394∗∗∗ 16.352∗∗∗ 28.344∗∗∗ 76.131∗∗∗
(4.185) (7.466) (8.122) (5.737) (2.343) (5.039) (5.957) (2.256) (2.843) (2.710) (4.627) (6.709)
Year 2011 24.959∗∗∗ 30.558∗∗∗ 35.568∗∗∗ 86.320∗∗∗ 15.252∗∗ 23.179∗∗∗ 31.565∗∗∗ 137.147∗∗∗ 34.339∗∗∗ 20.482∗∗∗ 36.639∗∗∗ 89.198∗∗∗
(3.222) (4.668) (5.404) (6.115) (2.054) (3.640) (4.858) (8.192) (4.521) (3.049) (5.366) (8.023)
1031 17.531∗∗∗ −0.299 20.314∗∗∗ 30.050∗∗∗ 11.505∗∗∗ −8.607
(4.257) (−0.041) (5.380) (3.752) (2.636) (−1.171)
Assemblage 45.842∗∗∗ 55.543∗∗ 16.953 −17.911 10.615 57.410
(2.949) (2.265) (1.071) (−0.509) (0.528) (1.361)
Build to Suit 35.439 30.519 72.718∗∗∗ 63.326∗ −4.542 −64.679∗
(1.582) (0.793) (3.798) (1.662) (−0.246) (−1.815)
Business Value 0.508 −51.569 32.441 9.095 61.701∗ 63.019
(0.019) (−0.879) (0.898) (0.104) (1.808) (1.410)
Condo Conversion 113.769∗∗∗ 329.173∗∗∗ −1.483 −50.473 24.397∗ 46.316∗
(3.529) (8.171) (−0.077) (−1.342) (1.828) (1.908)
Contamination −3.646 1.728 −111.47∗∗∗ −299.91∗∗ −23.913 51.037
(−0.107) (0.022) (−2.665) (−2.314) (−0.444) (0.358)
Deed Restriction 22.205 41.994 −5.791 −34.403 −12.294 −24.810
(0.310) (0.272) (−0.139) (−0.332) (−0.279) (−0.175)
Deferred Maintenance −18.820∗∗ −16.777 −13.628∗ −46.282∗∗ −5.097 36.400∗
(−2.178) (−0.859) (−1.760) (−2.180) (−0.559) (1.952)
Distressed Sale −22.638∗ 54.596∗ −14.014 −11.250 −45.444∗∗∗ −76.907∗∗∗
(−1.763) (1.884) (−1.106) (−0.334) (−4.093) (−4.087)
Model N 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579
ESTAR-N 10 10 10 10 24 24 24 24 899 899 899 899
Dual-N 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 286 286 286 286
LEED N 14 14 14 14 26 26 26 26 118 118 118 118
Prof Seller N 15 15 15 15 45 45 45 45 226 226 226 226
Prof Buyer N 18 18 18 18 60 60 60 60 771 771 771 771
Prof Both N 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 66 66 66 66
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
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>17,435 SF Medium >44,000 SF
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
Ground Lease 198.245∗∗∗ 1124.37∗∗∗ 20.439 146.538∗∗∗ −7.226 −24.988∗∗∗
(6.779) (31.395) (1.350) (5.091) (−0.942) (−2.722)
High Vacancy 28.940∗ 24.065 15.791∗ 290.697∗∗∗ −42.685∗∗∗ −75.908∗∗∗
(1.806) (0.884) (1.709) (14.170) (−6.843) (−6.238)
Historical −18.316 −169.14∗∗∗ −6.908 −124.44∗∗∗ 34.064∗ 69.850∗∗∗
(−0.621) (−3.091) (−0.321) (−2.636) (1.838) (2.674)
Investor NNN 42.378∗∗∗ 62.423∗∗∗ 26.540∗∗∗ 13.666 25.409∗∗∗ 6.671
(5.616) (4.602) (3.699) (0.878) (3.802) (0.677)
Land Contract −14.621 −16.923 −13.066 −31.806 −21.393 −58.042
(−0.703) (−0.286) (−0.472) (−0.321) (−0.280) (−0.091)
Option Sale 15.502 14.846 3.270 −41.682 8.732 24.478
(1.021) (0.537) (0.221) (−1.234) (0.656) (1.193)
Partial Interest 47.458∗∗ 1882.87∗∗∗ −73.625∗∗∗ −75.939 −65.253∗∗∗ −139.69∗∗∗
(2.422) (65.175) (−3.989) (−1.630) (−6.024) (−15.355)
Redevelopment 120.706∗∗∗ 398.490∗∗∗ 19.084 −1.517 −27.890∗∗ −98.592∗∗∗
(7.463) (18.248) (1.463) (−0.056) (−2.315) (−3.587)
REO −43.294∗∗∗ −65.870∗∗ −41.331∗∗∗ −159.39∗∗∗ −45.456∗∗∗ −70.735∗∗∗
(−4.033) (−2.372) (−3.911) (−4.886) (−4.027) (−3.388)
Sale Leaseback 1.421 −23.053 25.860∗∗∗ 38.725∗∗ 15.977∗∗ −9.301
(0.189) (−1.599) (3.053) (2.157) (2.287) (−0.981)
Shell Condition 29.552 18.483 −5.821 −18.665 −46.198∗∗ −162.88∗∗∗
(1.524) (0.593) (−0.302) (−0.433) (−2.111) (−3.078)
Short Sale −30.560 −73.853 −48.990 −153.56 −22.071 −49.214
(−0.990) (−1.069) (−1.644) (−1.546) (−0.538) (−1.062)
Single Tenant 8.239∗∗∗ 11.268∗∗ 8.620∗∗∗ 46.021∗∗∗ 7.019∗∗ 29.041∗∗∗
(3.054) (2.168) (2.985) (6.924) (2.031) (4.394)
Tenant Purchase −3.775 −7.907 18.168∗∗∗ −0.167 24.129∗∗∗ 56.593∗∗∗
(−0.551) (−0.548) (2.580) (−0.010) (2.870) (4.027)
R Square 0.114 0.390 0.407 0.698 0.106 0.367 0.378 0.487 0.206 0.406 0.420 0.500
Model N 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 460 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 476 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579 8, 579
ESTAR-N 10 10 10 10 24 24 24 24 899 899 899 899
Dual-N 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 286 286 286 286
LEED N 14 14 14 14 26 26 26 26 118 118 118 118
Prof Seller N 15 15 15 15 45 45 45 45 226 226 226 226
Prof Buyer N 18 18 18 18 60 60 60 60 771 771 771 771
Prof Both N 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 66 66 66 66
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
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Table E: This table presents results from OLSDV regressions on sales PSF of the building population split into thirds by the
ESTAR distribution. In each size category results are presented first with the core controls, then with professional ownership
controls added, then with sale condition controls also added, and finally weighted by price with all controls. ***,**,* represent statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
size<=151,775 Medium size>=280,563
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
ESTAR −33.600 −25.681 −25.887 −59.177 77.326∗∗∗ 40.327∗ 40.770∗ 93.014∗∗∗ 26.742∗∗∗ 23.922∗∗∗ 24.089∗∗∗ −7.511
(−0.864) (−0.790) (−0.805) (−0.863) (3.112) (1.909) (1.942) (2.718) (5.382) (5.444) (5.520) (−1.370)
LEED 19.430 37.227 34.893 123.834∗∗ 54.839∗∗ 45.461∗∗ 48.465∗∗ 129.350∗∗∗ 87.599∗∗∗ 68.252∗∗∗ 69.831∗∗∗ 33.760∗∗∗
(0.590) (1.353) (1.280) (2.520) (2.293) (2.241) (2.403) (3.341) (7.051) (6.306) (6.507) (2.804)
Dual −9.286 −27.402 −47.991 −139.78∗ −49.176 −14.033 −16.452 32.254 39.549∗∗∗ 48.539∗∗∗ 47.393∗∗∗ 8.099
(−0.169) (−0.598) (−1.057) (−1.650) (−0.811) (−0.273) (−0.322) (0.231) (4.745) (6.615) (6.507) (1.146)
Prof Buyer 206.732∗∗∗ 207.150∗∗∗ 358.974∗∗∗ 103.720∗∗∗ 105.510∗∗∗ 262.662∗∗∗ 22.704∗∗∗ 23.192∗∗∗ 1.408
(8.479) (8.576) (12.418) (7.655) (7.817) (12.580) (5.069) (5.215) (0.257)
Prof Seller 21.271 23.054 13.781 25.107 22.896 10.371 57.267∗∗∗ 53.935∗∗∗ 55.047∗∗∗
(0.774) (0.849) (0.298) (1.621) (1.487) (0.334) (7.464) (7.081) (6.182)
Prof Both 0.000 0.000 0.000 −79.580 −91.333 −353.13 71.734∗∗∗ 72.722∗∗∗ 179.794∗∗∗
(.) (.) (.) (−0.774) (−0.891) (−1.023) (5.163) (5.280) (14.044)
Intercept 443.192∗∗∗ 300.038∗∗∗ 313.185∗∗∗ 430.658∗∗∗ 407.848∗∗∗ 339.426∗∗∗ 332.560∗∗∗ 1097.56∗∗∗ 233.033∗∗∗ 164.541∗∗∗ 161.488∗∗∗ 330.925∗∗∗
(5.794) (4.533) (4.781) (3.338) (7.734) (7.121) (6.995) (10.040) (7.386) (5.023) (4.947) (5.736)
lnsize −39.744∗∗∗ −35.135∗∗∗ −36.436∗∗∗ −53.209∗∗∗ −28.961∗∗∗ −32.379∗∗∗ −31.984∗∗∗ −121.74∗∗∗ 12.773∗∗∗ −0.585 −0.365 0.752
(−4.805) (−5.076) (−5.321) (−3.963) (−5.241) (−6.898) (−6.831) (−11.373) (4.107) (−0.214) (−0.134) (0.191)
age100 25.108∗∗∗ 1.838 0.938 −8.695 23.800∗∗∗ 10.340 9.700 110.422∗∗∗ 1.008 −24.639∗∗∗ −25.620∗∗∗ −106.38∗∗∗
(3.116) (0.263) (0.135) (−0.631) (2.818) (1.401) (1.314) (6.181) (0.103) (−2.813) (−2.923) (−7.134)
age75 27.362∗∗∗ −1.095 −3.288 −23.708∗ 14.534∗ −7.262 −7.490 41.377∗∗ −8.284 −45.179∗∗∗ −46.177∗∗∗ −181.79∗∗∗
(3.714) (−0.173) (−0.524) (−1.849) (1.884) (−1.087) (−1.120) (2.465) (−0.951) (−5.791) (−5.906) (−14.256)
age50 21.694∗∗∗ 6.446 6.388 85.560∗∗∗ 2.284 −2.270 −1.453 8.964 −28.023∗∗∗ −38.962∗∗∗ −38.294∗∗∗ −102.38∗∗∗
(3.315) (1.149) (1.148) (7.336) (0.308) (−0.356) (−0.228) (0.551) (−2.985) (−4.733) (−4.664) (−7.357)
age40 4.704 −6.050 −6.201 −7.544 3.159 −4.732 −3.059 −1.254 −15.420∗ −28.526∗∗∗ −29.100∗∗∗ −89.478∗∗∗
(0.738) (−1.108) (−1.142) (−0.656) (0.452) (−0.788) (−0.508) (−0.081) (−1.793) (−3.789) (−3.867) (−7.268)
age30 14.519∗∗ −1.670 −1.377 −1.830 3.351 −5.625 −4.560 −9.353 −26.315∗∗∗ −27.198∗∗∗ −27.005∗∗∗ −124.71∗∗∗
(2.497) (−0.333) (−0.276) (−0.176) (0.530) (−1.036) (−0.834) (−0.670) (−3.375) (−3.990) (−3.951) (−10.676)
age20 17.827∗∗∗ 3.493 3.669 −3.219 14.827∗∗ 3.179 3.363 8.596 −16.402∗∗ −26.331∗∗∗ −26.884∗∗∗ −115.09∗∗∗
(3.181) (0.723) (0.764) (−0.323) (2.463) (0.613) (0.644) (0.650) (−2.265) (−4.165) (−4.229) (−10.721)
age15 35.244∗∗∗ 20.949∗∗∗ 18.780∗∗ 13.922 36.896∗∗∗ 26.055∗∗∗ 25.029∗∗∗ 14.041 10.411 6.263 3.718 −65.392∗∗∗
(4.017) (2.830) (2.557) (0.965) (4.058) (3.366) (3.231) (0.775) (1.012) (0.701) (0.417) (−4.633)
age10 49.112∗∗∗ 37.184∗∗∗ 37.459∗∗∗ 49.749∗∗∗ 44.467∗∗∗ 37.825∗∗∗ 36.355∗∗∗ 38.486∗∗ 28.912∗∗∗ 20.588∗∗∗ 17.425∗∗ −48.216∗∗∗
R Square 0.112 0.348 0.357 0.417 0.293 0.525 0.548 0.608 0.248 0.511 0.530 0.691
Model N 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175
ESTAR-N 311 311 311 311 310 310 310 310 312 312 312 312
LEED N 93 93 93 93 35 35 35 35 30 30 30 30
Dual-N 32 32 32 32 71 71 71 71 192 192 192 192
Non-Eco-N 23,093 23,093 23,093 23,093 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 660 660 660 660
Prof Seller N 180 180 180 180 55 55 55 55 51 51 51 51
Prof Buyer N 434 434 434 434 211 211 211 211 204 204 204 204
Prof Both N 23 23 23 23 21 21 21 21 23 23 23 23
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
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Continued from previous page
Smallest 1/3 ESTAR Buildings (<125,000 SF) Mid 1/3 ESTAR Buildings Largest 1/3 (>256,150 SF)
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
(6.586) (5.833) (5.919) (4.023) (5.878) (5.834) (5.591) (2.522) (3.453) (2.809) (2.379) (−3.742)
age5 50.276∗∗∗ 34.330∗∗∗ 33.340∗∗∗ 32.557∗∗∗ 41.814∗∗∗ 36.429∗∗∗ 36.064∗∗∗ 36.986∗∗ 44.327∗∗∗ 33.186∗∗∗ 30.035∗∗∗ 4.638
(7.231) (5.752) (5.618) (2.846) (5.719) (5.800) (5.743) (2.506) (5.302) (4.557) (4.134) (0.393)
stories 29.093∗∗∗ 7.722∗∗∗ 8.215∗∗∗ 13.432∗∗∗ 14.381∗∗∗ 5.204∗∗∗ 5.495∗∗∗ 7.621∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗
(16.470) (4.802) (5.161) (4.591) (12.320) (5.035) (5.336) (3.948) (2.654) (2.810) (3.437) (4.846)
A Class 75.449 75.117∗ 70.015∗ 117.904∗ 46.525∗∗∗ 57.992∗∗∗ 58.930∗∗∗ 110.203∗∗∗ 87.407∗∗∗ 71.213∗∗∗ 70.997∗∗∗ 101.708∗∗∗
(1.502) (1.788) (1.686) (1.698) (4.346) (6.341) (6.482) (6.195) (15.841) (14.510) (14.553) (8.674)
B Class 22.440∗∗∗ 23.262∗∗∗ 23.011∗∗∗ 34.168∗∗∗ 23.679∗∗∗ 22.508∗∗∗ 22.178∗∗∗ 24.156∗∗∗ 43.947∗∗∗ 35.339∗∗∗ 35.232∗∗∗ 53.244∗∗∗
(7.790) (9.510) (9.507) (7.250) (7.908) (8.721) (8.629) (3.860) (9.672) (8.898) (8.941) (4.849)
lnland −5.325∗∗∗ 7.913∗∗∗ 7.393∗∗∗ 9.642∗∗∗ −7.518∗∗∗ 6.388∗∗∗ 6.050∗∗∗ 15.688∗∗∗ −27.238∗∗∗ −8.775∗∗∗ −8.947∗∗∗ −21.913∗∗∗
(−3.133) (5.381) (5.076) (3.237) (−4.309) (4.188) (3.984) (4.366) (−17.919) (−6.284) (−6.436) (−9.744)
Amenity 4.154 1.212 1.117 −11.690∗∗ 4.877∗ 5.451∗∗ 5.416∗∗ −7.012 10.494∗∗∗ 18.369∗∗∗ 20.043∗∗∗ 36.572∗∗∗
(1.535) (0.513) (0.478) (−2.541) (1.789) (2.269) (2.265) (−1.247) (3.093) (6.121) (6.711) (5.473)
Year 2002 10.919 7.461 7.511 26.084∗∗ 3.791 −0.096 0.474 −7.625 8.020 0.335 −1.473 28.078∗∗
(1.538) (1.257) (1.279) (1.966) (0.534) (−0.016) (0.079) (−0.477) (1.047) (0.050) (−0.223) (1.988)
Year 2003 10.642 7.516 8.136 6.188 12.378∗ 6.235 6.634 −1.548 −9.603 −7.977 −7.804 5.413
(1.548) (1.306) (1.426) (0.479) (1.789) (1.059) (1.132) (−0.102) (−1.257) (−1.201) (−1.184) (0.410)
Year 2004 22.019∗∗∗ 18.128∗∗∗ 18.547∗∗∗ 14.264 11.213∗ 10.361∗ 10.913∗∗ 4.753 −0.278 −5.542 −4.763 −13.450
(3.291) (3.235) (3.341) (1.160) (1.725) (1.874) (1.983) (0.330) (−0.039) (−0.895) (−0.776) (−1.065)
Year 2005 41.685∗∗∗ 39.641∗∗∗ 40.054∗∗∗ 50.234∗∗∗ 21.018∗∗∗ 20.333∗∗∗ 21.956∗∗∗ 14.624 14.720∗∗ 12.010∗∗ 12.748∗∗ 7.752
(6.497) (7.379) (7.516) (4.341) (3.341) (3.801) (4.118) (1.060) (2.195) (2.062) (2.206) (0.648)
Year 2006 61.119∗∗∗ 55.559∗∗∗ 56.112∗∗∗ 78.735∗∗∗ 50.623∗∗∗ 46.014∗∗∗ 48.014∗∗∗ 71.788∗∗∗ 35.428∗∗∗ 32.372∗∗∗ 32.566∗∗∗ 68.837∗∗∗
(9.258) (10.035) (10.219) (6.784) (8.033) (8.566) (8.953) (5.381) (5.488) (5.766) (5.839) (6.013)
Year 2007 70.611∗∗∗ 71.693∗∗∗ 72.294∗∗∗ 88.895∗∗∗ 61.959∗∗∗ 60.977∗∗∗ 62.780∗∗∗ 84.366∗∗∗ 44.238∗∗∗ 45.437∗∗∗ 47.739∗∗∗ 123.757∗∗∗
(10.780) (13.037) (13.215) (7.750) (9.983) (11.522) (11.876) (6.477) (6.980) (8.204) (8.671) (11.086)
Year 2008 67.184∗∗∗ 74.915∗∗∗ 76.660∗∗∗ 100.093∗∗∗ 68.317∗∗∗ 67.333∗∗∗ 70.309∗∗∗ 109.448∗∗∗ 66.826∗∗∗ 62.031∗∗∗ 65.645∗∗∗ 176.529∗∗∗
(10.560) (13.932) (14.305) (8.832) (11.159) (12.841) (13.420) (8.498) (10.643) (11.164) (11.884) (15.959)
Year 2009 69.951∗∗∗ 83.584∗∗∗ 85.004∗∗∗ 155.653∗∗∗ 49.727∗∗∗ 61.856∗∗∗ 64.360∗∗∗ 94.123∗∗∗ 55.216∗∗∗ 61.228∗∗∗ 64.228∗∗∗ 176.012∗∗∗
(10.524) (14.779) (15.105) (13.208) (7.626) (11.028) (11.491) (6.852) (7.737) (9.700) (10.243) (14.481)
Year 2010 26.614∗∗∗ 40.480∗∗∗ 44.178∗∗∗ 68.068∗∗∗ 15.103∗∗ 28.099∗∗∗ 33.492∗∗∗ 32.816∗∗ 19.568∗∗∗ 15.982∗∗∗ 27.748∗∗∗ 57.530∗∗∗
(4.185) (7.466) (8.122) (5.737) (2.343) (5.039) (5.957) (2.256) (2.814) (2.610) (4.461) (4.599)
Year 2011 24.959∗∗∗ 30.558∗∗∗ 35.568∗∗∗ 86.320∗∗∗ 15.252∗∗ 23.179∗∗∗ 31.565∗∗∗ 137.147∗∗∗ 32.955∗∗∗ 18.835∗∗∗ 34.836∗∗∗ 56.831∗∗∗
(3.222) (4.668) (5.404) (6.115) (2.054) (3.640) (4.858) (8.192) (4.255) (2.762) (5.024) (4.605)
1031 17.531∗∗∗ −0.299 20.314∗∗∗ 30.050∗∗∗ 11.625∗∗∗ −15.836∗∗
(4.257) (−0.041) (5.380) (3.752) (2.624) (−1.985)
Assemblage 45.842∗∗∗ 55.543∗∗ 16.953 −17.911 10.556 35.004
R Square 0.112 0.348 0.357 0.417 0.293 0.525 0.548 0.608 0.248 0.511 0.530 0.691
Model N 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175
ESTAR-N 311 311 311 311 310 310 310 310 312 312 312 312
LEED N 93 93 93 93 35 35 35 35 30 30 30 30
Dual-N 32 32 32 32 71 71 71 71 192 192 192 192
Non-Eco-N 23,093 23,093 23,093 23,093 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 660 660 660 660
Prof Seller N 180 180 180 180 55 55 55 55 51 51 51 51
Prof Buyer N 434 434 434 434 211 211 211 211 204 204 204 204
Prof Both N 23 23 23 23 21 21 21 21 23 23 23 23
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
Continued on next page
138
Continued from previous page
Smallest 1/3 ESTAR Buildings (<125,000 SF) Mid 1/3 ESTAR Buildings Largest 1/3 (>256,150 SF)
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
(2.949) (2.265) (1.071) (−0.509) (0.517) (0.744)
Build to Suit 35.439 30.519 72.718∗∗∗ 63.326∗ −5.049 −68.741∗
(1.582) (0.793) (3.798) (1.662) (−0.269) (−1.730)
Business Value 0.508 −51.569 32.441 9.095 59.371∗ 64.682
(0.019) (−0.879) (0.898) (0.104) (1.713) (1.298)
Condo Conversion 113.769∗∗∗ 329.173∗∗∗ −1.483 −50.473 23.771∗ 54.622∗∗
(3.529) (8.171) (−0.077) (−1.342) (1.754) (2.018)
Contamination −3.646 1.728 −111.47∗∗∗ −299.91∗∗ −21.297 89.996
(−0.107) (0.022) (−2.665) (−2.314) (−0.390) (0.567)
Deed Restriction 22.205 41.994 −5.791 −34.403 −12.089 −23.181
(0.310) (0.272) (−0.139) (−0.332) (−0.271) (−0.147)
Deferred Maintenance −18.820∗∗ −16.777 −13.628∗ −46.282∗∗ −4.725 29.991
(−2.178) (−0.859) (−1.760) (−2.180) (−0.511) (1.443)
Distressed Sale −22.638∗ 54.596∗ −14.014 −11.250 −36.113∗∗∗ 294.890∗∗∗
(−1.763) (1.884) (−1.106) (−0.334) (−3.219) (19.188)
Ground Lease 198.245∗∗∗ 1124.37∗∗∗ 20.439 146.538∗∗∗ −6.794 −23.406∗∗
(6.779) (31.395) (1.350) (5.091) (−0.874) (−2.402)
High Vacancy 28.940∗ 24.065 15.791∗ 290.697∗∗∗ −43.030∗∗∗ −105.23∗∗∗
(1.806) (0.884) (1.709) (14.170) (−6.792) (−7.789)
Historical −18.316 −169.14∗∗∗ −6.908 −124.44∗∗∗ 36.311∗ 118.838∗∗∗
(−0.621) (−3.091) (−0.321) (−2.636) (1.929) (4.086)
Investor NNN 42.378∗∗∗ 62.423∗∗∗ 26.540∗∗∗ 13.666 25.036∗∗∗ 12.461
(5.616) (4.602) (3.699) (0.878) (3.689) (1.134)
Land Contract −14.621 −16.923 −13.066 −31.806 −20.190 −9.994
(−0.703) (−0.286) (−0.472) (−0.321) (−0.260) (−0.014)
Option Sale 15.502 14.846 3.270 −41.682 7.929 24.283
(1.021) (0.537) (0.221) (−1.234) (0.587) (1.068)
Partial Interest 47.458∗∗ 1882.87∗∗∗ −73.625∗∗∗ −75.939 −70.599∗∗∗ −191.29∗∗∗
(2.422) (65.175) (−3.989) (−1.630) (−6.447) (−19.860)
Redevelopment 120.706∗∗∗ 398.490∗∗∗ 19.084 −1.517 −28.127∗∗ −93.593∗∗∗
(7.463) (18.248) (1.463) (−0.056) (−2.299) (−3.054)
REO −43.294∗∗∗ −65.870∗∗ −41.331∗∗∗ −159.39∗∗∗ −45.286∗∗∗ −161.94∗∗∗
(−4.033) (−2.372) (−3.911) (−4.886) (−3.950) (−7.016)
Sale Leaseback 1.421 −23.053 25.860∗∗∗ 38.725∗∗ 16.668∗∗ −18.144∗
(0.189) (−1.599) (3.053) (2.157) (2.358) (−1.871)
Shell Condition 29.552 18.483 −5.821 −18.665 −45.753∗∗ −148.31∗∗
R Square 0.112 0.348 0.357 0.417 0.293 0.525 0.548 0.608 0.248 0.511 0.530 0.691
Model N 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175
ESTAR-N 311 311 311 311 310 310 310 310 312 312 312 312
LEED N 93 93 93 93 35 35 35 35 30 30 30 30
Dual-N 32 32 32 32 71 71 71 71 192 192 192 192
Non-Eco-N 23,093 23,093 23,093 23,093 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 660 660 660 660
Prof Seller N 180 180 180 180 55 55 55 55 51 51 51 51
Prof Buyer N 434 434 434 434 211 211 211 211 204 204 204 204
Prof Both N 23 23 23 23 21 21 21 21 23 23 23 23
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
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Smallest 1/3 ESTAR Buildings (<125,000 SF) Mid 1/3 ESTAR Buildings Largest 1/3 (>256,150 SF)
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
(1.524) (0.593) (−0.302) (−0.433) (−2.058) (−2.513)
Short Sale −30.560 −73.853 −48.990 −153.56 −22.984 −39.219
(−0.990) (−1.069) (−1.644) (−1.546) (−0.552) (−0.759)
Single Tenant 8.239∗∗∗ 11.268∗∗ 8.620∗∗∗ 46.021∗∗∗ 6.939∗∗ 20.936∗∗∗
(3.054) (2.168) (2.985) (6.924) (1.977) (2.848)
Tenant Purchase −3.775 −7.907 18.168∗∗∗ −0.167 25.398∗∗∗ 73.415∗∗∗
(−0.551) (−0.548) (2.580) (−0.010) (2.982) (5.289)
R Square 0.112 0.348 0.357 0.417 0.293 0.525 0.548 0.608 0.248 0.511 0.530 0.691
Model N 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 22, 819 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 521 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175 1, 175
ESTAR-N 311 311 311 311 310 310 310 310 312 312 312 312
LEED N 93 93 93 93 35 35 35 35 30 30 30 30
Dual-N 32 32 32 32 71 71 71 71 192 192 192 192
Non-Eco-N 23,093 23,093 23,093 23,093 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 660 660 660 660
Prof Seller N 180 180 180 180 55 55 55 55 51 51 51 51
Prof Buyer N 434 434 434 434 211 211 211 211 204 204 204 204
Prof Both N 23 23 23 23 21 21 21 21 23 23 23 23
Sale Condition Controls X X X X X X
Weighting X X X
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ESSAY 3
A New Paradigm
CoStar and the Matching Method
Abstract
This paper defined a new econometric method for assessing normal and abnormal
returns for commercial real estate. The matching method uses appraisal based grid
comparisons coupled with hedonic coefficient adjustments. This method was system-
atized and automated using the CoStar database. The matching method permits local
comparisons of real estate assets rather than imposing national supply and demand
parameters through hedonic regression. The theoretical development and empirical
testing of these methods represent a new contribution in the commercial real estate
literature.
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1. Introduction
This paper developed and tested a new econometric method for assessing Com-
mercial Real Estate (CRE) normal and abnormal returns. The methods outlined here
offer an objective, repeatable methodology suitable for academic use. After outlining
the theoretical model, results from nearly 20 Million iterations of empirical tests of
the model are presented.
This paper expands potential academic methodology in commercial real estate
beyond simple hedonic regression. The bulk of the extant academic real estate lit-
erature relied on forms of hedonic regression modeling, which are both powerful and
useful (Malpezzi, 2002). Hedonic models estimate values for individual characteris-
tics bundled together to form a good or service. Real estate estimations commonly
use hedonic models; for example, the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) uses them to
estimate housing prices (Fixler, Fortuna, Greenlees, and Lane, 1999).
In standard CRE appraisals, real estate professionals use a series of comparables
for each property. Generally, attributes like square feet, class, submarket, age and
others provide the baseline to determine the appropriate data set. In individual ap-
praisals, real estate professionals exercise expert judgment in the selection process.
Mass data modeling on a national scale does not lend itself to hand selection of
comparables. However, the data set CoStar provides can be used to create a match-
ing methodology that reasonably approximates real estate practitioner methods, and
creates a baseline normal estimation of expected returns.
Previous authors have examined alternative methods to hedonic regression for real
estate estimation. Colwell, Cannaday, and Wu (1983) offered a systematic overview
of the grid method for residential real estate. Kang and Reichert (1991) empirically
tested the grid method combined with a hedonic regression for attribute adjustments
in the residential sector. This paper extended the theoretical and empirical applica-
tion of the grid method, which most closely mirrors practitioner appraisal techniques
into the CRE arena.
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2. Literature Review
Real Estate Finance, like other financial fields, endeavors to analyze assets objec-
tively, consistently, and without error. This paper focuses on Commercial Real Estate
(CRE) finance, using leasing and pricing data. Unfortunately, few models specifically
apply to CRE, due to primarily to the dearth of available data. Corporate finance uti-
lizes normative models based on the pioneering work of Markowitz (1952). Financial
engineers use models such as Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) (Lintner, 1965)
and compare risk rewards based on Sharpe ratios (Sharpe, 1964). Positive models
like Fama and French 3-Factor Model (Fama and French, 1993) and Arbitrage Pricing
Theory (APT) are also used (Roll and Ross, 1980).
A wealth of objective data exists to value public corporate assets in equity price
databases such as The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and financial
statement databases such as Standard & Poor’s Compustat.
In CRE, a dearth of publicly available databases minimizes the uniformity of
modeling and wealth of empirical testing. In contrast to public stock prices, much of
the CRE information is privately held. Some indices like National Council of Real
Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) and the American Council of Life Insurers
(ACLI) provide information on private real estate. However, similar to CRSP, they
tend to reflect pricing information with little in the way of explanatory or control
variables. Issues such as price smoothing and information asymmetry exists in these
indices (Fisher, Geltner, and Webb, 1994; Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2004).
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) provides a Real
Estate Investment Trust (REIT) index commonly used in the literature. Several other
REIT indices also exist (e.g. MSCI REIT Preferred Index, Dow Jones Composite
All REIT Index, FTSE NAREIT US and Global Real Estate Index Series), but
they indirectly reflect property pricing through the REIT valuation. The correlation
between returns on direct and indirect real estate investments has been typically
found to be weak (Oikarinen, Hoesli, and Serrano, 2011).
This paper, through the matching method, estimated values in a manner most
consistent with practitioner methods. In single site or single improvement valuation,
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appraisers/underwriters traditionally utilize the grid approach. The Appraisal Insti-
tute defines the grid method as a set of procedures in which a value indication is
derived by comparing the property being appraised to similar properties that have
been sold recently, applying appropriate units of comparison, and making adjustments
to the sale prices of the comparables based on the elements of comparison (Appraisal
Institute (U.S.) (2001): 63). They utilize standard comparison metrics like location,
submarket, square feet, building class, etc.
In this approach the practitioner, hand selects a series (3-10) of comparables that
they deem most like the subject property. However, personal judgment, and thus
variation will enter the estimation process. In traditional grid methods, vague terms
like “Superior” and “Inferior” connote a wide range of reasonable adjustments; they
could reasonable mean as much as a 25% adjustment to price upwards or downwards.
Obviously, the hand selection of comparables will vary from person to person, and
how they determine the underlying value of the varying CRE attributes will also be
unique. As the number and complexity of leases increase, the degree of difficulty in
accurately assessing value increases (Firstenberg, Ross, and Zisler, 1998). The lack of
a uniform pricing mechanism creates information asymmetry, and inconsistent pricing
in the market (Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2004). The appraisal based grid method’s
subjective nature makes it unsuitable for broad academic research, and created a need
for consistent, repeatable tests in the literature.
In the past, many academics relied on hedonic regression, a form of ordinary
least squares (OLS) where a product’s attributes determine the overall value, to
estimate premiums, abnormal returns, etc. Provided traditional OLS assumptions are
in place, hedonic regression, as a form of OLS, yields consistent, unbiased estimations.
However, in national CRE estimations, not all OLS assumptions, particularly the
assumption of independence, may hold.
Also, when many dummy variable are included, regressions may suffer from the
“incidental parameter” problem (Baltagi and Kao, 2001). When this occurs, dummy
variables may become inconsistent. Not only can this raise issues through the market
adjustments, but also when testing other dummy variables. The use of green real
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estate dummy variable are becoming common in the CRE literature.
The originally proposed hedonic model (Rosen, 1974) involved a two stage least
squares (2SLS) where demand and supply were simultaneously estimated. Two stage
regression involves the inclusion of an instrumental variable to complete the model.
Wiley, Benefield, and Johnson (2010) estimated the traditional model in sustainable
real estate by simultaneously estimating lease rates and occupancy rates. Occasion-
ally, researchers use a three stage least squares (3SLS) to account for additional
endogenous effects, e.g. (Clauretie and Daneshvary, 2011).
Although several authors expressed concern that a one-stage hedonic regression
may be under-identified (Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim, 2002), researchers often
estimated a one step hedonic regression; for example, the effect of a vector of at-
tributes on sales price (Fuerst and McAllister, 2011). Hedonic regression captures
the concept that buyers exhibit different preferences for the same product, and those
buyer preferences may even vary across markets (Sirmans, Macpherson, and Zietz,
2005).
Many criticisms of hedonic estimations exist in the literature. Brown and Rosen
(1982) expand on Rosen’s original work suggesting that second stage estimation may
not always yield new information. Specifically, they suggest in real estate related he-
donic estimations, researchers may have to “impose the condition that the structural
demand and supply parameters be identical across markets, even though the hedonic
price loci are not.”
In fact, current literature demonstrated that demand and supply parameters are
not consistent from city to city in the form of fundamental supply/demand parameters
and especially in cap rates1 (Binkley and Ciochetti, 2010; Chichernea, Miller, Fisher,
Sklarz, and White, 2008). Thus, in the context of a national CRE hedonic regression,
it would inappropriate to impose homogeneous structural demand and supply across
markets. Yet, this is exactly what virtually all the CRE literature has done, using
only linear adjustments to the intercept in the form of market dummies.
1A cap rate, or capitalization rate is the discount rate used in valuing commercial real estate’s
current or predicted income as a perpetuity to establish current value.
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Ekeland et al. (2002) argued that hedonic models in a single market were under-
identified and empirical content derived from their use was inherently biased. Bowden
(1992) outlined concerns that hedonic models were not fully identified in a market
like real estate because price is a function of both buyer characteristics and building
characteristics. Malpezzi (2002) concurred with potential specification problems in
single stage hedonic regressions, and further argued that two-stage hedonic regression
must be of different form to be estimable. In other words, models that involve a
logarithmic first stage and a linear second stage may be estimable, but there will
be issues when both stages are in logarithmic form. Epple (1987) suggested that
the majority of hedonic models include endogenous variables, and may not produce
consistent parameter estimates.
Another issue that arises in real estate estimations involves controlling for geo-
graphic dispersion in a national sample. Some authors argued for the use of spatial
statistics to control for geographic dispersion (Pace and Gilley, 1998). Hayunga and
Pace (2010) argued that real estate is a field built on the notion of location, yet
the literature has not employed formal spatial techniques to examine the effects of
geography on commercial property portfolios.
McDonald (2002) suggested that more studies were needed that dis-aggregated
location and submarket. As noted above, the literature has clearly demonstrated cap
rate diversity across metropolitan statistical areas (Chichernea et al., 2008; Hayunga
and Pace, 2010). Whether hedonic regression controls such as cluster or submarket
dummies adequately control for locational heterogeneity remains an open question.
2.1. Costar–Opening Modeling Doors
Recently CoStar opened its private CRE database to the academic world, and
several journal articles appeared in such publication as American Economic Review,
Journal of Real Estate Finance, and Real Estate Economics using this database (Eich-
holtz, Kok, and Quigley, 2010; Fuerst and McAllister, 2011). While not perfect, the
CoStar database provides a consistent tool to estimate leasing and sales prices, and
the attributes that determine price premiums.
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Now that a universally available database exists for study, the primary question
is how to best analyze the data.
Several authors have addressed weakness in the various real estate indices like
NAREIT, NCREIF, and ACLI (Fisher, Gatzlaff, Geltner, and Haurin, 2003). As ar-
gued previously, limitations on the availability and reliability of property level Com-
mercial Real Estate (CRE) data have constrained broad empirical testing of existing
theories, and the development of new empirical methods (Fisher, 2002).
The matching method accounts for market and submarket issues by estimating ex-
pected returns using only properties within a market. This method provides unbiased
estimates of both individual properties, and portfolio wide trends.
2.2. Grid Comparable Overview
The matching model’s core characteristics originated from the Grid Comparable
method. In individual real estate valuation, investors and appraisers hand select a
set of comparable properties for valuation purposes (Colwell et al., 1983; Pace and
Gilley, 1998). The process involves subjective selection of comparables, and subjective
adjustment of the building characteristics.
Grid Method Example
To better understand the grid method, let us assume a fictional building lists for
a $2,000,000 sales price. An appraiser, underwriter, or some real estate valuation
expert hand selects a series of comparables which have recently sold in the market;
for simplicity, let us assume three comparables are chosen. In general, comparables
are selected from the same submarket to increase the level of spatial homogeneity.
However, distinct locational difference still exist within any submarket, and need to
be addressed.
When comparing location, unless attempting to integrate a mathematical spa-
tial analysis (Dubin, Pace, and Thibodeau, 1999; Pace, Barry, and Sirmans, 1998),
subjective adjustments again are used in the traditional grid method.
Further simplifying our example, we could assume all the sales were within a short
period of time, avoiding the issue of time adjustments. Time from sale adjustments
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depended on whether a market is rising, falling or stable, and involved judgment on
the pace of inflationary or deflationary pressures in the market. A grid was then
developed which compares the building level attributes of the comparables to the
subject buildings.
Table 1 shows the grid for our fictional subject and three comparables. Adjust-
ments were made to the comparable sales prices in an attempt to equate the price
of the comparables to that of the subject. For example, comparable one lists as con-
taining 90,000 ft2 and the subject as containing 100,000 ft2. We therefore adjusted
the price of comparable one upwards to price it as if it had 100,000 ft2. Similarly,
comparable two lists as containing 110,000 ft2, so its price adjusted downward to
make it as if it had 100,000 ft2.
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Table 1: Grid Comparison Method
Example of Grid Comparable
Subject Comparable 1 Comparable 2 Comparable 3
Sale Price $2,000,000 $1,900,000 $2,100,000 $2,050,000
Square Feet 100,000 90,000 +$50,000 110,000 -$50,000 100,000 $0
Location Superior -$25,000 Inferior +$35,000 Superior -$50,000
Age 20 Yrs 10 Yrs -$35,000 35 Yrs +$25,000 5 Yrs -$50,000
Building Class Class A Class B +$20,000 Class A $0 Class A 0
Amenities Retail None +$35,000 Retail $0 Retail and Bank -$15,000
Net Adjustments +$45,000 -$10,0000 -$115,000
Adj Price $1,945,000 $2,090,000 $1,935,000
Estimated Value2 $1,990,000
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Subjectivity enters the process when determining how much to adjust per square
foot (PSF) (Geltner, 1989; Pagourtzi, Assimakopoulos, Hatzichristos, and French,
2003; Quan and Quigley, 1991). In this example, the valuer chose to adjust by $50
PSF based on their subjective expert knowledge of the market.
In traditional grid methods, vague terms like “Superior” and “Inferior” connote
a wide range of reasonable adjustments. In this example, the range of adjustments
went from -$50,000 to +$35,000.
Age of the building similarly can have subjective adjustment in a traditional grid
method. Here, the range of adjustments was from -$50,000 to +$25,000. Generally,
age of building depreciates in a non-linear fashion, and subjective measures may or
may not fully capture this curve.
Incorporating local market knowledge, property specific knowledge, and poten-
tially transaction level knowledge represent the primary advantages of subjective grid
comparable method (Knight, Carter Hill, and Sirmans, 1993). However, the lack of
consistent valuation metrics from expert to expert and the wide range of potential
adjustments make it ill suited for academic studies.
The grid method provides the foundation for the more advanced models described
here, which also incorporate hedonic modeling as a supporting technique.
Previous Attempts at Systematizing the Grid Method
Previous authors have attempted to systematize the comparison process. Isakson
(1986) uses a “nearest neighbors” approach rather than an adjustment grid, based on
the Mahalanobis distance of the various attributes.3 The advantage of the method was
that it relied on weighted averages of sales prices, and ignores the issue of characteristic
level adjustments. The downside, as Vandell (1991) identified was that it lacked the
ability to gauge the relative import of property level characteristics, or the degree
3The Mahalanobis distance Dij is represented by the formula:
Dij =
√
(xi − xj)
∑ −1(xi − xj)′
where xi and xj represent the vectors of standardized amenity coordinates for properties i and j
and
∑ −1 is the variance-covariance matrix of the amenity coordinates for all properties.
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of confidence in the magnitude of each adjustment factor. Vandell (1991) created
a minimum variance method for grid weighting. These theoretical models primarily
relied on residential real estate for any subsequent empirical testing.4
Isakson (1988) extended the nearest neighbor to a commercial real estate sample
in Dallas, Texas. He had mixed results, finding some consistency in retail property
evaluations, but not in office or industrial.
Hedonic Coefficient Adjustments and Weighting in Grid Methods
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no other paper has approached CRE esti-
mations using a grid method with hedonic adjustments. However, one prior article,
using residential data, tested the grid method, enhanced with hedonic regression to
provide adjustment metrics for the coefficients (Kang and Reichert, 1991).
Hedonic coefficient adjustment involves estimating the value for a metric like
square feet from a hedonic regression. If the hedonic regression valued square feet at
$10 PSF, then this value would be used to appropriately adjust the comparables.
Once the comparable set has been selected and the adjustment coefficients esti-
mated, the model still must decide the optimal weighting scheme for the comparable
set. In other words, in the vector of comparables C = [X1, ..., XN ] where X1 repre-
sents comparable 1, and there are N comparables, the model still must determine the
optimal W ∗i such that [W
∗
1 X1, ..., W
∗
N XN ] represents the optimally weighted set.
Equally weighting each comparable may not be optimal because different prop-
erties may be more representative of the subject property. Colwell et al. (1983)
provided the first notable discussion of the grid adjustment method. They examined
three methods of adjustment characteristic values:
1. Additive Dollar Adjustment Method (ADAM),
2. Additive Percentage Adjustment Method (APAM),
3. Multiplicative Percentage Adjustment Method (MPAM).
As Colwell et al. (1983) outlined in their paper, the APAM method aligns with the
4One notable exception to this was Isakson (1988) who used Dallas, Texas CRE data.
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log-linear model, the most commonly used form of hedonic real estate estimation.
Lack of data availability represented the prior major constraint for hedonic price
adjustment method in previous research (Colwell et al., 1983; Fisher et al., 2003; Lai
and Wang, 1996). However, the availability of the CoStar national database provides
ample data for empirical testing.
3. Model and Hypotheses Grid Comparable
Although adjusted for CRE, the model most closely follows Kang and Reichert
(1991).
3.1. Data
The primary data source for this analysis came from CoStar.5 CoStar is “the
world leader for commercial real estate intelligence,” and graciously provides their in-
dustry leading data free of charge to qualified university instructors and researchers.6
CoStar contains over 2.8 Million US Commercial properties, including sales and leas-
ing information. Data includes, but is not limited to location, physical buildings
characteristics, tenants, and lease details.
3.2. Descriptive Statistics
The rent data was cleaned to include only data with a size and rent field existing.
The data consisted of 48,733 rent observations across the top 50 Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Areas (MSA) (56 defined markets) in the United States; all rent observations
are from Q4 2011. Descriptive statistics for key variables are shown in Table 2.
3.3. Basic Matching Model
The matching model created a repeatable and objective method, developed through
an algorithmic process which yielded consistent test measures applicable to a wide
5Source: CoStar Group, Inc.
6See http://www.costar.com/specialprograms/costaruniversity.aspx for details on how to apply
for access.
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Table 2: This table shows basic descriptive statistics for the building population. The
sample was drawn from CoStar. The rent sample is from Q4 2011. The top 50 MSA’s
(56 Markets) by human population during Q4 2011 were sampled. Rent is rent per
square foot, size is in square feet, and age is years since construction.
Mean Mean
Market N Size Rent Age Market N Size Rent Age
Building Population 48,733 70,672 19 26 Milwaukee/Madison 569 54,861 14 33
Atlanta 1,742 78,704 16 22 Minneapolis/St Paul 1,009 84,177 13 30
Austin 560 61,619 17 20 Nashville 448 63,939 17 21
Baltimore 785 51,504 19 25 New Orleans 242 87,735 16 22
Birmingham 304 53,486 16 30 New York City 777 218,797 52 68
Boston 1,386 56,108 18 37 Northern New Jersey 1,723 56,018 20 27
Buffalo/Niagara Falls 188 55,405 14 36 Oklahoma City 269 63,380 14 27
Charlotte 651 72,528 17 20 Orange (California) 1,415 51,546 21 25
Chicago 2,606 97,882 17 26 Orlando 598 48,678 16 20
Cincinnati/Dayton 642 59,661 13 25 Philadelphia 1,661 73,087 18 27
Cleveland 652 68,624 14 30 Phoenix 1,471 55,265 18 20
Columbus 689 50,642 13 25 Pittsburgh 567 72,517 16 26
Dallas/Ft Worth 1,846 97,345 16 22 Portland 714 58,787 18 28
Denver 1,177 75,138 17 25 Providence 257 47,508 16 42
Detroit 1,300 61,628 15 26 Raleigh/Durham 519 45,164 17 17
East Bay/Oakland 676 58,254 21 30 Richmond VA 355 59,652 16 31
Hampton Roads 430 44,833 16 25 Sacramento 876 46,799 19 21
Hartford 384 64,416 17 34 Salt Lake City 423 55,543 16 25
Houston 1,323 113,418 17 22 San Antonio 444 60,195 17 27
Indianapolis 620 56,957 15 25 San Diego 983 51,303 22 24
Inland Empire (California) 801 31,493 17 19 San Francisco 538 110,658 31 36
Jacksonville (Florida) 397 54,191 16 21 Seattle/Puget Sound 1,187 65,783 19 25
Kansas City 804 59,003 16 29 South Bay/San Jose 617 52,784 24 29
Las Vegas 689 38,458 17 15 South Florida 1,945 59,343 19 22
Long Island (New York) 867 67,622 25 34 St. Louis 881 59,465 16 26
Los Angeles 2,447 80,940 26 28 Tampa/St Petersburg 769 53,190 16 22
Louisville 331 57,330 14 22 Washington DC 2,455 95,161 27 23
Marin/Sonoma 128 43,064 27 33 Westchester/So CT 319 73,601 24 33
Memphis 277 59,883 15 28
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variety of issues. It provides a new method to further advance the empirical testing
of CRE.
The systematic matching was generated from the commercial real estate variables
most significant in the selection process. The author performed a stepwise regression
on lnrent (natural log of rent) for the entire database.7 Results are shown in Table 3.
Table 3: This table shows results from a stepwise regression with the dependent
variable of lnrent. The results are shown in decreasing importance to the dependent
variable.
Step Variable Partial Cumulative C(p) F Value Pr > F
R-Square R-Square
1 Lnsize 0.1155 0.1155 6705.9 6098.07 <.0001
2 NNN 0.0326 0.1481 4741 1785.72 <.0001
3 A Class 0.0221 0.1702 3411.9 1240.47 <.0001
4 B Class 0.0187 0.1889 2283.4 1077.91 <.0001
5 Percent Leased 0.0155 0.2044 1351.6 907.6 <.0001
6 Stories 0.0117 0.2161 647.61 696.47 <.0001
7 Lnage 0.0049 0.221 353.15 294.29 <.0001
8 FSG 0.0028 0.2238 187.41 167.1 <.0001
Based on the stepwise, and practitioner guidance the matching method first in-
corporates the following variables:
1. Submarket,
2. Size,
3. Class (A Class, B Class, C Class),
4. Rent.
Submarkets were included as a driving force behind the argument that matching
may improve results from OLSDV with linear market adjustments. Size and building
class were three of the top four variables from the stepwise regression. I did not
7The stepwise method used a forward selection method that adds variables to the model one by
one, subject to an F test for variable significance. Potential issues with this method include some
reliance on the order of inclusion. However, this method was used as a secondary objective method
for variable inclusion, with primary focus on literature and practitioner guidance.
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include the NNN8 variable, because it might have limited the matching process more
than necessary. However, the hedonic adjustment models still accounted for the rental
difference between NNN and FSG through attribute adjustments.
I also included rent as a catch-all matching variable. A large dispersion indicated
that the property was simply not a comparable for reasons not captured in the other
controls; in other words, it may act as an outlier in rental estimations. As detailed
later in the paper, categorical rankings were used to segment each market. Rent was
separated into 20 categories, and the rent bound was plus or minus two categories,
which encompassed 25% of the market. The rent parameter acted as a proxy for
omitted variables, excluding buildings whose rent was clearly out of range to be an
acceptable comparable; the 25% market band was selected to provide a wide range
to generate sufficient comparables while still not biasing the results.
The N, or number of comparables, varied with each subject property. The min-
imum was set at 3; if less than three comparables existed, the subject property was
excluded. The percentages of properties excluded by market varied, and is shown in
Table 7. The maximum was set at 10. When more than 10 comparables were selected
from the matching, they were narrowed to 10 based on the 10 least sum of squares
difference method. That process is detailed in Equation 5
The basic model began with: RSj defined as the rent for the subject, S, property
j. For the sample used time was constant as Q4 2011.
First, a set of comparables, RCj for R
S
j based on the vector, Xi, of control variables
as discussed was determined. There were 3 to 10 (N ) comparables for each each j th
observation, such that RCj = [R
c
1j, R
c
2j, ..., R
c
Ntj]. Where more than 10 comparables
were drawn, I narrowed to 10 based on the lowest sum of squares difference from the
subject.
Second, I estimated Raw RˆSj based on the average of the comparable set:
8NNN or Triple Net leases are lease types where the tenant pays a base rent and incurs all
expenses. FSG or Full Service Gross leases are where the tenant pays a flat rent and the owner
incurs all expenses. There is a spectrum of leases in between the two. Obviously, NNN rent would
be less than FSG rent, ceterus paribus.
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RˆSj =
N∑
1
Rcnj
N
(1)
Finally, to test whether the expected rent, Raw RˆSj , was different from the ob-
served rent, I performed a paired t-test for dependent populations.
t =
Dˆ
σD√
N
(2)
Where:
Dˆ represents the mean of differenced data set (RSj − Raw RˆSj )
σD represents the standard deviation of differenced data set (R
S
j − Raw RˆSj )
N represents the number of random draws being tested.
The paired t-test tests:
Hypothesis 1. DRj = 0
No difference exists between the observed Rj for a random sam-
ple of buildings and the estimated Rˆj from its comparable set of
buildings using the basic matching method .
Note that a rejection of the null signifies failure of the model. The results that
indicate successful estimation of expected rent would be T-Stats greater than -1.96
(5% confidence level) and less than 1.96 (5% confidence level), or failing to reject the
null.
3.4. Matching Model with Hedonic Coefficient Adjustment / Grid Method
This method is a new contribution to the academic CRE literature. I used a
combination of hedonic modeling and a matching model.
Following Kang and Reichert (1991), this method combined the two techniques
and used regression to generate the adjustment coefficients used in the grid adjustment
method.
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First I used a market by market hedonic regression to estimate the appropriate
attribute coefficients for each variable in each market. Each market was individually
regressed on lnrent to establish values for building attributes in the specific market.
The values by attribute were used for the creating the net adjustments in equation
3. Hedonic coeficient results are displayed across two tables, Tables 4 and 5.
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Table 4: This table shows regression results for the random market subsets, consisting of 80% of the total market N of each
market. Results are displayed across two tables. The remaining results are in Table 5. Lnrent was the dependent variable for
all regressions.
***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Market Intercept lnsize age100 age75 age50 age40 age30 age20 age15 age10 age5
Atlanta 2.106∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ −0.048 −0.017 −0.227∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.137∗∗∗ −0.045
(17.700) (3.099) (−0.542) (−0.278) (−3.820) (−3.266) (−6.535) (−6.863) (−0.531) (−4.425) (−1.391)
Austin 2.649∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.046 −0.005 0.082 −0.181∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.084∗∗ −0.071∗
(14.501) (0.249) (−0.416) (−0.033) (0.872) (−2.478) (−4.358) (−5.926) (0.019) (−2.090) (−1.734)
Baltimore 2.388∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ −0.320∗∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.109∗ −0.090∗ −0.094∗∗
(13.205) (2.596) (−5.469) (−4.544) (−5.320) (−4.766) (−3.885) (−4.427) (−1.872) (−1.807) (−2.079)
Birmingham 2.122∗∗∗ 0.018 −0.070 −0.132 0.109 −0.158∗∗ −0.107∗∗ −0.046 0.030 0.082 0.100∗
(8.032) (0.658) (−1.020) (−1.648) (1.360) (−2.435) (−1.995) (−0.994) (0.350) (1.331) (1.677)
Boston 2.660∗∗∗ −0.025 0.106∗∗ 0.102∗ 0.048 0.104∗ 0.033 0.021 −0.101 −0.048 0.044
(15.287) (−1.441) (2.264) (1.810) (0.747) (1.661) (0.640) (0.495) (−0.955) (−0.753) (0.697)
Buffalo/Niagara Falls 2.953∗∗∗ −0.057∗ −0.113 −0.276∗∗ −0.409∗∗∗ −0.110 −0.116 −0.020 −0.022 −0.063 0.014
(8.725) (−1.661) (−0.892) (−2.536) (−3.976) (−0.964) (−1.081) (−0.209) (−0.201) (−0.598) (0.137)
Charlotte 2.608∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.400∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗ −0.148∗ −0.207∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ −0.227∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗
(12.612) (−0.249) (−2.824) (−3.090) (−1.858) (−3.155) (−4.386) (−4.499) (−3.543) (−3.738) (−2.150)
Chicago 2.180∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.044 0.012 −0.071∗∗ −0.067∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.035
(23.019) (4.367) (1.328) (0.367) (−2.027) (−2.186) (−5.147) (−4.718) (−2.125) (−3.271) (−1.177)
Cincinnati/Dayton 2.328∗∗∗ 0.010 −0.227∗∗∗ −0.354∗∗∗ −0.382∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗ −0.072
(10.474) (0.437) (−3.566) (−5.209) (−4.409) (−5.150) (−3.396) (−3.799) (−2.723) (−2.679) (−1.325)
Cleveland 2.081∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.060 −0.155∗ −0.055 0.030 0.057 0.125∗ 0.004 0.169∗∗ 0.109
(9.390) (0.290) (−0.789) (−1.962) (−0.690) (0.405) (0.825) (1.964) (0.045) (2.374) (1.483)
Columbus 2.091∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ −0.104 −0.298∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗ −0.300∗∗∗ −0.114∗ −0.181∗∗∗ 0.002
(11.295) (2.408) (−1.556) (−4.802) (−4.158) (−4.676) (−5.545) (−6.467) (−1.701) (−3.754) (0.045)
Dallas/Ft Worth 2.591∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.122∗ −0.144∗∗∗ −0.267∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗ −0.304∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗
(26.633) (0.689) (−1.783) (−2.883) (−5.483) (−6.190) (−10.230) (−11.613) (−3.692) (−5.370) (−2.258)
Denver 2.266∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ −0.084 −0.227∗∗∗ −0.287∗∗∗ −0.333∗∗∗ −0.427∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗ −0.250∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗
(16.374) (4.576) (−1.457) (−2.921) (−4.806) (−6.246) (−9.604) (−8.729) (−2.579) (−5.541) (−3.753)
Detroit 2.189∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗ −0.072∗ −0.030 −0.045 0.020
(15.305) (2.560) (−3.778) (−2.437) (−2.832) (−2.640) (−3.218) (−1.746) (−0.455) (−0.841) (0.427)
East Bay/Oakland 2.640∗∗∗ 0.018 −0.042 −0.164∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗ −0.154∗∗ −0.107∗ −0.124 −0.258∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗
(13.000) (0.895) (−0.292) (−2.389) (−3.384) (−2.498) (−2.464) (−1.799) (−1.468) (−3.421) (−1.976)
Hampton Roads 2.272∗∗∗ 0.031 −0.211∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗ −0.350∗∗∗ −0.105 −0.218∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗
(10.534) (1.390) (−2.915) (−3.695) (−4.623) (−1.607) (−4.734) (−4.516) (−3.280) (−3.036) (−2.292)
Hartford 3.022∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗ −0.093 −0.287∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗ −0.120∗ −0.033 0.034 0.161 0.044
(13.747) (−2.117) (−1.238) (−3.885) (−3.204) (−3.223) (−1.858) (−0.619) (0.230) (1.574) (0.503)
Houston 2.600∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.166 −0.226∗∗∗ −0.294∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.308∗∗∗ −0.281∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗
(21.186) (0.548) (−1.032) (−2.905) (−5.539) (−6.220) (−9.707) (−9.244) (−2.670) (−2.953) (−2.593)
Indianapolis 2.465∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.196∗∗ −0.086 −0.245∗∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗ −0.096 −0.053 −0.000
(10.047) (0.068) (−2.334) (−1.198) (−2.668) (−3.786) (−3.116) (−2.334) (−1.376) (−0.843) (−0.007)
Inland Empire (California 2.280∗∗∗ 0.031 0.171 −0.071 −0.367∗∗∗ −0.403∗∗∗ −0.246∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗ −0.115∗ −0.013 −0.068∗
(9.741) (1.228) (0.596) (−0.420) (−3.718) (−5.005) (−5.522) (−6.527) (−1.799) (−0.114) (−1.812)
Jacksonville (Florida) 3.253∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.249∗∗ −0.195∗∗ −0.075 −0.109 −0.180∗∗∗ −0.206∗∗∗ −0.131 −0.076 −0.009
(15.534) (−2.677) (−2.417) (−2.301) (−0.941) (−1.542) (−3.098) (−4.441) (−1.646) (−1.511) (−0.197)
Kansas City 2.028∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗∗ −0.238∗∗∗ −0.285∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗ −0.077 −0.012 −0.005
(11.665) (2.788) (−4.827) (−4.405) (−5.085) (−5.076) (−3.627) (−4.048) (−1.261) (−0.234) (−0.108)
Las Vegas 2.017∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 −0.539∗∗ −0.316∗∗∗ −0.483∗∗∗ −0.347∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗
(8.635) (4.359) (.) (.) (−2.433) (−3.185) (−7.217) (−6.135) (−3.875) (−4.124) (−2.301)
continued on next page
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Market Intercept lnsize age100 age75 age50 age40 age30 age20 age15 age10 age5
Long Island (New York) 2.827∗∗∗ 0.004 0.142 0.129∗∗∗ 0.037 0.068 0.026 0.040 0.056 0.065 0.043
(18.440) (0.248) (1.638) (2.679) (0.809) (1.571) (0.597) (1.032) (0.679) (0.890) (0.760)
Los Angeles 2.992∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.184 −0.156∗∗∗ −0.096∗ −0.208∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −0.097 −0.155∗∗
(21.407) (0.185) (−1.452) (−2.602) (−1.733) (−3.831) (−3.823) (−4.979) (−2.962) (−1.405) (−2.325)
Louisville 1.651∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗ −0.178 −0.107 −0.077 −0.097 −0.017 −0.043 −0.098∗
(6.845) (2.716) (−3.742) (−2.810) (−1.515) (−1.489) (−1.387) (−1.647) (−0.203) (−0.740) (−1.681)
Marin/Sonoma 1.541∗∗∗ 0.105∗ 0.000 0.297 0.158 0.225∗∗ 0.094 0.112 −0.023 0.000 −0.059
(2.869) (1.937) (.) (1.658) (1.058) (2.057) (0.896) (1.124) (−0.138) (.) (−0.317)
Memphis 1.989∗∗∗ 0.046 −0.750∗∗∗ −0.500∗∗∗ −0.251∗ −0.377∗∗∗ −0.393∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗ −0.132 −0.190∗ −0.014
(6.215) (1.326) (−5.203) (−3.608) (−1.873) (−2.883) (−3.517) (−2.324) (−0.827) (−1.696) (−0.122)
Milwaukee/Madison 2.314∗∗∗ 0.029 −0.112∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗ −0.017 0.033
(13.096) (1.648) (−2.570) (−5.512) (−2.465) (−2.879) (−2.583) (−2.973) (−2.075) (−0.394) (0.766)
Minneapolis/St Paul 2.303∗∗∗ 0.019 −0.340∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ −0.321∗∗∗ −0.375∗∗∗ −0.299∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗∗ −0.145∗ −0.110∗∗ −0.100∗∗
(14.261) (1.139) (−6.239) (−5.150) (−5.186) (−7.395) (−6.742) (−5.747) (−1.771) (−2.390) (−2.219)
Nashville 2.068∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗ −0.273∗∗∗ −0.077 −0.167∗∗ −0.092 −0.125∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗ −0.098∗ −0.016
(9.307) (2.105) (−3.313) (−0.851) (−2.247) (−1.087) (−2.301) (−3.707) (−2.191) (−1.934) (−0.321)
New Orleans/Metairie/Ke 1.094∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ −0.264 0.000 −1.391∗∗∗ −0.092 −0.039 −0.027 0.051 −0.438∗∗ 0.510∗
(2.803) (3.725) (−1.223) (.) (−4.535) (−0.690) (−0.471) (−0.394) (0.250) (−2.135) (1.785)
New York City 4.394∗∗∗ −0.049∗ −0.391∗ −0.458∗∗ −0.371∗ −0.431∗∗ −0.334 −0.387∗ 0.000 −0.547 −0.101
(12.885) (−1.804) (−1.960) (−2.300) (−1.779) (−1.991) (−1.356) (−1.755) (.) (−1.102) (−0.350)
Northern New Jersey 2.707∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.006 −0.046 −0.054 0.035 0.022 −0.001 −0.100 −0.019 0.095∗∗∗
(22.145) (−0.088) (−0.109) (−1.078) (−1.343) (1.134) (0.811) (−0.049) (−1.562) (−0.420) (2.632)
Oklahoma City 1.789∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ −0.234 −0.350∗∗ −0.213∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗ −0.321∗∗∗ −0.281∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗ −0.035 −0.011
(6.610) (2.927) (−1.526) (−2.451) (−2.048) (−2.685) (−3.841) (−3.551) (1.993) (−0.340) (−0.128)
Orange (California) 2.704∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.088 −0.338∗∗∗ −0.051 −0.088 −0.101∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.106 −0.155∗∗∗ −0.096∗
(15.050) (0.262) (−0.515) (−3.085) (−0.463) (−1.642) (−2.231) (−3.025) (−1.495) (−2.952) (−1.808)
Orlando 1.871∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.064 −0.121 −0.197∗∗ −0.140∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.232∗∗∗ 0.135 −0.080 −0.014
(8.133) (3.125) (0.330) (−1.142) (−2.377) (−1.906) (−3.701) (−5.089) (0.985) (−1.619) (−0.288)
Philadelphia 2.557∗∗∗ 0.010 −0.120∗∗∗ −0.057 −0.053 0.035 −0.022 −0.012 0.065 0.046 0.096∗∗∗
(22.843) (0.874) (−2.964) (−1.568) (−1.537) (1.024) (−0.773) (−0.475) (1.392) (1.189) (2.816)
Phoenix 2.356∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.105 −0.296∗∗∗ −0.357∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗
(20.974) (2.994) (.) (−1.304) (−5.107) (−6.929) (−10.781) (−11.495) (−2.323) (−6.993) (−4.562)
Pittsburgh 1.576∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.009 0.122∗∗ 0.018 0.033 0.003 0.070 0.207∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.141∗∗
(7.736) (3.190) (0.174) (2.319) (0.336) (0.589) (0.061) (1.609) (3.361) (2.545) (2.130)
Portland 2.927∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.300∗∗∗ −0.345∗∗∗ −0.457∗∗∗ −0.340∗∗∗ −0.332∗∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗
(16.039) (−0.828) (−5.214) (−6.072) (−7.331) (−5.583) (−6.859) (−7.566) (−4.899) (−5.412) (−3.051)
Providence 2.159∗∗∗ 0.056 −0.323∗∗∗ −0.176 −0.083 −0.360∗∗∗ −0.292∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗ −0.164 −0.195 −0.086
(6.062) (1.574) (−3.288) (−1.436) (−0.719) (−3.281) (−2.824) (−2.066) (−1.075) (−1.145) (−0.817)
Raleigh/Durham 2.359∗∗∗ 0.033 0.126 −0.260∗∗∗ −0.109 −0.165∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗
(12.288) (1.613) (0.615) (−2.765) (−1.354) (−2.884) (−6.410) (−5.484) (−4.793) (−5.240) (−2.597)
Richmond VA 2.228∗∗∗ 0.036 −0.175∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ 0.071 −0.047 −0.025
(10.950) (1.625) (−2.789) (−3.005) (−2.518) (−3.254) (−3.370) (−2.655) (1.075) (−0.799) (−0.451)
Sacramento 2.821∗∗∗ −0.015 −0.153 −0.169∗∗ −0.071 −0.125∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗ −0.054 −0.064 −0.081∗∗
(19.268) (−0.984) (−1.317) (−2.194) (−1.025) (−1.954) (−4.792) (−5.975) (−1.115) (−1.605) (−2.256)
Salt Lake City 2.030∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ −0.132∗ −0.303∗∗∗ −0.211∗∗ −0.467∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗ −0.243∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.039
(9.491) (3.310) (−1.697) (−4.334) (−2.560) (−5.800) (−6.499) (−5.853) (−3.011) (−2.593) (−0.744)
San Antonio 1.896∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ −0.343∗∗∗ −0.127∗ −0.144∗∗ −0.232∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗ −0.049 −0.069 −0.034
(10.417) (4.426) (−3.934) (−1.793) (−2.041) (−4.226) (−3.633) (−3.546) (−0.530) (−1.224) (−0.780)
San Diego 2.231∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ −0.034 0.071 −0.138 −0.011 −0.184∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗ −0.057 −0.052 −0.074
(10.636) (3.000) (−0.238) (0.638) (−1.557) (−0.167) (−3.992) (−3.881) (−0.770) (−0.937) (−1.472)
San Francisco 2.649∗∗∗ 0.027 0.163 0.048 0.098 0.050 0.092 0.091 0.065 0.129 0.168
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(7.827) (0.807) (1.582) (0.457) (0.840) (0.462) (0.892) (0.942) (0.289) (1.098) (1.341)
Seattle/Puget Sound 2.320∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ −0.257∗∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗ −0.326∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗
(17.070) (4.225) (−4.794) (−5.964) (−5.961) (−4.965) (−5.386) (−6.004) (−4.028) (−4.176) (−3.369)
South Bay/San Jose 3.849∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ 0.018 −0.224 −0.027 0.046 −0.074 −0.038 0.342 −0.091 −0.024
(11.193) (−3.048) (0.099) (−1.276) (−0.193) (0.349) (−0.608) (−0.314) (1.615) (−0.631) (−0.176)
South Florida 2.613∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.000 −0.070 −0.123∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗ −0.077∗ −0.059∗ 0.007
(21.076) (2.057) (.) (−1.085) (−2.769) (−2.893) (−5.372) (−6.707) (−1.646) (−1.660) (0.211)
St. Louis 2.314∗∗∗ 0.020 −0.332∗∗∗ −0.285∗∗∗ −0.218∗∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ −0.069
(12.756) (1.074) (−5.303) (−4.375) (−3.535) (−5.032) (−3.996) (−4.084) (−1.993) (−3.177) (−1.322)
Tampa/St Petersburg 1.844∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ −0.021 −0.094 −0.196∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.054 −0.079
(10.205) (3.989) (−0.187) (−1.205) (−2.640) (−2.922) (−4.194) (−4.012) (−0.142) (−0.941) (−1.446)
Washington DC 2.405∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.035 −0.011 −0.036 −0.082∗∗∗ −0.015 −0.060∗ 0.004
(21.442) (3.086) (5.269) (4.176) (0.846) (−0.349) (−1.253) (−3.388) (−0.330) (−1.737) (0.134)
Westchester/So Connecticu 2.822∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.132 0.052 −0.078 −0.098 −0.107 −0.073 −0.067 −0.092 0.004
(8.489) (−0.323) (−1.058) (0.609) (−0.874) (−1.163) (−1.396) (−0.962) (−0.533) (−0.607) (0.025)
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Table 5: This table shows regression results for the random market subsets, consisting of 80% of the total market N of each
market. Results are displayed across two tables. The first set of results are in Table 4. Lnrent was the dependent variable for
all regressions.
***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Market Renovated Percent Leased stories A Class B Class NNN FSG Amenity ESTAR LEED Dual R Square
Atlanta 0.068∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ −0.003 0.199∗∗∗ 0.023 0.027 0.093 −0.014 0.358
(1.779) (4.738) (1.950) (5.748) (3.489) (−0.135) (10.073) (1.334) (0.744) (0.831) (−0.246)
Austin 0.001 0.001∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ −0.015 0.011 −0.048 0.133 0.363
(0.013) (2.675) (4.003) (3.813) (5.026) (−3.680) (3.851) (−0.608) (0.222) (−0.428) (1.642)
Baltimore −0.054 0.000 −0.003 0.280∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.003 0.009 0.061 −0.086 0.441
(−1.298) (0.831) (−0.965) (6.713) (4.589) (−4.701) (5.635) (0.155) (0.040) (0.755) (−0.522)
Birmingham −0.051 0.002∗∗∗ 0.005 0.297∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.048 −0.038 0.000 0.000 0.555
(−0.852) (3.042) (0.804) (4.406) (4.813) (2.175) (7.367) (1.018) (−0.320) (.) (.)
Boston −0.055 0.001∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗ −0.014 0.038 −0.099 0.275 0.048 0.250
(−1.145) (2.826) (7.628) (7.319) (5.255) (−5.593) (−0.459) (1.551) (−1.133) (1.590) (0.246)
Buffalo/Niagara Falls 0.070 0.001 0.011 0.482∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ −0.116∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.041 0.236 0.000 −0.450∗ 0.516
(0.624) (1.067) (1.482) (4.679) (3.657) (−1.758) (2.111) (0.834) (1.066) (.) (−1.707)
Charlotte 0.048 0.002∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ −0.059 0.096∗∗∗ 0.042 0.018 0.027 0.148 0.359
(0.846) (4.219) (3.033) (4.707) (3.904) (−1.426) (2.961) (1.329) (0.348) (0.241) (1.245)
Chicago 0.028 0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.026∗ −0.020 0.171 0.045 0.240
(1.134) (6.860) (3.827) (4.307) (5.045) (−8.625) (5.287) (1.719) (−0.633) (1.495) (0.982)
Cincinnati/Dayton 0.116∗∗ −0.000 0.009∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.006 0.170∗∗∗ 0.022 −0.111 0.152 −0.115 0.305
(2.181) (−0.484) (2.493) (4.208) (5.554) (0.184) (5.007) (0.750) (−1.171) (1.119) (−0.545)
Cleveland −0.033 0.002∗∗∗ 0.005 0.465∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.013 0.042 0.488∗∗ 0.079 0.410
(−0.499) (3.942) (1.362) (7.345) (8.083) (−2.025) (2.660) (0.451) (0.453) (2.294) (0.341)
Columbus −0.064 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.047 0.053∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.044∗ 0.085 0.000 −0.027 0.288
(−1.206) (2.935) (0.589) (−0.953) (2.008) (−3.391) (5.072) (1.945) (0.828) (.) (−0.155)
Dallas/Ft Worth 0.034 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.003 0.023 0.036 0.075 0.202∗∗∗ 0.416
(1.567) (6.872) (2.135) (12.231) (9.067) (−5.867) (−0.164) (1.572) (1.297) (1.035) (3.533)
Denver 0.083∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ −0.305∗∗∗ −0.048∗ −0.021 0.080∗∗ 0.082 0.086∗ 0.442
(2.897) (2.126) (3.090) (4.705) (6.341) (−9.927) (−1.870) (−1.137) (2.522) (1.018) (1.900)
Detroit 0.016 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.252∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.019 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.241
(0.430) (6.080) (0.202) (5.334) (4.570) (−7.738) (−0.203) (−0.923) (1.000) (.) (.)
East Bay/Oakland 0.103∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.096 0.009 0.055 0.144∗∗∗ −0.020 0.081 0.227∗ 0.012 0.233
(1.752) (3.426) (2.658) (1.371) (0.293) (1.155) (4.754) (−0.754) (1.361) (1.799) (0.135)
Hampton Roads −0.024 0.001 0.004 0.284∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ −0.045 0.169∗∗∗ −0.005 0.051 −0.020 −0.167 0.475
(−0.456) (1.162) (0.881) (4.961) (4.205) (−1.121) (5.789) (−0.176) (0.677) (−0.130) (−0.811)
Hartford −0.047 0.001∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ −0.007 0.007 0.174 0.000 0.471
(−0.833) (2.771) (1.664) (5.258) (4.554) (−2.657) (5.356) (−0.204) (0.068) (0.716) (.)
Houston 0.043∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ −0.031 0.178∗∗∗ −0.012 0.044 0.036 0.035 0.347
(1.902) (5.266) (4.961) (6.871) (5.512) (−1.067) (6.483) (−0.588) (1.533) (0.399) (0.677)
Indianapolis 0.058 0.001∗∗ 0.006 0.295∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ −0.072 0.110∗∗∗ 0.022 −0.111 0.349 0.000 0.245
(0.885) (1.987) (1.396) (4.331) (4.694) (−1.571) (3.258) (0.735) (−1.270) (1.109) (.)
Inland Empire (California −0.073 0.001∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.040 0.172∗∗∗ 0.017 −0.027 −0.122 0.000 0.301
(−1.003) (1.849) (3.424) (2.824) (2.702) (1.235) (5.729) (0.674) (−0.354) (−0.713) (.)
Jacksonville (Florida) −0.015 −0.000 0.007∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.047 0.000 0.029 0.470
(−0.303) (−0.359) (1.802) (5.867) (4.117) (−2.681) (4.676) (−0.317) (−0.471) (.) (0.182)
Kansas City −0.011 0.001∗∗ −0.009∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.043 0.303∗∗ −0.073 0.504
(−0.285) (2.094) (−2.554) (7.342) (8.486) (−5.480) (6.195) (−0.181) (−0.603) (2.088) (−0.418)
Las Vegas 0.074 0.000 0.018∗ 0.061 −0.062 −0.186∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ −0.102∗ 0.123 0.182 0.000 0.347
(0.746) (0.613) (1.679) (0.732) (−1.139) (−6.258) (3.563) (−1.862) (0.694) (1.179) (.)
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Long Island (New York) −0.005 0.002∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.001 −0.086∗∗∗ −0.094 −0.244 0.000 0.167
(−0.130) (3.621) (4.065) (5.343) (4.394) (−0.113) (−0.036) (−3.609) (−0.794) (−0.861) (.)
Los Angeles 0.123∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.002 0.364∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ −0.036 0.063∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗ 0.018 −0.013 0.124∗∗ 0.190
(4.618) (6.497) (−1.210) (10.805) (7.075) (−1.228) (3.495) (−2.526) (0.623) (−0.086) (2.107)
Louisville 0.175∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.009 0.420∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ 0.037 0.033 −0.016 0.230 0.000 0.458
(2.692) (2.724) (−1.651) (6.822) (4.981) (−2.646) (0.966) (0.963) (−0.172) (0.937) (.)
Marin/Sonoma 0.011 0.003∗∗ −0.010 0.129 0.108 0.077 0.245∗∗∗ 0.019 0.318∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.412
(0.068) (2.053) (−0.250) (0.860) (1.471) (0.630) (3.135) (0.234) (2.021) (.) (.)
Memphis 0.044 0.001∗ 0.003 0.208∗∗ 0.140∗∗ −0.081 0.284∗∗∗ 0.088∗ 0.075 0.090 0.000 0.571
(0.417) (1.716) (0.521) (2.106) (2.583) (−1.191) (5.610) (1.676) (0.369) (0.299) (.)
Milwaukee/Madison 0.036 0.000 0.006∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ −0.050∗ 0.018 0.118 −0.059 0.340
(0.948) (0.088) (1.834) (3.052) (4.929) (−7.010) (4.241) (−1.734) (0.307) (0.923) (−0.462)
Minneapolis/St Paul 0.073∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.186∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.041∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.013 −0.007 −0.015 0.035 0.281
(1.674) (3.647) (0.216) (3.455) (1.553) (−1.671) (11.227) (0.447) (−0.149) (−0.077) (0.403)
Nashville 0.026 0.001∗ 0.001 0.251∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.018 0.130 0.011 0.438
(0.537) (1.677) (0.135) (4.283) (4.229) (−2.034) (3.055) (2.700) (0.258) (0.884) (0.078)
New Orleans/Metairie/Ke 0.017 0.000 −0.014∗∗ 0.138 0.113∗∗ −0.035 0.051 −0.033 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.343
(0.239) (0.572) (−2.166) (1.195) (2.296) (−0.545) (0.868) (−0.679) (0.132) (.) (.)
New York City 0.098 0.004∗∗ −0.004 0.511∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.163 −0.144 −0.037 0.036 0.567∗ 0.409∗∗ 0.156
(1.414) (2.224) (−1.486) (5.757) (2.558) (0.614) (−1.152) (−0.798) (0.409) (1.657) (2.102)
Northern New Jersey 0.057∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ 0.033 −0.028∗ 0.076 −0.082 0.000 0.200
(2.195) (5.501) (4.753) (7.186) (4.681) (−5.823) (1.368) (−1.676) (1.259) (−0.435) (.)
Oklahoma City 0.033 0.001∗ −0.002 0.314∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.041 −0.893∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.433
(0.467) (1.696) (−0.284) (3.540) (2.738) (−3.190) (0.543) (−1.034) (−3.044) (.) (.)
Orange (California) 0.045 0.003∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.005 0.078∗∗∗ −0.042∗ 0.043 0.256∗ −0.138 0.170
(1.206) (6.423) (2.156) (4.548) (2.668) (0.177) (3.350) (−1.890) (1.203) (1.721) (−1.617)
Orlando 0.069 0.001∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.024 −0.091∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.101 −0.070 0.000 0.356
(1.136) (2.869) (2.728) (2.014) (0.674) (−2.680) (2.742) (0.136) (−1.313) (−0.364) (.)
Philadelphia 0.005 0.001∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗∗ 0.040∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.019 0.248∗ 0.061 0.315
(0.197) (2.727) (2.601) (9.552) (7.242) (−11.419) (1.877) (3.028) (0.453) (1.892) (0.541)
Phoenix 0.146∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.004 0.240∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ −0.002 0.062∗ −0.106 0.093 0.449
(3.963) (4.447) (1.300) (6.149) (6.847) (−4.154) (8.106) (−0.163) (1.801) (−1.187) (1.143)
Pittsburgh 0.044 0.001∗ −0.001 0.392∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.051 0.149∗∗∗ 0.041 0.038 −0.099 0.000 0.456
(0.999) (1.948) (−0.494) (6.416) (5.331) (0.835) (5.071) (1.424) (0.342) (−0.532) (.)
Portland 0.107∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ −0.060 0.108∗∗∗ −0.016 0.069 0.034 −0.157 0.418
(2.628) (4.935) (3.098) (5.372) (4.242) (−1.630) (3.634) (−0.548) (1.471) (0.454) (−1.231)
Providence −0.078 0.001 0.037∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ 0.042 −0.052 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.443
(−0.863) (0.821) (2.930) (2.645) (3.806) (−3.303) (0.560) (−0.861) (0.141) (.) (.)
Raleigh/Durham 0.077 0.000 0.007∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ −0.051∗ 0.170∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.027 −0.040 0.000 0.456
(1.559) (0.941) (1.658) (4.795) (4.497) (−1.707) (6.226) (−0.476) (−0.433) (−0.200) (.)
Richmond VA 0.138∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.003 0.217∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.013 −0.026 0.000 0.000 0.482
(3.580) (1.718) (0.738) (3.974) (3.576) (−2.723) (2.569) (0.467) (−0.441) (.) (.)
Sacramento 0.108∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.021 0.081∗∗ 0.209 −0.043 0.467
(2.188) (3.179) (5.056) (5.948) (8.755) (−5.937) (6.073) (1.079) (2.121) (1.568) (−0.513)
Salt Lake City 0.045 −0.000 0.013∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗ 0.057 −0.002 0.051 −0.036 0.163 0.564
(0.727) (−0.111) (2.915) (3.214) (2.257) (−3.925) (1.307) (−0.083) (0.653) (−0.167) (0.787)
San Antonio 0.001 0.000 −0.002 0.172∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ −0.047 0.176∗∗∗ 0.028 0.030 0.212 0.055 0.458
(0.017) (0.054) (−0.610) (3.103) (2.400) (−1.299) (5.234) (0.932) (0.576) (1.013) (0.382)
San Diego −0.062 0.001∗∗ −0.005 0.415∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗ 0.059∗∗ −0.006 0.024 0.209 0.055 0.351
(−1.525) (2.498) (−1.197) (8.455) (7.728) (−2.403) (2.073) (−0.246) (0.489) (1.310) (0.526)
San Francisco 0.227∗∗∗ 0.001 0.005 0.123 0.088∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.065 0.049 0.054 0.137 0.141 0.189
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(2.859) (1.281) (1.286) (1.482) (1.699) (3.705) (1.446) (1.070) (0.718) (0.649) (1.547)
Seattle/Puget Sound 0.073∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003 0.172∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ −0.016 0.044 0.059 −0.029 0.354
(2.295) (4.609) (1.445) (3.680) (3.334) (−4.119) (5.112) (−0.719) (0.948) (0.798) (−0.471)
South Bay/San Jose −0.093 0.003∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.001 −0.099∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.319 0.304 0.164
(−0.872) (3.615) (2.067) (3.238) (3.858) (0.447) (−0.023) (−2.455) (2.852) (1.415) (1.495)
South Florida 0.005 0.001∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.038∗ −0.182∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.026 −0.089∗∗ −0.036 0.019 0.313
(0.202) (2.375) (7.764) (4.694) (1.891) (−9.522) (4.261) (1.451) (−2.473) (−0.351) (0.257)
St. Louis 0.037 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.323∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ −0.034 0.120 −0.111 0.470
(1.066) (3.253) (0.060) (6.916) (4.611) (−4.573) (7.077) (3.708) (−0.352) (0.750) (−0.404)
Tampa/St Petersburg 0.025 0.001∗∗∗ −0.000 0.182∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.047 0.000 0.041 0.424
(0.659) (2.595) (−0.079) (3.743) (2.626) (−2.504) (6.529) (2.236) (0.707) (.) (0.287)
Washington DC 0.012 0.001∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.545
(0.499) (4.193) (14.515) (5.858) (2.501) (−4.638) (6.492) (3.608) (3.008) (2.469) (2.366)
Westchester/So Connecticu 0.041 0.002∗∗∗ 0.018∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ −0.129∗ −0.131 0.023 0.012 0.129 0.000 0.271
(0.643) (2.667) (1.894) (4.562) (4.517) (−1.851) (−1.395) (0.465) (0.100) (0.398) (.)
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Second, I created a net adjustment factor (ANETi), based on the closeness of fit
for an observation to its potential pairs. The (ANETi) was derived based on:
ANETi =
∑
|βi(Xsi −Xci )| (3)
where
Xi represents the ith explanatory variable in the model
βi represents the regression-derived market value (hedonic price) for
each property characteristic
s, c stands for subject and comparable properties, respectively
j indicates a specific comparable property.
In the third step, each comparable’s price was adjusted based on the the compa-
rables selected and the adjustment coefficients derived from the hedonic regression.
This differed from the basic matching model in that the matching model assumed the
the comparables were reasonable proxies for the subject buildings, and no attribute
specific adjustment was made to estimate the predicted lease/sales price.
In this method, similar to traditional appraisal, each comparable’s lease/sales
price was adjusted based on the estimated weight of the attribute. For example, the
hedonic regression might estimate SF to be worth an average of $50 PSF, thus the
comparable would be adjusted upward or downward $50 for each SF it differed from
the subject property as outlined in Table 1. In mathematical terms:
Rˆsj = R
c
j +NETj = R
c
j +
∑
|βi(Xsi −Xci )| (4)
where
RˆSj represents the estimated rent of the subject property based upon
comparable j
RCj indicates the actual rent of the comparable property
NETj represents the net adjustment from the property including both
positive and negative adjustments.
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The fourth step estimated a single value for the subject property by taking a
weighted average of the net adjustments.
3.5. Comparable Weighting
Up to this point, I have focused on how to adjust the property level characteristics
in the comparables, but the effective and optimal weighting of the comparables merits
its own discussion.
As Lin and Liao (2011) suggested, regression analysis yields property attribute
adjustment coefficients, but was not designed to select the qualified comparables or
assign the optimal weights. Colwell et al. (1983) discuss the five possible weighting
schemes:
1. absolute value weighting,
2. quadratic or squared weighting,
3. statistical reliability,
4. distance-based weights,
5. a minimum or “no zero” weight technique.
They reached no conclusion regarding the theoretically optimal weighting scheme,
but rather suggested that selection of weights is “a matter of judgment tempered
by experience”. Kang and Reichert (1991) found the sum of squares method to be
statistically reliable, and relied on it in their paper. The sum of squares method from
Colwell et al. (1983) is:
w∗j =
n∑
k=1
m∑
i=1
(βi(xis − xik))2 −
m∑
i=1
(βi(xis − xij))2
(n− 1)
n∑
k=1
m∑
i=1
(βi(xis − xik))2
(5)
where
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w∗j = the optimal weighting for the j th comparable,
βi = the adjustment for factor the ith attribute,
n∑
k=1
m∑
i=1
(βi(xis − xik))2 = the sum of the squared values of all adjustment made
within a grid,
m∑
i=1
(βi(xis − xij))2(n− 1) = the sum of the squared values of all adjustment made
for comparable j,
m = the number of attributes for which adjustments are
made, and
n = the number of comparables
I followed the extant literature and used the sum of squares weighting for the
hedonic adjustment. Employing the matching methodology with hedonic regression
coefficient adjustments, I then updated equation 1 such that the optimal weighting
w∗j was incorporated.
RˆSj =
N∑
1
w∗jR
c
nj
N
(6)
With the proper weights I then computed DRj
RSj − RˆSj = DRj (7)
Finally, I used DRj as in the basic matching to examine the paired t-test equation
2.
The hypothesis tested was:
Hypothesis 2. DRj = 0
No difference exists between the observed Rj for a random sam-
ple of buildings and the estimated Rˆj from its comparable set
of buildings using the matching method with hedonic coefficient
adjustments.
Note that a rejection of the null signifies failure of the model. The results that
indicate successful estimation of expected rent would be T-Stats greater than -1.96
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(5% confidence level) and less than 1.96 (5% confidence level), or failing to reject the
null.
3.6. Comparable Selection
The variable selection was described above. Now with sufficient background on
the entire model, this section details the comparable selection process.
Comparables were first selected by matching the submarket cluster9 to the sub-
market cluster of the subject property. In order to effectively compare different size
and rent ranges, each market was divided into 20 different categorical sections. This
method offered advantages over using percentages in that it narrowed the range of
comparables in the middle sections. In order to be selected as a comparable, both size
and rent were required to be plus or minus two categories. Thus, a building ranking
in the 14th size category, could draw comparables from the 12th through the 16th
size categories. In addition, the building had to be the same class (A Class, B Class).
The model selection went as follows:
1. Comparable submarket = Subject submarket,
2. Comparable Size - 2 <= Subject Size <= Comparable Size +2,
3. Comparable Rent - 2 <= Subject Rent <= Comparable Rent +2,
4. Comparable Building Class = Subject Building Class.
A building comparable had to meet all the criteria to be selected in the pool. In the
first wave of tests, if the subject property did not generate at least 3 comparables, then
it was excluded from the analysis. A second wave of tests was performed, where when
a property did not generate at least 3 comparables, the building class requirement
was dropped. This meant it drew from a wider pool of comparables, but possibly
more unlike the subject. However, in the hedonic model, the expected rent should
have been properly adjusted for class.
In the event there were more than ten comparables the sum of squares weighting
method was used on the entire comparable set. Of the initial set, the top ten proper-
9As defined by The CoStar Group.
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ties in terms of closeness of fit were kept, and the rest discarded. The sum of squares
method was re-calculated for hedonic weighting based on the final ten comparables.
4. Testing the Models
I first created testable and holdout portions of the top 50 MSA’s for validation
testing. The testable portion consisted of randomly drawn 80% of the market, and
the holdout was the remainder.
Testing the model on the testable portion consisted of 7 steps:
1. Select 5% of the market randomly.
2. For each property selected, determine its comparable set of 3-10 properties.
3. Estimate expected Rent for each property based on its comparables (Basic
RHAT or Hedonic RHAT, depending on method).
4. Perform a paired T-Test for the entire set of observed rent and expected rent
for the draw (e.g. for a market of 1,000 buildings, 50 properties would be
selected, and the paired T-Test would test for differences between the expected
and actual rent for the 50 properties collectively).
5. Repeat steps 1-4 a total of 500 times 10.
6. Examine the distribution of paired T-Tests from the 500 draws to determine if
the model functions as expected.
7. Repeat steps 1-6 in several different iterations:
(a) Using less stringent matching criteria where necessary:
i. Using only coefficients with statistical significance of 10% or better,
ii. Using only coefficients with statistical significance of 10% or better,
excluding all green coefficients (ESTAR, LEED, Dual),11
iii. Using all coefficients,
10Each full set of data testing took 5-7 days to complete. Each full market sample was comprised
of roughly 2,000 randomly drawn properties, tested 500 times, for a total of 1 million tests. Each
property averaged over 8 comparables, using roughly 8 million observations for each full set of 500
random draws. In addition, each full market samples was executed in four ways, for an approximate
total of 4 Million subject properties compared to 32 Million comparables.
11Recent research by Robinson 2013 showed green variables may not be reliable market to market.
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iv. Using all coefficients, except the green coefficients (ESTAR, LEED,
Dual).
(b) Using more stringent matching criteria only:
i. Repeat steps i-iv above.
4.1. Selecting the Random Draw
The paired t-test for each market was based on a randomly drawn 5% of the
testable portion. A market with 1,000 buildings would have 50 buildings randomly
selected. Minneapolis makes a good sample market for illustrative purposes. Al-
though its building N for the testable portion was actually 1,007, this discussion will
treat it as 1,000 for explanatory purposes.
In any given draw of 50 buildings, each building could only be selected once.
However, no constraints on future draws were placed. A building could theoretically
be utilized in many or none of the 500 random samples.
Possible small sample properties
Once the building N drops below 600, the sample falls to less than 30 observations.
At this point, the model could become less reliable due to an insufficient sample N.
Results were still shown, but have been indicated on the table as potentially less
reliable.
4.2. Comparables
Using the methods described above, a set of comparables was drawn for each of
the 50 subject properties. If a property could not successfully generate a minimum
of three comparables, it was excluded from the data set. Consequently, a draw of
50 properties may exclude 5 of them, and the paired T-Test would be on the 45
remaining in the sample.
4.3. Estimate Expected Rent
An Rˆj was created for each building based on both the basic and hedonic coefficient
adjusted methods described in detail above. Each subject property was omitted from
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inclusion in its own comparable set. As noted earlier, each subject property could
also only act as subject property once per draw. However, the data set available to
draw comparables consisted of the entire testable population.
4.4. Perform Paired T-Test
After estimating the expected rent for each property in the randomly drawn sam-
ple, an array of observed and expected rent remained. Labeling Sn as the subject
property observed rent, and Sˆn as the subject property expected rent, the following
array would be observed:

S1 Sˆ1
S2 Sˆ2
.. ..
S50 Sˆ50

The paired T-Test tested for a statistical difference between the two samples, as
in Equation 2.
4.5. Repeat 1-4 a total of 500 times
Each market was queried 500 times to avoid a single sampling of buildings biasing
the results. In any single draw, 50 properties in our example, buildings at the top or
bottom of the rent distribution could create a sample where expected and observed
rent are statistically significant. In five hundred samples, the expectation was that
some of the samples would reject the null, or fail. If the model worked 90% of the
time, then one would expect 10% of the time it would fail.
After repeating steps 1-4 for a total of 500 draws, an array of T-Tests was shown.
Each of the 500 sets of from the Array above yielded a T-Test. This analysis yielded
a new array of the T-Tests:
[
T1 T2 T... T500
]
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4.6. Examine Distribution of T-Tests
The set of 500 paired T-Tests was ordered from smallest to largest. The most
logical way to examine the data was to look at the distribution of the tails. If the
5th percentile and 95th percentile failed to reject the null, then the model worked on
90% of the draws.
The results the most rigorous test, shown in Table 12, have been presented graph-
ically below:
Figure 1: This figure shows the distribution of T-Stats for 500 random draws of the
Minneapolis market sorted from small to large. The 5th, 10th, median, 90th and 95th
percentiles are shown.
Using the graph above as a guide, the upper tails of the distribution, the 95th
and 90th percentiles, failed to reject the null of no difference at conventional levels.
Thus the model effectively determined expected rent. At the lower end of the tails,
the 10th percentile failed to reject, demonstrating model functioning. However, the
5th percentile did reject the null at a 10% significance level. Consequently, all draws
below the 5th percentile rejected the null at a 10% or better significance level.
This shows the model worked as expected the vast majority of the time.
Since forecasting individual prices was not the model’s purpose, examining the
distribution of paired T-Tests provided valuable insight into whether the model could
be used for academic research. However, the results suggest that the model also
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shows promise as a practitioner tool for estimating rental adjustments. The model’s
purpose was as an alternative to hedonic modeling for baseline normal and abnormal
return estimations. Performing a series of large samples provided the optimal gauge
of the model’s empirical performance.
5. Results
The results presented a compelling case that for the use matching models, and
matching with hedonic coefficient adjustments as methods to estimate an expected
rent. In the great majority of cases, Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1. DRj = 0
No difference exists between the observed Rj for a random sam-
ple of buildings and the estimated Rˆj from its comparable set of
buildings using the basic matching method .
failed to be rejected at a 10% confidence level. Similarly, Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2. DRj = 0
No difference exists between the observed Rj for a random sam-
ple of buildings and the estimated Rˆj from its comparable set of
buildings using matching method with hedonic coefficient adjust-
ments.
failed to be rejected at a 10% confidence level.
The first set of models, with more stringent matching criteria performed remark-
ably well on the lower end of the distribution. The model yielding the most consistent
rejection of the null was the model using only the significant coefficients from the re-
gression, followed closely by the similar model excluding the green components. Most
markets detected no statistical difference between Hedonic RHAT and observed rent
in the 5th percentile, and every market until the N dropped below 320 showed no
difference in the 10th percentile. Performance at the upper tail was still strong, only
4 of the largest 44 markets showed a statistical difference greater than 5%, and over
80% of the markets showed no difference at all.
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However, the upper portion of the rental distribution did not perform quite as
well as the lower tails. This may have indicated increased heterogeneity in those
markets at the upper distribution of rent and size. It could also have suggesed that
the regression coefficients were a bit inconsistent in the tails.
Remarkably, the Basic RHAT, or the unweighted regressions, performed almost
as well, and in some cases better. The portion where Basic RHAT outperformed
the hedonic RHAT was in the upper portion of the rent distribution. This suggests
that the regression coefficients from the hedonic coefficients were less effective at the
upper portions of the rent distribution. This finding suggests that the matching
process was functioning effectively. Note that the four different iterations were still
relevant, because the sum of squares method to reduce comparables to a maximum
of ten still incorporated the corresponding weighting.
In the following set of models, those where less stringent matching criteria was
permitted when applicable, results were still solid. They remained reasonably con-
sistent until the market N fell under 300, at which point a higher rejection rate was
observed. Most likely, there were not sufficient comparables to effectively estimate
rent in the lower N.
The overall results present a compelling case for using matching models plus incor-
porating hedonic coefficient adjustments for academic modeling. The vast majority
of market samples, well over 90% in total, detected no statistical difference between
expected rent using matching, and observed rent.
The results represent a significant contribution to the literature by demonstrating
that the theoretical application of matching methods functions as an academic model.
The control set shown in Table 20, which shows that smaller building consistently
show less rent than larger buildings, demonstrates a simple application of the model
in empirical studies.
Two summary tables are presented first. Table 6 summarizes the results from
the detailed Tables 8 through 15. The percentages shown are the percent of the
top 34 markets, those containing 600 or more buildings, that failed to reject the null
hypothesis of no difference between observed and estimated rent. 600 N was chosen as
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the level where 5% of the market yielded 30 buildings. Falling under 30 observations
may lead to small sample properties in T-Stat estimations.
Failure to reject the null hypothesis means model success. Results in 5th percentile
mean that the corresponding percentage of markets rejected the null at the 5% or
10% significance level as shown in the table. For example, the first data point shows
that using only the significant coefficients as the comparable selection method, 5.6%
of markets rejected the null at 5% significance levels at the 5th percentile of their
market distribution. Similarly, no market rejected the null at the 10th percentile of
the t-test distribution. Zero percent rejection means the model successfully estimated
rent for all markets on a statistical basis.
Rejection at the 10% level includes those markets that rejected at the 5% level as
well. Summary results are shown for each model iteration
Table 6 showed a few key outcomes. The best performing models were those
using only the significant coefficients. Excluding the green variables from the ”all”
coefficients model seemed to improve the model performance slightly. However, ex-
cluding green from the significant coefficients model deteriorated performance; note
that green variables would only have been included if they were significant in that
market’s hedonic regression.
The second summary table, Table 7, shows the detail for the information used in
the analysis. Each property could have selected up to 10 comparables, or as little as
3. The Mean Comps per property column shows the Mean comparables per property.
The Mean N for T-Test represents the average number of subjects with successful
comparable selection per random draw. As noted, 5% of each market was drawn,
but those properties with less than 3 comparables were disregarded. The Mean N
column shows the average N used in the paired T-test for each market. Mean N % of
draw represents the Mean N for T-Test as a percentage of the total properties drawn.
An 80% number means that 20% of the properties selected did not successfully draw
three or more comparables. All Mean N less than 30 were highlighted as potential
small sample issues.
174
Table 6: This table summarizes the results of the distribution of T-Statistics displayed
in Tables 8 through 15. The percentages shown are the percent of the top 34 markets,
those containing 600 or more buildings, that failed to reject the null hypothesis of
no difference between observed and estimated rent. Failure to reject means model
success. Results in 5th percentile mean that the corresponding percentage of markets
rejected the null at the 5% or 10% significance level as shown in the table. Rejection
at the 10% level includes rejection at the 5% level as well. Zero percent rejection
means the model successfully estimated rent for all markets on a statistical basis.
Summary results are shown for each model iteration.
Basic RHAT % failed to reject the null at 5% or better
Stringent Matching Looser Matching
5th 10th 90th 95th 5th 10th 90th 95th
Sig. Coef. Only 5.9% 0.0% 0.0% 20.6% 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 26.5%
Sig. Coef. -No Green 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 17.6% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 23.5%
All Coef. 5.9% 0.0% 0.0% 17.6% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 14.7%
All Coef. No Green 5.9% 0.0% 5.9% 8.8% 5.9% 0.0% 0.0% 14.7%
Basic RHAT % failed to reject the null at 10% or better
Sig. Coef. Only 26.5% 0.0% 11.8% 82.4% 20.6% 0.0% 17.6% 61.8%
Sig. Coef. -No Green 20.6% 0.0% 14.7% 70.6% 20.6% 0.0% 17.6% 97.1%
All Coef. 44.1% 2.9% 5.9% 58.8% 38.2% 2.9% 8.8% 55.9%
All Coef. No Green 41.2% 2.9% 0.0% 64.7% 32.4% 0.0% 2.9% 47.1%
Hedonic RHAT % failed to reject the null at 5% or better
Stringent Matching Looser Matching
Sig. Coef. Only 0.0% 0.0% 11.8% 29.4% 0.0% 0.0% 11.8% 23.5%
Sig. Coef. -No Green 0.0% 0.0% 11.8% 38.2% 0.0% 0.0% 8.8% 29.4%
All Coef. 5.9% 0.0% 0.0% 32.4% 2.9% 0.0% 2.9% 14.7%
All Coef. No Green 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 29.4% 5.9% 0.0% 0.0% 17.6%
Hedonic RHAT % failed to reject the null at 10% or better
Sig. Coef. Only 23.5% 0.0% 23.5% 73.5% 23.5% 0.0% 29.4% 76.5%
Sig. Coef. -No Green 29.4% 0.0% 29.4% 82.4% 11.8% 2.9% 26.5% 32.4%
All Coef. 38.2% 5.9% 17.6% 79.4% 32.4% 2.9% 8.8% 55.9%
All Coef. No Green 26.5% 0.0% 29.4% 82.4% 32.4% 0.0% 2.9% 61.8%
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Following the summary tables, the detailed results are reported. Tables 8 and 9
show results for Basic RHAT with less stringent matching. Tables 10 and 11 show
results for Basic RHAT, or the unadjusted estimation of expected rent using only the
first matching criteria. Tables 12 and 13 show the results for Hedonic RHAT with less
stringent matching, when necessary. Tables 14 and 15 show the results for Hedonic
RHAT, or the hedonic adjusted models using only the first matching criteria.
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Table 7: This table summarizes the mean information used in the market analysis.
The Mean Comps per property column represents the mean comparables used for
each individual property. The Mean N for T-Test represents the average number of
subjects with successful comparable selection per random draw. That N was used
for the paired t-tests. % of Draw Matched represents the percentage of properties
successfully paired with comparables per random draw. All Mean N less than 30 were
highlighted as potential small sample issues.
More Stringent Matching Less Stringent Matching
Mean Comps Mean N % of Draw Mean Comps Mean N % of Draw
Market N Market Name per Property for T-Test Matched per Property for T-Test Matched
2606 Chicago 8.47 83.17 85% 8.46 93.26 95%
2455 Washington DC 8.17 73 79% 8.06 83.2 90%
2447 Los Angeles 8.04 78.5 85% 8.16 87.06 95%
1945 South Florida 5.86 34.91 47% 5.87 49.24 67%
1846 Dallas/Ft Worth 7.29 53.66 77% 7.33 60.94 87%
1742 Atlanta 8.27 54.82 83% 8.44 60.67 92%
1723 Northern New Jersey 5.16 32.01 49% 5.55 48.06 74%
1661 Philadelphia 8.51 55.54 88% 8.59 60.18 96%
1471 Phoenix 7.61 47.36 85% 7.72 52.41 94%
1415 Orange (California) 8.55 46.8 87% 8.57 51.99 96%
1386 Boston 6.19 34.16 64% 6.45 46.01 87%
1323 Houston 5.71 25.5 51% 5.90 34.04 68%
1300 Detroit 6.28 31.62 65% 6.39 42.66 87%
1187 Seattle/Puget Sound 7.81 39.56 88% 8.02 43.79 97%
1177 Denver 7.22 31.1 69% 7.16 36.48 81%
1009 Minneapolis/St Paul 5.86 21.41 56% 6.21 29.32 77%
983 San Diego 7.35 26.55 72% 7.34 32.36 87%
881 ’St. Louis’ 6.64 21.82 66% 6.79 28.36 86%
876 Sacramento 7.84 26.91 82% 8.02 30.19 91%
867 Long Island (New York) 7.71 24.89 75% 7.82 29.57 90%
804 Kansas City 6.83 19.06 64% 6.78 23.01 77%
801 Inland Empire (California) 8.68 27.5 92% 8.88 29.74 99%
785 Baltimore 5.36 14.41 48% 5.56 20.19 67%
777 New York City 8.14 23.19 80% 8.25 26.88 93%
769 Tampa/St Petersburg 7.21 20.56 71% 7.13 25.4 88%
714 Portland 5.78 15.8 59% 5.97 20.15 75%
689 Columbus 6.22 15.04 58% 6.51 20.86 80%
689 Las Vegas 6.40 18.28 70% 6.43 20.62 79%
676 East Bay/Oakland 6.35 15.94 61% 6.28 21.95 84%
652 Cleveland 5.30 11.61 46% 5.36 17.11 68%
651 Charlotte 6.26 13.66 55% 6.13 18.25 73%
642 Cincinnati/Dayton 5.05 12.09 50% 5.49 18.59 77%
620 Indianapolis 6.33 11.52 48% 6.04 17.01 71%
617 South Bay/San Jose 5.21 10.8 47% 5.32 16.08 70%
598 Orlando 5.01 5.64 25% 5.42 8.1 35%
569 Milwaukee/Madison 6.50 16.28 74% 6.74 20.12 91%
567 Pittsburgh 5.74 8.32 38% 5.49 12.43 57%
560 Austin 6.21 9.5 45% 5.89 12.12 58%
538 San Francisco 6.04 10.7 51% 6.27 14.25 68%
519 Raleigh/Durham 6.33 11.87 59% 6.30 16.15 81%
448 Nashville 5.30 7.1 42% 5.27 9.3 55%
444 San Antonio 5.98 9.72 57% 6.37 12.18 72%
430 Hampton Roads 7.89 13.55 85% 7.94 15.35 96%
423 Salt Lake City 5.55 9.69 61% 5.69 11.56 72%
397 Jacksonville (Florida) 5.22 4.73 32% 5.27 7.2 48%
384 Hartford 4.99 5.62 37% 5.17 9.25 62%
355 Richmond VA 7.07 8.76 63% 6.76 10.87 78%
331 Louisville 5.19 2.96 23% 4.68 5.12 39%
319 Westchester/So Connecticut 5.17 2.17 18% 4.58 3.29 27%
304 Birmingham 5.19 5.32 48% 5.01 8.17 74%
277 Memphis 4.89 3.19 32% 4.69 4.69 47%
269 Oklahoma City 6.77 7.71 77% 7.24 8.71 87%
257 Providence 4.96 2.57 26% 4.58 5.2 52%
242 New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner 4.07 2.42 27% 4.57 4.95 55%
188 Buffalo/Niagara Falls 3.25 1.35 19% 3.11 1.88 27%
128 Marin/Sonoma 5.11 3.03 61% 5.24 4.39 88%177
Table 8: This table shows the distribution of T-statistics from 500 random draws of 5% of each market for Basic RHAT, or
estimated rent without attribute adjustments. Results are for adjustments based on the first, and less stringent matching criteria
if necessary, and using comparable selection based on sum of squares from only significant coefficients with and without Green
variables are shown. The results using hedonic adjustments from all coefficients, as opposed to only significant, are shown in
Table 9. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Percentile for Sig. Coef. Percentile for Sig. Coef. No Green
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
2606 Chicago −1.443 −1.200 0.035 1.411 1.640 −1.428 −1.125 0.182 1.414 1.776∗
2455 Washington DC −1.628 −1.289 −0.217 1.102 1.528 −1.595 −1.241 −0.011 1.306 1.585
2447 Los Angeles −1.920∗ −1.631 −0.248 0.931 1.302 −1.795∗ −1.485 −0.226 1.031 1.491
1945 South Florida −1.568 −1.285 0.072 1.408 1.883∗ −1.501 −1.153 0.113 1.344 1.711∗
1846 Dallas/Ft Worth −1.430 −1.145 −0.114 1.542 1.815∗ −1.438 −1.266 −0.109 1.285 1.723∗
1742 Atlanta −1.365 −1.095 0.243 1.801∗ 2.277∗∗ −1.314 −1.046 0.134 1.651∗ 1.940∗
1723 Northern New Jersey −1.411 −1.170 0.066 1.439 1.820∗ −1.458 −0.968 0.188 1.554 1.960∗∗
1661 Philadelphia −1.556 −1.240 −0.261 1.273 1.741∗ −1.561 −1.312 −0.148 1.394 1.821∗
1471 Phoenix −1.609 −1.383 −0.266 1.252 1.546 −1.593 −1.366 −0.206 1.203 1.522
1415 Orange (California) −1.493 −1.146 0.176 1.459 1.808∗ −1.602 −1.135 0.211 1.465 1.819∗
1386 Boston −1.723∗ −1.387 −0.060 1.316 1.602 −1.765∗ −1.420 −0.120 1.139 1.365
1323 Houston −1.414 −1.112 0.027 1.334 1.607 −1.551 −1.252 0.100 1.349 1.607
1300 Detroit −1.343 −1.069 0.016 1.589 1.984∗∗ −1.478 −1.152 0.100 1.715∗ 2.213∗∗
1187 Seattle/Puget Sound −1.523 −1.211 0.046 1.482 1.869∗ −1.541 −1.310 −0.154 1.323 1.576
1177 Denver −1.363 −1.082 0.025 1.264 1.543 −1.513 −1.279 −0.049 1.357 1.835∗
1009 Minneapolis/St Paul −1.733∗ −1.476 0.058 1.256 1.582 −1.692∗ −1.409 −0.050 1.182 1.504
983 San Diego −1.389 −1.043 0.229 1.565 1.970∗∗ −1.269 −0.935 0.192 1.583 1.883∗
881 ’St. Louis’ −1.453 −1.277 −0.049 1.382 1.737∗ −1.462 −1.296 −0.104 1.362 1.665∗
876 Sacramento −1.230 −0.905 0.282 1.747∗ 2.178∗∗ −1.260 −0.976 0.227 1.779∗ 2.043∗∗
867 Long Island (New York) −1.498 −1.216 0.168 1.410 1.653∗ −1.548 −1.266 0.151 1.357 1.655∗
804 Kansas City −1.283 −1.010 0.145 1.577 1.988∗∗ −1.286 −1.100 0.071 1.653∗ 2.160∗∗
801 Inland Empire (California) −1.488 −1.258 −0.102 1.509 1.844∗ −1.318 −1.152 0.049 1.439 1.835∗
785 Baltimore −1.618 −1.310 −0.069 1.182 1.589 −1.552 −1.157 −0.071 1.250 1.606
777 New York City −1.922∗ −1.614 0.182 1.196 1.424 −2.003∗∗ −1.612 0.132 1.153 1.366
769 Tampa/St Petersburg −1.069 −0.901 0.399 1.986∗∗ 2.339∗∗ −1.248 −1.060 0.275 1.743∗ 2.173∗∗
714 Portland −1.391 −1.178 0.118 1.640 1.935∗ −1.342 −1.120 0.112 1.586 2.008∗∗
689 Columbus −1.720∗ −1.361 −0.269 1.146 1.498 −1.832∗ −1.388 −0.085 1.218 1.596
689 Las Vegas −1.312 −1.032 0.164 1.550 2.034∗∗ −1.371 −1.043 0.247 1.664∗ 2.065∗∗
676 East Bay/Oakland −1.430 −1.058 0.087 1.690∗ 2.029∗∗ −1.417 −1.149 0.071 1.469 1.743∗
652 Cleveland −1.350 −1.084 0.275 1.691∗ 1.950∗ −1.497 −1.109 0.191 1.512 1.747∗
651 Charlotte −1.190 −0.912 0.380 1.674∗ 1.962∗∗ −1.463 −1.052 0.373 1.629 2.014∗∗
642 Cincinnati/Dayton −1.337 −1.128 −0.006 1.612 1.897∗ −1.437 −1.128 0.017 1.558 1.952∗
620 Indianapolis −1.654∗ −1.269 0.040 1.277 1.492 −1.840∗ −1.484 −0.097 1.184 1.502
617 South Bay/San Jose −1.653∗ −1.399 −0.102 1.208 1.603 −1.696∗ −1.342 −0.031 1.340 1.652∗
*Small sample issues possible below 600 N
598 Orlando −1.472 −1.190 0.180 1.512 1.846∗ −1.524 −1.123 0.282 1.699∗ 1.967∗∗
continued on the next page
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Percentile for Sig. Coef. Percentile for Sig. Coef. No Green
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
569 Milwaukee/Madison −1.536 −1.319 0.003 1.448 1.725∗ −1.449 −1.220 −0.021 1.456 1.824∗
567 Pittsburgh −1.377 −1.114 0.168 1.528 1.905∗ −1.541 −1.157 0.187 1.531 1.827∗
560 Austin −2.074∗∗ −1.589 −0.175 1.227 1.571 −1.892∗ −1.542 −0.168 1.186 1.540
538 San Francisco −1.579 −1.132 0.101 1.512 1.782∗ −1.690∗ −1.378 0.030 1.299 1.533
519 Raleigh/Durham −1.359 −1.074 0.050 1.535 1.832∗ −1.414 −1.159 0.105 1.225 1.697∗
448 Nashville −1.578 −1.264 −0.211 1.510 1.837∗ −1.810∗ −1.419 −0.307 1.298 1.681∗
444 San Antonio −1.538 −1.160 0.119 1.399 1.671∗ −1.626 −1.298 0.217 1.502 1.800∗
430 Hampton Roads −1.817∗ −1.489 −0.333 1.091 1.581 −1.812∗ −1.488 −0.222 1.231 1.637
423 Salt Lake City −1.527 −1.253 −0.014 1.293 1.655∗ −1.531 −1.256 0.098 1.362 1.811∗
397 Jacksonville (Florida) −1.611 −1.240 −0.013 1.548 1.979∗∗ −1.689∗ −1.376 −0.104 1.470 1.972∗∗
384 Hartford −1.833∗ −1.350 0.027 1.388 1.743∗ −1.729∗ −1.356 −0.028 1.269 1.727∗
355 Richmond VA −1.572 −1.260 −0.027 1.451 1.921∗ −1.623 −1.395 0.093 1.429 1.649∗
331 Louisville −1.823∗ −1.373 0.238 1.463 1.913∗ −2.100∗∗ −1.532 0.056 1.490 2.098∗∗
319 Westchester/So Connecticut −2.379∗∗ −1.730∗ −0.193 1.452 2.044∗∗ −2.345∗∗ −1.669∗ −0.295 1.412 1.933∗
304 Birmingham −1.359 −1.102 0.061 1.748∗ 2.102∗∗ −1.223 −0.969 0.201 1.624 2.131∗∗
277 Memphis −1.898∗ −1.445 −0.078 1.481 1.987∗∗ −2.139∗∗ −1.513 −0.013 1.689∗ 2.559∗∗
269 Oklahoma City −1.058 −0.880 0.602 1.996∗∗ 2.382∗∗ −1.253 −0.958 0.555 1.900∗ 2.214∗∗
257 Providence −2.192∗∗ −1.428 0.048 1.467 1.940∗ −2.624∗∗∗ −1.699∗ −0.155 1.433 1.776∗
242 New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner −1.722∗ −1.346 0.038 1.510 1.886∗ −1.622 −1.269 0.132 1.698∗ 2.177∗∗
188 Buffalo/Niagara Falls −3.818∗∗∗ −1.869∗ −0.262 2.167∗∗ 4.566∗∗∗ −2.418∗∗ −1.639 −0.216 1.953∗ 4.034∗∗∗
128 Marin/Sonoma −1.855∗ −1.493 −0.164 1.636 2.327∗∗ −1.636 −1.333 −0.109 1.435 1.974∗∗179
Table 9: This table shows the distribution of T-statistics from 500 random draws of 5% of each market for Basic RHAT, or
estimated rent without attribute adjustments. . Results are for adjustments based on the first, and less stringent matching
criteria if necessary, and using comparable selection based on sum of squares from all coefficients with and without Green
variables are shown. The results from using only significant coefficients for hedonic adjustment, as opposed to all coefficients,
are shown in Table 8. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Percentile for All Coef. No Green Percentile for All Coef.
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
2606 Chicago −1.685∗ −1.343 −0.159 1.144 1.465 −1.714∗ −1.371 −0.149 1.206 1.454
2455 Washington DC −1.939∗ −1.595 −0.415 0.897 1.340 −1.915∗ −1.614 −0.400 0.952 1.340
2447 Los Angeles −1.972∗∗ −1.628 −0.274 0.935 1.266 −1.973∗∗ −1.627 −0.293 1.068 1.462
1945 South Florida −1.506 −1.167 0.148 1.415 1.825∗ −1.446 −1.203 0.015 1.318 1.823∗
1846 Dallas/Ft Worth −1.569 −1.242 −0.170 1.296 1.697∗ −1.482 −1.225 −0.190 1.082 1.485
1742 Atlanta −1.374 −1.199 −0.089 1.526 1.800∗ −1.460 −1.190 −0.126 1.390 1.745∗
1723 Northern New Jersey −1.215 −0.894 0.165 1.569 2.004∗∗ −1.438 −1.115 0.147 1.621 1.944∗
1661 Philadelphia −1.494 −1.238 −0.106 1.461 1.911∗ −1.500 −1.303 −0.207 1.413 1.810∗
1471 Phoenix −1.631 −1.383 −0.301 1.057 1.477 −1.669∗ −1.446 −0.457 1.094 1.492
1415 Orange (California) −1.564 −1.211 0.057 1.240 1.519 −1.639 −1.298 −0.006 1.267 1.543
1386 Boston −1.716∗ −1.451 −0.189 1.234 1.535 −1.667∗ −1.387 −0.050 1.158 1.409
1323 Houston −1.657∗ −1.308 −0.055 1.453 1.761∗ −1.510 −1.247 0.120 1.418 1.743∗
1300 Detroit −1.359 −1.154 0.026 1.574 1.967∗∗ −1.340 −1.146 −0.041 1.593 1.992∗∗
1187 Seattle/Puget Sound −1.743∗ −1.550 −0.339 1.200 1.481 −1.780∗ −1.501 −0.344 1.131 1.557
1177 Denver −1.486 −1.240 −0.072 1.243 1.556 −1.665∗ −1.354 −0.000 1.320 1.717∗
1009 Minneapolis/St Paul −1.638 −1.320 −0.052 1.207 1.476 −1.824∗ −1.621 −0.172 1.175 1.468
983 San Diego −1.421 −1.126 0.181 1.550 1.935∗ −1.498 −1.159 0.163 1.559 2.073∗∗
881 ’St. Louis’ −1.623 −1.313 −0.060 1.370 1.735∗ −1.460 −1.232 −0.286 1.337 1.626
876 Sacramento −1.414 −1.171 0.014 1.481 1.898∗ −1.437 −1.166 0.047 1.661∗ 2.043∗∗
867 Long Island (New York) −1.427 −1.121 0.142 1.403 1.689∗ −1.511 −1.159 0.150 1.523 1.739∗
804 Kansas City −1.471 −1.157 −0.014 1.447 1.929∗ −1.438 −1.226 −0.037 1.540 1.914∗
801 Inland Empire (California) −1.533 −1.147 0.009 1.558 1.893∗ −1.390 −1.122 0.121 1.590 1.859∗
785 Baltimore −1.744∗ −1.426 0.019 1.286 1.538 −1.797∗ −1.362 0.058 1.318 1.570
777 New York City −1.967∗∗ −1.565 0.188 1.193 1.442 −1.926∗ −1.645∗ 0.020 1.129 1.362
769 Tampa/St Petersburg −1.307 −1.039 0.223 1.642 2.030∗∗ −1.153 −0.963 0.264 1.656∗ 2.058∗∗
714 Portland −1.535 −1.240 −0.070 1.424 1.755∗ −1.390 −1.164 0.117 1.481 1.746∗
689 Columbus −1.734∗ −1.334 −0.181 1.192 1.480 −1.669∗ −1.399 −0.343 1.034 1.308
689 Las Vegas −1.329 −1.079 0.217 1.648∗ 2.063∗∗ −1.376 −1.114 0.231 1.735∗ 2.222∗∗
676 East Bay/Oakland −1.380 −1.076 0.070 1.457 1.847∗ −1.483 −1.186 −0.129 1.490 1.861∗
652 Cleveland −1.529 −1.166 0.241 1.614 1.866∗ −1.522 −1.204 0.185 1.436 1.754∗
651 Charlotte −1.403 −0.995 0.429 1.578 1.890∗ −1.253 −1.045 0.275 1.607 1.911∗
642 Cincinnati/Dayton −1.470 −1.200 −0.031 1.529 1.987∗∗ −1.414 −1.121 −0.053 1.496 1.798∗
620 Indianapolis −1.731∗ −1.460 −0.033 1.244 1.502 −1.787∗ −1.504 −0.089 1.194 1.480
617 South Bay/San Jose −1.751∗ −1.300 −0.119 1.413 1.781∗ −1.738∗ −1.464 −0.200 1.154 1.460
*Small sample issues possible below 600 N
598 Orlando −1.444 −1.122 0.276 1.596 1.868∗ −1.547 −1.270 0.237 1.665∗ 1.994∗∗
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Percentile for All Coef. No Green Percentile for All Coef.
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
569 Milwaukee/Madison −1.433 −1.162 0.057 1.497 1.902∗ −1.546 −1.214 −0.002 1.468 1.685∗
567 Pittsburgh −1.371 −1.060 0.251 1.416 1.707∗ −1.372 −1.029 0.337 1.547 1.903∗
560 Austin −2.012∗∗ −1.665∗ −0.233 1.200 1.557 −2.001∗∗ −1.560 −0.221 1.083 1.492
538 San Francisco −1.532 −1.198 0.047 1.399 1.765∗ −1.556 −1.211 0.014 1.355 1.619
519 Raleigh/Durham −1.599 −1.183 0.118 1.397 1.763∗ −1.537 −1.195 0.039 1.432 1.786∗
448 Nashville −1.716∗ −1.335 −0.106 1.471 1.883∗ −1.636 −1.308 −0.203 1.273 1.674∗
444 San Antonio −1.753∗ −1.190 0.228 1.363 1.631 −1.465 −1.126 0.166 1.446 1.708∗
430 Hampton Roads −1.934∗ −1.503 −0.392 0.995 1.372 −1.784∗ −1.504 −0.378 1.018 1.345
423 Salt Lake City −1.728∗ −1.399 0.015 1.493 1.866∗ −1.498 −1.291 0.033 1.407 1.914∗
397 Jacksonville (Florida) −1.672∗ −1.264 −0.063 1.443 2.010∗∗ −1.631 −1.262 −0.031 1.501 2.036∗∗
384 Hartford −1.723∗ −1.308 −0.006 1.481 1.900∗ −1.586 −1.267 0.024 1.419 1.858∗
355 Richmond VA −1.631 −1.346 −0.039 1.448 1.645 −1.615 −1.330 0.070 1.493 1.740∗
331 Louisville −2.059∗∗ −1.516 0.183 1.607 2.150∗∗ −1.987∗∗ −1.446 0.150 1.713∗ 2.171∗∗
319 Westchester/So Connecticut −2.825∗∗∗ −1.891∗ −0.111 1.595 2.539∗∗ −2.670∗∗∗ −1.966∗∗ −0.171 1.627 2.155∗∗
304 Birmingham −1.496 −1.148 0.132 1.697∗ 2.331∗∗ −1.295 −1.075 0.135 1.746∗ 2.078∗∗
277 Memphis −2.162∗∗ −1.611 −0.025 1.826∗ 2.374∗∗ −2.109∗∗ −1.527 −0.122 1.412 1.968∗∗
269 Oklahoma City −1.135 −0.946 0.489 1.752∗ 2.117∗∗ −1.156 −0.944 0.453 1.842∗ 2.168∗∗
257 Providence −2.288∗∗ −1.646∗ 0.105 1.465 1.935∗ −2.148∗∗ −1.517 0.112 1.574 2.262∗∗
242 New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner −1.705∗ −1.327 0.165 1.736∗ 2.208∗∗ −1.594 −1.258 0.055 1.761∗ 2.156∗∗
188 Buffalo/Niagara Falls −3.192∗∗∗ −1.789∗ −0.156 2.598∗∗∗ 4.939∗∗∗ −3.634∗∗∗ −2.045∗∗ −0.206 1.968∗∗ 4.400∗∗∗
128 Marin/Sonoma −1.805∗ −1.396 0.000 1.744∗ 2.472∗∗ −1.761∗ −1.409 −0.147 1.681∗ 2.340∗∗
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Table 10: This table shows the distribution of T-statistics from 500 random draws of 5% of each market for Basic RHAT, or
estimated rent without attribute adjustments. . Results are for adjustments based on the first matching criteria, and using
comparable selection based on sum of squares from only significant coefficients with and without Green variables are shown.
The results using hedonic adjustments from all coefficients, as opposed to only significant, are shown in Table 9. ***,**,* represent
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Percentile for Sig. Coef. Percentile for Sig. Coef. No Green
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
2606 Chicago −1.427 −1.149 0.108 1.486 1.850∗ −1.622 −1.322 0.085 1.346 1.582
2455 Washington DC −1.700∗ −1.363 −0.107 1.283 1.654∗ −1.514 −1.214 −0.022 1.273 1.737∗
2447 Los Angeles −2.000∗∗ −1.636 −0.254 0.961 1.289 −1.845∗ −1.477 −0.227 0.998 1.260
1945 South Florida −1.755∗ −1.374 −0.123 1.122 1.590 −1.748∗ −1.362 −0.132 1.141 1.508
1846 Dallas/Ft Worth −1.420 −1.075 0.004 1.514 1.952∗ −1.521 −1.184 0.050 1.604 1.928∗
1742 Atlanta −1.170 −0.989 0.319 1.905∗ 2.248∗∗ −1.219 −0.980 0.242 1.882∗ 2.172∗∗
1723 Northern New Jersey −1.450 −1.162 0.257 1.450 1.775∗ −1.513 −1.190 0.219 1.659∗ 2.003∗∗
1661 Philadelphia −1.603 −1.366 −0.222 1.273 1.824∗ −1.502 −1.227 −0.214 1.251 1.605
1471 Phoenix −1.467 −1.183 0.138 1.518 1.765∗ −1.438 −1.076 0.154 1.499 1.862∗
1415 Orange (California) −1.445 −1.234 0.157 1.395 1.746∗ −1.455 −1.142 0.017 1.384 1.652∗
1386 Boston −1.799∗ −1.322 0.022 1.267 1.521 −1.874∗ −1.443 −0.181 1.198 1.501
1323 Houston −1.455 −1.184 0.190 1.437 1.760∗ −1.290 −1.048 0.181 1.420 1.758∗
1300 Detroit −1.467 −1.187 0.003 1.589 1.999∗∗ −1.406 −1.124 0.148 1.626 2.041∗∗
1187 Seattle/Puget Sound −1.411 −1.188 0.049 1.407 1.749∗ −1.597 −1.292 0.020 1.388 1.842∗
1177 Denver −1.486 −1.265 −0.235 1.426 1.652∗ −1.560 −1.306 −0.136 1.387 1.621
1009 Minneapolis/St Paul −1.942∗ −1.533 −0.124 1.148 1.385 −1.871∗ −1.444 −0.072 1.225 1.541
983 San Diego −1.504 −1.234 0.083 1.383 1.742∗ −1.319 −1.039 0.251 1.548 1.921∗
881 ’St. Louis’ −1.417 −1.272 −0.074 1.420 1.750∗ −1.452 −1.123 0.019 1.515 1.831∗
876 Sacramento −1.319 −1.145 −0.001 1.594 1.962∗∗ −1.404 −1.095 0.109 1.531 1.889∗
867 Long Island (New York) −1.432 −1.186 0.040 1.490 1.873∗ −1.539 −1.250 −0.048 1.488 1.871∗
804 Kansas City −1.327 −1.013 0.303 1.786∗ 2.188∗∗ −1.262 −0.987 0.425 1.781∗ 2.205∗∗
801 Inland Empire (California) −1.389 −1.121 −0.036 1.460 1.780∗ −1.465 −1.240 0.054 1.292 1.674∗
785 Baltimore −1.741∗ −1.465 0.178 1.225 1.647∗ −1.480 −1.130 0.142 1.240 1.608
777 New York City −2.030∗∗ −1.640 −0.080 1.063 1.284 −1.986∗∗ −1.630 −0.084 1.070 1.314
769 Tampa/St Petersburg −1.219 −0.910 0.444 1.905∗ 2.195∗∗ −1.483 −1.173 0.167 1.565 1.889∗
714 Portland −1.256 −1.013 0.251 1.589 1.837∗ −1.438 −1.098 0.315 1.613 1.935∗
689 Columbus −1.450 −1.242 0.061 1.340 1.730∗ −1.622 −1.260 −0.096 1.314 1.832∗
689 Las Vegas −1.414 −1.155 0.215 1.434 1.889∗ −1.403 −1.128 0.121 1.514 1.751∗
676 East Bay/Oakland −1.590 −1.317 −0.125 1.372 1.802∗ −1.502 −1.264 −0.075 1.327 1.745∗
652 Cleveland −1.585 −1.247 0.245 1.404 1.705∗ −1.661∗ −1.229 0.134 1.380 1.700∗
651 Charlotte −1.335 −1.037 0.369 1.631 2.164∗∗ −1.278 −1.064 0.416 1.798∗ 2.132∗∗
642 Cincinnati/Dayton −1.323 −0.975 0.550 1.844∗ 2.151∗∗ −1.301 −1.088 0.424 1.717∗ 1.973∗∗
620 Indianapolis −1.863∗ −1.475 0.052 1.283 1.587 −1.788∗ −1.388 0.012 1.247 1.599
617 South Bay/San Jose −1.646∗ −1.365 0.080 1.496 1.898∗ −1.569 −1.213 0.087 1.418 1.716∗
*Small sample issues possible below 600 N
598 Orlando −1.649∗ −1.254 0.087 1.662∗ 2.220∗∗ −1.687∗ −1.413 −0.131 1.506 1.876∗
569 Milwaukee/Madison −1.374 −1.089 0.135 1.485 1.935∗ −1.339 −1.110 0.194 1.443 1.840∗
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Percentile for Sig. Coef. Percentile for Sig. Coef. No Green
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
567 Pittsburgh −1.518 −1.119 0.413 1.406 1.838∗ −1.643 −1.241 0.477 1.388 1.646∗
560 Austin −1.892∗ −1.485 −0.202 1.146 1.582 −1.885∗ −1.489 −0.098 1.135 1.397
538 San Francisco −1.587 −1.267 0.077 1.507 1.737∗ −1.568 −1.332 0.124 1.464 1.819∗
519 Raleigh/Durham −1.587 −1.368 −0.034 1.342 1.652∗ −1.741∗ −1.482 −0.122 1.276 1.626
448 Nashville −1.756∗ −1.379 0.067 1.572 2.060∗∗ −1.590 −1.241 0.031 1.599 2.027∗∗
444 San Antonio −1.688∗ −1.208 0.177 1.456 1.770∗ −1.654∗ −1.233 0.136 1.414 1.745∗
430 Hampton Roads −1.599 −1.316 −0.027 1.316 1.719∗ −1.486 −1.197 0.113 1.359 1.640
423 Salt Lake City −1.518 −1.155 0.237 1.515 1.803∗ −1.560 −1.263 0.164 1.475 2.003∗∗
397 Jacksonville (Florida) −1.879∗ −1.478 0.172 1.502 1.900∗ −1.709∗ −1.305 0.097 1.562 1.970∗∗
384 Hartford −1.993∗∗ −1.480 −0.057 1.556 2.279∗∗ −1.957∗ −1.405 0.019 1.677∗ 2.237∗∗
355 Richmond VA −1.464 −1.121 0.171 1.522 1.875∗ −1.640 −1.363 0.010 1.482 1.904∗
331 Louisville −2.715∗∗∗ −1.664∗ 0.028 2.505∗∗ 4.267∗∗∗ −2.429∗∗ −1.810∗ −0.008 1.926∗ 2.578∗∗∗
319 Westchester/So Connecticut −2.877∗∗∗ −1.733∗ 0.141 2.050∗∗ 3.020∗∗∗ −2.516∗∗ −1.894∗ 0.089 1.975∗∗ 3.142∗∗∗
304 Birmingham −1.422 −1.139 0.287 2.009∗∗ 2.541∗∗ −1.671∗ −1.306 0.354 1.939∗ 2.535∗∗
277 Memphis −1.750∗ −1.250 0.250 1.850∗ 3.106∗∗∗ −2.314∗∗ −1.575 −0.220 1.704∗ 3.096∗∗∗
269 Oklahoma City −1.233 −0.882 0.442 1.756∗ 2.112∗∗ −1.357 −1.045 0.477 1.750∗ 2.096∗∗
257 Providence −2.583∗∗∗ −1.858∗ 0.264 1.935∗ 2.905∗∗∗ −2.375∗∗ −1.724∗ −0.015 1.909∗ 2.563∗∗
242 New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner −2.395∗∗ −1.524 0.439 1.836∗ 2.975∗∗∗ −1.974∗∗ −1.404 −0.022 1.753∗ 2.975∗∗∗
188 Buffalo/Niagara Falls −19.035∗∗∗ −3.480∗∗∗ 0.015 5.439∗∗∗ 5.439∗∗∗ −4.194∗∗∗ −0.963 0.053 68.433∗∗∗ 68.433∗∗∗
128 Marin/Sonoma −1.873∗ −1.289 0.146 2.213∗∗ 3.755∗∗∗ −1.823∗ −1.353 0.168 2.115∗∗ 3.188∗∗∗
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Table 11: This table shows the distribution of T-statistics from 500 random draws of 5% of each market for Basic RHAT, or
estimated rent without attribute adjustments. . Results are for adjustments based on the first matching criteria, and using
comparable selection based on sum of squares from all coefficients with and without Green variables are shown. The results
from using only significant coefficients for hedonic adjustment, as opposed to all coefficients, are shown in Table 8. ***,**,* represent
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Percentile for All Coef. No Green Percentile for All Coef.
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
2606 Chicago −1.811∗ −1.454 −0.266 1.037 1.398 −1.865∗ −1.542 −0.337 0.927 1.232
2455 Washington DC −1.786∗ −1.549 −0.363 0.887 1.209 −1.718∗ −1.441 −0.254 0.821 1.194
2447 Los Angeles −2.100∗∗ −1.709∗ −0.318 0.842 1.177 −2.047∗∗ −1.686∗ −0.379 0.874 1.248
1945 South Florida −1.877∗ −1.546 −0.213 1.076 1.455 −1.776∗ −1.302 −0.135 1.147 1.577
1846 Dallas/Ft Worth −1.420 −1.234 −0.036 1.431 1.918∗ −1.409 −1.102 0.036 1.389 1.694∗
1742 Atlanta −1.456 −1.192 −0.084 1.488 1.854∗ −1.398 −1.080 0.006 1.613 1.938∗
1723 Northern New Jersey −1.430 −1.152 0.165 1.507 1.750∗ −1.284 −1.041 0.283 1.633 1.952∗
1661 Philadelphia −1.461 −1.242 −0.128 1.187 1.635 −1.537 −1.338 −0.212 1.280 1.620
1471 Phoenix −1.694∗ −1.330 −0.201 1.200 1.654∗ −1.562 −1.264 −0.179 1.300 1.733∗
1415 Orange (California) −1.667∗ −1.360 −0.089 1.272 1.607 −1.703∗ −1.422 −0.043 1.352 1.623
1386 Boston −1.817∗ −1.479 −0.132 1.216 1.585 −1.688∗ −1.379 −0.051 1.181 1.470
1323 Houston −1.411 −1.073 0.312 1.497 1.888∗ −1.497 −1.114 0.189 1.426 2.003∗∗
1300 Detroit −1.362 −1.109 0.064 1.439 1.911∗ −1.385 −1.065 0.030 1.424 1.772∗
1187 Seattle/Puget Sound −1.672∗ −1.366 −0.206 1.222 1.608 −1.652∗ −1.384 −0.131 1.315 1.719∗
1177 Denver −1.695∗ −1.397 −0.261 1.095 1.568 −1.656∗ −1.423 −0.384 1.218 1.592
1009 Minneapolis/St Paul −1.856∗ −1.496 −0.130 1.265 1.529 −1.811∗ −1.555 −0.191 1.198 1.496
983 San Diego −1.479 −1.073 0.191 1.520 1.967∗∗ −1.447 −1.177 0.042 1.486 1.902∗
881 ’St. Louis’ −1.296 −1.088 0.196 1.519 1.754∗ −1.377 −1.080 0.182 1.418 1.660∗
876 Sacramento −1.529 −1.301 −0.100 1.334 1.730∗ −1.511 −1.321 −0.133 1.471 1.836∗
867 Long Island (New York) −1.398 −1.141 0.109 1.473 1.782∗ −1.511 −1.286 −0.044 1.580 1.894∗
804 Kansas City −1.527 −1.177 0.128 1.562 1.958∗ −1.348 −1.068 0.069 1.491 1.801∗
801 Inland Empire (California) −1.353 −1.083 0.135 1.495 1.767∗ −1.305 −1.041 0.232 1.544 1.818∗
785 Baltimore −1.821∗ −1.406 0.071 1.167 1.530 −1.734∗ −1.402 0.102 1.249 1.511
777 New York City −1.916∗ −1.615 −0.142 1.128 1.377 −1.969∗∗ −1.582 0.043 1.113 1.332
769 Tampa/St Petersburg −1.313 −1.025 0.230 1.613 2.071∗∗ −1.225 −1.041 0.166 1.629 1.949∗
714 Portland −1.388 −1.092 0.065 1.576 1.879∗ −1.269 −1.031 0.268 1.518 1.768∗
689 Columbus −1.632 −1.269 −0.115 1.251 1.572 −1.756∗ −1.411 −0.082 1.466 1.718∗
689 Las Vegas −1.507 −1.208 0.115 1.723∗ 2.061∗∗ −1.465 −1.158 0.014 1.509 2.127∗∗
676 East Bay/Oakland −1.689∗ −1.315 −0.097 1.410 1.891∗ −1.583 −1.275 −0.000 1.528 1.757∗
652 Cleveland −1.722∗ −1.328 0.114 1.317 1.651∗ −1.761∗ −1.286 0.259 1.381 1.666∗
651 Charlotte −1.290 −1.002 0.303 1.601 2.039∗∗ −1.333 −1.111 0.360 1.673∗ 1.946∗
642 Cincinnati/Dayton −1.337 −1.036 0.502 1.823∗ 2.252∗∗ −1.403 −1.119 0.378 1.715∗ 2.112∗∗
620 Indianapolis −2.022∗∗ −1.487 0.009 1.208 1.528 −1.903∗ −1.623 −0.049 1.171 1.491
617 South Bay/San Jose −1.569 −1.244 0.124 1.577 1.979∗∗ −1.500 −1.197 0.073 1.490 1.831∗
*Small sample issues possible below 600 N
598 Orlando −1.627 −1.301 0.031 1.494 1.871∗ −1.569 −1.328 −0.026 1.466 1.854∗
continued on the next page
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Percentile for All Coef. No Green Percentile for All Coef.
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
569 Milwaukee/Madison −1.403 −1.107 0.238 1.536 1.921∗ −1.494 −1.159 0.137 1.466 1.808∗
567 Pittsburgh −1.551 −1.186 0.370 1.500 1.914∗ −1.593 −1.125 0.495 1.585 1.981∗∗
560 Austin −1.931∗ −1.556 −0.210 1.285 1.575 −1.799∗ −1.452 −0.118 1.242 1.513
538 San Francisco −1.472 −1.220 0.161 1.567 1.876∗ −1.604 −1.353 0.081 1.459 1.716∗
519 Raleigh/Durham −1.751∗ −1.469 −0.013 1.290 1.584 −1.693∗ −1.360 −0.155 1.300 1.586
448 Nashville −1.696∗ −1.330 0.028 1.408 1.811∗ −1.649∗ −1.326 −0.004 1.478 1.975∗∗
444 San Antonio −1.844∗ −1.376 0.179 1.384 1.774∗ −1.622 −1.290 0.199 1.451 1.724∗
430 Hampton Roads −1.906∗ −1.408 −0.203 1.167 1.488 −1.694∗ −1.334 0.005 1.280 1.675∗
423 Salt Lake City −1.455 −1.251 0.208 1.440 1.765∗ −1.536 −1.175 0.187 1.437 1.925∗
397 Jacksonville (Florida) −2.002∗∗ −1.479 0.127 1.625 1.941∗ −1.907∗ −1.452 0.148 1.553 2.001∗∗
384 Hartford −1.971∗∗ −1.366 0.187 1.754∗ 2.581∗∗∗ −1.723∗ −1.408 0.043 1.748∗ 2.490∗∗
355 Richmond VA −1.497 −1.229 0.039 1.455 1.853∗ −1.530 −1.322 0.018 1.474 1.977∗∗
331 Louisville −2.893∗∗∗ −1.766∗ 0.188 2.380∗∗ 3.552∗∗∗ −2.218∗∗ −1.291 0.066 1.787∗ 3.184∗∗∗
319 Westchester/So Connecticut −2.394∗∗ −1.694∗ −0.018 2.032∗∗ 4.541∗∗∗ −3.087∗∗∗ −2.059∗∗ 0.035 2.004∗∗ 2.680∗∗∗
304 Birmingham −1.408 −1.026 0.495 2.013∗∗ 2.685∗∗∗ −1.445 −0.973 0.489 1.908∗ 2.357∗∗
277 Memphis −2.269∗∗ −1.618 −0.015 2.083∗∗ 3.259∗∗∗ −2.008∗∗ −1.549 −0.021 1.864∗ 2.870∗∗∗
269 Oklahoma City −1.464 −1.002 0.609 1.873∗ 2.293∗∗ −1.242 −1.047 0.413 1.792∗ 2.236∗∗
257 Providence −2.694∗∗∗ −1.651∗ 0.178 1.834∗ 2.754∗∗∗ −2.001∗∗ −1.434 0.326 1.948∗ 2.563∗∗
242 New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner −1.993∗∗ −1.416 0.116 1.953∗ 2.784∗∗∗ −1.966∗∗ −1.405 0.214 1.705∗ 2.460∗∗
188 Buffalo/Niagara Falls −19.035∗∗∗ −4.194∗∗∗ 0.053 68.433∗∗∗ 68.433∗∗∗ −4.194∗∗∗ −1.383 −0.203 4.148∗∗∗ 5.052∗∗∗
128 Marin/Sonoma −2.072∗∗ −1.541 −0.099 2.174∗∗ 3.244∗∗∗ −1.774∗ −1.283 0.057 2.065∗∗ 2.987∗∗∗
185
Table 12: This table shows the distribution of T-statistics from 500 random draws of 5% of each market for Hedonic RHAT,
estimated rent using hedonic adjustments based on building attributes. Results are for adjustments based on the first, and
less stringent matching criteria if necessary, and using results for adjustments based on only significant coefficients with and
without Green variables are shown. The results using hedonic adjustments from all coefficients, as opposed to only significant,
are shown in Table 13. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Percentile for Sig. Coef. Percentile for Sig. Coef. No Green
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
2606 Chicago −1.474 −1.195 0.039 1.352 1.666∗ −1.555 −1.218 0.076 1.484 1.830∗
2455 Washington DC −1.475 −1.153 −0.126 1.270 1.645∗ −1.491 −1.185 −0.017 1.364 1.642
2447 Los Angeles −1.526 −1.096 0.239 1.470 1.842∗ −1.259 −0.946 0.206 1.477 1.965∗∗
1945 South Florida −1.448 −0.981 0.271 1.672∗ 2.103∗∗ −1.283 −0.937 0.283 1.626 1.890∗
1846 Dallas/Ft Worth −1.654∗ −1.429 −0.360 1.080 1.507 −1.546 −1.383 −0.282 1.086 1.429
1742 Atlanta −1.211 −0.947 0.488 2.012∗∗ 2.417∗∗ −1.141 −0.922 0.420 1.935∗ 2.232∗∗
1723 Northern New Jersey −1.563 −1.266 −0.044 1.264 1.672∗ −1.482 −1.077 0.070 1.421 1.849∗
1661 Philadelphia −1.739∗ −1.453 −0.386 0.908 1.394 −1.681∗ −1.449 −0.304 1.114 1.638
1471 Phoenix −1.553 −1.318 −0.132 1.410 1.770∗ −1.490 −1.252 −0.100 1.293 1.666∗
1415 Orange (California) −1.120 −0.741 0.594 1.848∗ 2.194∗∗ −1.295 −0.883 0.572 1.807∗ 2.155∗∗
1386 Boston −1.603 −1.314 −0.026 1.422 1.742∗ −1.615 −1.383 −0.045 1.229 1.489
1323 Houston −1.646∗ −1.376 −0.221 0.960 1.377 −1.716∗ −1.420 −0.080 1.166 1.509
1300 Detroit −1.447 −1.098 0.029 1.558 1.987∗∗ −1.433 −1.163 0.075 1.791∗ 2.170∗∗
1187 Seattle/Puget Sound −1.776∗ −1.521 −0.188 1.281 1.579 −1.640 −1.389 −0.233 1.118 1.515
1177 Denver −1.417 −1.167 −0.012 1.316 1.638 −1.493 −1.220 0.026 1.472 1.843∗
1009 Minneapolis/St Paul −1.672∗ −1.349 0.167 1.311 1.707∗ −1.521 −1.195 0.066 1.335 1.613
983 San Diego −0.979 −0.657 0.615 2.137∗∗ 2.515∗∗ −0.856 −0.571 0.691 2.095∗∗ 2.372∗∗
881 ’St. Louis’ −1.409 −1.179 0.031 1.406 1.739∗ −1.406 −1.188 0.036 1.451 1.713∗
876 Sacramento −0.905 −0.633 0.689 2.311∗∗ 2.640∗∗∗ −0.924 −0.638 0.683 2.180∗∗ 2.524∗∗
867 Long Island (New York) −1.900∗ −1.511 −0.150 1.135 1.385 −1.893∗ −1.659∗ −0.194 1.098 1.419
804 Kansas City −1.102 −0.840 0.472 1.882∗ 2.298∗∗ −1.157 −0.952 0.207 1.902∗ 2.296∗∗
801 Inland Empire (California) −1.521 −1.352 −0.234 1.412 1.758∗ −1.585 −1.215 −0.125 1.339 1.760∗
785 Baltimore −1.469 −1.144 0.079 1.323 1.794∗ −1.333 −1.040 0.141 1.462 1.845∗
777 New York City −1.737∗ −1.193 0.416 1.398 1.595 −1.804∗ −1.268 0.406 1.382 1.579
769 Tampa/St Petersburg −1.058 −0.735 0.575 2.063∗∗ 2.521∗∗ −1.063 −0.753 0.617 2.019∗∗ 2.369∗∗
714 Portland −1.384 −1.143 0.210 1.681∗ 1.932∗ −1.380 −1.149 0.084 1.491 1.851∗
689 Columbus −1.607 −1.338 −0.210 1.196 1.534 −1.643 −1.335 0.101 1.333 1.684∗
689 Las Vegas −1.749∗ −1.421 −0.110 1.277 1.654∗ −1.604 −1.261 −0.013 1.364 1.702∗
676 East Bay/Oakland −1.482 −1.158 0.161 1.673∗ 1.912∗ −1.401 −1.107 0.133 1.505 1.917∗
652 Cleveland −1.607 −1.229 0.200 1.438 1.710∗ −1.592 −1.296 0.117 1.362 1.606
651 Charlotte −1.313 −1.008 0.266 1.591 1.935∗ −1.446 −0.981 0.356 1.670∗ 2.002∗∗
642 Cincinnati/Dayton −1.347 −1.047 0.124 1.647∗ 1.947∗ −1.357 −1.083 0.185 1.709∗ 2.077∗∗
620 Indianapolis −1.483 −1.100 0.293 1.378 1.779∗ −1.544 −1.196 0.175 1.372 1.614
617 South Bay/San Jose −1.627 −1.335 −0.115 1.288 1.715∗ −1.607 −1.311 −0.004 1.256 1.706∗
*Small sample issues possible below 600 N
598 Orlando −1.475 −1.145 −0.246 1.744∗ 2.243∗∗ −1.317 −0.992 0.343 1.911∗ 2.368∗∗
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Percentile for Sig. Coef. Percentile for Sig. Coef. No Green
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
569 Milwaukee/Madison −1.708∗ −1.368 −0.100 1.238 1.607 −1.661∗ −1.406 −0.114 1.212 1.534
567 Pittsburgh −1.571 −1.333 0.035 1.372 1.649∗ −1.838∗ −1.443 −0.015 1.400 1.773∗
560 Austin −2.031∗∗ −1.547 −0.169 1.187 1.454 −1.832∗ −1.529 −0.045 1.205 1.542
538 San Francisco −1.251 −0.870 0.344 1.720∗ 2.039∗∗ −1.548 −1.196 0.145 1.570 1.974∗∗
519 Raleigh/Durham −1.597 −1.330 −0.102 1.290 1.685∗ −1.554 −1.231 −0.106 1.195 1.604
448 Nashville −1.562 −1.202 −0.123 1.456 1.826∗ −1.746∗ −1.441 −0.195 1.381 1.793∗
444 San Antonio −1.327 −1.067 0.242 1.557 1.851∗ −1.428 −1.019 0.349 1.613 1.952∗
430 Hampton Roads −1.405 −1.062 0.034 1.457 1.961∗∗ −1.478 −1.243 0.148 1.718∗ 2.099∗∗
423 Salt Lake City −1.403 −1.081 0.125 1.492 1.804∗ −1.520 −1.215 0.158 1.542 1.937∗
397 Jacksonville (Florida) −1.474 −1.209 0.250 1.707∗ 2.201∗∗ −1.435 −1.179 0.064 1.703∗ 2.207∗∗
384 Hartford −1.717∗ −1.418 −0.215 1.148 1.754∗ −1.786∗ −1.501 −0.197 1.248 1.693∗
355 Richmond VA −1.622 −1.255 −0.070 1.573 1.917∗ −1.530 −1.310 0.048 1.385 1.719∗
331 Louisville −1.792∗ −1.040 0.455 1.919∗ 2.662∗∗∗ −1.767∗ −1.275 0.271 1.718∗ 2.201∗∗
319 Westchester/So Connecticut −3.228∗∗∗ −2.191∗∗ −0.026 1.357 1.981∗∗ −2.412∗∗ −1.997∗∗ −0.127 1.488 1.999∗∗
304 Birmingham −1.610 −1.439 −0.155 1.583 2.072∗∗ −1.844∗ −1.328 −0.010 1.465 1.861∗
277 Memphis −1.614 −1.207 0.062 1.912∗ 2.406∗∗ −1.647∗ −1.253 0.120 1.847∗ 2.513∗∗
269 Oklahoma City −1.044 −0.809 0.632 1.973∗∗ 2.496∗∗ −1.176 −0.960 0.542 1.827∗ 2.266∗∗
257 Providence −1.619 −1.002 0.272 1.814∗ 2.494∗∗ −1.538 −1.178 0.178 1.891∗ 2.495∗∗
242 New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner −1.612 −1.215 0.289 1.895∗ 2.434∗∗ −1.780∗ −1.237 0.299 1.868∗ 2.316∗∗
188 Buffalo/Niagara Falls −2.066∗∗ −1.351 0.014 2.342∗∗ 3.797∗∗∗ −1.940∗ −1.218 0.384 3.569∗∗∗ 6.407∗∗∗
128 Marin/Sonoma −1.773∗ −1.483 −0.085 1.796∗ 2.669∗∗∗ −1.950∗ −1.505 −0.093 1.819∗ 2.473∗∗187
Table 13: This table shows the distribution of T-statistics from 500 random draws of 5% of each market for Hedonic RHAT,
estimated rent using hedonic adjustments based on building attributes.. Results are for adjustments based on the first, and less
stringent matching criteria if necessary, and using all coefficients with and without Green variables are shown. The results from
using only significant coefficients for hedonic adjustment, as opposed to all coefficients, are shown in Table 12. ***,**,* represent
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Percentile for All Coef. No Green Percentile for All Coef.
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
2606 Chicago −1.167 −0.885 0.353 1.664∗ 1.977∗∗ −1.279 −0.831 0.455 1.618 1.995∗∗
2455 Washington DC −1.894∗ −1.529 −0.403 0.959 1.299 −1.881∗ −1.512 −0.225 1.060 1.308
2447 Los Angeles −1.462 −1.051 0.186 1.547 1.828∗ −1.205 −0.865 0.380 1.581 1.891∗
1945 South Florida −1.777∗ −1.412 −0.191 1.037 1.401 −1.742∗ −1.459 −0.074 1.202 1.562
1846 Dallas/Ft Worth −1.080 −0.767 0.492 1.798∗ 2.090∗∗ −0.878 −0.663 0.552 1.928∗ 2.421∗∗
1742 Atlanta −1.290 −0.970 0.157 1.781∗ 2.263∗∗ −1.208 −1.022 0.228 1.672∗ 2.125∗∗
1723 Northern New Jersey −1.132 −0.872 0.360 1.733∗ 2.106∗∗ −1.227 −0.905 0.343 1.541 1.904∗
1661 Philadelphia −1.200 −0.823 0.454 1.831∗ 2.292∗∗ −1.079 −0.846 0.501 1.891∗ 2.220∗∗
1471 Phoenix −0.977 −0.681 0.572 1.852∗ 2.354∗∗ −1.076 −0.622 0.761 2.101∗∗ 2.453∗∗
1415 Orange (California) −1.008 −0.790 0.613 1.906∗ 2.263∗∗ −1.084 −0.704 0.620 1.786∗ 2.184∗∗
1386 Boston −1.676∗ −1.398 −0.034 1.159 1.434 −1.816∗ −1.521 −0.058 1.197 1.573
1323 Houston −1.413 −1.173 0.169 1.526 1.805∗ −1.336 −1.001 0.170 1.569 1.974∗∗
1300 Detroit −1.108 −0.773 0.355 1.676∗ 2.080∗∗ −1.281 −0.934 0.362 1.731∗ 2.177∗∗
1187 Seattle/Puget Sound −1.471 −1.152 0.097 1.449 1.939∗ −1.378 −1.067 0.210 1.362 1.710∗
1177 Denver −1.353 −1.020 0.276 1.476 1.913∗ −1.337 −1.015 0.216 1.593 2.003∗∗
1009 Minneapolis/St Paul −1.665∗ −1.347 −0.118 1.258 1.586 −1.816∗ −1.259 0.050 1.320 1.698∗
983 San Diego −1.531 −1.170 0.254 1.454 1.764∗ −1.385 −1.112 0.125 1.388 1.820∗
881 ’St. Louis’ −1.324 −1.033 0.335 1.651∗ 2.158∗∗ −1.443 −1.009 0.354 1.595 1.927∗
876 Sacramento −1.318 −1.037 0.320 1.671∗ 2.022∗∗ −1.248 −1.008 0.384 1.663∗ 1.950∗
867 Long Island (New York) −1.512 −1.099 0.186 1.600 1.866∗ −1.630 −1.232 0.082 1.402 1.793∗
804 Kansas City −1.001 −0.772 0.591 1.935∗ 2.223∗∗ −1.066 −0.692 0.648 1.905∗ 2.302∗∗
801 Inland Empire (California) −1.199 −0.885 0.580 1.832∗ 2.155∗∗ −1.186 −0.866 0.478 1.876∗ 2.162∗∗
785 Baltimore −1.583 −1.128 0.132 1.423 1.850∗ −1.641 −1.194 0.177 1.382 1.688∗
777 New York City −1.809∗ −1.576 −0.201 1.104 1.339 −1.960∗ −1.467 0.004 1.148 1.339
769 Tampa/St Petersburg −1.647∗ −1.299 −0.046 1.284 1.736∗ −1.563 −1.341 −0.005 1.243 1.612
714 Portland −1.751∗ −1.334 0.086 1.541 1.973∗∗ −1.686∗ −1.269 −0.053 1.336 1.821∗
689 Columbus −1.880∗ −1.509 −0.211 1.072 1.562 −1.743∗ −1.431 −0.187 1.029 1.412
689 Las Vegas −1.349 −1.023 0.170 1.525 1.906∗ −1.379 −1.070 0.200 1.447 1.850∗
676 East Bay/Oakland −1.460 −1.084 0.131 1.391 1.663∗ −1.519 −1.084 0.252 1.630 1.944∗
652 Cleveland −1.472 −1.198 0.068 1.408 1.673∗ −1.532 −1.134 0.173 1.558 2.079∗∗
651 Charlotte −1.336 −1.000 0.173 1.642 2.017∗∗ −1.355 −0.987 0.282 1.693∗ 2.192∗∗
642 Cincinnati/Dayton −1.463 −1.177 −0.061 1.230 1.555 −1.645 −1.346 −0.007 1.430 1.895∗
620 Indianapolis −1.127 −0.723 0.571 1.783∗ 2.166∗∗ −1.321 −0.870 0.617 1.686∗ 2.059∗∗
617 South Bay/San Jose −1.256 −0.815 0.324 1.681∗ 1.973∗∗ −1.183 −0.851 0.486 1.855∗ 2.331∗∗
*Small sample issues possible below 600 N
598 Orlando −2.117∗∗ −1.626 −0.222 1.290 1.675∗ −1.877∗ −1.542 −0.150 1.392 1.696∗
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Percentile for All Coef. No Green Percentile for All Coef.
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
569 Milwaukee/Madison −1.419 −1.089 0.295 1.454 2.057∗∗ −1.334 −0.898 0.315 1.693∗ 2.054∗∗
567 Pittsburgh −1.476 −1.093 0.245 1.625 1.952∗ −1.544 −1.075 0.120 1.470 1.811∗
560 Austin −1.531 −1.256 0.037 1.511 1.760∗ −1.645 −1.352 0.041 1.576 2.053∗∗
538 San Francisco −1.498 −1.222 0.063 1.333 1.747∗ −1.546 −1.204 −0.074 1.427 1.888∗
519 Raleigh/Durham −1.450 −1.103 0.262 1.587 1.954∗ −1.479 −1.090 0.232 1.530 1.954∗
448 Nashville −1.742∗ −1.254 0.055 1.396 1.771∗ −1.805∗ −1.256 0.088 1.366 1.743∗
444 San Antonio −1.666∗ −1.274 0.205 1.476 1.895∗ −1.362 −1.003 0.347 1.722∗ 1.992∗∗
430 Hampton Roads −1.285 −0.848 0.286 1.748∗ 2.060∗∗ −1.207 −0.813 0.365 1.723∗ 2.154∗∗
423 Salt Lake City −1.442 −1.140 0.300 1.817∗ 2.184∗∗ −1.465 −1.038 0.370 1.682∗ 2.097∗∗
397 Jacksonville (Florida) −1.962∗∗ −1.335 0.109 1.465 1.836∗ −1.826∗ −1.390 0.150 1.490 1.823∗
384 Hartford −2.202∗∗ −1.552 0.018 1.279 1.605 −1.977∗∗ −1.434 −0.054 1.273 1.618
355 Richmond VA −1.488 −1.033 0.285 1.546 2.058∗∗ −1.416 −1.057 0.278 1.713∗ 2.174∗∗
331 Louisville −2.219∗∗ −1.541 0.088 1.555 2.043∗∗ −2.110∗∗ −1.349 0.052 1.691∗ 2.208∗∗
319 Westchester/So Connecticut −2.131∗∗ −1.556 −0.081 1.416 1.826∗ −2.521∗∗ −1.773∗ −0.087 1.576 2.226∗∗
304 Birmingham −1.920∗ −1.469 −0.096 1.274 1.783∗ −1.755∗ −1.419 −0.096 1.266 1.730∗
277 Memphis −2.542∗∗ −1.772∗ −0.137 1.644 2.407∗∗ −2.267∗∗ −1.614 −0.184 1.276 1.952∗
269 Oklahoma City −1.451 −1.116 0.220 1.708∗ 2.094∗∗ −1.355 −1.099 0.145 1.549 2.052∗∗
257 Providence −1.831∗ −1.217 0.166 1.862∗ 2.763∗∗∗ −1.513 −1.104 0.229 1.883∗ 2.507∗∗
242 New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner −1.957∗ −1.493 −0.019 1.528 2.259∗∗ −2.129∗∗ −1.607 0.090 1.678∗ 2.349∗∗
188 Buffalo/Niagara Falls −5.031∗∗∗ −2.809∗∗∗ 0.012 1.962∗∗ 3.314∗∗∗ −2.840∗∗∗ −1.883∗ 0.059 3.891∗∗∗ 7.701∗∗∗
128 Marin/Sonoma −2.499∗∗ −1.832∗ −0.091 1.418 2.193∗∗ −2.308∗∗ −1.684∗ −0.052 1.614 2.537∗∗
189
Table 14: This table shows the distribution of T-statistics from 500 random draws of 5% of each market for Hedonic RHAT,
estimated rent using hedonic adjustments based on building attributes.. Results are for adjustments based on the first matching
criteria, and using only significant coefficients with and without Green variables are shown. The results using hedonic adjust-
ments from all coefficients, as opposed to only significant, are shown in Table 13. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels respectively.
Percentile for Sig. Coef. Percentile for Sig. Coef. No Green
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
2606 Chicago −1.371 −1.082 0.197 1.416 1.661∗ −1.505 −1.136 0.103 1.437 1.769∗
2455 Washington DC −1.446 −1.133 0.035 1.440 1.868∗ −1.380 −1.162 0.008 1.360 1.801∗
2447 Los Angeles −1.581 −1.218 0.163 1.359 1.802∗ −1.455 −1.053 0.197 1.419 1.720∗
1945 South Florida −1.557 −1.218 0.098 1.379 1.777∗ −1.553 −1.174 −0.015 1.265 1.678∗
1846 Dallas/Ft Worth −1.505 −1.272 −0.242 1.210 1.600 −1.724∗ −1.345 −0.092 1.309 1.701∗
1742 Atlanta −1.050 −0.846 0.440 2.106∗∗ 2.476∗∗ −1.105 −0.856 0.542 2.168∗∗ 2.690∗∗∗
1723 Northern New Jersey −1.604 −1.248 0.108 1.472 1.803∗ −1.549 −1.206 0.110 1.513 1.924∗
1661 Philadelphia −1.815∗ −1.463 −0.403 1.066 1.448 −1.673∗ −1.295 −0.351 1.049 1.560
1471 Phoenix −1.390 −1.091 0.309 1.592 2.009∗∗ −1.282 −0.979 0.260 1.566 1.987∗∗
1415 Orange (California) −1.251 −0.791 0.465 1.670∗ 2.065∗∗ −1.166 −0.938 0.306 1.660∗ 2.070∗∗
1386 Boston −1.614 −1.311 0.018 1.271 1.653∗ −1.743∗ −1.389 −0.080 1.272 1.569
1323 Houston −1.684∗ −1.445 −0.186 1.156 1.504 −1.501 −1.235 −0.092 1.228 1.650∗
1300 Detroit −1.492 −1.234 −0.024 1.580 2.014∗∗ −1.419 −1.136 0.176 1.685∗ 2.095∗∗
1187 Seattle/Puget Sound −1.653∗ −1.386 −0.198 1.126 1.561 −1.754∗ −1.450 −0.115 1.253 1.726∗
1177 Denver −1.619 −1.340 −0.179 1.235 1.612 −1.662∗ −1.415 −0.092 1.429 1.816∗
1009 Minneapolis/St Paul −1.955∗ −1.440 −0.101 1.135 1.442 −1.699∗ −1.385 −0.024 1.306 1.566
983 San Diego −1.099 −0.787 0.501 1.824∗ 2.176∗∗ −0.902 −0.597 0.724 1.971∗∗ 2.389∗∗
881 ’St. Louis’ −1.330 −1.032 0.188 1.593 1.878∗ −1.263 −1.035 0.256 1.620 1.997∗∗
876 Sacramento −1.059 −0.819 0.482 2.161∗∗ 2.443∗∗ −1.061 −0.803 0.490 1.977∗∗ 2.310∗∗
867 Long Island (New York) −1.758∗ −1.524 −0.319 1.210 1.622 −1.784∗ −1.499 −0.299 1.119 1.470
804 Kansas City −1.126 −0.817 0.631 2.068∗∗ 2.449∗∗ −1.175 −0.802 0.798 2.064∗∗ 2.428∗∗
801 Inland Empire (California) −1.351 −1.188 −0.057 1.380 1.686∗ −1.602 −1.319 −0.162 1.161 1.447
785 Baltimore −1.601 −1.102 0.225 1.488 1.811∗ −1.312 −0.930 0.242 1.423 1.737∗
777 New York City −1.928∗ −1.486 0.149 1.130 1.364 −1.748∗ −1.383 0.017 1.178 1.347
769 Tampa/St Petersburg −1.193 −0.874 0.538 2.071∗∗ 2.539∗∗ −1.252 −0.970 0.377 1.901∗ 2.268∗∗
714 Portland −1.211 −0.941 0.378 1.714∗ 2.059∗∗ −1.362 −1.096 0.485 1.722∗ 2.035∗∗
689 Columbus −1.518 −1.218 0.108 1.372 1.730∗ −1.429 −1.171 0.022 1.443 1.928∗
689 Las Vegas −1.498 −1.256 0.093 1.398 1.954∗ −1.400 −1.143 0.129 1.545 1.872∗
676 East Bay/Oakland −1.594 −1.375 −0.193 1.306 1.728∗ −1.397 −1.200 −0.057 1.445 1.886∗
652 Cleveland −1.659∗ −1.326 0.161 1.273 1.611 −1.737∗ −1.465 0.058 1.303 1.694∗
651 Charlotte −1.380 −1.098 0.191 1.635 1.871∗ −1.357 −1.048 0.408 1.794∗ 2.200∗∗
642 Cincinnati/Dayton −1.396 −1.020 0.351 1.792∗ 2.214∗∗ −1.430 −1.151 0.337 1.698∗ 2.094∗∗
620 Indianapolis −1.762∗ −1.090 0.241 1.481 1.688∗ −1.772∗ −1.327 0.100 1.386 1.689∗
617 South Bay/San Jose −1.630 −1.309 −0.084 1.503 1.932∗ −1.516 −1.194 −0.052 1.496 1.986∗∗
*Small sample issues possible below 600 N
598 Orlando −1.390 −1.103 0.304 1.906∗ 2.546∗∗ −1.526 −1.144 0.194 1.795∗ 2.265∗∗
569 Milwaukee/Madison −1.557 −1.271 −0.063 1.324 1.740∗ −1.651∗ −1.329 −0.048 1.256 1.595
continued on the next page
190
Percentile for Sig. Coef. Percentile for Sig. Coef. No Green
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
567 Pittsburgh −1.716∗ −1.249 0.107 1.367 1.908∗ −1.924∗ −1.317 0.224 1.310 1.612
560 Austin −1.896∗ −1.538 −0.156 1.182 1.540 −1.814∗ −1.463 −0.103 1.105 1.475
538 San Francisco −1.570 −1.128 0.232 1.626 2.024∗∗ −1.613 −1.167 0.110 1.443 1.849∗
519 Raleigh/Durham −1.841∗ −1.516 −0.142 1.184 1.488 −2.051∗∗ −1.668∗ −0.237 1.145 1.530
448 Nashville −1.770∗ −1.421 0.033 1.505 1.943∗ −1.713∗ −1.374 0.093 1.508 1.984∗∗
444 San Antonio −1.380 −0.980 0.335 1.645 2.228∗∗ −1.397 −1.064 0.300 1.696∗ 2.038∗∗
430 Hampton Roads −1.362 −1.059 0.165 1.430 1.972∗∗ −1.222 −0.980 0.394 1.858∗ 2.110∗∗
423 Salt Lake City −1.456 −1.113 0.134 1.584 1.984∗∗ −1.464 −1.151 0.162 1.745∗ 2.157∗∗
397 Jacksonville (Florida) −2.197∗∗ −1.364 0.207 1.770∗ 2.502∗∗ −1.713∗ −1.127 0.262 1.773∗ 2.559∗∗
384 Hartford −1.974∗∗ −1.399 −0.063 1.444 2.128∗∗ −2.225∗∗ −1.549 0.066 1.692∗ 2.627∗∗∗
355 Richmond VA −1.398 −1.043 0.226 1.657∗ 1.903∗ −1.602 −1.279 0.080 1.664∗ 2.106∗∗
331 Louisville −2.233∗∗ −1.471 0.165 2.367∗∗ 3.212∗∗∗ −2.056∗∗ −1.442 0.229 2.186∗∗ 4.239∗∗∗
319 Westchester/So Connecticut −6.453∗∗∗ −3.225∗∗∗ 0.021 1.796∗ 3.332∗∗∗ −4.329∗∗∗ −2.883∗∗∗ 0.167 1.529 2.840∗∗∗
304 Birmingham −1.544 −1.147 0.188 1.908∗ 2.475∗∗ −1.782∗ −1.228 0.183 1.700∗ 2.362∗∗
277 Memphis −1.896∗ −1.307 0.136 1.902∗ 2.844∗∗∗ −2.222∗∗ −1.512 −0.042 1.883∗ 2.792∗∗∗
269 Oklahoma City −1.313 −0.974 0.412 1.643 2.080∗∗ −1.493 −1.009 0.409 1.637 1.968∗∗
257 Providence −2.825∗∗∗ −1.802∗ 0.291 2.642∗∗∗ 5.374∗∗∗ −2.802∗∗∗ −1.693∗ 0.247 2.443∗∗ 4.491∗∗∗
242 New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner −1.517 −1.282 0.461 1.838∗ 3.655∗∗∗ −2.122∗∗ −1.541 0.011 1.740∗ 2.558∗∗
188 Buffalo/Niagara Falls −1.749∗ −1.749∗ 0.817 2.790∗∗∗ 6.168∗∗∗ −2.750∗∗∗ −1.287 0.817 2.495∗∗ 8.811∗∗∗
128 Marin/Sonoma −2.868∗∗∗ −1.874∗ 0.017 1.905∗ 2.928∗∗∗ −2.680∗∗∗ −1.692∗ 0.067 1.618 2.580∗∗∗
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Table 15: This table shows the distribution of T-statistics from 500 random draws of 5% of each market for Hedonic RHAT,
estimated rent using hedonic adjustments based on building attributes.. Results are for adjustments based on the first matching
criteria, and using all coefficients with and without Green variables are shown. The results from using only significant coefficients
for hedonic adjustment, as opposed to all coefficients, are shown in Table 12. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels respectively.
Percentile for All Coef. No Green Percentile for All Coef.
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
2606 Chicago −1.338 −1.023 0.230 1.607 1.939∗ −1.272 −0.986 0.363 1.562 1.864∗
2455 Washington DC −2.253∗∗ −1.732∗ −0.500 0.759 1.236 −1.744∗ −1.409 −0.196 1.036 1.502
2447 Los Angeles −1.620 −1.263 0.029 1.206 1.615 −1.673∗ −1.249 −0.046 1.241 1.556
1945 South Florida −1.737∗ −1.400 −0.117 1.053 1.455 −1.675∗ −1.355 −0.132 1.221 1.526
1846 Dallas/Ft Worth −1.441 −1.181 0.187 1.624 1.940∗ −1.262 −0.862 0.287 1.720∗ 2.189∗∗
1742 Atlanta −1.267 −0.984 0.225 1.790∗ 2.156∗∗ −1.220 −0.936 0.292 1.710∗ 2.077∗∗
1723 Northern New Jersey −1.435 −1.043 0.370 1.695∗ 2.054∗∗ −1.243 −0.870 0.453 1.651∗ 1.902∗
1661 Philadelphia −1.150 −0.891 0.469 1.632 1.998∗∗ −1.272 −0.902 0.451 1.725∗ 2.124∗∗
1471 Phoenix −1.368 −0.913 0.303 1.643 1.978∗∗ −1.340 −0.915 0.435 1.720∗ 2.090∗∗
1415 Orange (California) −1.263 −0.921 0.352 1.662∗ 2.015∗∗ −1.334 −0.932 0.390 1.816∗ 2.179∗∗
1386 Boston −1.735∗ −1.356 −0.058 1.246 1.603 −1.687∗ −1.357 −0.051 1.130 1.419
1323 Houston −1.398 −1.101 0.123 1.472 1.873∗ −1.591 −1.235 0.118 1.543 1.888∗
1300 Detroit −1.306 −1.016 0.170 1.546 2.026∗∗ −1.548 −1.155 0.100 1.490 1.822∗
1187 Seattle/Puget Sound −1.590 −1.245 0.025 1.285 1.606 −1.543 −1.120 0.086 1.457 1.894∗
1177 Denver −1.559 −1.231 −0.039 1.209 1.772∗ −1.574 −1.247 −0.053 1.349 1.892∗
1009 Minneapolis/St Paul −1.771∗ −1.442 −0.058 1.269 1.710∗ −1.675∗ −1.296 −0.024 1.304 1.749∗
983 San Diego −1.636 −1.247 0.145 1.468 1.874∗ −1.478 −1.129 0.103 1.351 1.822∗
881 ’St. Louis’ −1.446 −1.063 0.283 1.622 1.896∗ −1.451 −1.124 0.350 1.678∗ 1.894∗
876 Sacramento −1.554 −1.176 0.106 1.447 1.859∗ −1.509 −1.089 0.198 1.638 1.935∗
867 Long Island (New York) −1.676∗ −1.330 −0.106 1.140 1.591 −1.613 −1.345 −0.186 1.030 1.402
804 Kansas City −1.173 −0.774 0.431 1.734∗ 2.126∗∗ −1.291 −0.933 0.338 1.551 1.908∗
801 Inland Empire (California) −1.166 −0.981 0.415 1.895∗ 2.281∗∗ −1.228 −0.833 0.341 1.774∗ 2.201∗∗
785 Baltimore −1.741∗ −1.271 0.047 1.331 1.652∗ −1.455 −1.088 0.157 1.501 1.810∗
777 New York City −2.011∗∗ −1.707∗ −0.236 1.026 1.290 −1.999∗∗ −1.599 0.013 1.106 1.346
769 Tampa/St Petersburg −1.658∗ −1.143 0.165 1.359 1.684∗ −1.368 −1.101 −0.027 1.510 1.844∗
714 Portland −1.606 −1.283 −0.074 1.256 1.744∗ −1.700∗ −1.242 −0.022 1.396 1.923∗
689 Columbus −1.605 −1.242 −0.055 1.266 1.738∗ −1.739∗ −1.339 −0.010 1.412 1.816∗
689 Las Vegas −1.732∗ −1.065 0.120 1.565 1.803∗ −1.558 −1.225 0.089 1.523 2.111∗∗
676 East Bay/Oakland −1.776∗ −1.316 0.100 1.462 2.017∗∗ −1.562 −1.156 0.176 1.598 2.172∗∗
652 Cleveland −1.704∗ −1.357 0.065 1.374 1.693∗ −1.893∗ −1.444 0.147 1.425 1.683∗
651 Charlotte −1.303 −1.051 0.275 1.613 2.052∗∗ −1.400 −0.940 0.369 1.811∗ 2.149∗∗
642 Cincinnati/Dayton −1.222 −0.942 0.357 1.859∗ 2.216∗∗ −1.351 −0.903 0.441 1.893∗ 2.339∗∗
620 Indianapolis −1.647∗ −1.266 0.128 1.421 1.756∗ −1.477 −1.155 0.016 1.537 1.881∗
617 South Bay/San Jose −1.737∗ −1.325 0.024 1.459 1.894∗ −1.464 −1.162 0.106 1.445 1.833∗
*Small sample issues possible below 600 N
598 Orlando −1.995∗∗ −1.444 0.038 1.284 1.676∗ −2.016∗∗ −1.387 −0.076 1.409 1.845∗
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Percentile for All Coef. No Green Percentile for All Coef.
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
569 Milwaukee/Madison −1.815∗ −1.393 −0.030 1.386 2.021∗∗ −1.813∗ −1.394 −0.155 1.198 1.618
567 Pittsburgh −1.823∗ −1.394 0.086 1.536 1.843∗ −1.703∗ −1.291 0.090 1.545 1.985∗∗
560 Austin −1.627 −1.172 0.100 1.514 1.997∗∗ −1.623 −1.300 0.011 1.507 1.833∗
538 San Francisco −1.446 −1.216 0.031 1.356 1.814∗ −1.863∗ −1.409 −0.097 1.333 1.763∗
519 Raleigh/Durham −1.806∗ −1.387 −0.027 1.237 1.630 −1.901∗ −1.218 0.082 1.388 1.759∗
448 Nashville −1.721∗ −1.320 0.067 1.429 2.019∗∗ −1.981∗∗ −1.481 0.125 1.479 2.049∗∗
444 San Antonio −1.713∗ −1.264 0.188 1.370 1.741∗ −1.649∗ −1.144 0.228 1.473 1.851∗
430 Hampton Roads −1.533 −1.123 0.224 1.649∗ 2.130∗∗ −1.154 −0.794 0.322 1.639 2.072∗∗
423 Salt Lake City −1.620 −1.292 0.165 1.422 1.897∗ −1.779∗ −1.385 0.038 1.432 1.836∗
397 Jacksonville (Florida) −2.452∗∗ −1.530 0.044 1.408 1.933∗ −2.025∗∗ −1.512 0.107 1.583 2.277∗∗
384 Hartford −1.922∗ −1.338 0.413 1.744∗ 2.344∗∗ −1.811∗ −1.349 0.212 1.581 2.001∗∗
355 Richmond VA −1.525 −1.158 0.067 1.510 2.008∗∗ −1.614 −1.332 −0.069 1.519 2.040∗∗
331 Louisville −3.286∗∗∗ −2.127∗∗ 0.073 1.524 2.364∗∗ −3.052∗∗∗ −2.163∗∗ −0.041 1.895∗ 2.786∗∗∗
319 Westchester/So Connecticut −4.592∗∗∗ −2.554∗∗ −0.141 1.303 1.855∗ −7.570∗∗∗ −3.991∗∗∗ 0.121 1.606 3.096∗∗∗
304 Birmingham −1.734∗ −1.177 0.203 1.685∗ 2.336∗∗ −2.191∗∗ −1.417 0.264 1.836∗ 2.553∗∗
277 Memphis −2.488∗∗ −1.620 0.192 2.293∗∗ 3.737∗∗∗ −3.164∗∗∗ −2.038∗∗ 0.052 1.953∗ 2.973∗∗∗
269 Oklahoma City −1.342 −1.031 0.294 1.696∗ 2.112∗∗ −1.525 −1.114 0.258 1.681∗ 2.223∗∗
257 Providence −2.551∗∗ −1.536 0.081 2.129∗∗ 3.109∗∗∗ −2.837∗∗∗ −1.507 −0.015 2.730∗∗∗ 3.869∗∗∗
242 New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner −3.460∗∗∗ −2.508∗∗ −0.140 1.398 1.924∗ −3.503∗∗∗ −2.237∗∗ −0.072 1.466 2.211∗∗
188 Buffalo/Niagara Falls −1.288 −1.130 0.659 4.599∗∗∗ 7.447∗∗∗ −2.523∗∗ −1.822∗ 0.112 3.096∗∗∗ 8.814∗∗∗
128 Marin/Sonoma −4.233∗∗∗ −2.349∗∗ −0.151 1.649∗ 2.795∗∗∗ −4.362∗∗∗ −2.355∗∗ −0.041 1.939∗ 3.042∗∗∗
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5.1. Holdback Results
The models were also backtested on the holdback sample to test the robustness
of the model. The number of iterations was reduced to 200. Since the number of
buildings available as subject properties was greatly reduced, significant redundancy
would have been introduced with a large set of iteration. Each model was run 200
times. While the subject properties could only be drawn from the holdback sample,
comparable properties were available from the whole market. The coefficients for
hedonic adjustments were based on the regression results from the testing sample
(80% of the market randomly drawn).
Results from backtesting on the holdback sample are presented in Tables 16 and
17 for Hedonic RHAT, or the hedonic adjusted models. Tables 18 and 19 show results
for Basic RHAT, or the unadjusted estimation of expected rent.
The results were remarkably similar to the primary testing sample. The market
with larger number of buildings consistently failed to reject the null in the 10th
percentile tails of the distribution. The holdback results indicated that the model
design was not sample specific, and should continue to perform well with other data
samples. The consistent results produced no indications that the model was fitted
to the data. Future tests of the model on new sets of data could further confirm the
model’s robustness.
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Table 16: This table shows the distribution of T-statistics from 200 random draws of 5% of each market for Hedonic RHAT from
the Holdback Sample. The MarketN represents the subject properties available from the holdback sample, which was 20% of
the market. The comparables were drawn from the whole market. Results for adjustments based on only significant coefficients
with and without Green variables are shown. The results using hedonic adjustments from all coefficients, as opposed to only
significant, are shown in Table 13. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Percentile for Sig. Coef. Percentile for Sig. Coef. No Green
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
649 Chicago −1.324 −1.074 0.277 1.650∗ 1.864∗ −1.406 −1.092 0.079 1.659∗ 2.110∗∗
611 Washington DC −1.534 −1.211 0.179 1.865∗ 2.405∗∗ −0.770 −0.581 0.603 2.179∗∗ 2.612∗∗∗
611 Los Angeles −1.971∗∗ −1.581 −0.302 1.082 1.459 −1.491 −0.977 0.485 1.650∗ 2.088∗∗
472 South Florida −3.068∗∗∗ −2.675∗∗∗ −1.307 0.191 0.728 −0.583 −0.303 1.122 2.497∗∗ 2.744∗∗∗
445 Dallas/Ft Worth −2.065∗∗ −1.800∗ −0.577 0.729 1.023 −0.881 −0.532 0.658 2.252∗∗ 2.745∗∗∗
420 Atlanta −2.438∗∗ −2.123∗∗ −1.207 0.229 0.659 −1.513 −1.226 −0.260 2.040∗∗ 2.490∗∗
416 Northern New Jersey −1.052 −0.825 0.352 2.017∗∗ 2.207∗∗ −1.263 −1.138 0.167 1.793∗ 1.968∗∗
401 Philadelphia −0.708 −0.553 0.756 2.337∗∗ 2.665∗∗∗ −1.953∗ −1.669∗ −0.619 0.903 1.336
357 Phoenix −2.296∗∗ −1.868∗ −0.460 0.760 1.069 −0.745 −0.216 1.161 2.217∗∗ 2.458∗∗
340 Orange (California) −1.503 −1.182 0.135 1.345 1.825∗ −1.002 −0.798 0.315 2.015∗∗ 2.252∗∗
333 Boston −1.437 −1.054 0.294 1.581 2.181∗∗ −1.741∗ −1.420 −0.138 1.321 1.687∗
319 Houston −2.772∗∗∗ −2.368∗∗ −1.040 0.344 0.863 −0.874 −0.568 1.137 2.162∗∗ 2.405∗∗
314 Detroit −1.642 −1.387 −0.221 1.195 1.645∗ −1.855∗ −1.714∗ −0.881 0.272 0.872
283 Seattle/Puget Sound −1.150 −0.864 0.444 1.738∗ 2.037∗∗ −0.647 −0.337 0.861 2.230∗∗ 2.410∗∗
283 Denver −2.423∗∗ −1.953∗ −0.785 0.504 1.199 −1.323 −1.143 0.278 1.849∗ 2.263∗∗
247 Minneapolis/St Paul −2.041∗∗ −1.761∗ −0.473 0.781 0.998 −1.518 −0.919 0.595 1.508 1.731∗
245 San Diego −2.311∗∗ −2.059∗∗ −0.731 0.651 0.978 0.410 0.713 2.048∗∗ 3.520∗∗∗ 3.991∗∗∗
218 ’St. Louis’ −1.069 −0.610 0.657 2.158∗∗ 2.463∗∗ −1.120 −0.855 0.384 2.263∗∗ 2.484∗∗
218 Sacramento −1.952∗ −1.615 −0.195 1.127 1.560 −1.379 −1.040 0.383 2.174∗∗ 2.628∗∗∗
215 Long Island (New York) −1.259 −0.544 0.732 2.004∗∗ 2.400∗∗ −1.818∗ −1.463 0.074 1.375 1.629
203 Kansas City −0.953 −0.758 0.436 2.006∗∗ 2.317∗∗ −1.443 −1.151 −0.116 1.946∗ 2.389∗∗
203 Inland Empire (California) −1.652∗ −1.283 −0.001 1.418 1.640 −1.224 −0.986 0.091 1.461 1.803∗
194 Baltimore −2.318∗∗ −1.788∗ −0.531 0.637 1.076 −0.912 −0.548 0.789 2.118∗∗ 2.428∗∗
192 New York City −2.882∗∗∗ −2.245∗∗ −0.693 0.827 1.089 −1.431 −0.862 0.664 1.681∗ 1.850∗
189 Tampa/St Petersburg −1.708∗ −1.425 −0.421 1.222 1.628 −1.165 −0.930 0.308 2.323∗∗ 3.340∗∗∗
172 Portland −1.503 −0.922 0.163 1.342 1.925∗ −0.790 −0.487 1.066 2.373∗∗ 2.880∗∗∗
165 Columbus −1.982∗∗ −1.674∗ −0.373 1.010 1.320 −1.866∗ −1.600 0.082 1.420 1.766∗
165 Las Vegas −2.600∗∗∗ −2.269∗∗ −1.013 0.330 0.774 −1.440 −1.156 0.140 1.413 1.828∗
161 East Bay/Oakland −0.997 −0.678 0.736 1.998∗∗ 2.302∗∗ −1.878∗ −1.675∗ −0.569 0.833 1.190
157 Cleveland −1.087 −0.792 0.470 1.940∗ 2.517∗∗ −1.713∗ −1.319 −0.184 1.244 1.457
156 Charlotte −1.848∗ −1.651∗ −0.370 1.218 1.486 −0.815 −0.595 0.956 2.326∗∗ 2.711∗∗∗
155 Cincinnati/Dayton −3.643∗∗∗ −3.067∗∗∗ −1.684∗ −0.353 −0.024 −0.949 −0.559 0.846 2.365∗∗ 2.797∗∗∗
150 Indianapolis −3.103∗∗∗ −2.579∗∗∗ −0.948 0.555 0.854 −1.427 −1.019 0.257 1.706∗ 2.581∗∗∗
148 South Bay/San Jose −1.157 −0.864 0.229 1.637 2.053∗∗ −1.945∗ −1.642 −0.270 1.380 1.626
143 Orlando −2.076∗∗ −1.720∗ −0.319 1.196 1.471 −1.803∗ −1.406 0.151 1.449 1.898∗
135 Milwaukee/Madison −1.057 −0.862 0.435 2.198∗∗ 2.648∗∗∗ −1.305 −1.175 −0.267 1.470 1.911∗
135 Pittsburgh −1.355 −1.217 −0.000 1.494 2.053∗∗ −1.828∗ −1.455 −0.451 1.241 1.544
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Percentile for Sig. Coef. Percentile for Sig. Coef. No Green
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
133 Austin −2.176∗∗ −1.893∗ −0.434 0.750 1.300 −1.623 −1.394 0.135 1.346 1.692∗
128 San Francisco −1.696∗ −1.121 0.320 1.889∗ 2.145∗∗ −1.485 −1.078 0.137 1.624 1.954∗
123 Raleigh/Durham −2.480∗∗ −2.001∗∗ −0.765 0.935 1.171 −0.790 −0.457 0.923 2.557∗∗ 2.866∗∗∗
106 Nashville −1.322 −1.049 0.183 1.849∗ 2.375∗∗ −1.039 −0.671 0.715 2.439∗∗ 3.035∗∗∗
105 San Antonio −1.186 −0.743 0.680 1.701∗ 1.946∗ −1.126 −0.419 1.154 2.343∗∗ 2.854∗∗∗
101 Hampton Roads −2.611∗∗∗ −2.178∗∗ −0.692 0.516 1.020 −1.117 −0.720 0.953 2.490∗∗ 3.096∗∗∗
99 Salt Lake City −2.260∗∗ −1.724∗ −0.226 1.227 1.479 −1.005 −0.525 0.906 2.174∗∗ 2.525∗∗
93 Jacksonville (Florida) −2.238∗∗ −1.915∗ −0.554 1.047 1.798∗ −2.733∗∗∗ −2.044∗∗ −0.548 1.062 1.400
89 Hartford −0.725 −0.460 0.909 2.109∗∗ 2.622∗∗∗ −2.368∗∗ −1.644 −0.010 1.134 1.486
85 Richmond VA −1.588 −1.168 0.335 1.763∗ 2.057∗∗ −1.331 −1.067 0.409 1.966∗∗ 2.198∗∗
79 Louisville −1.856∗ −1.108 0.527 1.980∗∗ 2.590∗∗∗ −0.995 −0.638 0.745 2.417∗∗ 3.117∗∗∗
77 Westchester/So Connecticut −5.175∗∗∗ −3.245∗∗∗ −0.602 0.775 1.060 −6.366∗∗∗ −4.075∗∗∗ −0.255 1.073 1.387
76 Birmingham −2.204∗∗ −1.662∗ −0.143 1.388 1.921∗ −1.849∗ −1.474 −0.382 1.213 1.566
71 Memphis −1.856∗ −1.089 0.551 2.306∗∗ 3.380∗∗∗ −1.839∗ −1.245 0.631 2.182∗∗ 3.124∗∗∗
71 Oklahoma City −1.660∗ −1.413 −0.260 1.170 1.575 −1.931∗ −1.475 −0.191 1.237 1.579
66 Providence −2.476∗∗ −2.137∗∗ −0.058 1.432 1.931∗ −2.250∗∗ −1.748∗ −0.103 1.483 1.873∗
65 New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner −2.166∗∗ −1.752∗ −0.620 1.124 1.585 −2.078∗∗ −1.624 −0.449 1.196 1.706∗
50 Buffalo/Niagara Falls −2.954∗∗∗ −1.386 0.246 2.787∗∗∗ 5.813∗∗∗ −1.629 −1.319 0.018 2.706∗∗∗ 4.474∗∗∗
34 Marin/Sonoma −1.766∗ −1.401 −0.112 1.782∗ 2.606∗∗∗ −1.676∗ −1.444 −0.058 1.869∗ 2.484∗∗
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Table 17: This table shows the distribution of T-statistics from 200 random draws of 5% of each market for Hedonic RHAT
from the Holdback Sample. The MarketN represents the subject properties available from the holdback sample, which was 20%
of the market. The comparables were drawn from the whole market. Results for adjustments based on all coefficients with and
without Green variables are shown. The results from using only significant coefficients for hedonic adjustment, as opposed to
all coefficients, are shown in Table 12. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Percentile for All Coef. No Green Percentile for All Coef.
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
649 Chicago −1.404 −1.170 0.037 1.509 1.742∗ −1.208 −0.820 0.407 1.809∗ 2.381∗∗
611 Washington DC −1.089 −0.720 0.546 2.006∗∗ 2.279∗∗ −1.027 −0.771 0.437 1.883∗ 2.214∗∗
611 Los Angeles −1.270 −0.890 0.327 1.713∗ 2.181∗∗ −1.808∗ −1.437 −0.234 1.225 1.657∗
472 South Florida −0.722 −0.198 1.157 2.597∗∗∗ 2.920∗∗∗ −2.419∗∗ −2.282∗∗ −0.953 0.242 0.563
445 Dallas/Ft Worth −0.964 −0.617 0.836 2.268∗∗ 2.828∗∗∗ −2.219∗∗ −1.865∗ −0.549 0.969 1.156
420 Atlanta −1.360 −1.085 −0.204 1.944∗ 2.352∗∗ −2.474∗∗ −2.099∗∗ −1.261 0.033 0.515
416 Northern New Jersey −1.307 −1.087 0.226 1.746∗ 2.258∗∗ −1.202 −0.796 0.567 1.938∗ 2.552∗∗
401 Philadelphia −1.770∗ −1.626 −0.589 1.014 1.392 −0.741 −0.490 0.960 2.517∗∗ 2.940∗∗∗
357 Phoenix 0.081 0.331 1.417 2.410∗∗ 2.647∗∗∗ −2.458∗∗ −2.056∗∗ −0.969 0.254 0.626
340 Orange (California) −1.025 −0.851 0.359 1.968∗∗ 2.336∗∗ −1.411 −1.097 0.358 1.736∗ 2.019∗∗
333 Boston −1.551 −1.333 −0.044 1.320 1.680∗ −1.214 −0.809 0.470 1.808∗ 2.136∗∗
319 Houston −0.828 −0.528 0.893 2.282∗∗ 2.580∗∗∗ −2.772∗∗∗ −2.269∗∗ −1.096 0.195 0.409
314 Detroit −1.732∗ −1.567 −0.683 0.782 1.525 −1.903∗ −1.630 −0.273 1.222 1.336
283 Seattle/Puget Sound −0.962 −0.600 0.777 2.113∗∗ 2.588∗∗∗ −1.154 −0.848 0.449 1.742∗ 2.121∗∗
283 Denver −1.394 −1.037 0.080 1.410 1.723∗ −2.293∗∗ −2.010∗∗ −0.728 0.418 0.902
247 Minneapolis/St Paul −1.217 −0.893 0.472 1.603 2.111∗∗ −2.559∗∗ −2.120∗∗ −0.525 0.870 1.170
245 San Diego 0.197 0.572 1.791∗ 3.293∗∗∗ 3.825∗∗∗ −2.507∗∗ −2.002∗∗ −0.699 0.613 0.929
218 ’St. Louis’ −1.152 −0.921 0.216 1.931∗ 2.440∗∗ −1.207 −0.743 0.598 2.110∗∗ 2.363∗∗
218 Sacramento −1.225 −0.860 0.397 1.938∗ 2.375∗∗ −2.192∗∗ −1.709∗ −0.318 0.974 1.319
215 Long Island (New York) −1.817∗ −1.267 0.166 1.081 1.328 −1.028 −0.729 0.770 1.831∗ 2.128∗∗
203 Kansas City −1.324 −1.085 −0.066 1.664∗ 2.184∗∗ −1.083 −0.687 0.455 1.677∗ 1.943∗
203 Inland Empire (California) −1.108 −0.836 0.365 1.658∗ 2.147∗∗ −1.487 −1.062 0.273 1.361 1.693∗
194 Baltimore −0.707 −0.312 0.820 2.274∗∗ 2.453∗∗ −1.776∗ −1.634 −0.297 1.228 1.555
192 New York City −1.577 −1.037 0.572 1.701∗ 1.901∗ −2.196∗∗ −1.900∗ −0.269 0.965 1.202
189 Tampa/St Petersburg −1.214 −0.871 0.541 2.471∗∗ 2.896∗∗∗ −1.654∗ −1.376 −0.280 1.292 1.814∗
172 Portland −0.724 −0.449 1.090 2.475∗∗ 2.866∗∗∗ −1.521 −1.191 −0.107 1.294 1.784∗
165 Columbus −1.614 −1.343 0.041 1.333 1.620 −2.193∗∗ −1.811∗ −0.381 1.085 1.621
165 Las Vegas −1.656∗ −1.173 0.137 1.271 1.602 −2.800∗∗∗ −2.338∗∗ −0.947 0.281 0.675
161 East Bay/Oakland −1.940∗ −1.720∗ −0.522 0.762 1.193 −0.991 −0.801 0.548 1.854∗ 2.178∗∗
157 Cleveland −1.590 −1.233 0.085 1.455 1.753∗ −1.152 −0.935 0.523 1.835∗ 2.288∗∗
156 Charlotte −1.233 −1.032 0.521 1.820∗ 2.454∗∗ −2.208∗∗ −1.556 −0.271 1.179 1.419
155 Cincinnati/Dayton −1.174 −0.781 0.544 2.162∗∗ 2.576∗∗ −3.638∗∗∗ −2.960∗∗∗ −1.636 −0.178 0.048
150 Indianapolis −1.244 −0.799 0.516 1.611 2.286∗∗ −2.585∗∗∗ −2.357∗∗ −0.974 0.528 0.928
148 South Bay/San Jose −2.231∗∗ −1.837∗ −0.328 1.034 1.441 −1.333 −0.999 0.261 1.762∗ 2.059∗∗
143 Orlando −1.699∗ −1.293 0.011 1.374 1.683∗ −2.539∗∗ −1.722∗ −0.443 1.317 2.003∗∗
135 Milwaukee/Madison −1.433 −1.268 −0.500 1.172 1.517 −0.753 −0.580 0.560 2.400∗∗ 2.850∗∗∗
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Percentile for All Coef. No Green Percentile for All Coef.
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
135 Pittsburgh −1.818∗ −1.540 −0.195 1.279 1.783∗ −1.501 −1.276 0.230 1.712∗ 2.499∗∗
133 Austin −1.982∗∗ −1.506 −0.010 1.218 1.477 −2.458∗∗ −1.998∗∗ −0.609 0.778 1.035
128 San Francisco −1.547 −1.268 0.227 1.881∗ 2.334∗∗ −1.552 −1.154 0.187 1.443 2.036∗∗
123 Raleigh/Durham −0.539 −0.304 1.062 2.594∗∗∗ 3.027∗∗∗ −2.768∗∗∗ −2.102∗∗ −0.466 1.039 1.448
106 Nashville −1.113 −0.862 0.543 2.463∗∗ 2.826∗∗∗ −1.417 −1.027 0.175 1.595 2.198∗∗
105 San Antonio −0.972 −0.513 0.760 2.088∗∗ 2.386∗∗ −1.535 −0.940 0.602 1.594 1.761∗
101 Hampton Roads −1.310 −0.788 0.687 1.959∗ 2.256∗∗ −2.385∗∗ −1.925∗ −0.582 0.673 1.251
99 Salt Lake City −0.766 −0.464 1.032 2.061∗∗ 2.760∗∗∗ −2.608∗∗∗ −2.129∗∗ −0.200 1.225 1.503
93 Jacksonville (Florida) −3.067∗∗∗ −2.498∗∗ −0.531 0.954 1.114 −2.063∗∗ −1.799∗ −0.384 1.292 1.692∗
89 Hartford −2.228∗∗ −1.705∗ −0.153 1.251 1.672∗ −0.899 −0.506 1.029 2.420∗∗ 2.792∗∗∗
85 Richmond VA −1.333 −1.071 0.428 1.536 1.958∗ −1.467 −1.123 0.358 1.873∗ 2.264∗∗
79 Louisville −1.084 −0.715 0.892 2.291∗∗ 3.111∗∗∗ −1.389 −1.022 0.437 2.021∗∗ 2.417∗∗
77 Westchester/So Connecticut −3.190∗∗∗ −2.257∗∗ −0.022 1.050 1.554 −5.444∗∗∗ −3.008∗∗∗ −0.552 0.993 1.258
76 Birmingham −1.779∗ −1.483 −0.263 1.196 1.653∗ −1.749∗ −1.400 −0.112 1.628 2.085∗∗
71 Memphis −2.108∗∗ −0.754 0.707 2.487∗∗ 3.104∗∗∗ −1.651∗ −0.839 0.812 2.620∗∗∗ 3.678∗∗∗
71 Oklahoma City −1.762∗ −1.329 −0.117 1.321 2.030∗∗ −1.994∗∗ −1.499 −0.286 1.510 2.363∗∗
66 Providence −2.027∗∗ −1.581 0.140 1.657∗ 1.974∗∗ −2.245∗∗ −1.956∗ −0.165 1.205 1.623
65 New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner −2.042∗∗ −1.679∗ −0.431 1.373 1.915∗ −2.288∗∗ −1.734∗ −0.387 1.265 2.143∗∗
50 Buffalo/Niagara Falls −2.393∗∗ −1.674∗ −0.114 2.303∗∗ 4.373∗∗∗ −2.416∗∗ −1.585 0.301 4.431∗∗∗ 5.831∗∗∗
34 Marin/Sonoma −1.883∗ −1.507 0.246 1.772∗ 2.404∗∗ −1.727∗ −1.201 0.018 1.737∗ 2.673∗∗∗198
Table 18: This table shows the distribution of T-statistics from 200 random draws of 5% of each market for Basic RHAT from
the Holdback Sample. The MarketN represents the subject properties available from the holdback sample, which was 20% of
the market. The comparables were drawn from the whole market. Results for comparable selection based on sum of squares
from only significant coefficients with and without Green variables are shown. The results using hedonic adjustments from all
coefficients, as opposed to only significant, are shown in Table 9. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Percentile for Sig. Coef. Percentile for Sig. Coef. No Green
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
649 Chicago −1.705∗ −1.377 −0.166 1.403 1.891∗ −1.199 −1.004 −0.010 1.637 2.089∗∗
611 Washington DC −1.269 −0.948 0.370 2.120∗∗ 2.577∗∗∗ −1.300 −0.843 0.538 2.115∗∗ 2.548∗∗
611 Los Angeles −2.059∗∗ −1.673∗ −0.464 0.891 1.107 −1.992∗∗ −1.718∗ −0.201 0.886 1.108
472 South Florida −1.042 −0.839 0.535 1.867∗ 2.142∗∗ −0.809 −0.594 0.832 2.109∗∗ 2.395∗∗
445 Dallas/Ft Worth −1.377 −0.942 0.520 2.004∗∗ 2.296∗∗ −1.037 −0.732 0.453 2.249∗∗ 2.691∗∗∗
420 Atlanta −1.961∗∗ −1.854∗ −0.937 0.505 1.266 −1.884∗ −1.632 −0.762 1.072 1.482
416 Northern New Jersey −1.253 −1.107 −0.056 1.515 1.809∗ −1.292 −1.150 0.093 1.632 1.905∗
401 Philadelphia −1.823∗ −1.585 −0.644 0.703 0.981 −1.872∗ −1.642 −0.506 1.100 1.454
357 Phoenix −0.875 −0.574 0.648 1.690∗ 2.085∗∗ −0.840 −0.331 1.192 2.201∗∗ 2.560∗∗
340 Orange (California) −1.515 −1.250 −0.170 1.169 1.521 −1.370 −1.105 0.043 1.649∗ 1.945∗
333 Boston −1.988∗∗ −1.724∗ −0.241 1.289 1.720∗ −1.727∗ −1.493 −0.315 1.226 1.565
319 Houston −0.982 −0.841 0.630 1.902∗ 2.233∗∗ −1.113 −0.825 0.808 1.901∗ 2.169∗∗
314 Detroit −1.854∗ −1.643 −0.630 1.278 1.960∗ −1.861∗ −1.668∗ −0.770 0.460 1.053
283 Seattle/Puget Sound −1.242 −0.865 0.464 2.225∗∗ 2.448∗∗ −0.938 −0.494 0.969 2.540∗∗ 2.894∗∗∗
283 Denver −0.873 −0.557 0.711 2.136∗∗ 2.627∗∗∗ −1.007 −0.810 0.738 2.271∗∗ 2.727∗∗∗
247 Minneapolis/St Paul −1.763∗ −1.302 0.283 1.418 1.650∗ −1.671∗ −1.001 0.491 1.401 1.685∗
245 San Diego −0.308 −0.033 1.141 2.328∗∗ 2.793∗∗∗ −0.364 −0.080 1.040 2.477∗∗ 2.807∗∗∗
218 ’St. Louis’ −1.425 −1.084 −0.118 1.842∗ 2.521∗∗ −1.373 −1.064 −0.040 1.727∗ 2.078∗∗
218 Sacramento −0.890 −0.759 0.546 2.170∗∗ 2.497∗∗ −1.330 −0.979 0.568 2.257∗∗ 2.632∗∗∗
215 Long Island (New York) −1.540 −1.216 0.361 1.398 1.780∗ −1.986∗∗ −1.558 0.117 1.287 1.502
203 Kansas City −1.565 −1.256 −0.089 1.438 2.058∗∗ −1.311 −1.085 −0.076 2.049∗∗ 2.412∗∗
203 Inland Empire (California) −1.243 −0.810 0.493 1.875∗ 2.241∗∗ −0.931 −0.722 0.456 1.984∗∗ 2.455∗∗
194 Baltimore −0.950 −0.673 0.713 2.142∗∗ 2.522∗∗ −0.875 −0.643 0.731 2.091∗∗ 2.372∗∗
192 New York City −2.099∗∗ −1.616 0.383 1.405 1.678∗ −1.560 −0.952 0.702 1.516 1.811∗
189 Tampa/St Petersburg −1.297 −1.140 −0.242 1.234 1.762∗ −1.343 −1.085 −0.112 1.900∗ 2.523∗∗
172 Portland −1.240 −0.969 0.552 1.782∗ 2.053∗∗ −1.199 −0.812 0.580 1.863∗ 2.281∗∗
165 Columbus −1.893∗ −1.538 0.085 1.288 1.622 −2.028∗∗ −1.624 −0.174 1.111 1.626
165 Las Vegas −1.073 −0.728 0.620 1.817∗ 2.089∗∗ −1.298 −0.807 0.412 1.803∗ 2.145∗∗
161 East Bay/Oakland −1.917∗ −1.573 −0.370 0.787 1.108 −1.634 −1.424 −0.393 1.091 1.656∗
157 Cleveland −1.393 −1.199 0.055 1.587 1.789∗ −1.501 −1.332 −0.204 1.406 1.949∗
156 Charlotte −1.296 −0.863 0.430 1.962∗∗ 2.145∗∗ −0.997 −0.779 0.655 2.110∗∗ 2.532∗∗
155 Cincinnati/Dayton −1.235 −1.028 −0.056 1.861∗ 2.019∗∗ −1.475 −1.232 0.106 1.534 2.272∗∗
150 Indianapolis −1.521 −1.110 0.305 1.338 1.527 −1.725∗ −1.336 0.112 1.464 1.698∗
148 South Bay/San Jose −1.627 −1.416 −0.102 1.415 1.860∗ −1.696∗ −1.386 0.109 1.435 1.991∗∗
143 Orlando −1.920∗ −1.628 −0.077 1.402 1.692∗ −1.881∗ −1.408 0.077 1.576 2.004∗∗
135 Milwaukee/Madison −1.590 −1.381 −0.419 1.263 1.483 −1.398 −1.280 −0.411 1.557 1.964∗∗
135 Pittsburgh −1.440 −1.282 −0.133 1.447 1.878∗ −1.839∗ −1.503 −0.381 1.242 1.596
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Percentile for Sig. Coef. Percentile for Sig. Coef. No Green
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133 Austin −1.725∗ −1.448 0.086 1.126 1.597 −1.653∗ −1.358 0.008 1.268 1.669∗
128 San Francisco −2.248∗∗ −1.888∗ −0.292 1.163 1.673∗ −2.013∗∗ −1.578 −0.347 1.167 1.424
123 Raleigh/Durham −0.962 −0.658 0.878 2.113∗∗ 2.518∗∗ −0.719 −0.413 0.880 2.423∗∗ 2.893∗∗∗
106 Nashville −0.829 −0.593 0.751 2.910∗∗∗ 3.680∗∗∗ −0.815 −0.565 1.091 3.026∗∗∗ 3.955∗∗∗
105 San Antonio −2.736∗∗∗ −2.224∗∗ −0.558 0.781 1.058 −2.780∗∗∗ −2.240∗∗ −0.566 0.695 1.021
101 Hampton Roads −1.756∗ −1.595 −0.100 1.178 1.655∗ −1.321 −1.065 0.367 1.885∗ 2.389∗∗
99 Salt Lake City −1.184 −0.765 0.563 1.652∗ 1.908∗ −1.433 −0.847 0.666 1.844∗ 2.515∗∗
93 Jacksonville (Florida) −2.556∗∗ −2.063∗∗ −0.374 1.235 1.841∗ −2.106∗∗ −1.738∗ −0.427 0.948 1.623
89 Hartford −1.115 −0.727 0.523 1.884∗ 2.534∗∗ −1.383 −1.015 0.723 2.056∗∗ 2.562∗∗
85 Richmond VA −1.608 −1.333 0.071 1.415 1.659∗ −1.581 −1.221 0.149 1.595 1.834∗
79 Louisville −1.636 −1.003 0.687 2.113∗∗ 2.556∗∗ −1.190 −0.867 0.673 2.187∗∗ 2.804∗∗∗
77 Westchester/So Connecticut −3.831∗∗∗ −2.709∗∗∗ −0.626 1.016 1.675∗ −4.028∗∗∗ −3.016∗∗∗ −0.708 0.912 1.161
76 Birmingham −1.673∗ −1.385 −0.484 1.288 1.796∗ −1.743∗ −1.441 −0.311 1.226 1.524
71 Memphis −1.586 −0.687 0.603 1.865∗ 2.508∗∗ −2.380∗∗ −1.546 0.429 1.770∗ 2.112∗∗
71 Oklahoma City −1.494 −1.170 0.320 1.717∗ 2.395∗∗ −1.574 −1.179 0.301 1.748∗ 2.048∗∗
66 Providence −1.682∗ −1.344 −0.033 1.254 1.700∗ −1.579 −1.365 0.103 1.406 1.863∗
65 New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner −2.026∗∗ −1.686∗ −0.443 1.068 1.387 −2.180∗∗ −1.730∗ −0.470 1.235 1.388
50 Buffalo/Niagara Falls −2.085∗∗ −1.632 −0.018 1.889∗ 2.791∗∗∗ −1.753∗ −1.248 0.033 1.889∗ 2.791∗∗∗
34 Marin/Sonoma −2.081∗∗ −1.542 −0.455 1.880∗ 2.730∗∗∗ −1.932∗ −1.460 −0.295 2.148∗∗ 3.759∗∗∗
200
Table 19: This table shows the distribution of T-statistics from 200 random draws of 5% of each market for Basic RHAT from
the Holdback Sample. The MarketN represents the subject properties available from the holdback sample, which was 20% of
the market. The comparables were drawn from the whole market. Results for comparable selection based on sum of squares
from all coefficients with and without Green variables are shown. The results from using only significant coefficients for hedonic
adjustment, as opposed to all coefficients, are shown in Table 8. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Percentile for All Coef. No Green Percentile for All Coef.
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
649 Chicago −1.341 −1.098 0.099 1.683∗ 2.309∗∗ −1.504 −1.210 0.094 1.607 1.928∗
611 Washington DC −1.247 −0.933 0.454 2.181∗∗ 2.592∗∗∗ −1.173 −0.883 0.375 1.586 2.323∗∗
611 Los Angeles −2.094∗∗ −1.605 −0.369 1.020 1.367 −2.135∗∗ −1.741∗ −0.327 0.962 1.122
472 South Florida −1.052 −0.784 0.720 2.112∗∗ 2.271∗∗ −1.030 −0.646 0.599 2.043∗∗ 2.339∗∗
445 Dallas/Ft Worth −1.247 −0.676 0.779 2.308∗∗ 2.596∗∗∗ −1.190 −0.747 0.599 1.797∗ 2.060∗∗
420 Atlanta −1.679∗ −1.467 −0.677 0.840 1.352 −1.934∗ −1.768∗ −0.872 0.643 1.069
416 Northern New Jersey −1.284 −1.096 0.181 1.755∗ 2.018∗∗ −1.449 −1.242 0.142 1.677∗ 1.952∗
401 Philadelphia −1.816∗ −1.578 −0.517 1.127 1.690∗ −1.841∗ −1.646∗ −0.696 0.885 1.473
357 Phoenix −0.283 0.152 1.131 2.188∗∗ 2.458∗∗ −1.338 −0.975 0.495 1.726∗ 2.172∗∗
340 Orange (California) −1.560 −1.260 −0.164 1.496 1.863∗ −1.708∗ −1.278 0.120 1.357 1.513
333 Boston −1.713∗ −1.504 −0.135 1.338 1.605 −1.930∗ −1.516 −0.211 1.141 1.535
319 Houston −0.934 −0.738 0.765 2.005∗∗ 2.236∗∗ −1.057 −0.788 0.692 1.937∗ 2.270∗∗
314 Detroit −1.645∗ −1.470 −0.572 0.923 1.789∗ −1.919∗ −1.685∗ −0.641 0.899 1.343
283 Seattle/Puget Sound −0.947 −0.604 0.957 2.562∗∗ 2.889∗∗∗ −1.172 −0.909 0.454 2.094∗∗ 2.321∗∗
283 Denver −0.890 −0.692 0.813 2.033∗∗ 2.244∗∗ −0.971 −0.719 0.687 1.993∗∗ 2.381∗∗
247 Minneapolis/St Paul −1.278 −0.994 0.383 1.584 2.064∗∗ −1.928∗ −1.673∗ 0.303 1.325 1.652∗
245 San Diego −0.434 −0.204 1.167 2.311∗∗ 2.776∗∗∗ −0.515 −0.351 0.902 2.298∗∗ 2.729∗∗∗
218 ’St. Louis’ −1.377 −1.134 −0.178 1.479 1.815∗ −1.411 −1.202 0.035 1.635 1.975∗∗
218 Sacramento −1.021 −0.770 0.729 2.147∗∗ 2.584∗∗∗ −1.166 −0.864 0.309 2.026∗∗ 2.574∗∗
215 Long Island (New York) −1.488 −1.231 0.141 1.196 1.395 −1.539 −1.156 0.389 1.427 1.588
203 Kansas City −1.207 −1.061 0.023 1.698∗ 2.201∗∗ −1.394 −1.163 −0.220 1.815∗ 2.333∗∗
203 Inland Empire (California) −0.825 −0.566 0.724 2.234∗∗ 2.567∗∗ −1.001 −0.649 0.714 1.940∗ 2.196∗∗
194 Baltimore −0.713 −0.435 0.792 2.242∗∗ 2.563∗∗ −0.977 −0.484 0.953 2.266∗∗ 2.782∗∗∗
192 New York City −1.623 −1.091 0.708 1.621 1.876∗ −1.675∗ −1.220 0.579 1.586 1.842∗
189 Tampa/St Petersburg −1.447 −1.168 0.239 2.043∗∗ 2.367∗∗ −1.415 −1.199 −0.213 1.582 1.985∗∗
172 Portland −0.951 −0.760 0.675 1.953∗ 2.319∗∗ −1.081 −0.861 0.400 1.755∗ 2.045∗∗
165 Columbus −1.767∗ −1.490 −0.097 1.261 1.652∗ −2.101∗∗ −1.733∗ −0.100 1.327 1.732∗
165 Las Vegas −1.024 −0.669 0.675 1.613 1.859∗ −1.249 −0.822 0.546 1.829∗ 2.379∗∗
161 East Bay/Oakland −1.856∗ −1.493 −0.397 1.157 1.675∗ −1.971∗∗ −1.685∗ −0.456 1.044 1.667∗
157 Cleveland −1.228 −1.100 0.058 1.742∗ 2.148∗∗ −1.365 −1.080 −0.015 1.736∗ 2.105∗∗
156 Charlotte −1.337 −1.108 0.346 1.912∗ 2.254∗∗ −1.362 −1.039 0.392 1.781∗ 2.050∗∗
155 Cincinnati/Dayton −1.440 −1.227 −0.073 1.390 1.759∗ −1.498 −1.220 0.074 1.522 1.879∗
150 Indianapolis −1.500 −1.115 0.213 1.378 1.649∗ −1.598 −1.241 0.291 1.425 1.610
148 South Bay/San Jose −1.803∗ −1.608 −0.041 1.349 1.782∗ −1.670∗ −1.385 −0.053 1.472 1.811∗
143 Orlando −1.604 −1.190 −0.030 1.417 1.771∗ −1.705∗ −1.355 −0.212 1.320 1.695∗
135 Milwaukee/Madison −1.329 −1.197 −0.523 1.326 1.912∗ −1.416 −1.258 −0.445 1.546 2.159∗∗
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marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
135 Pittsburgh −1.801∗ −1.527 −0.172 1.329 1.829∗ −1.654∗ −1.430 0.046 1.511 1.896∗
133 Austin −1.745∗ −1.491 0.137 1.159 1.470 −1.815∗ −1.480 −0.065 1.196 1.311
128 San Francisco −1.824∗ −1.526 −0.319 1.173 1.539 −2.014∗∗ −1.698∗ −0.405 1.111 1.375
123 Raleigh/Durham −0.583 −0.378 1.129 2.459∗∗ 2.934∗∗∗ −0.906 −0.628 0.984 2.464∗∗ 2.906∗∗∗
106 Nashville −0.776 −0.632 1.105 3.391∗∗∗ 3.919∗∗∗ −0.856 −0.617 0.978 3.006∗∗∗ 3.902∗∗∗
105 San Antonio −2.698∗∗∗ −2.163∗∗ −0.702 0.782 1.051 −2.616∗∗∗ −2.234∗∗ −0.668 0.643 0.930
101 Hampton Roads −1.837∗ −1.400 0.160 1.388 1.717∗ −1.872∗ −1.651∗ −0.214 1.093 1.708∗
99 Salt Lake City −1.441 −1.042 0.707 1.712∗ 1.951∗ −1.369 −0.920 0.554 1.777∗ 2.131∗∗
93 Jacksonville (Florida) −2.676∗∗∗ −1.959∗ −0.549 0.679 1.018 −2.134∗∗ −1.575 −0.333 0.841 1.552
89 Hartford −1.263 −0.834 0.530 1.853∗ 2.313∗∗ −1.587 −1.085 0.701 2.001∗∗ 2.234∗∗
85 Richmond VA −1.633 −1.336 0.042 1.321 1.869∗ −1.568 −1.258 0.306 1.553 1.789∗
79 Louisville −1.199 −0.844 0.852 2.373∗∗ 2.966∗∗∗ −1.326 −0.652 0.960 2.392∗∗ 2.736∗∗∗
77 Westchester/So Connecticut −2.777∗∗∗ −2.156∗∗ −0.604 1.032 1.371 −3.578∗∗∗ −2.392∗∗ −0.513 0.987 1.648∗
76 Birmingham −2.030∗∗ −1.622 −0.529 1.015 1.560 −2.315∗∗ −1.547 −0.452 1.288 1.718∗
71 Memphis −2.264∗∗ −1.260 0.417 1.729∗ 2.474∗∗ −2.386∗∗ −1.462 0.507 1.850∗ 2.658∗∗∗
71 Oklahoma City −1.408 −1.076 0.249 2.025∗∗ 2.783∗∗∗ −1.350 −1.116 0.150 2.114∗∗ 2.707∗∗∗
66 Providence −1.893∗ −1.432 0.006 1.585 1.942∗ −1.934∗ −1.373 −0.029 1.408 1.648∗
65 New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner −2.151∗∗ −1.706∗ −0.433 1.265 1.449 −2.215∗∗ −1.807∗ −0.450 1.282 1.515
50 Buffalo/Niagara Falls −1.998∗∗ −1.622 −0.165 1.975∗∗ 2.461∗∗ −1.497 −1.308 −0.075 2.112∗∗ 2.590∗∗∗
34 Marin/Sonoma −1.816∗ −1.204 −0.192 1.751∗ 2.425∗∗ −1.959∗ −1.633 −0.505 2.062∗∗ 2.433∗∗202
5.2. Control Tests
The results suggested the core model effectively estimates expected rent based on
the comparables. However, I wanted to be sure that the results were not the result
of averaging over a large N. To test this, I ran a control set.
The control parameters matched the subject building to a building that was at
least 10 size categories larger; there were 20 total categories per market. In general,
larger buildings tend to command higher rents. The model used the less stringent
matching criteria where applicable. If the model was working efficiently, it should
reject the null consistently for the Basic RHAT, or unadjusted sample. The results
are shown in Table 20.
The control tests showed that, in most markets, the null was consistently rejected.
The expected rent exceeded the observed rent, as one would expect for the purposely
mis-matched buildings.
The Hedonic RHAT, or adjusted model, should significantly compensate for the
size differential through the hedonic coefficient adjustments. Again, the results con-
firmed that the hedonic adjustments were effectively matching expected rents to ob-
served rents. Certainly, the model performed worse than in properly matched sets,
but that was expected. The results did indicate that the adjustments were helping
the matching process.
One critical finding in the control tests was that purposeful mismatching could
identify market differences. This finding opens the door for future researchers to
investigate potential market inefficiencies or premiums through this method.
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Table 20: This table shows the distribution of T-statistics from 200 random draws of 5% of each market for the Control
Sample. Properties were matched to properties that were 10 (of 20 total) categories higher in size. Basic RHAT, or the
unadjusted matches and Hedonic RHAT, or the adjusted by hedonic coefficients, matches are shown. Significant coefficients are
shown in Table 8. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Basic RHAT Hedonic RHAT
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
2606 Chicago −2.982∗∗∗ −2.667∗∗∗ −1.379 −0.360 0.094 −0.307 −0.512 0.946 2.335∗∗ 2.878∗∗∗
2455 Washington DC −7.051∗∗∗ −6.497∗∗∗ −4.954∗∗∗ −3.402∗∗∗ −2.831∗∗∗ 1.612 2.192∗∗ 3.729∗∗∗ 5.370∗∗∗ 6.037∗∗∗
2447 Los Angeles −4.752∗∗∗ −4.074∗∗∗ −2.678∗∗∗ −1.142 −0.902 −1.777∗ −1.462 0.021 1.352 1.652∗
1945 South Florida −3.618∗∗∗ −3.156∗∗∗ −1.897∗ −0.624 −0.217 −1.698∗ −1.055 0.314 1.611 1.983∗∗
1846 Dallas/Ft Worth −4.662∗∗∗ −4.398∗∗∗ −3.189∗∗∗ −1.849∗ −1.521 −2.683∗∗∗ −2.298∗∗ −0.986 0.168 0.493
1742 Atlanta −5.326∗∗∗ −4.736∗∗∗ −3.400∗∗∗ −2.066∗∗ −1.734∗ −1.514 −0.946 0.485 2.014∗∗ 2.249∗∗
1723 Northern New Jersey −3.821∗∗∗ −3.341∗∗∗ −1.874∗ −0.560 −0.160 −1.704∗ −1.165 0.192 1.645 1.985∗∗
1661 Philadelphia −1.895∗ −1.489 −0.279 1.216 1.546 −0.985 −0.558 0.631 2.009∗∗ 2.361∗∗
1471 Phoenix −5.438∗∗∗ −4.693∗∗∗ −3.368∗∗∗ −2.192∗∗ −1.602 −2.290∗∗ −1.938∗ −0.618 0.749 1.109
1415 Orange (California) −3.111∗∗∗ −2.587∗∗∗ −1.253 0.107 0.373 −1.855∗ −1.443 −0.137 1.361 1.710∗
1386 Boston −2.964∗∗∗ −2.567∗∗ −1.155 0.091 0.457 −1.281 −0.889 0.491 1.668∗ 2.030∗∗
1323 Houston −5.393∗∗∗ −4.757∗∗∗ −3.095∗∗∗ −1.516 −1.232 −1.782∗ −1.640 −0.280 0.982 1.253
1300 Detroit −3.484∗∗∗ −3.059∗∗∗ −1.921∗ −0.535 −0.194 −1.750∗ −1.483 −0.320 0.996 1.266
1187 Seattle/Puget Sound −4.231∗∗∗ −3.652∗∗∗ −2.206∗∗ −0.815 −0.251 −1.564 −1.204 0.125 1.358 1.955∗
1177 Denver −5.866∗∗∗ −4.957∗∗∗ −3.313∗∗∗ −1.815∗ −1.375 −2.287∗∗ −1.983∗∗ −0.595 0.671 1.172
1009 Minneapolis/St Paul −2.077∗∗ −1.590 −0.350 0.943 1.411 −2.142∗∗ −1.680∗ −0.330 0.858 1.333
983 San Diego −6.133∗∗∗ −5.746∗∗∗ −3.731∗∗∗ −2.289∗∗ −1.853∗ −2.238∗∗ −1.786∗ −0.530 0.725 1.109
881 ’St. Louis’ −3.476∗∗∗ −3.062∗∗∗ −1.685∗ −0.391 −0.084 −1.128 −0.618 0.614 1.886∗ 2.347∗∗
876 Sacramento −2.491∗∗ −2.041∗∗ −0.823 0.507 1.103 −1.977∗∗ −1.649∗ −0.361 0.962 1.353
867 Long Island (New York) −3.091∗∗∗ −2.565∗∗ −0.920 0.361 0.571 −0.891 −0.516 0.822 2.278∗∗ 2.491∗∗
804 Kansas City −3.153∗∗∗ −2.825∗∗∗ −1.700∗ −0.411 0.142 −1.113 −0.623 0.495 2.198∗∗ 2.592∗∗∗
801 Inland Empire (California) −3.945∗∗∗ −3.553∗∗∗ −1.974∗∗ −0.567 −0.162 −1.863∗ −1.541 −0.293 1.228 1.625
785 Baltimore −5.441∗∗∗ −4.598∗∗∗ −3.143∗∗∗ −1.452 −1.210 −1.956∗ −1.641 −0.121 1.177 1.768∗
777 New York City −3.058∗∗∗ −2.392∗∗ −0.495 0.798 1.121 −3.638∗∗∗ −3.106∗∗∗ −1.122 0.340 0.700
769 Tampa/St Petersburg −5.487∗∗∗ −4.693∗∗∗ −2.770∗∗∗ −1.422 −1.009 −0.805 −0.619 1.044 2.899∗∗∗ 3.393∗∗∗
714 Portland −3.262∗∗∗ −2.915∗∗∗ −1.244 0.131 0.456 −1.477 −1.112 0.241 1.586 2.178∗∗
689 Columbus −2.194∗∗ −1.928∗ −0.829 0.273 0.518 −1.155 −0.869 0.412 1.772∗ 2.016∗∗
689 Las Vegas −4.825∗∗∗ −4.277∗∗∗ −2.564∗∗ −1.182 −0.859 −1.714∗ −1.139 0.124 1.650∗ 2.098∗∗
676 East Bay/Oakland −3.775∗∗∗ −3.427∗∗∗ −1.936∗ −0.341 0.154 −2.425∗∗ −1.924∗ −0.618 0.867 1.268
652 Cleveland −3.355∗∗∗ −2.799∗∗∗ −1.312 0.015 0.598 −1.556 −1.166 0.518 1.875∗ 2.399∗∗
651 Charlotte −3.351∗∗∗ −2.873∗∗∗ −1.436 −0.180 0.242 −1.593 −1.300 −0.010 1.503 1.821∗
642 Cincinnati/Dayton −2.503∗∗ −2.108∗∗ −0.860 0.271 0.635 −1.054 −0.675 0.789 2.494∗∗ 3.242∗∗∗
620 Indianapolis −3.197∗∗∗ −3.053∗∗∗ −1.419 −0.044 0.289 −1.503 −1.062 0.342 1.859∗ 2.338∗∗
617 South Bay/San Jose −2.861∗∗∗ −2.256∗∗ −0.757 0.480 0.734 −3.069∗∗∗ −2.595∗∗∗ −1.018 0.350 0.658
*Small sample issues possible below 600 N
598 Orlando −4.381∗∗∗ −3.720∗∗∗ −1.949∗ −0.703 −0.300 −1.115 −0.724 0.354 2.348∗∗ 2.895∗∗∗
569 Milwaukee/Madison −1.385 −1.043 0.306 1.835∗ 2.419∗∗ −1.222 −0.736 0.360 1.881∗ 2.493∗∗
continued on the next page
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Basic RHAT Hedonic RHAT
marketn marketname 5th 10th Median 90th 95th 5th 10th Median 90th 95th
567 Pittsburgh −4.825∗∗∗ −3.782∗∗∗ −2.127∗∗ −0.687 −0.349 −1.780∗ −1.064 0.360 1.690∗ 2.288∗∗
560 Austin −2.992∗∗∗ −2.351∗∗ −0.913 0.282 0.962 −1.865∗ −1.110 0.021 1.637 2.260∗∗
538 San Francisco −4.559∗∗∗ −4.175∗∗∗ −1.951∗ −0.617 −0.301 −2.037∗∗ −1.646∗ −0.141 1.135 1.657∗
519 Raleigh/Durham −4.779∗∗∗ −4.260∗∗∗ −2.696∗∗∗ −1.345 −0.858 −2.109∗∗ −1.691∗ −0.306 1.257 1.751∗
448 Nashville −8.893∗∗∗ −6.010∗∗∗ −2.738∗∗∗ −0.661 −0.290 −2.165∗∗ −1.252 0.317 2.339∗∗ 3.021∗∗∗
444 San Antonio −5.911∗∗∗ −4.927∗∗∗ −2.976∗∗∗ −1.683∗ −1.263 −2.166∗∗ −1.570 −0.514 1.167 1.509
430 Hampton Roads −3.443∗∗∗ −3.187∗∗∗ −1.753∗ −0.306 0.126 −1.531 −1.329 0.060 1.896∗ 2.443∗∗
423 Salt Lake City −5.644∗∗∗ −4.826∗∗∗ −2.924∗∗∗ −1.509 −1.077 −2.731∗∗∗ −1.865∗ −0.693 0.798 1.113
397 Jacksonville (Florida) −4.898∗∗∗ −3.309∗∗∗ −0.921 0.313 0.722 −2.208∗∗ −1.685∗ −0.294 1.324 1.732∗
384 Hartford −5.004∗∗∗ −3.926∗∗∗ −1.770∗ −0.255 0.071 −3.260∗∗∗ −2.579∗∗∗ −0.498 1.175 1.769∗
355 Richmond VA −5.364∗∗∗ −3.962∗∗∗ −2.392∗∗ −1.231 −0.909 −1.728∗ −1.223 0.017 1.668∗ 2.240∗∗
331 Louisville −8.259∗∗∗ −6.592∗∗∗ −2.720∗∗∗ −1.224 −0.857 −1.801∗ −1.365 −0.185 1.472 2.034∗∗
319 Westchester/So Connecticut −7.761∗∗∗ −5.078∗∗∗ −1.876∗ −0.270 0.216 −2.330∗∗ −1.555 0.117 2.173∗∗ 3.654∗∗∗
304 Birmingham −5.643∗∗∗ −4.276∗∗∗ −1.719∗ −0.187 0.241 −2.811∗∗∗ −1.972∗∗ −0.097 1.218 1.764∗
277 Memphis −5.407∗∗∗ −3.917∗∗∗ −1.913∗ −0.606 0.021 −1.200 −0.930 0.606 2.497∗∗ 3.909∗∗∗
269 Oklahoma City −4.338∗∗∗ −3.361∗∗∗ −0.768 0.510 1.075 −1.649∗ −1.341 0.018 2.269∗∗ 3.441∗∗∗
257 Providence −3.745∗∗∗ −3.359∗∗∗ −1.193 0.216 0.775 −1.838∗ −1.308 0.208 2.628∗∗∗ 3.859∗∗∗
242 New Orleans/Metairie/Kenner −9.569∗∗∗ −7.179∗∗∗ −2.482∗∗ −0.493 −0.346 −2.447∗∗ −1.766∗ −0.310 1.874∗ 2.511∗∗
188 Buffalo/Niagara Falls −4.266∗∗∗ −2.417∗∗ −0.434 1.598 2.406∗∗ −4.801∗∗∗ −2.684∗∗∗ −0.240 1.374 2.079∗∗
128 Marin/Sonoma −6.226∗∗∗ −4.624∗∗∗ −1.579 −0.014 0.301 −4.416∗∗∗ −2.374∗∗ 0.213 1.503 2.553∗∗205
6. Conclusion
This paper presented a theoretical basis for the use of alternative real estate
estimation models to pure hedonic regressions. Several articles in the extant literature
(Bowden, 1992; Ekeland et al., 2002; Epple, 1987; Malpezzi, 2002) have outlined
potential flaws in hedonic regression. When exploring national data sets, the use
of linear adjustments may not effectively capture market by market complexities.
Dummy variable may become inconsistent through the incidental parameter issues
(Baltagi and Kao, 2001). Also, national regressions impose supply and demand factors
across markets, when the extant literature clearly demonstrated market by market
differences (Chichernea et al., 2008).
This article presented one of the first alternative models for real estate value and
baseline normal return estimations in the literature. The empirical results demon-
strated consistent application of the theoretical model to real life data. The first
model was a basic matching model, based on the grid method. The automated al-
gorithm selected 3-10 comparable properties, and estimated an expected rent. The
second model, hedonic matching, built upon the first; it used hedonic regression co-
efficients from the subject market to adjust the expected rent calculations based on
the attribute differences of the subject and comparable properties.
The theoretical model presented was an objective, repeatable method using match-
ing with the CoStar database. The core models demonstrated consistent failure to
reject the null hypothesis of no difference between expected and observed rent in the
10th and 90th percentile tails of the distribution. Strongest performance was observed
in larger markets, with more comparables from which to select.
Two version of the model were tested, and the results from nearly 20 Million it-
erations of the model were shown. The null hypothesis of no difference in rent from
Hypotheses 1 and 2 was consistently rejected in the tails of the 500 test distributions.
The Hedonic RHAT model, which adjusted the expected rent using the hedonic coef-
ficients as the adjustment parameters effectively estimated expected rent. The Basic
RHAT model, which selected comparables and averaged their rent to estimated ex-
pected rent, performed with similar efficiency.
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In addition, tests of a holdback sample indicated that the model was not fit to the
data, and suggested flexibility and adaptability of the model to other data sets. While
this was designed for use with the CoStar database, the model could be easily adapted
to other national CRE databases as they may become available to researchers.
A control model was also examined, and the control confirmed two key compo-
nents of the model’s efficacy. The Basic RHAT, or unadjusted model, showed that
purposeful mismatching could identify market differences. This critical finding showed
that the model could be used to identify potential market inefficiencies or premiums
through that method. Also, the Hedonic RHAT, or adjusted model, showed rela-
tive robustness to purposeful mismatching. It performed adjustments to significantly
improve expected rent calculations.
Like any new normative model, the author recognizes that future research could
further improve its performance. The author invites other scholars to continue im-
proving upon the strong foundation laid out here12. In addition, to academic oppor-
tunities, the further refinement of this model into practitioner based application is a
real opportunity. Practitioners may benefit from the use of hedonic adjustments over
subjective ones.
New research opportunities stemming from this paper are abundant. In addition
to the further refinement of the model, confirmation or rejection of a wide range
of prior findings can be tested using this method. Differences in size, stories, view
premiums, or other building attributes could be purposefully mismatched to identify
premiums.
Another potential research avenue is a detailed comparison of stand-alone hedonic
regression to matching in a constructed data set.
Increased data availability for real estate researchers may represent the beginning
of new age in real estate research. No longer confined to private, one-off data sets,
researchers can now begin to investigate the best way to research. Alternative research
methods may open the door to a host of fresh findings, and new ideas in the field.
12Base code is available from the author by request to qualified researchers.
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It is the author’s hope that this articles represents merely the start of a new age in
empirical real estate research.
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Conclusion
Managing Well by Managing Good represents the first evidence that some of the
Sustainable Real Estate rent premiums, specifically Energy Star and Dual building
premiums, previously shown in the literature were neither theoretically or empirically
supported. A fundamental mismatch in financial motivation based on lease structure
summarizes the key theoretical argument against Energy Star rental premiums.. The
bulk of ESTAR leases, 61%, were FSG compared to only 14% NNN. In a FSG lease,
the tenant receives no benefit from reduced operating expenses. since energy savings
ultimately go to the building owner, renters have no incentive to overpay. Essentially,
a commercial broker would be saying to their tenant client, ”I know this building cost
more to rent, but you’re saving the building owner energy costs!”
The paper showed that perhaps Energy Star premiums where actually capturing
superior management skill rather than sustainability premiums. Professional owner-
ship was found to be significant, and in most regressions it dominated the ESTAR
premium.
I presented arguments that the use of OLSDV regression with too many dummy
variables can potentially lead to inconsistent dummy variable estimations (Baltagi
and Kao, 2001). Furthermore, the use of a single linear adjustment to the dependent
variable likely fails to adequately capture the market by market complexities of the
data. The use of fixed effects and a within transformation of each variable with
market fixed effects led to more consistent and reliable building attribute values.
Rental findings first found, similar to the extant literature using OLSDV regres-
sion, statistically significant ESTAR and Dual premiums. However, using the better
suited fixed effects method, the ESTAR and Dual premiums were no longer statisti-
cally significant. The Prof Owner variable remained significant regardless of method.
Sales data findings were consistent with the extant literature.
Further investigating the reasoning behind the different findings of OLSDV and
fixed effects, I explored the effect of individual markets. I showed through market
by market regression that potential green building premiums may be localized, but
no evidence suggesting a national premium was found. In fact, some of the markets
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even showed negative premiums.
This paper also demonstrated the dramatic effect a couple of markets can have
when using OLSDV. By removing just New York City and San Jose from the re-
gression, which did not disproportionately effect the green building N, the ESTAR
premiums disappeared with Prof Owner controls. The fact the removal of a mere 2
out of 56 markets alters the statistical significance of the variable of interest raised
serious questions as to both the power of the extant findings, and the reliability of
OLSDV as an estimation technique for this data set.
Strong evidence for the linkage between professional ownership and rent was pre-
sented. The results suggested that ESTAR and Dual buildings were roughly 4.5 times
more likely to be Professionally Owned than not. Through logistics regression on the
sales data, I demonstrated that professional buyers have an increased appetite for
green buildings. Professional buyers were 2 to 3 times more likely to purchase a green
buildings, but no correlation was found to sell a green buildings.
Finally, robustness tests in the form of non-parametric and Heckman tests for
endogeneity further confirmed the paper’s conclusions.
The findings in this paper counter much of the extant literature regarding sus-
tainable real estate premiums. The exploration of alternate estimation techniques
such as fixed effects, the inclusion of potentially missing variables like professional
ownership, and the detailed exploration of market by market effects represent not
only new contributions to the literature, but starting points for continued research.
Size Does Matter presented arguments that real estate portfolios should be exam-
ined from an economic perspective in addition to an equal weight. Failure to consider
these factors could lead to economically unjustified findings and econometrically bi-
ased results. Real Estate investments require capital, as do any financial investments,
and returns should be examined from a value weighted perspective.
The paper showed that the assumption of equal weights may lead to biased results
when estimating market premiums. At a minimum the paper findings argue that
examining both equal and value weight portfolios is a critical step..
The finding in this article also strongly supported the presence of a professional
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management premium, and the possibility that professional management represents
the agent of sustainability premiums. These results showing ownership rental premi-
ums across size categories support and are consistent with the findings in
Managing Well by Managing Good.
The results from the empirical tests demonstrated clear patterns in the distribution
of ESTAR rental premiums. Premiums were driven by smaller buildings, while the
larger buildings provided no evidence of sustainability premiums. Since nearly half of
the buildings over 225,000 SF achieved some level of green designation, perhaps the
green designation is becoming more of an expectation in that segment. In addition,
the findings here of 4% to 5% premiums for only the smallest ESTAR buildings are
economically realistic.
Similar to the rental database, the largest building sales regressions showed that
ESTAR held no premiums for the largest buildings. The economic impact clearly
shows in the sales premiums. An investment choice to purchase a $100 Million dollar
buildings represents a drastically different choice than to purchase 10 unique $10
Million dollar buildings. In fact, weighting by price had dramatic effect in most of
the size categories. While some sustainability premiums were found, the economic
impact of those was less for the smaller size categories.
Only LEED stand-alone buildings seemed to hold cross all size categories.
The quantile regression results confirmed this pattern; they clearly showed varia-
tions along the conditional means. Each of the premiums shown by the sustainability
categories tailed off at the upper end of their distributions. Not only does the quan-
tile regression support the findings that stratified size and economic attributes effect
premium analysis, but they raise questions regarding the overall viability of OLSDV
regression as an efficient tool to research a broad swath of buildings. OLSDV assumes
some level of consistent variance around the mean, but as conditional distributions
vary, the reliability of those estimators was called into question.
This paper provided evidence that potential market premiums, at least specific to
green premiums, were size and/or price dependent. It demonstrated clear evidence
that value weighting alters regression results in real estate sales portfolios.
214
A New Paradigm presented a theoretical basis for the use of alternative real estate
estimation models to pure hedonic regressions. It showed that national regressions
impose supply and demand factors across markets, while the extant literature clearly
demonstrated market by market differences.
This article presented one of the first alternative models for real estate value and
baseline normal return estimations in the literature. The empirical results demon-
strated consistent application of the theoretical model to real life data. The first
model was a basic matching model, based on the grid method. The automated al-
gorithm selected 3-10 comparable properties, and estimated an expected rent. The
second model, hedonic matching, built upon the first; it used hedonic regression co-
efficients from the subject market to adjust the expected rent calculations based on
the attribute differences of the subject and comparable properties.
The theoretical model presented was an objective, repeatable method using match-
ing with the CoStar database. The core models demonstrated consistent failure to
reject the null hypothesis of no difference between expected and observed rent in the
10th and 90th percentile tails of the distribution. Strongest performance was observed
in larger markets, with more comparables from which to select.
The null hypothesis of no difference in rent was consistently rejected in the tails of
the 500 test distributions. The Hedonic RHAT model, which adjusted the expected
rent using the hedonic coefficients as the adjustment parameters effectively estimated
expected rent. The Basic RHAT model, which selected comparables and averaged
their rent to estimated expected rent, performed with similar efficiency.
Holdback and control model test also supported and confirmed the model’s effi-
cacy.
Increased data availability for real estate researchers may represent the beginning
of new age in real estate research. No longer confined to private, one-off data sets,
researchers can now begin to investigate the best way to research. Alternative research
methods may open the door to a host of fresh findings, and new ideas in the field.
It is the author’s hope that this articles represents merely the start of a new age in
empirical real estate research.
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